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Last March, the author of this article was sitting at the Everest Cafe; in Kathmandu, talking to one of Nepal's very senior journalists, amidst subsequent waves of pro-monarchy protests that had engulfed the country in recent months. In casual conversation, the journalist mentioned the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and its dwindling fortunes under Oli’s Prime Ministerial regime. Cut to the present times, Nepal has given one of the most historic mandates to the RSP since the inception of democracy in the country: for the first time in the hill country, any party has gotten an absolute majority in a very difficult representation system, and just two seats short of a two-thirds supermajority. The election has also been historic for the Prime Ministerial candidate from RSP, Balendra Shah, and Kathmandu’s ex-mayor, who became the first Madhesi person to sit in the Prime Minister's chair.  Born out of chaos, post-Gen-Z protests occurred in September 2025, Nepal’s unelected government, led by former chief justice Sushila Karki, has also done an impressive job of delivering elections in the earlier decided timeline, unlike in Bangladesh. In the volatile neighborhood, elections and the return of stable democracy are obviously a sigh of relief for New Delhi. Nevertheless, in Nepal, the winners are new to foreign policy and diplomacy, and their implications will be important to unpack from Delhi’s side.  Since the inception of the democratic movement in Nepal with the establishment of the Nepal Congress in 1950, India has been supportive of it. At times, future prominent leaders of Nepal have studied in Indian Universities and then returned home with a strong democratic enthusiasm. During the monarchy’s time, when these leaders faced persecution, they took shelter in India. During the civil war, India played a critical role in bringing the mainstream political parties and the Maoist rebels together, culminating in the 12-point understanding in Delhi (2005) and the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. After the end of the bloody civil war in Nepal and the agreement between all parties to abolish the monarchy, it pushed for an inclusive constitution that addressed the rights of the Madhesi people in the Terai region. 2015 marked a critical juncture in India-Nepal relations, when the Madhesi agitation over Nepal’s constitution drew India into the fray. Since then, India-Nepal relations have been driven more by a sectoral, compartmentalised approach than by a holistic one. The situation has been complicated by political instability and the musical chairs of politics among three main political parties: Nepal Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (UML), and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). To even complicate matters, the head of CPN UML and 2015 Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s populist anti-India rhetoric surely helped him win the elections, but ruptured India-Nepal relations. At the same time, Nepal's joining the Belt and Road Initiative also alerted India. Nevertheless, the political instability has undermined many good diplomatic efforts on both sides and fuelled each other’s insecurities time and again. It also needs to be mentioned here that to err is human, and humans run states and diplomacy. So, between neighbours in the future as well, there will be issues that may feel contentious, but both sides need to understand that making a populist political rhetoric out of it will not help. Shishir Khanal in one interview has also clearly mentioned that his party will try to find diplomatic solutions to the contentious issues rather than making it an overt political confrontation, which is a very welcoming step.  It is also critical here to mention that for Balendra and RSP, this is going to be a difficult time geopolitically beyond the neighborhood, given the war in West Asia, and a significant chunk of the diaspora of both India and Nepal works there in different sector will surely ask leaders to work together in the tough times.  The mandate for the RSP is a sign of a generational change in Nepal's politics. It shows that the people want to move on from the cycles of instability and political rhetoric that have defined the country's recent past. India should see this change as less of a strategic puzzle and more of a chance to fix a relationship that has been strong in the past but has been strained by political mistakes on both sides. A leadership that is new to foreign policy may also be less rigid in its ideas about diplomacy, which could make it easier to deal with difficult issues in a more practical way. For Kathmandu, governing with such a strong mandate will also mean finding a balance between what people want and what is possible given the geography and the fact that the economy is linked to other countries. India is still Nepal's most important trading partner, and Nepal's political stability is just as important for India's own neighborhood policy.  In this situation, the new government's success will depend in part on how well it can keep working with New Delhi while also working on its own reform agenda. If both sides stay away from populist language and focus on steady diplomatic talks instead, the current political change in Nepal could quietly mark the start of a more stable and mature phase in India–Nepal relations. *Harsh Pandey is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, He is also a Life member of Delhi Based International Centre for Peace Studies.