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That Bipin Joshi’s fate was an excruciating personal affront and experience culminating in an unimaginable denouement is unquestionable. His family’s natural concern ending in Bipin’s untimely demise is likewise heartbreaking. My sincere condolences and prayers to them all!

Yet, as tragic as Bipin’s passing is, and as troubling as successive governance of Nepal has been, one ought not—I would even say one cannot—ascribe all blame on the government, the nation, or diplomacy per se, as some writers have done. But I am not blaming them: this has been a flaming, contentious, protracted and emotional issue which—nonetheless-should be cautious with any criticisms.

The external affairs ministry of each citizen’s home country has the prime responsibility to find the right connections and to employ the appropriate mechanisms to seek release of particular hostages. And--whether we like it or not—some countries have more clout than others as a result of experience, connections, funding, effort and cultural insights.
The Government of Nepal’s situation and efforts should be understood in proper context: not as an excuse, rather as the reality within a Gordian Knot of expectations.

Specifically, as can be expected, the government faced emotional entreaties by immediate family as well as supporters and broader public. Diverse levels of ministerial and bureaucratic experience and competence vis à vis hostage negotiation within a highly vicious environment confronted government, demanding:

• Focused ability to deal with unexpected events emanating from official international relationships and practices.
• Focused reliance on personal, sustained propinquity with similar level authorities in all countries which may host Nepali students and workers.
• Ability to directly deal with extreme conflict scenarios, combined with a willingness to search for, enlist and learn from knowledgeable and suitable experts from outside the government. Naturally, there must already be an a priori vetted list of suitable people, though additional focused specialists may also be called on.
• Intense ethnocultural and religious insights.

In this specific circumstance, it was incumbent on the government, i.e. relevant Minister, Ambassador, allied diplomats and related experts, to have sought connections in other countries which have communication with Hamas, while recognising that Gaza also has other militant groups (i.e. Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Astal Militia; Abu Shabab militia) with whom few countries can claim communication. Twelve other countries also had their citizens killed, injured or abducted; and some were better prepared to undertake presumably lengthy efforts to retrieve their nationals.

Diplomacy within such an egregious, volatile conflict can be extremely complicated. Unrelenting internal pressure within Israel to get its own hostages out first is an unenviable but necessary focus by its government. Thus, the context was complex, tragic, and heartbreaking; as of now, it still remains unstable.
Some countries have had much more intensive and/or longer-term collaboration with Israel than others, with several being more strident in their efforts.
Whoever may have been officially involved in seeking the release of Nepalis was therefore up against any combination of:

• Parties at war prioritising their own when seeking release of hostages or prisoners.
• Realisation that, at best, only a few might be released at any one time.
• Closer relationships with Israel by some other nations, with some exerting extreme pressure that only their status, relational longevity and skills could support.

Few negotiations, if any, have been straight forward, and encompassed some combination of:

• Dealing directly with Israel
• Dealing directly with another country that had better connections with and/or within Israel
• Dealing directly with another country that had connections with Hamas (e.g. USA and Qatar. Thailand also had official talks with Hamas by a group coordinated by parliamentary speaker Wan Muhamad Noor Matha. The group conveyed to Hamas that the citizens were not party to the conflict, but instead part of the around 30,000 Thai laborers who work in the Israeli agriculture sectors. While some had been captured, about 39 were killed in the attacks and about 8,600 repatriated to Thailand). It should be noted that Wan Noor, being an Islamic scholar, may have had advantages. How many other countries’ representatives had thought of having a Muslim expert on their team?
• Dealing directly with Hamas.

Most difficulties actually arise once the preceding is determined, i.e. the (or an) appropriate intermediary or direct contact group is verified. That aspect confirmed, priorities become development of trust via a patient, step by step process of considerable preparation. A snippet of this (Infinity Loop for Optimising Development of Empathy) was outlined in the 1993 updated edition of my book “Fancy Footwork: Entrapment in and Coping with the Nepali Management Model” (Ratna Pustak Bhandar; Kathmandu). Most importantly, this is not a one-day process, rather an iterative effort, building upon hours and days of calm exchanges, slowly evolving trust by building mutual rapport and understanding of each other’s perspective.

Some have suggested that one's religion prevented the ‘Western world’ from caring about a Hindu captive. Such a perspective is unfair, as there were hostages from 13 countries and many—of various religions—died in custody, let alone in the Oct 7 attack at Be’eri. Finding avenues for obtaining release of any hostage is, and has been, a very complex affair.

Other criticism exists regarding allowing students to travel and work in conflict-prone areas instead of prioritizing citizens’ safety. In this sense, Israel has actually provided many Nepalis with earning and learning opportunities whilst engaged in normally safe and useful work. Over 30 years ago Israel had established a highly securitized border which, while having proved to have been exceptionally effective, unfortunately became lax; and the IDF admitted to gross human errors by neglecting intelligence reports. Immediately after the incursion, Israel evacuated 200,000 people from border areas shared with the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. In this respect, acknowledgement must be afforded to the GoN for having precautionarily flown out from Israel, within 4 days of the incursion, over 300 of its citizens.

But even a few interior areas distant from Gaza—Eilat, Tel Aviv, even Jerusalem—had drone and rocket attacks. Thus the area of the students’ work had remained safe up to Oct 7.

But if such restrictions were to be formalised, how would the government have prevented over 5000 Nepali (mainly construction) contract workers dying in certain Asian countries; and over 70 Nepalis recruited—some surreptitiously—by Russia, dying in the war with Ukraine. How much effort has the government made to stem such enticements to its citizens? What alternatives currently exist to satisfy a decent living for the families of these citizens? Again, while I am not absolving GoN, the complexity of negotiating in a context of extreme violence demands the symbiotic consideration and understanding of the above points.