Submit your Article

Much has changed in South Asia since the 18th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit held in 2014. India-Pakistan tensions, a persistent stumbling block for the regional grouping, have further deteriorated over the years. In May 2025, the two nuclear-armed neighbors even engaged in a brief conflict, further threatening the region’s fragile security and stability. Their relationship is unlikely to improve in the immediate future.

Similarly, India-China relations reached a historic low after the deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020. Although there have been some improvements in recent months, the relationship remains fragile. Nepal-India ties have also experienced fluctuations over the past decade. India imposed a blockade on Nepal in 2015, and another dispute erupted in 2020 over the publication of new political maps. Only in recent years has a semblance of normalcy returned.

India-Bangladesh relations too have seen instability. Ties deteriorated after Bangladesh’s long-time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India in the wake of the student-led movement of 2024, which later evolved into a broader political uprising. India is now facing pressure from Bangladesh’s new ruling forces to repatriate Hasina. Meanwhile, the rise of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami has altered regional dynamics, improving Dhaka’s relationship with Pakistan. The two countries are now working to establish direct sea links between Karachi and Chittagong to boost bilateral trade, raising New Delhi’s eyebrows.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 has further complicated the regional landscape. No South Asian country has formally recognized the regime. As India cautiously improves its contacts with the Taliban, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have grown more hostile. 

Meanwhile, internal political transformations across SAARC member states have weakened earlier commitments to regional cooperation. The GenZ-led political wave in Nepal has, at least temporarily, sidelined traditional parties that had long championed the SAARC process. In Bangladesh, Hasina’s exit has removed one of the region’s strongest advocates of SAARC, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan shows little interest in it. Sri Lanka, still recovering from its recent economic crisis, is slowly returning to normalcy.

A generation of leaders who were once deeply invested in SAARC is now out of power and losing influence. Their successors, with limited grounding in SAARC’s history and purpose, are less inclined to prioritize regional integration.

India remains the central pillar of SAARC. Without India’s willingness and leadership, revival appears unlikely. Over the past decade, India’s global stature has grown significantly, and it is poised to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030. As SAARC has stagnated, India has increasingly promoted BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) as an alternative platform. Although other SAARC members do not view BIMSTEC as a true replacement, they are not in a position to revive SAARC without India’s consent. Yet India continues to fund SAARC institutions even as it publicly blames “one particular country” for obstructing progress.

During this period, China’s influence across South Asia, long considered India’s strategic backyard, has grown considerably. Except for Bhutan, all South Asian countries have signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China, an observer in SAARC, has deepened its engagement amid intensifying US-China rivalry. Both global powers are now vying for influence over smaller South Asian states.

It remains unclear how the US and China view SAARC’s relevance in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. Historically, India has viewed SAARC with suspicion, wary that smaller neighbors might unite to pressure New Delhi or use the platform as a collective bargaining bloc. In the current climate, such concerns may be even stronger. At the same time, South Asian countries increasingly prioritize sub-regional or bilateral cooperation over SAARC-level initiatives. Filling the vacuum created by SAARC’s inactivity, China has been exploring alternative cooperation mechanisms for South Asian states, excluding India. It has already established the China-South Asian Countries Poverty Reduction and Cooperative Development Center in Chongqing. Recently, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar suggested that a trilateral initiative involving Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan could be expanded to include other regional nations.

Despite SAARC’s stagnation, the need for regional cooperation has become more evident than ever. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the region’s vulnerabilities. Political instability has increased fragility across several member states. The US-initiated tariff wars further weakened regional economies. According to the World Bank, intra-regional trade in South Asia accounts for barely five percent of total trade—far below ASEAN’s 25 percent. Greater regional integration might have helped member countries better withstand recent economic shocks.

In Oct 2025, seven prominent economists issued a statement lamenting the absence of serious bilateral or regional trade dialogues in South Asia, despite being the world’s fastest-growing region. They noted that the gap between actual and potential trade continues to widen. More regional trade, they argued, could provide much-needed stability amid global trade volatility and help South Asian economies deepen their integration into global value chains.

Climate change is inflicting catastrophic damage across the region. Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and India have all experienced an alarming rise in floods and landslides in recent years. Sri Lanka’s devastating floods this year caused significant loss of life and property—yet SAARC remained inactive throughout the crisis.

During the early months of Covid-19, there were signs of revived regional engagement. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held talks with SAARC leaders and proposed collective health initiatives. But these efforts soon fizzled out. As the US under Donald Trump cut funding for key priorities such as health, climate, and development, SAARC could have stepped in by creating its own fund, but no substantial action followed.

Today, SAARC continues to fade from relevance, despite limited activities still being carried out by the Secretariat in Kathmandu. Most regional leaders no longer prioritize SAARC, and many have even stopped issuing messages on SAARC Day.

In the years immediately following the 2016 summit postponement, reviving SAARC was still raised in bilateral meetings, particularly by Nepal and Bangladesh. Leaders such as KP Sharma Oli and Sheikh Hasina often urged India to move forward with the summit process. But in recent years, the SAARC agenda has effectively disappeared from bilateral discussions. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan only deepened uncertainty since no South Asian country recognizes the Kabul regime, raising questions about its participation in future summits.

The SAARC Summit is supposed to convene every two years on a rotational basis. The last, the 18th Summit, was held in Kathmandu in Nov 2014. The 19th Summit was scheduled for Pakistan in 2016 but was cancelled after India announced a boycott. As chair, Nepal made several diplomatic attempts to revive the process, but all proved futile. It has now been a full decade since heads of state last gathered under the SAARC banner.

Other SAARC mechanisms have also stalled. The Council of Ministers, the second-highest body, last met formally in Pokhara in 2016. Informal sessions held annually in New York since 1997 have not taken place in recent years due to India-Pakistan tensions and uncertainties around Taliban representation. The Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries last met in March 2016. Only the Programming Committee, led by joint secretaries, continues to meet virtually.

For now, the future of SAARC remains deeply uncertain. The regional environment is not conducive for hosting a summit anytime soon. India’s changing relationships with its neighbors, shifting geopolitical dynamics, and growing political instability across several member states all point to a bleak outlook.

In a major anti-corruption drive, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), a constitutional body mandated to investigate corruption cases, has filed cases against 55 individuals—including five former ministers and ten former government secretaries—for their alleged involvement in corruption during the construction of Pokhara International Airport in western Nepal.

Similarly, cases have been filed against China CAMC Engineering Co. Ltd Chairman Wang Bao and Regional General Manager Shen Cheng for creating the environment of corruption. The company was selected for the airport’s construction. The Chinese side, however, has denied any corruption in the project. This is likely the highest-profile corruption case since the formation of the Sushila Karki-led government, established on the foundation of the GenZ movement, whose principal demand was combating corruption and ensuring good governance.

The airport was inaugurated in January 2023 by then Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the Maoist party. Since then, China has listed the airport under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a claim the Nepal government denies. Since its operation began, the airport has not conducted international, except few charter flights from China, resulting in a huge financial loss. According to Yagya Raj Regmi, Information Officer at the Special Court where the case has been filed, a liability of USD 7,434,345 has been determined against the 55 individuals.

In May this year, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House of Representatives instructed the CIAA to investigate the case. At that time, lawmakers were divided over the report, as some from communist parties defended the Chinese company and questioned the report’s integrity. China CAMC Engineering, the airport’s contractor, publicly criticized the PAC report as being riddled with factual inaccuracies and lacking professional, objective analysis of the project’s implementation. This indicates that the Chinese side is unwilling to accept any allegations of corruption in the airport’s construction.

The initial project cost, estimated at Rs 14 billion, was suspiciously inflated to Rs 22 billion. According to Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) officials, the airport must conduct at least 100 daily domestic flights and 50 weekly international flights to sustain operations. The airport also has to pay USD 3.2 million annually in interest.

On 21 March 2016, China Exim Bank and the Government of Nepal signed a government concessional loan agreement worth RMB 1.37 billion for the Pokhara International Regional Airport Construction Project. According to AidData, a research lab based in Washington, D.C., 25 percent of the loan amount (RMB 355.9 million) was provided interest-free with a 20-year maturity period and a 7-year grace period. The remaining 75 percent of the loan (RMB 1.02 billion) carried a 2 percent interest rate, with the same maturity and grace periods. AidData further reports that Nepal used this loan to on-lend to CAAN at a 5 percent interest rate through a Subsidiary Loan Agreement finalized on 5 June 2016.

The airport’s construction was delayed after China Exim Bank required the creation of a joint escrow account into which CAAN—the project’s executing agency—would deposit income generated from all its airports. CAAN refused, delaying the release of project funds and stalling construction. In 2017, CAAN and China Exim Bank reached a compromise to deposit only the revenues generated by Pokhara International Airport into the escrow account.

It is now certain that Pokhara International Airport cannot repay the loan to the Chinese bank. As a result, some Nepali politicians have begun requesting that China convert 75 percent of the loan into a grant. However, no negotiations have taken place, and China has already rejected the possibility. Former Prime Ministers Pushpa Kamal Dahal and KP Sharma Oli separately urged the Chinese side to convert the loan into a grant, but the request was denied. China side has not reacted yet. 

According to CIAA, although the cost estimate of 145 million US dollars for the construction was approved, contractor company, China CAMC Engineering Co. Ltd., with malicious intent and without reasonable grounds, unnaturally increased the cost estimate in order to obtain unlawful benefits for itself and the other involved defendants. 

The company engaged in collusion and manipulated the competitive process, and before entering further procurement procedures, set an abnormal price and raised the estimate to 286.526 million US dollars. It has been found that China CAMC Engineering Co. Ltd. corresponded with public officials of the public institution with malicious intent to facilitate this increase, said CIAA. 

The unprecedented youth-led protests of Sept 8–9—now popularly referred to as the GenZ movement—have fundamentally reshaped Nepal’s political landscape. What began as a decentralized, internet-driven outcry against a proposed social media ban swiftly grew into a mass uprising that targeted corruption, nepotism, impunity, and elite capture of the state. Although Nepal has witnessed people’s movements before, this was the first time that a digitally coordinated, leaderless, GenZ-dominated mobilization managed to topple a powerful government and force all major political parties into deep introspection.

In the two-day violence altogether 76 people were killed, leaving dozens injured. Yet the broader political consequences were even more far-reaching. The immediate effects of the protests was collapse of coalition government of Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, installation of interim government led by former chief justice Sushila Karki, a legitimacy crisis across traditional parties, leadership struggles and generational tensions with each party, and a renewed debate about intra-party democracy and accountability.

The movement provided a space for second-rung leaders of the major parties to speak up against the monopoly of single leaders inside the party. But, top leaders of the major parties have shown very few or no indication of reflection and accept their past mistakes. 

The GenZ movement also showed that there was a deep frustration among the party rank and file against the leaders, as it has been revealed that even the cadres of NC, UML and Maoist were engaged in the arson and vandalisms of party leaders. It also showed the animosity among local level cadres of the major political parties because some cadres of NC were engaged in the vandalism of private residences of CPN-UML and vice versa. Similarly, cadres of Maoist and Rastriya Swatantra Party also attacked the NC and UML leaders.

Inside the Nepali Congress

The Nepali Congress—the oldest democratic party—found itself at the epicenter of public anger. The shocking assault on Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba and then–Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba at their residence was emblematic of the extent of the public’s fury. Their rescue by the Nepal Army late on Sept 9 evening  and subsequent hospitalization symbolized the spectacular collapse of the NC’s authority. For weeks after the protests, Deuba remained silent, undergoing treatment in Singapore, while the party drifted without direction. 

At a critical moment when President Ram Chandra Paudel was consulting parties to form the new government, NC leaders were conspicuously absent. As a result, the Karki-led interim government was formed without NC’s input, a political setback that exposed the party’s organizational paralysis. 

The first NC leader to publicly address the GenZ protestors was General Secretary Gagan Kumar Thapa, who released a video message recognizing the grievances of the youth. His move reenergized young cadres and strengthened calls for generational change.

Soon after, both general secretaries—Gagan Thapa and Bishwa Prakash Sharma—openly demanded that Deuba relinquish party leadership, asserting that the NC could not regain public trust without internal reform. But, Deuba and his supporters opposed Thapa’s demand of resignation stating that it is morally wrong to attack the party leadership at a difficult time, though there is a very few space of morality in the politics.

Under growing pressure, Deuba named Purna Bahadur Khadka as acting party president before leaving for medical treatment. This gesture, however, did little to calm the situation. Top leaders of the party after Deuba, such as Shanshak Koirala, Bimalendra Nidhi, Krishna Prasad Sitaula, Prakash Man Singh, Prakash Sharan Mahat, Gopal Man Shrestha and Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar, stood against Thapa.

As per NC’s statute, Deuba is no longer eligible to run for the presidency, which means a leadership transition is unavoidable. But the question is who will lead the transition—and when. In the wake of the protests, about 54 percent of general convention representatives signed a petition demanding a special general convention before the March 5 national elections. Their objective was clear: elect a new leadership that resonates with the GenZ wave. But the proposal of a special general convention faced fierce resistance from seven brothers. They argued that holding a convention based on outdated delegate lists would be unfair and politically unsound. Acting President Khadka and senior leader Shekhar Koirala played a neutral role but they were also against Thapa and Sharma. In a way, all top leaders are against the Thapa’s bid to become party president either from special general convention or regular one.

The conflict escalated when Thapa and Sharma, backed by younger leaders and grassroots cadres, threatened to unilaterally convene the convention. This raised the specter of a party split, sending shockwaves through the NC. The party’s indecision lasted nearly two months, during which critics accused the NC of failing to act as the responsible political actors.  Ultimately, the Central Working Committee decided to hold the convention in January, setting off a fierce internal leadership contest. Thapa has announced his candidacy, positioning himself as the face of generational change. The establishment faction is preparing to field Khadka as their candidate. Senior leader Koirala, who previously competed against Deuba, is also gearing up for the presidency.

The outcome remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: The GenZ movement has forced the NC to confront its internal contradictions and prepare for a transformation it long resisted. However, holding the party’s general convention in January is still challenging, as the dispute regarding the active membership still remains unsettled. The process of holding NC’s general convention is one of the democratic processes in South Asia and it is too technical as well which demands a great deal of time to accomplish all tasks. The ‘seven brothers’ are working to find a consensual candidate for the party president who can get the support of Deuba.

Inside the UML: Oli’s struggle to retain control

If the NC suffered from inertia, the CPN-UML suffered from arrogance. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli—widely criticized for undemocratic tendencies—became one of the vocal critiques of the youth movement. He had to be evacuated from Baluwatar by the Nepali Army (NA) only after tendering his resignation. Because NA reportedly told him they can rescue him only if he resigns.  For four days, he was held in an army barracks in Makawanpur with his phone confiscated—an extraordinary development for a sitting prime minister in a democratic state—he spent altogether 10 days in army barracks before being released. Once released, Oli launched a political offensive, accusing the Karki government of being “unconstitutional” and calling for the reinstatement of Parliament. 

The party has filed a writ at the Supreme Court demanding the revival of Parliament. But inside the UML, the mood had shifted dramatically. Senior leaders demanded Oli’s resignation from party leadership, arguing that he should take moral responsibility for the deaths of 19 youths. But Oli refused, stating that the GenZ movement was launched against his party and country and he is not responsible for what happened on Sept 8-9.  To avoid the pressure to step down, he declared he would seek a renewed mandate at the Dec 13–15 General Convention.

Even before the GenZ movement, Oli had amended the party statute to secure a third consecutive term as party chair. He also blocked former President Bidhya Devi Bhandari from rejoining the mother party, fearing she could challenge his dominance. His decision to revoke her membership caused deep resentment among party cadres and senior leaders. The GenZ movement only intensified the internal fractures. For the first time in years, a strong challenger has emerged: Ishwar Pokhrel, backed by former President Bhandari and a coalition of disillusioned senior leaders, has announced his candidacy.

Local-level conventions revealed that nearly 50 percent of organized members abstained from voting, signaling widespread frustration and voter fatigue. UML’s upcoming general convention is now seen as a defining moment: a battle between Oli’s authoritarian grip and a rising internal rebellion. Whether Pokhrel can unite the anti-Oli faction remains uncertain, but the party’s internal cohesion has already been severely damaged. Out of 18 office bearers of the party, more than seven have already openly supported the Pokharel. Among the public, UML’s image has been severely damaged due to the killings of 19 students on Sept 8 when Oli was the prime minister. Now, Ishwor Pokhrel is challenging Oli who has the strong backing of the former President Bhandari.

Inside the Maoist Center: Dahal’s cunning consolidation

The Maoist Center responded differently from the NC and UML. Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal was the first major leader to react positively to the GenZ movement. His quick engagement in consultations for the new government allowed him to position himself as a pragmatic and flexible actor.  

To preempt internal criticism, Dahal dissolved the party’s Central Committee and announced the formation of a Convention Organizing Committee. This allowed him to reset the party structure and eliminate internal dissenting voices. Soon after the protests, senior Maoist leaders Janardhan Sharma and Narayan Kaji Shrestha pressed him to step down. But, Sharma was ultimately forced to leave the party after leaders and cadres who were close with Dahal intimidated him through social media and public forms.

Simultaneously, Dahal began a political outreach campaign, inviting former splinter groups and leaders from the CPN (Unified Socialist) led by Madhav Kumar Nepal. Dahal claims that 15 fringe communist groups have now joined his umbrella structure, the newly proclaimed Nepali Communist Party (NCP)—with Dahal as its convener. But, those parties which had joined the party have a minimum level of people’s support.  Whether this unity is ideological or merely symbolic is yet to be seen, but the move has strengthened Dahal’s control over the left space. 

Despite these consolidations, prominent leaders like Janardan Sharma and Sudan Kirati left the Maoist Centre to join former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai’s new political formation. Their exit underscores the lingering dissatisfaction with Dahal’s long tenure and centralization of authority. Nevertheless, compared to other parties, the Maoists appear the least destabilized—mainly because Dahal has mastered the art of internal crisis management. Unlike NC and CPN-UML, Dahal seemed positive about the GenZ movement. He has also formed a GenZ organization within the party to demonstrate that he fully supports the agenda of the movement. He is attacking Oli for failing to improve himself even after the GenZ movement. Another important development is Pushpa Kamal Dahal has abandoned Maoism because he has agreed to change the name of the party.

Inside the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)

The RSP entered Nepali politics as a fresh alternative to traditional parties, appealing especially to young urban voters. In the 2022 election, it emerged as the fourth largest party in the 275-member House of Representative (HoR), in a surprising victory. But paradoxically, it was one of the parties worst affected by the GenZ movement. Many protesters accused the RSP leadership of opportunism and inconsistency. Similarly, it was found that scores of the party’s cadres at the local level were involved in the arson and vandalism. After the Sept 8 protests, the party’s lawmakers decided to resign en masse from the House of Representative. 

The party’s chair Rabi Lamichhane, who was released from jail during the protests, returned to custody after widespread public criticism. Senior leaders Sumana Shrestha, Santosh Pariyar, and others resigned from the party. RSP hurriedly announced a unification with the Bibeksheel Party, but the move was perceived more as damage control than a strategic coalition. The party’s internal credibility crisis raises questions about whether the RSP can retain the youth support it once enjoyed. At the same time, the party faces a leadership crisis as Lamichhane is in jail. There is a tussle between top leaders of the party.

Inside the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP): Limited impact

The monarchist RPP experienced less disruption compared to the mainstream parties. The party maintained that elections alone cannot solve Nepal’s systemic crisis and called for fundamental political restructuring. A positive outcome of the GenZ movement was that longtime rivals Kamal Thapa and Rajendra Lingden initiated discussions about party unification. Although many challenges remain, both leaders acknowledge that a fragmented right-wing space cannot capitalize on the shifting political mood. Despite uncertainties, the RPP has expressed readiness to participate in upcoming elections.

The dismantle of CPN (Unified Socialist)

The GenZ movement led to the dissolution of the CPN (Unified Socialist) party led by former Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal who had formed the party in 2022, breaking up his ties with CPN-UML Chairperson Oli. A group of leaders led by Madhav Kumar Nepal decided to make party unification with CPN (Maoist Center) with an agreement of forming a new party Nepali Communist Party. However, scores of leaders refused to join Nepali Communist Party. Some leaders including Ram Kumari Jhakri decided to return to their mother party CPN-UML, while senior leaders of Ghana Shyam Bhushal joined hand CPN (Unified) led by veteran communist leader Chandra Dev Joshi.

The GenZ movement has forced Nepal’s political elites to confront realities they long ignored. 

Traditional parties can no longer rely on hierarchical, patronage-based politics. Leaders cannot remain in power indefinitely without facing internal revolts. Youth frustration has reached a breaking point—and will continue to shape political behavior. Political transparency and accountability are now unavoidable demands. Every major party—NC, UML, Maoist Centre, RSP, and RPP—has been compelled to undergo some degree of transformation.

Whether these changes lead to genuine democratic renewal or simply a reshuffling of old elites remains to be seen. But one truth is undeniable: Nepal’s GenZ has entered the political arena, and they are not leaving anytime soon. The GenZ movement has been beneficial for the youth leaders of the major political parties because now they are more vocal than in the past about the need for leadership change. The movement is also likely to force the traditional political parties to provide more space to the youths in the internal party organizations and in the elections. But, except inside the NC, the leadership change is unlikely in the major political parties.

After the GenZ movement, major political parties namely Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center) have not come together. In the past, during the time of crisis, there were traditions of three parties coming together but now they maintain a distance, at least publicly though they are engaged in informal talks. The animosity between Dahal and Oli remains in the political landscape. Dahal is publicly saying that the protest on September 8-9 happened due to the governance failure of Oli, while the latter has blamed Dahal that Maoist party was engaged in the vandalism and arson. Nepali Congress is also maintaining a distance with Oli on the political agenda. Oli tried to convince NC to stand in favor of restoration of Parliament but NC decided to participate in the elections.

New parties, new voters

The GenZ movement has triggered a surge in the registration of new political parties. After the GenZ movement, 25 new parties have been registered. According to the Election Commission, of the 37 applications submitted for party registration after the GenZ movement, 25 new parties had been registered as of this week. Similarly, the number of the political parties participating in the election is also going up. 

In 2022, only 84 political parties had participated in the election but this time more than 120 political parties have expressed their eagerness to participate in the elections. The total number of the political parties registered in the EC has already exceeded 143. Out of the 143 parties registered at the Election Commission, seven parties are led by women. The Election commission has said that the addition of more than 800,000 new voters is encouraging. Before the latest voter registration drive began, there were 18,168,000 voters, and for the upcoming elections, an additional 837,094 voters have now been registered.

The Nepali Congress has once again pulled itself back from the brink. After weeks of infighting over the timing of its General Convention, the party’s rival factions have finally settled on holding the gathering in early January. This compromise has, for now, quieted calls from the dissident camp for a special convention. Still, the truce remains fragile. Lingering disputes over active membership lists and the selection of convention representatives continue to cast doubt on whether the event can proceed as planned.

Against this uncertain backdrop, the leadership race is already underway. With national elections set for March 5, the NC is grappling with a strategic dilemma: should it overhaul its leadership before going to the polls, or wait until after the election to avoid further internal turbulence? The establishment and reformist camps are pulling in opposite directions, and their tug-of-war is shaping the party’s pre-election mood.

Across the aisle, the CPN-UML is moving ahead with preparations for its own national convention, scheduled for Dec 13–15 in Kathmandu. Yet instead of the usual sense of momentum, insiders describe an unexpected fatigue within the party. Local representatives in several districts have shown limited interest in internal elections, raising concerns among senior leaders. Many fear that if the grassroots remain disengaged now, they may not mobilize effectively during the national campaign.

The convention itself is expected to stage a high-stakes showdown between incumbent chair KP Sharma Oli and senior leader Ishwar Pokhrel. Oli maintains that he welcomes democratic competition but warns that a bruising leadership battle could leave the party divided at a critical moment. His preferred path of reaching consensus and avoiding internal bloodshed reflects the anxiety within the party ahead of the March polls.

Meanwhile, one of Nepal’s most popular technocrats is venturing deeper into the political arena. Kul Man Ghising, celebrated for ending load-shedding during his tenure at the Nepal Electricity Authority and now serving as a minister in the Karki-led government, has been crisscrossing the country in what increasingly resembles a shadow political campaign.

Though Ghising holds no formal party post, he is widely perceived as the driving force behind the newly launched Ujyaalo Nepal Party, fronted by former energy secretary Anup Upadhyaya. His appearance as the chief guest at the party’s Dec 4 inauguration has sparked debate about whether a sitting minister should be helping build a political organization. The presence of former Rastriya Swatantra Party MP Sumana Shrestha added to speculation that the party may be attracting disenchanted reformists from across the political spectrum.

On the left, Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s Nepali Communist Party has begun staging large mass meetings nationwide in an effort to project unity and strength after months of defections and organizational stagnation. Despite skepticism from rivals, turnout has been substantial, suggesting that Nepal’s fragmented left may still command an energized base heading into the elections.

Amid this churn, new political outfits continue to emerge almost weekly. As a result, Kathmandu is buzzing with speculation about potential pre-election alliances among them. Many observers believe only a coordinated front can challenge the traditional parties, whose supporters are showing signs of deepening disillusionment. A unified bloc of new parties could reshape the electoral battlefield and force the NC, UML, and the Maoist Centre into a more defensive posture.

Foreign relations are also subtly influencing political conversations. KP Sharma Oli’s decision to attend China’s Victory Day parade in September has left lingering discomfort in Tokyo, where officials had hoped he would decline the invitation given the event’s wartime symbolism. Even so, Japan has continued its development partnership with Nepal without interruption. This year alone, it has signed a ¥2.8bn grant for emergency rehabilitation of the flood-damaged Sindhuli Road and approved a Rs 31bn loan to upgrade the congested Koteshwor intersection. As one senior diplomat put it, “Japan has helped Nepal without strategic strings for decades. Future prime ministers should avoid needless missteps.”

Nepal also received a diplomatic boost this week with the appointment of Lt Gen Ganesh Kumar Shrestha as the new Force Commander of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei. A veteran with 36 years of service, Shrestha has led major divisions within the Nepali Army and served as Sector Commander in UNMISS, further reinforcing Nepal’s reputation as a committed peacekeeping nation.

Back home, negotiations between the government and the GenZ protest groups, whose nationwide demonstrations in September shook the political establishment, have stalled. More than 50 youth groups have submitted demands centered on swift and credible action against corruption. Recent high-profile arrests have raised hopes that the government may finally be allowing state institutions to act without political interference. Whether this represents genuine reform or tactical appeasement remains one of the capital’s most debated questions.

Despite the political noise, the Election Commission has begun setting up offices across the country in preparation for the March 5 polls. The government is reportedly preparing to recommend several electoral reforms to President Ram Chandra Poudel, including the introduction of a “None of the Above” (NOTA) option on the ballot—a proposal gaining support amid widespread frustration with political elites.

Yet major parties appear more preoccupied with internal disputes than with election readiness. A new theory circulating in Kathmandu suggests the government may even consider postponing the polls to give newly formed parties more breathing room. However, President Poudel is said to be pushing firmly for elections to proceed on schedule, warning that any delay could trigger a constitutional crisis.

Since the formation of the Sushila Karki–led government following  Sept 8–9 protests, there has been minimal engagement between Kathmandu and Beijing. In the aftermath of the GenZ protests, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chen Song met Prime Minister Sushila Karki and other government ministers to convey Beijing’s concerns, but there have been no high-level visits between Kathmandu and Beijing. 

Typically, October, November and December see a high number of visits as part of preparations for the coming year. This time, however, not only have the visits from China declined, but overall Chinese activities have also slowed. A China watcher noted, “Beijing may be in a wait-and-see position as the political developments unfold in Nepal.”

Similarly, Beijing’s viewpoint may be that since the current government cannot take major policy decisions, it is better to wait for the new government to be formed after the elections. According to people familiar with the matter, Beijing has conveyed two messages to Nepal following the GenZ protests. First, what happened on Sept 8–9 and the political course that followed is Nepal’s internal affair. Second, China has strongly raised its security concerns due to the open involvement of some Tibetan groups in those protests.

Over the past decade, China’s political, economic and security influence in Nepal has grown, increasing Beijing’s confidence that any government in power will refrain from jeopardizing its security interests related to Tibetan activities. However, the events of September have renewed Beijing’s worries.

Thus, after the GenZ movement, Beijing is experiencing both confidence and insecurity regarding its security interests. China is now closely monitoring the activities of the Tibetan community as well as broader political developments, including cabinet formation. Beijing believes that there can be no substantial progress on the Belt and Road Initiative under the current government. For this reason, China has adopted a policy of maintaining only a working relationship with the new government, with a special emphasis on security concerns. During this period, several Chinese delegations visited Nepal to study the Genz movement and assess potential challenges to bilateral relations. 

CPN-UML, the second-largest party in the dissolved House of Representatives, is undergoing an intense internal conflict, though it is far less vocal than the turmoil inside the Nepali Congress. Almost all senior leaders believe that Chairman KP Sharma Oli should step down for the sake of the party, arguing that his image has been tarnished by the killing of 19 students during the Sept 8 GenZ protest, when he was prime minister.

While some leaders have openly demanded his resignation, others remain hesitant, fearing that if Oli wins the party leadership next month, they could face the same fate as the many leaders who were sidelined after Oli became the UML chairman in 2015.

Senior leaders such as Ishwar Pokhrel, Surendra Pandey and Astha Laxmi Shakya have publicly stated that Oli should not contest the leadership election. Despite this, Oli is preparing to seek unanimous endorsement as party chair at the general convention scheduled for Dec 13-14 in Kathmandu. Many leaders worry that he could manipulate the process of selecting convention representatives to secure his victory.

In the 2021 convention, Bhim Rawal had challenged Oli, but was ultimately pushed out of UML. Rawal has now joined the Nepali Communist Party formed by former Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Dahal, having dropped the Maoist label, is now working to consolidate fringe communist groups under his leadership. Likewise, after a prolonged rivalry with Oli, Madhav Kumar Nepal split from UML to form his own party, CPN (Unified Socialist). Now he too has joined the Nepal Communist Party.

UML insiders say defeating Oli at the convention remains a herculean task, given his strong organizational grip. To maintain control, Oli even blocked the possible entry of former President Bidya Devi Bhandari by stripping her of party membership without any compelling justification. Bhandari, however, continues to oppose Oli from outside the party and is strongly backing senior leader Ishwar Pokhrel for party chair. Many senior leaders are also gravitating toward Pokhrel, and his faction is expected to restore Bhandari’s membership if they secure the leadership.

At a recent party meeting, Pokhrel informed Oli directly that he intends to run for the UML leadership. He is preparing to issue a public appeal to convention representatives in the coming days. Senior leaders Astha Laxmi Shakya, Yubaraj Gyawali, Surendra Pandey, Yogesh Bhattarai and Gokarna Bista have already rallied behind him. Meanwhile, senior leader Bishnu Poudel, who served as finance minister under Oli, has adopted a neutral stance, remaining silent on the leadership dispute despite his strong organizational influence across the country.

The conflict, however, is not limited to leadership. Many top leaders are dissatisfied with the party’s policy direction following the GenZ movement. They oppose Oli’s decision to form the National Volunteers Force, which they fear could trigger internal confrontations. Despite objections from key office bearers, Oli moved ahead with the plan and began coordinating directly with Mahesh Basnet, bypassing party structures.

These leaders argue the party cannot reject elections outright while focusing solely on restoring Parliament. They believe Oli is inflaming political tensions rather than helping stabilize the national environment, which has led to clashes between UML cadres and GenZ activists. 

Leaders worry that his refusal to acknowledge the concerns of young people could damage the party’s electoral prospects. Several senior leaders say that although the violence on Sept 8–9 was unprecedented, the party must recognize the underlying demands of the youth, particularly the need to curb corruption and improve governance. 

Rejecting the September protests will alienate the youth, one senior official said on condition of anonymity. The leader added that Oli now appears to be using the party’s institutional strength to shield himself from potential action over his role in those events, a move they warn will harm UML in the long run.

With the Nepali Congress already committing to elections, UML finds itself increasingly isolated. The Nepali Communist Party led by Dahal and other fringe parties have also decided to contest the polls on 5 March 2026. 

As the general convention approaches, Oli’s position among office bearers is weakening. Only a handful of senior leaders, including Pradeep Gyawali, Shankar Pokhrel, Bishnu Rimal and Prithvi Subba Gurung, continue to back him strongly, while most others either openly criticize him or support a change in leadership.

Uncertainty over the March 5 national elections looms large, as political parties remain unprepared. According to Prime Minister Sushila Karki, around 65 percent of election-related preparations have been completed. The government is also preparing a comprehensive security plan for the polls. However, concerns persist over whether Nepal Police can effectively maintain security, given its low morale and shortage of arms and ammunition. Defense analysts have ruled out deploying the Nepali Army on the frontline.

Meanwhile, the CPN-UML has taken to the streets in protest against the Karki-led government. The party organized demonstrations across local levels this week and has planned a series of mass protests in Kathmandu. It has refused to participate in elections conducted by the current government, calling it unconstitutional. The UML’s roadmap centers on the restoration of parliament, the formation of an all-party government, and the eventual conduct of early elections.

In contrast, the Nepali Congress remains without a clear and firm position, while the CPN (Maoist Centre) has expressed readiness to go to the polls. The Nepali Army, for its part, has already communicated to all stakeholders that it has no intention of taking over power, warning that such a move would only worsen the country’s political instability.

In the coming days, the focus will be on Nepal’s evolving political roadmap. Possible scenarios include a postponement of elections to April or May while allowing the Karki government to continue, or the formation of a consensus government among major political forces, followed by a new election announcement. Rumors have also surfaced about the possibility of a Chief Justice-led caretaker cabinet, similar to that of the 2013 second Constituent Assembly elections.

Adding to the uncertainty, President Ramchandra Paudel’s next move remains unclear. He had appointed Prime Minister Karki with the mandate to hold elections within six months. However, tensions between the two have reportedly grown after Karki dismissed the President’s proposal to include political party representatives in the cabinet. The President is also said to be dissatisfied with the lack of dialogue between the Prime Minister and political parties, a key prerequisite for holding credible elections.

However, the Election Commission (EC) has been active in engaging political parties to create a conducive environment for the polls. The EC is currently in consultations to finalize the election code of conduct.

Interestingly, not only traditional parties but even new political groups have expressed reluctance to hold elections on March 5, citing inadequate preparation time. Some representatives of the GenZ movement, including Sudan Gurung, have warned that they will not accept elections unless their demands are addressed first. Political observers estimate that it could take at least a year to manage the ongoing transition.

Security tensions also remain high. The Nepal Police has arrested around 500 people across the country for their alleged involvement in arson and vandalism during the Sept 8–9 protests. Critics, however, argue that the protesters should not be criminalized, as the demonstrations were a form of revolt. Earlier, Home Minister Om Prakash Aryal’s directive not to arrest protesters had sparked opposition from Nepal Police’s top brass. Now, Aryal finds himself under fire from both GenZ protestors and political parties.

Within the Nepali Congress, internal disputes over its upcoming general convention remain unresolved. There are growing fears that the party could split if it fails to settle the issue soon. The party has also begun collecting signatures from its lawmakers, a move interpreted as preparation to push for parliament restoration.

Meanwhile, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, now leading the Nepali Communist Party, has emphasized his readiness for elections but remains open to parliament restoration. He has succeeded in bringing 12 fringe communist parties under his fold and has once again become a vocal critic of KP Sharma Oli. In a related development, Bhim Rawal, who had left UML a few years ago, has joined Dahal’s NCP.

The number of political parties registered with the Election Commission has now exceeded 125, with around two dozen new applications under review. Following the GenZ protests, which toppled major political parties from power, a new wave of actors—including businesspeople, independent politicians, celebrities, and others—have shown interest in joining politics. Since the March 5 election announcement, the EC has received 21 new party registration applications.

For comparison, in the 2022 elections, 116 political parties were registered with the commission, though only 87 participated. Many of the new parties believe they can attract public support amid widespread disillusionment with mainstream political forces that have dominated power since 1990.

In other developments, President Paudel has removed Madhesh Province Head Sumitra Subedi and appointed Surendra Labh in her place. Meanwhile, Dan Bahadur Karki has taken charge as Inspector General of Nepal Police, succeeding Chandra Kuber Khapung. The new IGP faces the formidable challenge of boosting police morale and ensuring that the force can provide foolproof election security.

Controversial businessman Durga Prasai is reportedly planning street protests demanding the restoration of the monarchy. The government, however, is considering stopping the demonstrations, arguing they could further destabilize the fragile security environment. Home Minister Aryal has already held preliminary talks with Prasai, who has presented a 27-point list of demands, several of which are considered unrealistic and unconstitutional.

In another political development, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) Chairman Rajendra Lingden and Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal Chairman Kamal Thapa held talks this week to explore party unification. In the aftermath of the GenZ movement, polarization among royalist forces is intensifying, with discussions underway on whether to contest the elections or push for a broader movement.

Additionally, Cabinet Minister Kul Man Ghising has registered a new political party under the leadership of former energy secretary Anup Kumar Upadhyay. However, Home Minister Aryal has said he will not allow Ghising to form a new party. Ghising has faced criticism within the cabinet for his political involvement, with colleagues arguing that since he joined the government to facilitate elections within six months, his engagement in party politics is inappropriate.

Why did the Nepal Army (NA) not take the initiative to protect vital state installations such as the Parliament building, Singha Durbar, the Supreme Court, and the President’s Office? 

Since the violent GenZ protests of Sept 8–9, this question has reverberated from tea stalls to television studios, from ordinary citizens to political leaders and security analysts. And it is a question the Army will likely continue to face for generations.

 At a press conference on Oct 17, more than a month after the unrest, the NA said that Singha Durbar could have been saved only at the cost of significant human casualties, meaning it would have had to open fire on protesters. The Army, which has historically refrained from suppressing popular uprisings, maintained that the Sept 9 chaos was not a peaceful protest but a riot.

 According to Army officers, troops attempted to hold back demonstrators at Singha Durbar’s gates through physical restraint and warning fire. But as mobs surged in from all four directions, the Army acted under what it called the “principle of necessity,” prioritizing human lives over physical infrastructure. In essence, the NA decided not to kill civilians to protect government buildings.

Still, the Army claims it succeeded in safeguarding strategically vital assets. Despite the blaze at Singha Durbar, it says its personnel managed to protect sensitive documents and data servers belonging to the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Finance. Had those systems been destroyed, the state’s financial operations, such as salary payments, transactions, and accounting, could have ground to a halt within days, NA said.  The NA also claims credit for securing Tribhuvan International Airport during the unrest.

Initial media reports suggest that the NA has launched an internal investigation to identify deployment lapses that occurred on September 9 at sensitive and vital installations.

Inside the NA, there appears to be serious reflection underway regarding its failure to protect vital installations. However, publicly, the NA leadership is defending its actions on various grounds.

The questions confronting the Army today are not entirely new. Article 267 of Nepal’s Constitution designates the President as the Supreme Commander of the Army.

This has raised another sensitive issue: why did the Army not take measures to protect its own Commander-in-Chief, as President Ram Chandra Poudel reportedly had to seek temporary shelter elsewhere during the unrest? Public reaction on social media following the Army’s statement suggests deep skepticism. The common perception remains that soldiers stationed at key gates could have either convinced the protesters not to torch the buildings, or, if necessary, used limited force to defend them.

 Another question concerns the Army’s role in controlling the fires. Officials claimed that fire engines were dispatched to critical sites but were obstructed by protesters. According to the NA, by the following day, flames at most government buildings were under control, except at the Hilton Hotel. Chief Justice Prakash Man Singh Rawat, however, stated in an interview that he had to rely on the Lalitpur Municipality’s help to extinguish the blaze at the Supreme Court on the third day of arson.

 The list of questions goes on: Why didn’t the Army provide backup to the Nepal Police in controlling the mobs? Why was there a delay in mobilizing the Army after Prime Minister Oli’s resignation?

 Despite criticism, the Army’s subsequent actions helped stabilize the country. After taking full command of security on Sept 9, the law-and-order situation improved dramatically. At a time when political parties faced public anger, the Army facilitated dialogue between President Poudel and the GenZ protesters. Political leaders across party lines have since praised the NA for helping steer the crisis toward a constitutional resolution.

 Yet controversy lingers over the Army’s decision to confiscate the mobile phones of top political leaders under its protection. Officials justified the move, saying unrestricted communication among party leaders could have derailed the delicate process of forming a new government and deepened the crisis. The phones were returned only after Sushila Karki was sworn in as Prime Minister. Although President Poudel reportedly sought verbal consent from major parties, their actual role in the government formation process was minimal.

Public suspicion toward the Army is not without historical precedent. After the 2001 royal massacre that claimed the lives of King Birendra and his family, the NA repeatedly asserted that security of the royal palace was beyond its jurisdiction. Yet many citizens never accepted that explanation. Even after 25 years, people still ask: why did the Army fail to protect its own supreme commander?

Similarly, when the monarchy was abolished by the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly in 2008, the Army chose to remain silent. Monarchists continue to question why it did not resist the removal of the King.

 This time, however, the stakes are far greater. The questions facing the Army today cut deeper, carrying long-term implications for civilian–military relations and the integrity of the state.

 Despite the wave of criticism, the NA deserves recognition for restoring order and refraining from political intervention at a volatile moment. Rumors of a military takeover or a royal return were rife, but the Army maintained its apolitical character and ultimately acted to safeguard the constitutional framework.

 Still, the questions directed at the NA cannot be answered by the Army alone. They also implicate Nepal’s political leadership and its constitutional arrangements. The coalition government of the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML had the authority to declare a state of emergency or mobilize the Army through the National Security Council, but did not.

 The new government that comes from the March 5 elections must treat these issues with seriousness and urgency. Lessons from the September crisis should inform legal and constitutional reforms to ensure such lapses never recur. What unfolded in Nepal was unprecedented, both in terms of scale and the symbolism it carries.

 Rather than dragging the Army into controversy, political leaders must confront their own failures. The events of Sept 8–9 were not just a breakdown of security; they were a test of Nepal’s entire state apparatus.