KathmanduThe Americans in Nepal can cry themselves hoarse that their Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is neither a ‘military alliance’ nor aimed against ‘any particular country’. But despite their best efforts the IPS will continue to be seen as an anti-China geopolitical strategy. The more vocal they are on the issue, the more the perception will stick that they are being dishonest. This is not without reason though. While the Americans insist on the purity of purpose of the IPS, on the same breath, they also cannot resist warning Nepal not to rely too much on the Belt and Road Initiative, which they see as a ‘debt trap’ for poor countries.
The Chinese understanding of the IPS is no different, and this is not without benefits for Nepal. For one, Nepal can thank the IPS for making Xi Jinping visit Nepal. Given Nepal’s lack of commitment on finalizing his pet BRI projects, Xi would not have come if China was not so alarmed about the heightened American activism in Nepal. In the Chinese perception, India, which is still paying the diplomatic price of the 2015-16 blockade in Nepal, is happy to let the Americans and Europeans do the cheerleading against China for the time being.
The IPS is nebulous by design. There is no dotted line to sign on. The Americans can declare that they want to partner with so and so country under the strategy without that country ever having to formally endorse it. But it creates problems for small and geopolitically sensitive countries like Nepal which, as Tika Dhakal recently pointed out in his Kantipur column, is free to choose its other foreign friends but not its neighbors; it would be suicidal of Nepal to support the American strategy if it comes at the cost of alienating China, that vital counterweight to India.
It would be naïve to assume that India, which has traditionally been paranoid about any presence of western powers in its traditional backyard, would so easily outsource its Nepal strategy to the US. Perhaps, as the Chinese suspect, Indians are now allowing the Americans to do the heavy lifting against China while they try to work out their new Nepal plan.
The Indians want the Americans to keep up the pressure on China in South Asia, but not let them increase their influence in the region to the extent that India is no longer able to play a decisive role here. What may happen though is that as the communist government in Nepal inches progressively closer to China, India will be more and more comfortable working with the Americans, the Europeans and the Japanese to do the anti-China posturing on its behalf.
For the Chinese, Nepal’s recent packing orders to illegal North Koreans were the latest warning sign that the Americans are getting disconcertingly active in Nepal. This is why it has become important for President Xi to come now. To make his point, Xi might even decide to stay for a night in Kathmandu, despite a brazen lack of progress on the BRI projects. Symbolism means a lot in Chinese diplomacy.
