Diplomatic License: The pursuit of strategic autonomy
When the Constituent Assembly members found themselves stuck during the writing of a new constitution, they often looked to the charter of the southern neighbor, the world’s largest democracy, for inspiration. It made sense too. Gandhian nonviolence and Indian struggles against the British had inspired Nepal’s own movement for democracy. Had India not become independent in 1947, Nepal would probably have had to wait for democracy for several more years, if not decades. As it was, even the 1951 agreement on democratic rule in Nepal was signed in New Delhi. It is thus no surprise that we, like India, have ended up with a federal parliamentary democratic system.
Post-1950, there has been a lot of convergence in the two neighbors’ foreign policy as well. As underdeveloped thirdworld countries that could not afford to pick sides in the Cold War, both Nepal and India became founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Both still have Panchsheel as a bedrock of their foreign policy. When India started opening up its economy in the early 1990s, Nepal did too. Of course, the interests of a civilizational state like India cannot in substance be compared with those of a far smaller power like Nepal. There are bound to be fundamental differences. Yet even accounting for this, there are some remarkable similarities.
Take, for instance, the new quest of both the countries for ‘strategic autonomy.’ In recent times this concept has been most commonly used in the context of the European Union; how the 27-country bloc needs to pursue its own interests as the US retreats from its role as a guarantor of peace in Europe. As Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, a German think tank, defines it: “…strategic autonomy is… the ability to set priorities and make decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through—in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone.”
Pushed and pulled in its relations with the US, China and Russia, each an essential partner of India, Narendra Modi has strictly adhered to the letter and spirit of this definition. Nepal just entered a ‘strategic partnership’ of its own with China, and the prime minister says he will pursue similar partnership with India. The US believes it is already a strategic partner of Nepal, which the communist government in Kathmandu is quick to deny. But even with the US, Nepal’s desire to pursue a foreign policy independent of India is clearly visible. For this, the Oli government will tilt a touch more toward China, but will also be ready to engage more with the western powers whose presence on Nepali soil India has traditionally loathed.
Whatever spin the Oli government gives to its foreign policy conduct, its desire, first and foremost, seems to be to yank Nepal out of India’s old, self-defined security umbrella. As a vote-bank strategy, too, it’s a no-brainer; hence the close defense and security cooperation with China and the US, the “third parties” in this game. But if India remains keen about maintaining its upper hand in its traditional backyard, Nepal’s interests will be easily tradable for bigger geopolitical or economic gains. Even Panchsheel, lest we forget, is an Indo-China construct.
