Uddhab Pyakurel is Dean and Associate Professor at Kathmandu University. He teaches Political Sociology at School of Arts Kathmandu University. ApEx talked to him about the various dimensions of the GenZ movement and its aftermath.
How can the latest GenZ movement be understood from a sociological perspective?
The September uprising can be viewed as a public reaction to the attitude and behavior of Nepal’s major state stakeholders. Those who were taught or compelled to believe in the ideal model of governance have long harbored frustration toward the country’s political leadership. Ironically, political leaders themselves contributed to this cynicism. Over the years, while in opposition, they repeatedly told the public that Nepal was a “failed state” incapable of progress, often citing corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and foreign influence in their speeches and writings.
Regardless of their intent this persistent negativism gradually convinced citizens that Nepal’s society and polity were indeed facing severe challenges in governance and development. Even youths who were previously disengaged from political discourse watched these developments closely. When the government imposed a ban on social media, it became a trigger point. The youth mobilized rapidly, not just to understand the discourse but to contribute to it using new technologies and terminologies.
This was how the idea of “GenZ” found resonance in Nepal. Borrowed from the West, the term became a unifying identity for young, tech-savvy citizens with modern education. Thus, the movement found its roots in Nepal’s digital sphere before spilling into the streets.
Some observers hesitate to label the incident as a genuine social or political movement, citing it lasted for less than 48 hours. Yet, it should not be forgotten that within this short span, the movement forced the resignation of Nepal’s government. It was a feat unparalleled even by the revolutions of 1951, the People’s Movement of 1990, or Janaandolan II of 2006.
The extreme state violence on September 8 against peaceful protesters, followed by the unprofessional handling by security forces on September 9, were both deeply unfortunate and condemnable. These events led to chaos and destruction of property. However, compared to recent youth uprisings in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the Nepali version maintained a democratic character, operating within the constitutional framework. Even though Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli was compelled to resign and seek refuge at the army barracks, the President took control and steered the transition in line with constitutional procedures.
What are the main goals and aspirations driving the movement?
In today’s capitalist environment, most youths are trained to pursue careers rather than to understand the country’s social realities. Their key concern, therefore, is whether Nepal offers an environment conducive to their aspirations. While the state attempted some reforms along capitalist lines, it failed to communicate its progress effectively. The absence of transparent information channels allowed frustration to deepen across all sections of society.
The September 8 mobilization, however, was driven by modest but powerful goals: systemic reform, transparency, and inclusiveness in governance. The movement directly questioned the political relevance of long-dominant leaders—CPN-UML Chairman KP Sharma Oli, Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Maoist Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Beyond anti-corruption slogans, the youth demanded pustantaran (a generational shift in leadership) so they could engage with new, relatable political figures in building a better Nepal.
How have political parties responded to these protests?
Unfortunately, most political parties have responded with reaction rather than reflection. The first few weeks following the protests created a sense of hope for change, as debates emerged around the issues raised by the youth. Gradually, however, party leaders, many of whom had gone silent during the unrest, resurfaced with defensive statements. While some acknowledged the youth’s concerns, no meaningful action followed. Except for the Nepali Congress, no major party initiated a serious internal discussion on pustantaran. None of the senior leaders stepped down. Two months after the protests, party leaders largely resumed business as usual, behaving as if nothing had happened on September 8 and 9. They dismissed the uprising as reactionary or undemocratic, thereby deflecting attention from their own failures to understand public sentiment.
In your opinion, is the government capable of holding elections on March 5?
There is no alternative to holding timely elections in Nepal today. The government was formed with a clear electoral mandate, and polls must be conducted no later than March 5, 2026. These elections will not only restore constitutional legitimacy but also provide a pathway for the change envisioned by the youth. As for capability, there appears to be no major obstacle preventing the government from organizing the elections. While some raise concerns about security, they overlook Nepal’s experience in 2008, when elections were successfully held amid far more difficult circumstances, when over 100 armed groups operated across the country and police posts in rural areas remained closed due to the insurgency. Compared to that period, today’s situation is much more stable and manageable.
What should be the political roadmap moving forward?
To honor the mandate of the youth uprising, Nepal must integrate young aspirations into its political future. A multi-party democracy cannot function without political parties, but it also cannot progress without reforming them. The responsibility now lies squarely with party leaders. They must show genuine gestures of change within their organizations. Amending party constitutions and ensuring internal democracy would send a powerful message to the youth that transformation is possible within the system. This could encourage the generation below 30 to participate meaningfully in politics and governance, which can be a potential win-win for both sides. Unfortunately, the current direction is worrying. The two largest parties in the dissolved House appear confused about the future, focusing more on criticizing the new transitional government than on addressing public grievances. If political leaders continue resisting change, youth anger may escalate, not just against individual leaders but against political parties and the democratic system itself. Such a scenario risks pushing Nepal into another constitutional crisis, threatening political and institutional stability. Let’s hope that wisdom prevails and Nepal avoids such an unfortunate and undemocratic path.
