The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) is preparing to hold its general convention on Dec 13–15 to elect a new leadership. The CPN-UML’s internal dynamics are especially tense this year, as incumbent Chairperson KP Sharma Oli, who has been politically shaken by the recent GenZ movement, is seeking a third consecutive term. Though Oli had signaled before Sept 8–9 protests that he would lead the party for another five years, the large-scale demonstrations and the killing of 19 youths has severely dented his standing both inside and outside the party.
A number of senior UML leaders have urged Oli to retire from the party chairmanship, arguing that he should take moral responsibility for the deaths that occurred under his premiership. Yet, Oli remains defiant. He insists that he was removed from government not because of his governance failures, but because of his uncompromising “nationalist stance.” This claim once again reveals a familiar pattern: Oli’s consistent use of nationalism as a political tool to consolidate his power, deflect criticism and project himself as a defender of Nepal’s sovereignty. Inside the communist party, there is a tendency to create real, perceived or even fabricated enemies in order to convince cadres that they should focus on fighting these threats rather than questioning or changing the leadership. This is exactly what KP Oli is doing right now.
Oli’s nationalism card
‘Nationalism’ has long been a potent currency in Nepali politics, especially within communist parties, which frequently frame internal dissent as externally manipulated. After joining mainstream politics, it was Maoist Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal successfully weaponized ‘nationalism.’ When challenged by senior leader Baburam Bhattarai, Dahal often accused him of being influenced by foreign actors, particularly India. After losing power in 2008, Dahal blamed India for orchestrating his downfall and launched a political campaign centered on “national independence.” This narrative helped him maintain his grip on the Maoist party at a time when his leadership was under pressure.
Oli has followed a similar path since coming to power after 2015. He rose to national prominence during the 2015 Indian blockade, portraying himself as a staunch nationalist resisting external interference. His government’s issuance of a new political map of Nepal in 2020 further cemented his image as a leader willing to challenge powerful neighbors.
Internal challenge
For this year’s General Convention, Oli faces a more organized challenger than in previous conventions. His deputy, Ishwar Pokhrel, backed strongly by former President Bidya Devi Bhandari, has announced his candidacy for party chairman. Pokhrel’s camp is significantly stronger than in the 2021 convention, making him the first genuinely competitive candidate against Oli in years. Predictably, Oli’s supporters have begun portraying Pokhrel’s challenge as influenced by external forces. Such accusations are not new: within Nepal’s communist parties, labeling rivals as “foreign agents” is practically a political tradition. A Facebook post by Shankar Pokhrel on Nov 29, for example, stated: “The country is in crisis, and attacks on nationalist forces continue. In such a situation, firmness in policy and unity in leadership are essential. Let’s move forward—it is possible.”The subtext of the statement is clear: in the name of national unity, Ishwar Pokhrel should withdraw and support Oli. This framing aligns perfectly with the longstanding internal communist practice of marginalizing opponents by presenting them as threats to national interests.
GenZ protests and ‘foreign ploy’
The GenZ protests shook Nepal’s political establishment as thousands of young took to the streets against corruption, unemployment and political stagnation. Instead of acknowledging the domestic roots of the unrest, Oli and his loyalists characterized the protests as foreign-orchestrated, drawing parallels with color revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Oli has repeatedly argued that his government was targeted by foreign powers because of his policies in favor of nationalism, such as signing the BRI with China. This narrative implies that the protests were an attempt on the part of Western powers ‘to punish him and destabilize the UML.’
Oli’s belief that the GenZ uprising was externally orchestrated rests mostly on rumors and unverified reports. Most Nepalis view the movement as a spontaneous expression of frustration with political instability, chronic corruption and the failure of leaders to deliver meaningful reforms. The attempt to reduce a youth-led domestic uprising to foreign interference seems increasingly detached from public sentiment.
Social media ban and nationalism
One of the major triggers of the GenZ movement was the Oli government’s decision to ban several social media platforms for not registering in Nepal. Oli attempted to justify the move by claiming that these platforms violated Nepal’s sovereignty and refused to comply with national laws. This explanation, framed once again through the lens of nationalism, did little to placate widespread anger.
Oli’s public defense of controversial businessman Durga Prasai, arrested for inflammatory remarks, further underscored his reliance on the nationalism narrative. Prasai had released a video claiming that Western-funded NGOs were behind the GenZ protests, echoing Oli’s larger narrative of foreign interference. By siding with Prasai, Oli signaled once again that he sees political advantage in promoting the idea of a foreign conspiracy.
Will ‘nationalism’ work again?
UML leaders often boast that their party alone does not compromise on matters of national interest. In previous elections, this rhetoric helped Oli galvanize public support. But this time, the situation appears different. Oli has been raising the issue of foreign intervention behind the GenZ movement for more than two months, yet the narrative has gained little traction. Public sentiment has shifted. Nepalis today are more concerned about corruption, unemployment, inflation and the failure of political leaders to govern effectively. The idea that Nepal’s problems stem from foreign meddling, rather than deep-rooted internal dysfunction, no longer convinces many. Inside the UML, too, Oli’s nationalist rhetoric appears to be losing its persuasive power. The party rank-and-file recognizes that nationalism has become a convenient cover for resisting internal reforms and maintaining control. With rising dissatisfaction in the organization and the emergence of stronger rival factions, Oli’s grip on the party is not as secure as it once was.
Conclusion
KP Sharma Oli’s use of the term ‘nationalism’ has been a key part of his political identity for nearly a decade. It helped him rise to power, survive internal challenges and present himself as the champion of Nepali sovereignty. But political landscapes evolve, and public patience has limits. Today, with a frustrated younger generation, intensifying intra-party competition, and declining faith in political theatrics, Oli’s nationalism card appears increasingly exhausted. Whether it will still work at the upcoming General Convention remains uncertain, but all signs suggest that its effectiveness is rapidly waning.
