The number of self-proclaimed geopolitical observers in Nepal—those who claim to detect American maneuvering behind every major development—has been steadily growing. Not long ago, they pointed to an alleged US hand behind the GenZ movement; now, as election approaches, they are putting supposed American backing under a media trial fueled by conspiracy theories.
But did the United States really micro-manage Nepal’s GenZ movement? And is that even a priority for Washington at present?
A closer examination of the position taken by Washington at the time, along with the silence it maintained in Kathmandu, suggests otherwise. However, the three key issues raised by the GenZ movement—unrestricted access to and use of social media, good governance, and the elimination of corruption—are long-standing priorities of the United States. In that sense, the overlap may simply be coincidental.
Convergence of issues may imply goodwill, but there is no evidence to suggest that the United States actively intervened on the ground. That said, a notable number of youths who had participated in the US Embassy’s American Youth Council in Kathmandu were seen at the forefront of the movement. If one chooses not to view this as coincidence, it does leave room for suspicion.
As speculation intensified, the United States eventually commented on the GenZ movement, stating that “Nepal’s youth movement is an example of how old governments can be replaced to create opportunities for democratic participation.”
That, essentially, was the extent of Washington’s official position. Yet even this statement has been interpreted in multiple ways, often shaped by individual interests. It would not be entirely incorrect to say that the United States appeared supportive of youth-oriented initiatives—but equating that directly with support for the GenZ movement would be an overstatement.
Similarly, the United States has said little about Nepal’s upcoming election. Its official stance has been limited to a standard formulation: “In Nepal’s case, we believe they will adopt a credible and peaceful electoral process. We are ready to work with whichever side wins.”
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that Washington has no preferences at all in Nepal. Its most fundamental and default interest remains ensuring that no government in Nepal tilts toward China. Beyond that, it seeks a post-election government with which it can work comfortably.
This raises a crucial question: which party—and which prime ministerial candidate—fits that description?
At present, three major political forces dominate Nepal’s electoral landscape: the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML, and the Rastriya Swatantra Party. It is widely expected that the next government will emerge from within these three. All have already announced their prime ministerial candidates: Gagan Thapa for Congress, KP Sharma Oli for UML, and Balen Shah for RSP.
Formally declaring prime ministerial candidates before election is neither an established norm nor a standard practice in parliamentary systems. However, Nepal’s hybrid political system has seen such practices before—and this time, it has arguably taken on the character of a trend.
Even so, such declarations only hold if the candidates win parliamentary seats and go on to lead their respective parliamentary parties. This remains uncertain for all three candidates.
Both Oli and Balen are contesting from Jhapa-5, meaning one of them is bound to lose. That alone eliminates one prime ministerial prospect. At the same time, victory is not guaranteed for Gagan Thapa in Sarlahi-4 either.
The likelihood of any single party securing a majority appears slim. It is equally difficult to predict whether Congress or RSP will emerge as the largest party, though UML appears to be slipping into third place. Under Gagan Thapa’s leadership, Congress is not only competing for first place but also increasingly positioning itself to surpass RSP.
Even in this scenario, Oli remains a strong contender in Jhapa-5. If he wins while candidates from potentially larger parties lose, it could create an unusual situation: a prime ministerial candidate from a third-place party entering Parliament while those from leading parties fail. That would also raise further questions about RSP’s leadership, particularly as party chair Rabi Lamichhane—even if elected—faces legal challenges that may prevent him from taking the parliamentary oath, let alone becoming prime minister.
In such a fluid and uncertain political context, what might the United States prefer?
At present, Washington appears to be in a “wait and watch” mode. This does not mean it lacks preferences. Naturally, it would prefer a particular party to win and a certain leader to become prime minister. Its primary consideration remains that the winning side should not be aligned with China—something that is neither hidden nor surprising.
So, who might be in America’s “good books”?
First, consider UML and Oli. UML today is largely synonymous with Oli, who is firmly rooted in leftist politics. Even if relations are not always smooth, his ideological inclination is widely seen as closer to China—America’s principal global competitor. From this perspective, it is natural that UML and Oli would not rank highly in Washington’s preferences.
Moreover, Oli has often framed the GenZ movement not as a domestic political development but as part of a foreign conspiracy, implicitly pointing fingers at the United States. Such rhetoric further diminishes his standing in Washington’s eyes.
Turning to RSP and Balen Shah, the situation is equally complex. The party has yet to evolve into a fully institutionalized political force and remains closely tied to the persona of Rabi Lamichhane. With Lamichhane facing multiple legal cases, including allegations of financial misconduct, his political credibility has come under strain.
Balen Shah, presented as the party’s prime ministerial candidate, appears more as a strategic choice than a deeply rooted political leader. Though popular, he remains politically inexperienced, having emerged from a background in music and local governance. Comparisons with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy are sometimes drawn, though such parallels may not be reassuring from Washington’s standpoint.
Given these factors, it is difficult to see either Lamichhane or Balen fitting comfortably within Washington’s strategic preferences—particularly for a country that emphasizes governance, institutional credibility, and anti-corruption.
This leaves the Nepali Congress and Gagan Thapa. Under Thapa’s leadership, Congress has sought to reposition itself within its traditional democratic space, moving away from the left-leaning alignments associated with former party president Sher Bahadur Deuba. For Washington, this likely signals the return of a familiar and historically cooperative partner.
Thapa also represents a blend of youth and experience. His academic exposure at Harvard University, though brief, has contributed to his international profile. From an American strategic perspective, neither Congress nor Thapa is likely to fall into China’s sphere of influence—something that provides reassurance for US policy toward Nepal.
Another key factor is India. In shaping its Nepal policy, the United States must also take into account New Delhi’s interests, particularly given the broader geopolitical balance with China. The notion that Washington views Nepal through a Delhi lens stems from this reality.
At present, neither Oli nor Balen appears to be in India’s good books. Balen’s past remarks on Hindi films and his invocation of “Greater Nepal” rhetoric have not been well received in New Delhi. Oli, meanwhile, has previously strained relations with India through statements on Ayodhya and by endorsing controversial territorial claims. He remains a leading figure of nationalist, India-critical politics in Nepal.
With both Oli and Balen falling outside India’s preference, Washington’s decision becomes relatively straightforward. In such circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the Nepali Congress—and Gagan Thapa in particular—may well be in the “good books” of the United States as Nepal heads toward a highly uncertain electoral contest.
The author is a former journalist based in Washington, DC
