The federal government’s propensity to hide—or give incomplete information about—KP Oli’s health has everyone guessing about the continued fitness of their prime minister to lead the country. Perhaps for the first time, his health woes have also spawned a serious succession battle in the ruling Nepal Communist Party. If Oli is not fit, the first natural claimant to the PM’s post would be NCP co-chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal. In that case, he would also be the obvious choice as the new party chairman, at least until the next general convention. If only things were so straightforward though. 

Over a year and half since the formal unity of the CPN-UML and the CPN (Maoist Center) to form the NCP, the new party is still a divided house, the division running from the very top right down to the grassroots. Former UML rank and file are not ready to accept Dahal—with a legacy of a bloody insurgency behind him—as their leader, not the least because he seems minded to ditch the popular UML ‘people’s multi-party democracy’ line. They also fear that he could impose a top-down model, as he did in the former Maoist party, where he was the all-powerful ‘headquarter’. 

Ex-Maoist leaders in the NCP are just as adamant that the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between Oli and Dahal be honored. The agreement apparently stipulates that Oli will lead the government for half of its five-year term and Dahal for the rest. If not, Dahal will settle for the role of uncontested party chairman and will allow Oli to run the government for five years. But that too is a tricky proposition, again requiring some of Dahal’s fiercest critics in the party to come around. 

The NCP dispute is best resolved internally so that this government can serve out its full term. If the dispute gets out of control, all kinds of dicey actors could get involved, including monarchists and foreign hands. It is in the interest of the NCP to quickly settle Oli’s succession, both in the government and in the party. Perhaps the NCP senior brass is not foolish enough to let the left unity unravel and thus open up new political space for their rivals. Most Nepalis will hope so. If there is to be a change, let people endorse it in the next general election in 2022. It’s only just a touch over two years away now. 

Diplomatic License: The pursuit of strategic autonomy

When the Constituent Assembly members found themselves stuck during the writing of a new constitution, they often looked to the charter of the southern neighbor, the world’s largest democracy, for inspiration. It made sense too. Gandhian nonviolence and Indian struggles against the British had inspired Nepal’s own movement for democracy. Had India not become independent in 1947, Nepal would probably have had to wait for democracy for several more years, if not decades. As it was, even the 1951 agreement on democratic rule in Nepal was signed in New Delhi. It is thus no surprise that we, like India, have ended up with a federal parliamentary democratic system.

Post-1950, there has been a lot of convergence in the two neighbors’ foreign policy as well. As underdeveloped thirdworld countries that could not afford to pick sides in the Cold War, both Nepal and India became founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Both still have Panchsheel as a bedrock of their foreign policy. When India started opening up its economy in the early 1990s, Nepal did too. Of course, the interests of a civilizational state like India cannot in substance be compared with those of a far smaller power like Nepal. There are bound to be fundamental differences. Yet even accounting for this, there are some remarkable similarities.

Take, for instance, the new quest of both the countries for ‘strategic autonomy.’ In recent times this concept has been most commonly used in the context of the European Union; how the 27-country bloc needs to pursue its own interests as the US retreats from its role as a guarantor of peace in Europe. As Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, a German think tank, defines it: “…strategic autonomy is… the ability to set priorities and make decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through—in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone.”

Pushed and pulled in its relations with the US, China and Russia, each an essential partner of India, Narendra Modi has strictly adhered to the letter and spirit of this definition. Nepal just entered a ‘strategic partnership’ of its own with China, and the prime minister says he will pursue similar partnership with India. The US believes it is already a strategic partner of Nepal, which the communist government in Kathmandu is quick to deny. But even with the US, Nepal’s desire to pursue a foreign policy independent of India is clearly visible. For this, the Oli government will tilt a touch more toward China, but will also be ready to engage more with the western powers whose presence on Nepali soil India has traditionally loathed.

Whatever spin the Oli government gives to its foreign policy conduct, its desire, first and foremost, seems to be to yank Nepal out of India’s old, self-defined security umbrella. As a vote-bank strategy, too, it’s a no-brainer; hence the close defense and security cooperation with China and the US, the “third parties” in this game. But if India remains keen about maintaining its upper hand in its traditional backyard, Nepal’s interests will be easily tradable for bigger geopolitical or economic gains. Even Panchsheel, lest we forget, is an Indo-China construct.

DIPLOMATIC LICENSE
Xi humbled but disappointed

Xi Jinping was reportedly humbled by the warm hospi­tality of his hosts. But he was also disappointed. The 14-point joint statement and the 20-point ‘List of agree­ments’ read more like a litany of missed opportunities than an expression of abiding faith between two close friends. Xi came with an open heart, even promising a ‘big surprise’ for Nepal. The surprise never materialized when Xi saw that there was zero preparation on Nepal’s part to finalize BRI projects, even after the announcement of his visit; it was as if the country had completely disregarded his central foreign policy agenda. The US and India will look upon with great satisfaction that what was being billed as a watershed moment in Nepal-China bilateral ties turned out to be a dud. Instead of the announce­ment of a new 1,000 MW project (the surprise?), there was a reiteration of two previously signed hydro deals. The much-vaunted cross-border railway is no closer to being realized. Nor is there anything substantial in the agreements about removing the scores of non-tariff barriers Nepali goods enter­ing China face. The only widely acknowledged achievement of the visit was the 50-km Kathmandu-Keyrung tunnel road.

The signing of an extradition treaty could have put a big spoke in the diplomatic wheel of the US, which has been strongly lobbying for the rights of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. It did not materialize, thanks to the last-minute exertions of the American ambassador Randy Berry. Yet the mutual legal assistance treaty that we now have could still be enough to spy on and extradite Tibetans from Nepal to China.

The rivalry between the IPS and the BRI is the new game in town. Many thought Xi’s reference to “crushed bodies and shattered bones” referred to Hong Kong and what China sees as the American meddling there. Instead, what he was hint­ing at was the recent American lobbying on behalf of Tibetan refugees in Nepal that jinxed a ‘full blown’ extradition treaty.

Xi’s visit was all about minimizing the US presence in Nepal. Given Nepal’s lukewarm response to the BRI, there was no other conceivable reason for him to come here right now. Symbolically, being able to host one of the most powerful persons on the planet was a huge achieve­ment for Nepal, no doubt. Sadly, there was no happy post-Mamallapuram surprise.

Indian analysts seem confident that Nepal can’t easily overcome the constraints of geography. Yet working out a viable role for India in the IPS, and its application in South Asia, is proving to be rather tricky. Indians have traditionally been loath to let westerners have a say in Nepal; yet they also realize that it will be hard to deal with an increasingly self-as­sured China without US help. In any case, we could see a more assertive Indian ambassador taking over the ever-jovial Manjeev Singh Puri who was sent to Nepal to smooth ruffled feathers post-blockade.

As the US-China rivalry in Nepal heats up, let me also haz­ard a guess at another likely development soon: the visit of American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (provided he is not roasted in the Trump impeachment inquiry).

DIPLOMATIC LICENSE
Gandhi and Nepali foreign policy

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was not just a founding father of the Indian republic, he was also the original inspiration behind the post-independence Indian for­eign policy. As the undisputed leader of the Indian National Congress and a globally renowned anti-colonial nationalist, Gandhi was a big influence on Jawaharlal Nehru, indepen­dent India’s inaugural prime minister and the first articulator of its foreign policy. Although Nehru had no major ideolog­ical differences with Gandhi, even on foreign policy, Nehru also knew the limits of Gandhi’s idealism, some of which he shelved after he became India’s PM and foreign minister.

Nehru was more of a realist than Gandhi. For Gandhi, non-violence trumped everything, even national sovereignty. He abjured all kinds of violence; means for him could never justify ends. During the Second World War, when Britain was on the verge of declaring a war on a marauding Nazi Germany, Gandhi advised the British to exercise restraint, for violence would only beget more violence. He also wrote to Hitler, saying that he refused to “believe that you are the monster described by your opponents.” Nehru and others in the INC were more realistic in their assessment and put forth the condition that the INC would support Britain only if the British first agreed to grant India independence.

The INC under Gandhi initially advocated an Asian feder­ation, which Nehru later changed into a pitch for a global federation, only which, in his evaluation, could prevent more destructive world wars. The concept of non-alignment was born of the same desire of Nehruvian India—and four other countries—to maintain ‘amity to all and enmity towards none’. Nepali leaders like BP Koirala, KP Bhattarai and Ganesh Man Singh were highly influenced by Gandhi and his immediate heirs. As a result, Panchasheel and non-align­ment became the professed bedrock of Nepal’s foreign policy under successive Nepali Congress-led democratic govern­ments. Gandhi’s 150th birth anniversary was celebrated on Oct 2 in Nepal and India, two countries where there still are countless adherents of the ascetic leader. Yet instead of pacifism, both the countries have come to be strong adher­ents of realism. Issues of national interests are narrowly defined, be it India’s ‘neighborhood first’ policy under Modi or Nepal’s ‘equidistance’ policy under Oli. In both the countries, there is an increasing tendency to see people as entities that can be sacrificed for protection of sovereignty against an external enemy.

Even in Nepal, Gandhian idealism is seen as more appli­cable in domestic politics than in international affairs. For instance, its proponents argue that only when the Maoists gave up violence could they achieve their political goals. But when India blockaded Nepal, the latter had no option but to shun idealism and seek closer ties with communist China, in the perfect application of realpolitik. Even though our for­eign minister still professes abiding faith in Gandhian non-vi­olence, Nepal’s national interest is seen as best served when it is not too seduced by Gandhi’s homeland and spreads its eggs over multiple baskets. In this reading, Nepal can simul­taneously apply ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, ‘Gandhi’s path’ and ‘the American dream’. Hard choices have become impractical.

Diplomatic License 
Nepal and China: Mother of all gambles

I wanted to start this weekly column by stating the obvious: the efforts of the ruling Nepal Communist Party to ‘import’ key characteristics of the Communist Party of China is not just misguided (for the party) but also dangerous (for the country). One might ask: How can a political party that Nepalis so overwhelmingly trusted to secure their rights and freedoms now look to emulate the CPC, the antithesis of democratic freedoms? Or are our communist leaders, now firmly secure in power, thinking of imposing a single-party rule as well? Then, I have a second thought. Most Nepalis have long desired greater ‘balance’ in rela­tions with our two big neighbors. In fact, the NCP gained a near two-third vote on the promise of bringing about such balance in a post-blockade Nepal. To ‘tilt’ a little toward China had thus become a necessity. But what we wanted was more trade links with the northern neighbor, not wholesale import of Chinese communism, right? The concurrent hope was that even as its engagements in Nepal increased, China, unlike India, would refrain from any kind of political meddling.

But look at it through the eyes of the new Chinese lead­ership under Xi Jinping, who has made the ‘export’ of his thought a central plank of Chinese foreign policy. If so, why not start the great experiment in next-door Nepal, the tradi­tional outpost of all kinds of geopolitical experimentation? It makes economic sense too. The increasingly cash-strapped China is in no mood to spread its largesse without a guaran­teed return; or, absent that, more international legitimacy for the ‘Xi thought’. What better way to get that guarantee than by making the ruling party in the country of its investment toe its political line?

Perhaps Oli realized that the only way to get the Chinese to work for Nepal’s benefit was to agree to their demands. If so, he would only be acting on his party manifesto’s promise greater balance between India and China. To give the Oli government the benefit of doubt, perhaps this was the also price for bringing Xi to Nepal. After he comes, the NCP and its government can soon forget its promises to the northern neighbor.

Yet even that is a dangerous strategy, for the future course of Nepal-China ties may no longer be up to the NCP to decide. India and Nepal’s western friends will be alienated. Even the biggest hater of India in Nepal realizes that it is an indispensable partner, for countless reasons. Similarly, even the most stringent critic of the IPS understands the historic role of the US in helping Nepal open up to the outside world.

India and China have always presented Nepal with com­plicated geopolitical challenges; and there has never been an easy choice for us. The Oli government has made another risky gamble, with possibly far-reaching consequences. Leo Rose’s warning may be prescient.

KathmanduThe Americans in Nepal can cry themselves hoarse that their Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is neither a ‘military alliance’ nor aimed against ‘any particular country’. But despite their best efforts the IPS will continue to be seen as an anti-China geopolitical strategy. The more vocal they are on the issue, the more the perception will stick that they are being dishonest. This is not without reason though. While the Americans insist on the purity of purpose of the IPS, on the same breath, they also cannot resist warning Nepal not to rely too much on the Belt and Road Initiative, which they see as a ‘debt trap’ for poor countries.

The Chinese understanding of the IPS is no different, and this is not without benefits for Nepal. For one, Nepal can thank the IPS for making Xi Jinping visit Nepal. Given Nepal’s lack of commitment on finalizing his pet BRI projects, Xi would not have come if China was not so alarmed about the heightened American activism in Nepal. In the Chinese perception, India, which is still paying the diplomatic price of the 2015-16 blockade in Nepal, is happy to let the Americans and Europeans do the cheerleading against China for the time being.

The IPS is nebulous by design. There is no dotted line to sign on. The Americans can declare that they want to partner with so and so country under the strategy without that country ever having to formally endorse it. But it creates problems for small and geopolitically sensitive countries like Nepal which, as Tika Dhakal recently pointed out in his Kantipur column, is free to choose its other foreign friends but not its neighbors; it would be suicidal of Nepal to support the American strategy if it comes at the cost of alienating China, that vital counterweight to India.

It would be naïve to assume that India, which has traditionally been paranoid about any presence of western powers in its traditional backyard, would so easily outsource its Nepal strategy to the US. Perhaps, as the Chinese suspect, Indians are now allowing the Americans to do the heavy lifting against China while they try to work out their new Nepal plan.

The Indians want the Americans to keep up the pressure on China in South Asia, but not let them increase their influence in the region to the extent that India is no longer able to play a decisive role here. What may happen though is that as the communist government in Nepal inches progressively closer to China, India will be more and more comfortable working with the Americans, the Europeans and the Japanese to do the anti-China posturing on its behalf.
For the Chinese, Nepal’s recent packing orders to illegal North Koreans were the latest warning sign that the Americans are getting disconcertingly active in Nepal. This is why it has become important for President Xi to come now. To make his point, Xi might even decide to stay for a night in Kathmandu, despite a brazen lack of progress on the BRI projects. Symbolism means a lot in Chinese diplomacy.

Call it the China effect. An old criticism of India-funded projects in Nepal has been their long delays. But as China has stepped up its engagement in Nepal, India seems to have woken up to the urgent need to safeguard its old sway here. The completion of the Motihari-Amlekhgunj cross-border oil pipeline in a record 17 months hints at as much. It is no coincidence India has also expedited works on all its rail projects in Nepal, including the link between Kathmandu and Birgunj.

Some may see this as evidence of an unhealthy geopolitical competition between the two rising Asian giants. But can’t there also be a healthy rivalry between India and China as they look to expand their footprints in Nepal? If India starts completing its projects in Nepal on time, for whatever reason, Nepal only benefits. When the pipeline comes into full operation, it will also meet a crucial goal of the new National Security Policy: forestalling another blockade. The excuse of protests at the border to stop fuel supply to Nepal will no longer work.  

Likewise, Nepal’s relations with any other power should be determined by its national interests and long-term vision. Yet that is not the case. Nepal has signed up to the BRI, and yet it seems clueless about how to benefit from it. It now also finds itself a part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, again without a clear understanding of what it entails.  

There is always a subtext in foreign relations. It is unrealistic, even dangerous, to expect outsiders to do things for us pro bono. Nor is that the right way to develop our capacity in executing big projects. Whenever outside help is sought, in cash or kind, Nepal should look to supplement it with its own resources. Yet what we see is a woeful lack of cooperation and coordination among different government entities, which also hampers our foreign relations. Ministries are often working at cross-purposes. The foreign ministry brokers an important bilateral agreement on a big hydro project, only to be later thwarted by the environment ministry. Or the defense ministry clandestinely works on an arms deal, without the knowledge of the foreign ministry.

Kudos to India on the pipeline. But the China effect will only go so far. For long-term benefit, Nepali political leadership needs to spell out what Nepal wants from its bilateral and multilateral partners and then streamline its bureaucracy to achieve those common goals.   

A crucial contradiction seems to be developing in Nepal’s relations with China. On the one hand, our political leaders never tire of highlighting all the ways in which Nepal can benefit from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the other, Nepal has failed to present any concrete BRI proposal that the Chinese can seriously consider. The Chinese team under Foreign Minister Wang Yi that was recently in Kathmandu was flummoxed when its Nepali negotiating counterparts could present not a single solid proposal on prospective BRI projects.

The much-ballyhooed rail link between the two countries also came up for discussions. The Chinese side asked if Nepal had any plans on the Nepal-leg of the rail line from Rasuagadhi to Kathmandu. Instead of a firm reply, the Nepali side posed a curious counter-question: Why doesn’t China conduct the DPR for the same with its own money? But how, the Chinese responded, will Nepal feel ownership of the project in which it has no investment? This time no answer was forthcoming.

High-level Nepali and Chinese officials have been meeting often of late, and each time it is the same story. Basically, Nepal wants China to do everything: come up with project plans, prepare the DPRs, and complete the proposed projects on its own. Something else happens routinely as well. For instance, the political leadership in Nepal expresses its full commitment to some BRI project. Enthused, the Chinese start preparing. Then, they meet the Nepali bureaucrats across the table.

The Nepali bureaucrats come up with a hundred reasons why the proposed project won’t fly. “Are your bureaucrats actually working for Nepal?” asks a senior Chinese official closely involved in recent Nepal-China negotiations. The common perception is that the entire Nepali bureaucracy has become pro-Chinese after the Indian blockade of 2015-16. The endless stream of pleasure trips of our bureaucrats to the Middle Kingdom only reinforces this perception. But there is clearly more to the story than meets the eye.

On the part of the Chinese, one other thing is amply clear. They are bothered by the heightened American activism in South Asia and want its partner countries in the region to keep a safe distance from the sole superpower. Chinese advice to senior communist leaders to extricate Nepal from the Indo-Pacific Strategy naturally follows. In fact, Xi is coming primarily to strengthen China’s hand in Nepal vis-à-vis the US. But is it certain that Xi will come? Not if the Chinese are not assured on a possible PR debacle.

For instance, a pro-Tibet protestor showing the Snow Lion to President Xi during his Kathmandu trip and the image being broadcast around the world. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi thus spent most of his time in Kathmandu seeking assurance that such embarrassment to the Paramount Leader will be avoided at all cost. Given China’s troubled history with its own Muslims, it fears a possible backlash from the Nepali Muslim community as well. Even the small, seemingly innocuous protest outside the Chinese Embassy during Wang’s trip was seen as a red flag in Beijing. Thus no amount of preparation is enough.

If Xi is determined to come and the Nepali political leadership committed to host him, the trip will most likely go ahead. If Xi comes, expect one Narendra Damodardas Modi to come rushing hot on his heels.