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The 1950s were a transformative period in Nepal’s history, marked by significant changes both domestically and internationally. The end of the 104-year Rana autocracy ushered in a democratic era. Following the restoration of democracy in 1950, successive governments began implementing policy changes aimed at reshaping various facets of society.

Internationally, this decade was characterized by geopolitical shifts. India had recently gained independence, Pakistan emerged as a new state, and China asserted control over Tibet, which shares Nepal’s northern border. The rise of the Communist Party in China further altered the region’s dynamics. During this time, Nepal signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty 1950 with India, establishing a foundational framework for bilateral relations that remains influential today. As Nepal’s importance grew for both India and China, it also attracted attention from Western powers, particularly the United States. Breaking away from its prolonged isolation, Nepal embraced an open-door policy, receiving reciprocal interest from major global actors.

Domestically, Nepal faced numerous challenges. The absence of established institutions and policies essential for democratic governance hindered progress. Political parties were in their infancy, lacking the experience necessary to manage the aspirations of a transitioning society. To address the needs of the people, Nepal began dismantling its feudal policies and institutions, laying the groundwork for social, economic, and structural reforms.

Despite the abundance of literature on Nepal’s modern political history, much of the existing research tends to focus on prominent events, individuals, and familiar narratives. A new publication, Nepal in the Long 1950s, by Martin Chautari—a Kathmandu-based think tank—offers a fresh perspective on this critical period. Edited by Pratyoush Onta, Lokranjan Parajuli, and Mark Liechty, the book moves beyond the conventional focus on political milestones, delving into nuanced social and cultural dimensions that provide a broader understanding of the era.

The editors frame their exploration of the “Long 1950s” within the theoretical lens of French historian Fernand Braudel, who argued that history is shaped by enduring structural forces rather than discrete events or individuals. By situating Nepal’s transitions within broader regional and global contexts, the book sheds light on how internal developments were influenced by external dynamics and vice versa.

The ten chapters in Nepal in the Long 1950s examine diverse aspects of the decade’s transformation. For instance, Prawash Gautam’s chapter explores the rise of Kathmandu tea shops as public spheres, illustrating how these spaces fostered public opinion and supported pro-democracy movements during the decline of the Rana regime. Bandana Gyawali examines the ideological shift from “progress” to “development” in state policies, reflecting broader societal transformations. Peter Gill provides an in-depth analysis of land reform debates, arguing that legislative efforts were not inevitable outcomes of the 1950 revolution but the result of dynamic political processes involving a range of actors.

In another chapter, Onta investigates the short-lived Nepal Sanskritik Parishad, presenting it as part of a utopian cultural revival project in post-Rana Nepal. Sharad Ghimire discusses the 1954 floods, emphasizing how the disaster legitimized the state’s bureaucratic expansion and foreign aid initiatives, particularly in Chitwan’s Rapti Valley. Parajuli examines the founding of Tribhuvan University, analyzing the interplay of internal and external forces in shaping Nepal’s oldest and largest academic institution.

The second section of the book, titled “The World in Nepal,” shifts focus to the influence of foreign specialists, institutions, ideologies, and tourism on Nepal during this transformative decade. These chapters illustrate how global forces interacted with local contexts to reshape the nation’s development trajectory.

By combining previously published works with new contributions, Nepal in the Long 1950s offers an interdisciplinary approach to understanding this pivotal decade. It moves beyond conventional political history to provide fresh insights into the social, cultural, and geopolitical dimensions of mid-20th-century Nepal. This compilation is a significant addition to the study of Nepal’s modern history, offering readers a deeper and more nuanced understanding of a transformative period.

When the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML formed a coalition in July this year, they announced plans to review and amend the constitution, which has governed the country for a decade. This declaration not only stirred national politics but also captured the attention of external actors with a vested interest in Nepal’s constitutional framework. These international stakeholders, having invested significantly in crafting what they saw as a progressive charter, are eager to discern the nature and scope of the proposed amendments.

Domestically, the proposal has elicited a range of responses. The CPN (Maoist Center) and Madhes-based parties have warned against regressive changes, cautioning the coalition not to undermine federalism or inclusion whereas the royalist Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) is optimistic that the NC and UML might align with their agenda of dismantling federal structures and reinstating Nepal as a Hindu state. Recognizing the issue's sensitivity, NC and UML leaders have taken a cautious approach, repeatedly affirming their commitment to federalism and secularism. They are wary of destabilizing the political environment and mindful that any mishandling of the amendment process could spark unrest.

After six months of deliberation, the coalition has initiated groundwork for potential amendments. Leaders emphasize that this does not signal immediate changes but rather the beginning of a meticulous and inclusive process. A task force has been established to draft a base document, incorporating input from various sectors of society and analyzing the constitution's perceived shortcomings since its promulgation in 2015. Nepal’s constitution has undergone only two amendments: the first in 2016, addressing Madhes-based parties’ demands and resolving India's blockade, and the second in 2020, incorporating Nepal’s updated political map.

Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak has clarified that the amendment process will not unfold overnight. According to him, the task force will first identify areas requiring changes before engaging other political parties for broader consultations. The primary objective, he noted, is to enhance political stability. Leaders from both the NC and UML argue that the current electoral system, which combines First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR), is inherently flawed. They propose transitioning to a purely FPTP system for electing members of the House of Representatives while addressing inclusion through alternative mechanisms. This proposal has strong backing within the two ruling parties but faces stiff opposition from the Maoist Center and Madhes-based parties, who advocate for a fully proportional representation system.

Proponents of electoral reform within the NC and UML contend that the existing mixed system inhibits the likelihood of a single-party majority, perpetuating coalition governments and political instability. They argue that a streamlined electoral framework is essential for fostering governance continuity. However, achieving consensus on this issue remains a daunting task. Opposition parties have expressed deep reservations, and even within the NC and UML, some factions are cautious about pushing too hard on electoral reform without broader support.

Federalism has also emerged as a contentious topic. Within the NC and UML, voices are growing louder for a re-evaluation of Nepal’s federal structure. While senior leaders have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the existing model, many within their ranks argue that provincial structures are inefficient and should be dismantled. They believe resources would be better allocated by strengthening local and central governments. Yet, this proposition is staunchly opposed by the Maoist Center and Madhes-based parties, who view federalism as a cornerstone of Nepal’s inclusive democratic framework.

The issue of secularism adds another layer of complexity. There appears to be a tacit agreement among key leaders—Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba and Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal—that the secular provision could be revisited. However, none of them is willing to openly champion this controversial change. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, a long-time critic of Nepal’s secular status, has reportedly lobbied for its removal. According to insiders, even Dahal has privately signaled to BJP leaders that he might support scrapping secularism if Oli and Deuba also endorse the move.

In addition to these major issues, the task force is expected to examine other constitutional provisions based on a decade of implementation. These may include judicial reforms, provisions for decentralization and mechanisms to ensure greater accountability within state institutions. The goal, according to NC General Secretary Gagan Kumar Thapa, is to address the coalition-driven nature of current governance. Thapa emphasizes that the amendments aim to pave the way for single-party governments that can function effectively for a fixed term, reducing the instability caused by frequent coalition changes.

As the NC and UML prepare to move forward, opposition parties are not sitting idle. The Maoist Center and Madhes-based parties are reportedly conducting internal deliberations to solidify their positions on constitutional amendments. They are expected to challenge the ruling coalition’s proposals, particularly on issues related to federalism, inclusion and electoral reform.

Ultimately, the success of the constitution amendment process hinges on the durability of the NC-UML coalition. Despite ideological differences, the two parties have demonstrated a pragmatic approach, focusing on maintaining their alliance. From parliamentary cooperation to task forces on governance and foreign policy, they are working to align their priorities. However, their ability to achieve meaningful reforms will depend on forging consensus with other political forces and navigating a complex web of domestic and international expectations.

Nepal’s constitution, taken as a landmark achievement in 2015, faces its most significant test yet.

Who will succeed Nepali Congress (NC) President Sher Bahadur Deuba? This question dominates discussions within the party as Deuba’s tenure nears its end. According to the party statute, he cannot contest for a third term, setting the stage for what is expected to be a fierce competition among senior leaders to take up the party’s mantle.

Senior party figures have already begun internal lobbying and consultations. The stakes are high, as the NC faces increasing public dissatisfaction with its leadership. This discontent is not unique to the NC; major political parties across Nepal are under scrutiny for their inability to deliver on public expectations. The choice of the next NC president is being watched closely, not only domestically but also internationally. The party’s rank and file is  yearning for a dynamic leader who can revitalize its organizational structure and restore public trust, which has eroded significantly over the past few years amid the rise of new political forces.

Deuba has so far refrained from signaling any preference for his successor and is expected to maintain this neutrality. In a recent interaction with the media in Biratnagar, he dismissed speculations about endorsing a candidate, stating that the party’s general convention will decide the new leadership. However, his inner circle—leaders like Purna Bahadur Khadka, Bimalendra Nidhi and Prakash Man Singh—are all keen to secure his endorsement. Another potential contender, Bal Krishna Khand, was once considered a strong candidate but has faded into the background due to his alleged involvement in the fake Bhutanese refugee scandal. For now, none of these leaders have formally announced their candidacy, but behind-the-scenes maneuvering is intensifying.

Among these figures, Khadka stands out for his loyalty, as he has never openly challenged Deuba’s leadership whereas Nidhi and Singh have previously contested against Deuba, alongside Shekhar Koirala, in the party’s 14th General Convention. During the second round of that election, Nidhi and Singh strategically supported Deuba, helping him defeat Koirala. As a gesture of gratitude, Deuba later backed Singh’s spouse, Srijana Singh, as the NC candidate for Kathmandu Mayor in the local elections.

Singh currently holds the influential positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Urban Development. Nidhi, despite a history of strained ties with Deuba after contesting for the presidency, is actively seeking to mend fences. He argues that his seniority and status as a prominent Madhesi leader make him a deserving candidate. However, his task is far from easy, as he must navigate both internal rivalries and the broader dynamics of party politics.

From the anti-Deuba camp, two prominent leaders—Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Thapa—are gearing up for the race. Koirala has already launched a nationwide campaign to bolster his candidacy. In contrast, Thapa is taking a more calculated approach, weighing his moves carefully to avoid jeopardizing his relationship with Deuba. Over the years, the two have found common ground on several issues, which has eased tensions between them. Deuba has even publicly praised Thapa’s contributions within and beyond the party, signaling a certain level of mutual respect.

At the same time, there is speculation that Deuba is working to elevate his spouse, Arzu Rana Deuba, to a senior party position—possibly vice-president—during the upcoming 15th General Convention. This potential move adds another layer of complexity to the ongoing leadership contest, as it could shift internal alliances.

Koirala, for his part, remains vocal in his criticism of the party’s leadership and the government’s performance. Thapa, in contrast, has adopted a more measured tone, carefully calibrating his public statements to preserve his rapport with Deuba. Despite his relatively weak organizational base, Thapa enjoys strong support among the party’s youth, who view him as a symbol of hope and renewal. His popularity among younger members gives him a distinct advantage, even as he faces challenges in consolidating his position within the broader party structure.

It remains unclear whether Koirala and Thapa will form another alliance, as they did in the 14th convention, or choose to compete independently. In the previous convention, their alliance saw Koirala lose the presidency while Thapa secured his position as general secretary. This time, both leaders are carefully weighing their options. All prospective candidates are eager to secure Deuba’s endorsement, given his strong influence over the party’s Central Working Committee, provincial structures and local levels. However, Deuba’s silence on the matter has left many in his camp anxious.

Candidates like Koirala and Thapa have reportedly reached out to Deuba’s allies, offering positions in their potential leadership teams to win support. Yet, insiders say Deuba is likely to remain non-committal until the eleventh hour, a strategy that could leave his faction in a state of uncertainty. As the NC moves closer to this crucial juncture, the party’s leadership race promises to be a defining moment for its future.

Dec 19, Balkot, Bhaktapur

“This country will never improve, believe me,” a man declared as I entered the teashop. His voice, laden with frustration, carried across the room. “People are suffering endlessly—corruption is rampant, and those aligned with the major political parties are getting richer, while people like us continue to struggle.”

The conversation quickly shifted to Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chairperson Rabi Lamichhane, turning the teashop into a lively arena of debate. “Look,” one man said in Lamichhane’s defense, “the media allegations about his unusual bank transactions have already been proven baseless. His wife clarified they’re just repaying a home loan in installments.”

Not everyone was convinced. Another participant retorted, “The details of the ongoing police investigation are still unclear. Let’s not jump to conclusions.”

Since starting this column, I’ve noticed Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah rarely faces criticism, while opinions on Lamichhane remain sharply divided. In this teashop, too, some argued that Nepali Congress and CPN-UML supporters were targeting Lamichhane out of political vendetta, while others accused him of involvement in cooperative fraud.

The discussion veered towards the apparent disinterest of Nepali youth in politics. “Young people in their 20s today have no understanding of the political movements of 2006-2007, or even the contributions of Nepali Congress and CPN-UML,” commented a participant who seemed educated and politically aware.

According to him, the younger generation’s detachment stems from the lack of coverage of Nepal’s significant democratic milestones—like the movements of 1950, 1980, 1990, and 2006—in the school curriculum. “They don’t value democracy because they’ve never experienced autocracy,” he stated, as others listened in reflective silence.

He reminisced about his college days when campuses were vibrant political hubs. “Now, private colleges are politically apathetic. Government colleges still show some awareness, but it’s fading fast,” he said with concern.

Another voice in the room offered a starkly different perspective. “The root of Nepal’s problems lies in the end of the Panchayat regime in 1990 and the premature establishment of democracy,” he asserted. Democracy, he claimed, deeply politicized Nepali society and fractured its unity. “Before 1990, we were united. Our forefathers helped one another, and there was a sense of community. Now, politics has divided us.”

While some nodded in agreement, others appeared skeptical, challenging his romanticized portrayal of the past.

As expected, the conversation shifted again, this time to the escalating trend of youth migration for education and employment abroad. Most blamed political instability and job scarcity, but one person took a different stance. “It’s not just unemployment,” he said. “Today’s youth migrate for luxury. They see the affluence of wealthy countries and dream of that lifestyle, even if they can earn well here.”

He argued that migration is a global phenomenon, not limited to Nepal. “Even in countries like China and India, youth are leaving. Job creation and political stability might not solve this entirely,” he said, expressing concern over Nepal’s ageing population. “Soon, countries like Japan, South Korea, and Germany, which face their own ageing crises, will offer attractive packages to lure our workers.”

Another participant turned the focus to internal migration and its consequences. “As people flock to Kathmandu for education and jobs, fertile land in villages is being abandoned,” he lamented. “If another crisis like Covid-19 forces us back to the villages, we’ll face severe problems with no food to sustain us.”

The discussion also touched on the rampant spread of misinformation. One man claimed Prime Minister Oli had been attacked during a visit to Banepa, only to be contradicted by another participant who called the video fake. “How can it be fake when there’s a video?” another argued, illustrating the confusion sowed by unverified information.

The topic then shifted to a recent video of UML leader Surya Thapa, head of the parliamentary probe panel investigating cooperative fraud. In the video, widely shared on social media, Thapa defended Rabi Lamichhane, stating no evidence linked him to the cooperative scandal. The debate over the authenticity of such claims reflected the broader challenge of discerning truth in a digitally driven society.

Since Sept 2019, the United States has provided over $700m in foreign aid through programs administered by the US Department of State and USAID. These aid initiatives have focused on health, economic growth, democracy and governance, and food security, according to a spokesperson for the US Department of State.

The US is committed to deepening its long-standing partnership with Nepal in supporting its democratic resiliency, promoting economic opportunity, and protecting and advancing its sovereignty, the Spokesperson  said in an email interview.  “Our robust people-to-people ties are the cornerstone of our relationship, fostering friendship, understanding, trust, and goodwill.”

According to the Spokesperson , the $500m Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, along with the Government of Nepal’s additional $197m contribution, is another great example of the US commitment to Nepal.  The Spokesperson said the MCC projects will bring high quality, green energy and improved roads to the people of Nepal to power continued economic growth. “$260m in US International Development Finance Corporation loans and equity investments will support agricultural and small and medium sized enterprises, particularly women-run enterprises.”

With the re-election of Donland Trump as president of America, foreign policy watchers in Nepal and India are keenly watching whether there will be any changes in US policy toward South Asia and Nepal. The Spokesperson  assuaged the doubt by stating that the US do not have any changes in policy to announce at this point of time. Nepal recently signed the Cooperation Framework for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), raising eyebrows in New Delhi and Washington. Both New Delhi and Washington have advised Nepal to accept the support under BRI in a transparent way to prevent debt burden.

Commenting on Nepal’s BRI agreement, the Spokesperson said, “It is up to the Government of Nepal to determine which agreements and partnership will benefit its people.” He, however, added that such partnership between two countries should be open, transparent, and mutually beneficial. That is the basis of our partnership with Nepal, and we will continue to seek opportunities to support Nepal’s ongoing development efforts.

During Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to China on Dec 2-5, the two sides came up with a statement which has been a topic of discussions in the political and diplomatic circles. The statement says that Nepal firmly supports China’s efforts to achieve its national reunification and opposes Taiwan’s independence.

Though the issue of Taiwan independence and shift from one China policy to one China principle was mentioned in the joint statement during former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s China visit last year, China’s “national reunification” effort is a new development.

Addressing this issue, the Spokesperson said that their approach to Taiwan has remained consistent across decades and administrations. “The United States has a longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.” The Spokesperson further added that their one China Policy is distinct from China’s one China principle. “We do not take a position on the ultimate resolution of Cross-Strait differences, and we maintain that Cross-Strait differences must be resolved peacefully, free from coercion, and in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” 

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli continues to reassure his key coalition partner, the Nepali Congress (NC), that he will hand over the government leadership to its President, Sher Bahadur Deuba, after 18 months. Oli seems to be operating under a constant fear of betrayal by the NC. At the same time, a section of NC leaders doubts whether Oli will actually relinquish power, suspecting he might pivot to the CPN (Maoist Center) to revive the left alliance agenda for the upcoming elections.

Every other day, Prime Minister Oli, his ministers, and senior party leaders publicly declare that the coalition will endure until 2027 and that no external force can topple it. On Sunday, Shankar Pokharel, General Secretary of the CPN-UML, stated that the government is strong and will remain stable unless one of the coalition partners decides to break it. On Monday, Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak echoed similar sentiments, asserting there are no immediate threats to the coalition. For now, Deuba appears committed to maintaining the alliance, hopeful of assuming the premiership in 18 months. Upon his return from a five-day official visit to China on December 5, Prime Minister Oli reaffirmed that there are no significant differences between the NC and UML and that Deuba would become Prime Minister with UML’s backing after the agreed period.

There was initial dissatisfaction within the NC over the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) deal with China. Some NC leaders argued the deal contradicted the party’s position that Nepal should only accept grants under the BRI framework. However, the contention subsided after Deuba strongly defended the agreement. The deal’s inclusion of “aid financing,” which encompasses both grants and loans, stirred concerns that it paves the way for Nepal to take loans. Prior to Oli’s China visit, BRI was a major point of contention between the two coalition partners. However, they managed to resolve their differences by forming a joint task force. As a compromise, both China and Nepal agreed to “aid financing” as the investment modality for infrastructure projects under the BRI.

Senior NC leaders are now defending the government to protect their positions, as any coalition reshuffle could jeopardize their roles. Deuba, too, seems reluctant to alter the coalition, as a new arrangement might not guarantee him the premiership. Meanwhile, CPN (Maoist Center) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal has reportedly been communicating through multiple channels to assure Deuba of his party’s unconditional support for an NC-led coalition until the next elections. This is contingent on NC’s willingness to forge an electoral alliance. Key NC leaders, including Vice-chairman Purna Bahadur Khadka, are said to be in constant talks with Dahal, exploring the feasibility of such a coalition.

A few weeks ago, NC General Secretary Gagan Kumar Thapa leaked information about potential coalition talks, prompting Dahal to quickly dismiss the claims, stating he had not proposed a new coalition to the NC. Sources, however, suggest that a potential coalition could include the NC, CPN (Maoist Center), Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), CPN (Unified Socialist), and Madhes-based parties. This coalition would likely function as an “election government.” Many political leaders believe abrupt changes in the coalition remain a possibility for two main reasons. First, Dahal publicly criticized the government’s “retaliatory action” against RSP Chairman Rabi Lamichhane, signaling potential collaboration. Second, Dahal appears to be consolidating his political base, raising questions about the coalition’s stability.

A section of NC leaders believes that Oli’s signing of the BRI deal with China has strained his relationship with New Delhi. They argue that the current coalition was formed against India’s preferences. Although the BRI agreement does not include sensitive provisions, New Delhi has historically opposed the initiative. While India has not officially reacted to the Nepal-China BRI agreement, its discontent remains implicit. Recognizing this, Prime Minister Oli is actively working to mend ties with New Delhi, hoping to stabilize the coalition.

Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with the government’s performance is also growing. Although the coalition appears strong in numbers, its inability to deliver on promises has drawn criticism. Both Prime Minister Oli and Deuba publicly downplay these differences, with Deuba defending the government’s performance. However, within the NC, senior leaders like Shekhar Koirala have begun voicing concerns about the government’s functioning.

Political analysts suggest that the coalition’s fate largely hinges on internal dynamics within the NC. While Deuba maintains strong control over the party’s parliamentary and central committees, efforts are underway to undermine his authority. For this to succeed, leaders like Thapa and Koirala would need to join forces. Some NC insiders predict that Deuba may eventually face pressure to reconsider his alliance with Oli. However, it remains unclear why ministers and senior leaders continue to issue reassurances about the coalition’s longevity.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has unveiled the much-anticipated Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Cooperation Framework between Nepal and China, which has identified 10 projects but leaves the investment modality ambiguous. A closer study of the document indicates that implementation remains an uphill task.

The investment modality for the BRI projects continues to be one of the most disputed and ambiguous issues. The Nepali Congress (NC) has consistently held its position that it will accept only projects built through grants, while the CPN-UML is open to taking loans. Regarding the investment modality, the document mentions that “the two sides will work to ensure technical support and aid financing modalities that suit the needs of the two sides and the requirements for sovereign-initiated projects.”

The document further states that the two sides will conduct an objective analysis of the technical, financial, commercial, and economic feasibility of the projects and ensure value for money for the prioritized initiatives. It also allows for seeking international financial support to finance BRI projects, stating, “The two sides will continue to call upon international multilateral financial development institutions or mechanisms to provide more financial support for promoting connectivity and development.”

As per the agreement, Nepal will welcome and facilitate the establishment of branches of Chinese banks and financial institutions. The two sides will work to expand the use of national currencies in bilateral trade and investment according to practical situations. The framework also highlights elevating bilateral relations to a strategic partnership of cooperation, a vision articulated during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal in 2019.

For implementation, China has designated the National Development and Reform Commission, together with the ministries of foreign affairs and commerce, to take the lead. Nepal, in turn, has designated its ministries of foreign affairs and finance. These entities will coordinate bilateral cooperation under the framework.

The document makes it clear that the framework does not constitute an international treaty and thus does not create rights or obligations under international law. It is subject to each country’s national laws, regulations, and policies governing specific projects. This provision means that, like the United States’ Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the BRI framework does not require parliamentary approval.

The document also clarifies that project cooperation implemented under this framework does not prevent either side from engaging in similar cooperation with other countries or mechanisms. Disputes regarding the framework will be resolved through consultations and negotiations between the two sides.

The framework came into effect on the date of its signing and will remain valid for three years, with automatic extensions for subsequent three years, unless either party provides a written notice of termination three months in advance. Importantly, the termination of the framework will not affect any ongoing cooperation projects. Recently, China has sought to bring all bilateral cooperation under this framework, but even if it is terminated, ongoing projects will not be affected.

Under the BRI, the document lists 10 infrastructure and urban development projects. These include the Tokha-Chhahare Tunnel, which is of strategic importance for Nepal-China trade and aims to reduce travel time, improve road safety, and support economic growth. A letter of exchange for the project feasibility study has already been agreed upon by both sides. Another significant project is the Hilsa-Simikot Corridor, one of eight North-South corridors aimed at enhancing connectivity between Nepal and China. A letter of exchange for the feasibility study of upgrading the Hilsa-Simikot section has also been signed.

The much-discussed Nepal-China cross-border railway project is expected to traverse Nepal’s Rasuwa district, offering a direct link between the two countries and enhancing bilateral connectivity. The agreement states that after the completion of the feasibility study, the two sides will work to build the China-Nepal cross-border railway.

Other projects include Amargadhi City Hall in Dadeldhura, the home constituency of NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba. The 220 kV cross-border power transmission line is another prioritized project, although discussions on its implementation are ongoing. Additional initiatives include Madan Bhandari University of Science and Technology, Kathmandu Scientific Center and Science Museum, China-Nepal Friendship Industrial Park in Jhapa, and Jhapa Sports and Athletic Complex, located in Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s constituency.

The BRI framework has become a tool for political parties, particularly the communists, to advance their agendas, but implementation may face roadblocks due to internal and external factors. Although top politicians from the ruling coalition are attempting to downplay differences between the NC and UML, the two ruling parties are not aligned. UML leaders, including Prime Minister Oli, have stated that BRI involves both grants and loans, while NC leaders remain firmly committed to a grants-only approach.

A major challenge for the framework’s implementation lies in the NC’s stance, as the party is likely to remain a dominant force in Nepal’s politics, whether in power or opposition. While NC President Deuba and his ministers have supported the BRI framework to maintain coalition unity, the party’s position is expected to harden if it leads the government in the future. This makes forging a national consensus on BRI project execution extremely difficult.

Even among communist parties, which tend to speak positively about BRI to please China and their voter base, substantive action on the initiative has been limited. For example, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, chairman of the CPN (Maoist Center), has often praised BRI, but made little effort to advance it during his tenure as prime minister. Bureaucratic resistance further complicates matters. The Finance Ministry, in particular, has historically opposed taking loans for BRI projects due to concerns over economic viability and repayment capacity. Recent corruption scandals have also made bureaucrats wary of projects perceived as serving political interests rather than national priorities.

Nepal’s geopolitical realities and economic constraints pose additional challenges. India, for instance, has expressed reservations about Nepal’s participation in BRI, citing sovereignty concerns, and has advised Nepal to prioritize transparency and safeguard its independence. These geopolitical factors, combined with Nepal’s already significant debt burden, have slowed BRI progress over the past decade and will likely continue to do so.

The selection of projects itself raises questions about their alignment with BRI’s objectives of fostering transformative infrastructure and economic integration. For example, the proposed cross-border railway is a highly ambitious project that Nepal is not financially equipped to undertake, even on a grant basis. Its economic viability is questionable, as is the feasibility of other projects, such as tunnels and industrial parks, that do not align with BRI’s stated goal of improving people’s livelihoods. Securing funding for such initiatives remains a significant challenge.

The NC had decided to accept grants while rejecting loans before the BRI framework was signed during Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China. The party presented this position during internal discussions, and the Oli-led government aligned its proposal accordingly. However, concerns have arisen about “aid financing” being prioritized over grant financing in the framework.

The NC’s position remains that only projects funded through grants should proceed. The party argues that conditional loans, whether from China or other countries, are not in Nepal’s interest, given the country’s poor track record of generating returns from such projects. The experience of the Pokhara International Airport, which has become a financial burden due to its inability to deliver returns, underscores this point.

The government has conveyed Nepal’s preference for grants to Chinese leaders, and officials are optimistic that China will honor this stance in upcoming agreements. The Nepali side hopes that grant commitments will be implemented and that negotiations for the listed projects will proceed smoothly. Technical cooperation and industrial investments are also encouraged, as they have the potential to boost employment and create mutual benefits.

Prime Minister Oli, upon returning from China, reiterated that Nepal will prioritize grants over loans under BRI. The Foreign Ministry has also conveyed a similar message. While discussions around the BRI framework continue, its successful implementation will depend on navigating political divisions, ensuring transparency, and securing economically viable projects.

The United States supports Nepal in maintaining strong relationships with all its neighbors, including China, provided these ties are based on mutual respect and uphold Nepal’s sovereignty and independence, a senior US official has stated. Donald Lu, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, highlighted this message during his two-day visit to Nepal, which concluded on Monday.

Speaking with a select group of journalists, Lu said, “We support Nepal in making its own independent decisions without external influence.” His remarks underscore the US stance on fostering Nepal’s ability to act as a sovereign state in its foreign and domestic policies.

During his visit, Lu held meetings with key political leaders, including Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba, CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal, and senior government officials. He assured them that US-Nepal collaboration would continue regardless of changes in Nepal’s political leadership. Lu, who has been actively engaged with Nepal for the past four years, played a pivotal role in securing the endorsement of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact in 2022. Reflecting on its progress, he noted, “There has been real progress in implementing the MCC compact, growing the USAID portfolio, increasing US investments in Nepal, and expanding the presence of US volunteers.”

Lu also praised the recent virtual meeting between Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and global tech entrepreneur Elon Musk. He described it as a promising development for boosting investment and trade between the two countries, calling it “fantastic.” Additionally, he commended Nepal’s political parties for advancing the transitional justice process, saying, “The passage of transitional justice bills through consensus marks a significant achievement, though challenges and difficult steps remain ahead.”

On the issue of climate change, Lu reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to supporting Nepal in addressing its vulnerabilities. He recognized Nepal’s expectations for increased development assistance and private sector investment from the US, expressing optimism about further collaboration in tackling climate-related challenges.

However, Lu refrained from commenting on Nepal’s recent agreement with China on Framework Cooperation for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), citing the lack of public disclosure. “I have many questions about the BRI agreement, but I hope it will be shared transparently so Nepali citizens can understand its contents,” he said. He also declined to comment on provisions in the joint statement issued after Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China, particularly those concerning Taiwan. Nevertheless, he emphasized that transparency in such agreements is essential for ensuring public trust and accountability.

Lu’s visit reaffirmed the US commitment to strengthening ties with Nepal while supporting its sovereignty, sustainable development, and independent decision-making.