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Minister for Foreign Affairs Bala Nanda Sharma is returning back to Kathmandu from Dhaka Thursday afternoon. He is on an official visit to Bangladesh from Tuesday to attend the state funeral of Begum Khaleda Zia, former Prime Minister of Bangladesh and Chairperson of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

Minister Sharma attended the state funeral in Dhaka on Wednesday afternoon, where a floral wreath was laid at the burial site of the late leader on behalf of the Government of Nepal.

During the visit, Foreign Minister Sharma met Tarique Rahman, son of the late Begum Zia and Acting Chairperson of the BNP, and conveyed condolences on behalf of the Government and people of Nepal. Sharma noted Begum Zia’s role in Bangladesh’s political and democratic journey. Rahman thanked the foreign minister for attending the funeral and expressed hope for continued cooperation between Nepal and Bangladesh.

On Wednesday afternoon, Sharma also called on the Chief Adviser of the Interim Government of Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, and handed over a message of condolence from Prime Minister Sushila Karki. In the message, the prime minister acknowledged Begum Zia’s contributions to strengthening Nepal-Bangladesh relations during her three terms as prime minister.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussions during the meeting covered bilateral relations and explored ways to enhance cooperation in areas such as trade, energy, connectivity, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges.

Foreign Minister Sharma also met Bangladesh’s Adviser for Foreign Affairs Md Touhid Hossain and delivered a personal letter of condolence. Hossain thanked Nepal for its continued support and for the foreign minister’s presence at the funeral.

2016 was celebrated as the bicentenary of diplomatic ties between Nepal and the United Kingdom. Officially, diplomatic relations between the two countries are said to have begun in 1816, the year Nepal signed the Sugauli Treaty with  East India Company. 

The nine-article treaty was not signed between two sovereign states; rather, it was between the sovereign nation of Nepal and an economic entity, the East India Company. Article One of the treaty states: “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honorable East India Company and the King of Nepal.”

The East India Company formally relinquished control over India in 1858, when its rule was replaced by the British Crown. The first official treaty between Nepal and Great Britain was signed only in 1923. Known as the Treaty Between the United Kingdom and Nepal, it was signed in Kathmandu on 21 Dec 1923. The first article of the seven-article treaty states: “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Governments of Great Britain and Nepal, and the two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect each other’s independence, both internal and external.”

In this sense, the 1923 treaty is the only agreement signed between two sovereign nations. Yet, the Sugauli Treaty continues to be regarded as the benchmark of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Interestingly, the narrative is different when it comes to China. The treaty signed on 2 Oct 1791, known as the Treaty of Betrawati, presents notable parallels with the Sugauli Treaty. First, both treaties were signed in the aftermath of war. The Betrawati Treaty was concluded 24 years before the Sugauli Treaty, the former following China’s victory over Nepal, and the latter resulting from British victory. Second, neither treaty was signed directly between official state actors, though state authority was clearly referenced in both. In Article One of the Betrawati Treaty, China is explicitly mentioned: “That China should henceforth be considered as father to both Nepal and Tibet, who should regard each other as brothers.”

Similarly, the British government is referenced in Article Seven of the Sugauli Treaty, which states: “The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any difference shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Rajah of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, by which award the Rajah of Nipal engages to abide.”

From Nepali perspective, both treaties represent subjugation—one in terms of political hierarchy and the other through the loss of nearly one-third of its territory. Yet, this remains the reality of history, and there is no alternative but to acknowledge it.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of Nepal-China diplomatic ties, formally established on 1 Aug 1955 in Kathmandu. Unlike its relations with the United Kingdom, Nepal and China do not recognize 1792 as the beginning of formal diplomatic relations. This discrepancy calls for deeper debate and clearer interpretation. If Nepal-UK diplomatic ties are considered to have begun in 1816, why should Nepal–China relations not be acknowledged as starting in 1792? Conversely, if 1955 is accepted as the official starting point of Nepal-China ties, why is 1923 not similarly recognized as the true beginning of Nepal–UK diplomatic relations?

Historically, Nepal-China relations date back to the seventh century during the reign of Narendradev. However, no formal written documents from that period exist. The earliest documented diplomatic agreement dates to 1792. Therefore, this should be considered the formal beginning of Nepal-China diplomatic ties.

If diplomatic agreements concluded during China’s monarchical era are deemed inapplicable to the People’s Republic of China, then why should Nepal accept the same logic, given that the 1955 Nepal-China treaty was signed under Nepal’s own monarchy, led by King Mahendra? It would serve the interests of both countries to recognize 1792 as the first documented instance of formal diplomatic engagement.

India has been closely engaging with the Sushila Karki-led interim government since its formation. New Delhi was the first to welcome her leadership. On Sept 18, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke with Karki, expressing India’s readiness to “work closely to further strengthen the special ties between the two countries” and reaffirming India’s support for Nepal’s efforts to restore peace and stability.

Although the Karki government is interim and time-bound, New Delhi is working with it as a full partner: signing key agreements, convening bilateral mechanisms, and facilitating high-level exchanges. Ministers have been traveling to New Delhi, and diplomatic activity in Kathmandu has intensified. 

This week, Munu Mahawar, additional Secretary at India’s Ministry of External Affairs, visited Kathmandu, the first high-level foreign official to do so after the Sept 8–9 GenZ protests.  He met Prime Minister Karki and all cabinet ministers, pledging India’s logistical support for the March 5 elections. Notably, Mahawar did not meet leaders of the major political parties, even though the Indian Embassy continues to quietly engage with the broader political spectrum. 

Many members of the international community in Kathmandu remain hesitant to meet political leaders publicly. According to leaders, New Delhi has been encouraging them to view the March 5 elections as the only credible path to ending the current political deadlock. 

The Karki government has also signaled goodwill toward India by not recalling Nepal’s Ambassador to New Delhi, Shankar Sharma, despite recalling ambassadors to 11 other countries, including China, the US, and the UK. 

Oli’s exit from power may also have been welcomed in strategic circles in New Delhi, where he had long been perceived as leaning toward Beijing. As Kathmandu’s engagement with Beijing has slowed and the US has taken a low-key approach to Nepal’s internal political developments, Nepal–India ties have grown significantly stronger.

Since the formation of the Sushila Karki–led government following  Sept 8–9 protests, there has been minimal engagement between Kathmandu and Beijing. In the aftermath of the GenZ protests, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chen Song met Prime Minister Sushila Karki and other government ministers to convey Beijing’s concerns, but there have been no high-level visits between Kathmandu and Beijing. 

Typically, October, November and December see a high number of visits as part of preparations for the coming year. This time, however, not only have the visits from China declined, but overall Chinese activities have also slowed. A China watcher noted, “Beijing may be in a wait-and-see position as the political developments unfold in Nepal.”

Similarly, Beijing’s viewpoint may be that since the current government cannot take major policy decisions, it is better to wait for the new government to be formed after the elections. According to people familiar with the matter, Beijing has conveyed two messages to Nepal following the GenZ protests. First, what happened on Sept 8–9 and the political course that followed is Nepal’s internal affair. Second, China has strongly raised its security concerns due to the open involvement of some Tibetan groups in those protests.

Over the past decade, China’s political, economic and security influence in Nepal has grown, increasing Beijing’s confidence that any government in power will refrain from jeopardizing its security interests related to Tibetan activities. However, the events of September have renewed Beijing’s worries.

Thus, after the GenZ movement, Beijing is experiencing both confidence and insecurity regarding its security interests. China is now closely monitoring the activities of the Tibetan community as well as broader political developments, including cabinet formation. Beijing believes that there can be no substantial progress on the Belt and Road Initiative under the current government. For this reason, China has adopted a policy of maintaining only a working relationship with the new government, with a special emphasis on security concerns. During this period, several Chinese delegations visited Nepal to study the Genz movement and assess potential challenges to bilateral relations.