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It has happened at last. Two and a half years after Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli signed the landmark trade and transit agreement during his state visit to China in 2016, the protocol to make the agreement functional has finally been agreed to. China will now allow Nepal four ports and three dry ports for third-country trade. As per the agreement, Nepali cargo vehicles will be allowed into China to ferry goods to and fro from these ports. When the finalized protocol is signed at the highest level—most probably during the expected Nepal visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping, sometime in 2019—it will be a monumental development for the landlocked Nepal.

It will once and for all end the state of Nepal’s near complete dependence on India, with which it does nearly 90 percent of its trade and through which it carries out all of its third-coun­try trade. When the Chinese routes are open, never again will India be able to impose the kind of crippling economic blockades it has resorted to whenever Kathmandu has not agreed to do its bidding. That at least is the idea.

But there are some hitches. The nearest Chi­nese port is over 2,600 km away while the port of Kolkata that Nepal has traditionally relied on for third-country trade is just 627 km from the Nepali bor­der. That being the case, how many traders will choose Chinese routes instead of Indian ones? Thus by the time the finalized protocol is signed, Nepal and Chi­na must explore ways to make transit via China both cheap and hassle-free. For instance one advantage of Chinese ports could be that the freight-handling there is fast and Nepali traders will not have to spend much to store their goods there.

We believe that irrespective of the issue of financial viability, just having the option of reaching the high seas via China will greatly boost the morale of the landlocked country. In today’s interconnected world, no country can afford to completely rely on another; it must rather look to engage with the widest spectrum of countries possible. We also hope that India under­stands this and that it does not look to punish Nepal for ‘cozying up’ to China. Such churlishness will only undercut India’s standing among the smaller countries in the region.

The constitution confers on all Nepalis over 18 years of age the right to vote in any one electoral constituency in the country. Yet around four million of them were denied a vote in the last electoral cycle in 2017. Electoral laws required that you be present in person if you wanted to vote. As this option was often unavailable for migrants, they were, in a way, disenfranchised. This is why the Supreme Court order to the government to arrange for Nepali migrants abroad to vote in elec­tions in Nepal is timely. For a remittance-dependent country, it was criminal to deny those living and working abroad, Nepal’s lifeblood, their inalienable right to adult franchise.

But while the apex court decision is laudable, it will not be easy to implement. The first thing that the Election Commission must do is find out exactly how many Nepali citizens are living abroad. With Nepalis now scattered all over the world, this will be challenging. In that case, perhaps a start can be made by making voting arrangements for those who show an active inter­est in exercising their franchise. But even this is easier said. How does the commission find out if they have already renounced their Nepali citizenships, in which case they can’t vote?

There are many other technical and logistical hur­dles. But if it was impossible, 110 countries would not be doing it. There is a growing realization that in a world that is getting more and more integrated thanks to the rapid growth of information technology and eas­ier travel, it is both immoral and impractical to deny the legitimate citizens of a particular country their fun­damental right to vote.

As the Nepali government is now under legal obliga­tion to act likewise, and as it is a complicated issue, it may not be a bad idea to constitute a team of experts to suggest feasible ways. Thankfully, the next round of elections are not scheduled for years. The focus over the next few years should thus be on allowing maxi­mum number of Nepalis abroad to vote rather than piloting the idea among select communities. There is enough time.  

 That the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sec­toral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has been unable to come up with a governing charter in over two decades of its existence is no coincidence. The member coun­tries—initially Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand, which were later joined by Bhutan and Nepal—seemingly wanted to build a vibrant economic bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia, two of the fastest growing regions in the world. But for most of its existence BIMSTEC was badly neglected.

Then there was SAARC. As things stand, SAARC is the least integrated region in the world, with inter-country trade within SAARC accounting for less than six percent of the total foreign trade of the eight-member states. The concept of South Asian Free Trade Area, though much discussed, could never be implemented, as India and Pakistan continued to lock horns over even seemingly inconsequential issues. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at some point seems to have concluded that it is futile to expect a more connected South Asia via SAARC, so long as Pakistan is a part of it.

And so the moribund BIMSTEC was revived in 2014, the year it held its third heads-of-state summit, and the year its secretariat was finally established in Dhaka. If SAARC could not unite South Asia, perhaps a forum like BIMSTEC, minus Pakistan, and minus SAARC’s ‘unanimous decision’ provision, was better placed to enhance regional trade and connectivity. But this is a gamble.

As the fourth BIMSTEC summit ends in Kathmandu, the seven-member states have agreed to enhance trade through land and water ways, to collectively fight ter­rorism, to draft the long-delayed charter, to establish a regional fund and to boost customs cooperation. The charter, when ready, will add clarity about BIMSTEC’s purpose. More than that, if the forum can for instance facilitate the extension of India-Myanmar-Thailand highway all the way to Nepal, it could herald a sea of change in Nepal’s development. But will the securi­ty-minded India be ready to open up its territories for such an undertaking? What will greater anti-terrorism cooperation entail? And what happens to SAARC now? Even though India is uncommitted, other countries in South Asia still set great store by SAARC. The fourth summit brought some clarity on BIMSTEC and on regional cooperation. But perhaps not enough.

 The first reservation of a Nepali skeptic of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sec­toral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is that, technically, Nepal should not even be a part of it as the country is not on the Bay of Bengal. Of course, as Constantino Xavier points out, this reading overlooks Nepal’s centuries-old trade and cultural ties with other BIMSTEC countries like India, Bangladesh, Thailand and Myanmar before the British colonized the Indian subcontinent.

The other concern is that India is promoting the seven-member BIMSTEC to somehow undercut the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the eight-member regional grouping which, unlike BIMSTEC, includes Pakistan, India’s arch-enemy. In this reckoning, Nepal should be wary of support­ing BIMSTEC whose achievements are underwhelm­ing, even when compared to the perennially-subpar SAARC. Also, while SAARC brings together eight coun­tries of South Asia, a natural construct, BIMSTEC incon­gruously embraces five South Asian and two Southeast Asian countries.

Whether the skeptics are right or not, Nepal ought to be careful. First, is there a tangible way Nepal can benefit from BIMSTEC? The Nepali parliament recent­ly passed an anti-terrorism bill as a part of its com­mitment to BIMSTEC. This will entail greater security cooperation with BIMSTEC countries, primarily with India. Have the implications of new security commit­ments to India been properly weighed?

It would also be wonderful if Nepal could leverage the BIMSTEC forum to gain direct land access to Ban­gladesh and Myanmar via India. But will India, which has been rather paranoid about the security threats it faces from its neighbors, be ready to offer Nepal such an unhindered passage to these countries, or to the Indian Ocean? And has Nepal calculated the cost of iso­lating Pakistan and making the SAARC forum defunct?

There has been little of substance from Nepal gov­ernment on how it can use BIMSTEC to deal with vital issues like climate change or cross-border power trade. The fourth BIMSTEC summit in Kathmandu is sched­uled to issue a ‘BIMSTEC charter’. But what problems of Nepal will the charter help address again remain murky. In principle, there is absolutely nothing wrong with Nepal spreading its global footprint in its quest for greater prosperity. But at what cost? Without such cool-headed calculation, we are afraid that Nepal’s cur­rent approach to BIMSTEC is a shot in the dark