Submit your Article

The election government led by Prime Minister Sushila Karki has come under growing criticism for its handling of Nepal’s relations with its immediate neighbors, particularly China. Since the formation of the government following the GenZ movement, Prime Minister Karki and senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have repeatedly reaffirmed Nepal’s commitment to the One-China policy. However, these assurances appear to have done little to fully reassure Beijing.

In recent months, China has dispatched a series of official and semi-official teams to Nepal to assess the evolving political situation and its possible implications for bilateral relations. Diplomatic sources in Kathmandu say these visits reflect Beijing’s concerns about political uncertainty following the Sept 8–9 GenZ movement and the direction of Nepal’s new leadership.

Beijing’s unease reportedly deepened after Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama sent a congratulatory message to Prime Minister Karki upon her assumption of office. The message came as a shock to Chinese officials, who subsequently conveyed strong concerns to the Nepali leadership through diplomatic channels. China views any public engagement—direct or indirect—with the Dalai Lama as a sensitive issue, given its longstanding position that he represents separatist activities.

More recently, the visit of Tibetan spiritual leader Jonang Gyletsab Rinpoche to Nepal and the reception accorded to him in Kathmandu has once again raised eyebrows, both in Beijing and within Nepal’s political circles. Although Nepali officials maintain that the visit was religious in nature, critics argue that the government failed to anticipate the diplomatic repercussions.

Vice-chairperson of the CPN-UML, Ram Bahadur Thapa, publicly accused the Karki-led interim government of providing space to what he described as “anti-China activities” on Nepali soil. “The Dalai Lama’s representative came to Nepal and was received with great honor at the airport,” Thapa said, alleging that the government is implicitly protecting elements opposed to China’s core interests.

Foreign policy analyst Rupak Sapkota also points to the shortcomings in the government’s diplomatic approach. According to him, the Karki administration’s “immature handling” of relations with neighboring countries has raised suspicions in Beijing regarding Nepal’s commitment to the One-China policy.

Sapkota is not alone in his assessment. Several observers of Nepal’s foreign and strategic affairs have expressed concern that relations between Kathmandu and Beijing have become strained since the GenZ movement. Beijing reportedly also harbored reservations about the composition of the new cabinet and the broader political team assembled by Prime Minister Karki.

Adding to the diplomatic unease, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu remained without an ambassador for over a month after Chen Song was recalled to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Beijing has now appointed Zhang Maoming, a familiar face in Nepal’s political and diplomatic circles, who is expected to arrive in Kathmandu in the second week of this month. Observers see his appointment as a signal that China intends to recalibrate its engagement with Nepal during a politically sensitive period.

In recent months, multiple Chinese delegations have visited Kathmandu to study the GenZ movement, assess preparations for upcoming elections, and gauge the likely nature of the next government. Notably, Beijing has maintained near silence on the GenZ movement in official statements, and Chinese state media have published far fewer reports and commentaries on Nepal than in the past—an absence that many analysts interpret as cautious watchfulness rather than indifference.

The United States has maintained a notably low-key profile in Kathmandu amid policy uncertainty under the Donald Trump administration and shifting political dynamics in Nepal.

Washington’s decision to rebuke or roll back several longstanding policies, including the dismantling of USAID and the absence of clear strategic guidance, left US embassies abroad uncertain about their priorities. As a result, US engagement in Nepal declined sharply, accompanied by a noticeable drop in high-level visits between Kathmandu and Washington.

It was only in Aug 2025 that President Trump appointed Sergio Gor as the next US ambassador to India and special envoy for South and Central Asian affairs. During this interim period, the US Embassy in Kathmandu worked largely behind the scenes to persuade the new administration to continue the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact.

Shortly after State Department officials began re-engaging on South and Central Asia, Nepal experienced major political upheaval that led to the fall of the KP Sharma Oli-led government. Unverified reports and rumors alleging the involvement of US-backed non-governmental organizations in Sept 8–9 GenZ protests further reinforced Washington’s cautious approach and contributed to its subdued public posture.

Following the formation of a new government under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, the US formally welcomed it. Since then, however, there have been no public US statements on elections or Nepal’s internal political developments. While the ambassador and senior embassy officials continue to attend public events, they have largely refrained from commenting on domestic politics or the broader trajectory of bilateral relations.

This restraint has fueled concerns in Kathmandu about the Trump administration’s priorities toward Nepal. Addressing these concerns this week, senior State Department officials said the US is recalibrating—not withdrawing—its assistance. They indicated that future support will be narrower and more selective, focused on areas that serve US national interests and align with President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.

Allison Hooker, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said the administration’s aid strategy represents a calibration, not a pullback. “The US is a Pacific power, and the future of the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to our core national interests,” she said, emphasizing that Washington’s commitment to the region remains firm.

As senior US officials step up visits to other South Asian countries, diplomatic sources suggest Kathmandu could see similar engagements in the coming days, potentially offering clearer signals of Washington’s evolving approach to Nepal.

Amid reports of serious impacts on critical sectors such as health and education in developing and least-developed countries following cuts in U.S. aid, senior State Department officials have said that Washington has not pulled back assistance but is instead recalibrating it.

Speaking at a conference on U.S. foreign assistance in the Indo-Pacific held in Washington, the officials said the United States continues to provide support in the Indo-Pacific region in line with U.S. national security interests and President Donald Trump’s foreign policy priorities.

Allison Hooker, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said the administration’s aid strategy in the region represents a calibration, not a pullback. “The U.S. is a Pacific power, and the future of the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to our core national interests,” she said, highlighting that Washington’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific remains unwavering.

In his second term as president, the Trump administration dismantled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a move that has stressed the health and education systems of scores of countries that had long relied on American aid.

“Our foreign assistance needs to be a force multiplier as we safeguard our national security with the greatest military in the world, along with our allies and like-minded partners,” Hooker said.

Speaking at the same conference, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Michael DeSombre said, “We never got out of the foreign assistance business as some media narratives have claimed. During the review period of foreign aid, however, we saw an opportunity to fundamentally reimagine how foreign assistance is done, which required us to step back and examine the underlying principles that would guide our work.”

The resulting principles, he said, form a strategic framework aligned with the core tenets of the National Security Strategy and will guide U.S. efforts to ensure programs remain focused and effective. The statements by senior officials clearly indicate that the U.S. will continue to provide support in selective and narrow areas that align with its national interests.

The Trump administration issued a new National Security Strategy in November that places the Indo-Pacific region high on its list of priorities.

The document states: “The Indo-Pacific is already the source of almost half the world’s GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP), and one third based on nominal GDP. That share is certain to grow over the 21st century, which means the Indo-Pacific is already—and will continue to be—among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds.”

“To thrive at home, we must successfully compete there—and we are,” the document says, noting that President Trump signed major agreements during his October 2025 travels that further deepened ties in commerce, culture, technology, and defense, reaffirming U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The strategy also emphasizes improving commercial and other relations with India to encourage New Delhi’s contribution to Indo-Pacific security, including continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States under the “Quad.” It further states that the U.S. will work to align the actions of its allies and partners to prevent domination by any single competitor nation.

In Nepal, as in other countries, more than 80 percent of USAID assistance has been cut, though Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) investments have continued. Nearly a year after Trump returned to power, no senior U.S. officials have visited Nepal, even as there have been frequent visits to other smaller South Asian countries, notably Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Similarly, following the Gen Z movement, the U.S. has maintained a low-key profile in Nepal.

After years of tension and hostility, India and China are slowly moving toward rapprochement, signaling a potential shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. Their recent interactions, notably during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, are being closely observed not only across South Asian capitals but also in Western capitals, particularly Washington, DC.

On Aug 31, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the SCO summit. This marked one of the highest-level engagements between the two nations since their last meeting in Kazan in Oct 2024. The deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020 had severely strained bilateral ties.

During the meeting, both leaders acknowledged the progress made in stabilizing their relationship and expressed intent to build on this momentum. A particularly sensitive area—the long-standing border dispute—was a focal point. Modi noted that after the disengagement along certain friction points at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), an “atmosphere of peace and stability” had emerged. He further stated that special representatives from both countries had reached an agreement on enhanced border management.

Chinese President Xi emphasized that both sides should not let boundary issues define the overall relationship. He advocated for stronger bilateral cooperation and said, “It should be the right choice for China and India to be good-neighborly friends and partners that help each other succeed, and have the dragon and the elephant dance together.”

The ‘Dragon and Elephant’ metaphor has been previously invoked by Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who in March this year described it as the only correct strategic choice for both sides.

The Galwan Valley clash of June 2020 was the most serious military confrontation between India and China since the 1962 war, resulting in casualties on both sides. The incident led to a rapid deterioration in diplomatic, economic, and people-to-people ties. In the aftermath, direct flights between the two countries were suspended, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra was halted, and economic cooperation was curtailed.

However, signs of normalization have begun to appear. Both the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and direct air travel between New Delhi and Beijing are set to resume, signaling a renewed interest in rebuilding trust.

The rapprochement comes at a time when both countries are facing economic headwinds—partly due to external pressures such as the US trade war. US President Donald Trump’s administration has imposed steep tariffs on Chinese goods and extended similar measures to India, further complicating relations with both Asian powers.

As economic nationalism and protectionism rise in the West, India and China are increasingly turning to each other—not out of mutual affection but pragmatic necessity. Both countries are exploring expanded market access, supply chain integration, and greater cooperation in global governance.

At the SCO summit, Modi emphasized the importance of the bilateral relationship, stating, “Cooperation between our two countries is linked to the interests of 2.8bn people. This will also pave the way for the welfare of all humanity,” he said. Despite the warming tone, deep strategic divergences remain, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. India is a key member of the Quad alliance, along with the US, Japan, and Australia. The group aims to promote a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific, which Beijing perceives as an anti-China bloc.

India has also rejected China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on grounds of sovereignty and transparency—especially given that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI project. Moreover, India remains wary of China’s growing influence in South Asia, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives, where Beijing has invested heavily under its regional outreach strategy.

Despite these regional tensions, both countries continue to collaborate on global platforms. India and China are active participants in BRICS—a bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, and South Africa—which aims to offer an alternative to Western-dominated institutions. Discussions are ongoing about introducing a BRICS currency, although differences between India and China on implementation persist.

In their statements, both leaders recognized their roles as ancient civilizations, populous nations, and key voices of the Global South. They pledged to continue cooperation in multilateral frameworks on issues like climate change, sustainable development, and global economic governance.

India-China relations have seen cyclical highs and lows since they established diplomatic ties in 1950. Major milestones include Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark visit to China in 1988, and Chinese President Xi’s visit to India in 2014, followed by reciprocal visits and two informal summits in 2018 (Wuhan) and 2019 (Chennai). These engagements laid the groundwork for what was once seen as a promising new phase in bilateral ties.

However, the Galwan clash derailed much of that progress. Now, with global realignments and economic shifts, both countries appear to be reassessing their strategic calculus. The recent SCO declaration also criticized unilateral economic measures—widely interpreted as a rebuke of the West’s use of tariffs and sanctions. 

“Member States oppose unilateral coercive measures, including those of an economic nature, that contravene the UN Charter… negatively affecting the global economy, undermining fair competition, hindering international cooperation and the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals,” the declaration states.

The meeting between Modi and Xi in Tianjin symbolizes a cautious thaw between two regional heavyweights who have more to gain from cooperation than conflict. Yet, while economics may bring them closer in the short term, deep-seated geopolitical differences will continue to shape the trajectory of the India-China relationship. Whether the dragon and the elephant can truly dance or merely avoid stepping on each other’s toes remains one of Asia’s most critical strategic questions.