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Constantino Xavier holds a Phd in South Asian studies from Johns Hopkins Uni­versity. Currently a Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brook­ings India, Xavier is writing a book on India’s crisis response and involvement in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. He is also researching the challenges of connectivity and security across the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions. A close observ­er of South Asian geopolitics, Xavier sat down with Biswas Baral and Kamal Dev Bhattarai to discuss growing Indo-Pak tensions, the Asia Pacific Strategy and India’s relationship with Nepal.

How do you view the recent terrorist attacks in Kashmir and developments in Indo-Pak relations since?

No doubt it is going to escalate. We do not know how India will retaliate. War is a big word, and there are many ways in which these two countries can go about it.

Is there a possibility of a repetition of the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’?

Surgical strikes, cross-border strikes, sanctions, mobilizations—there are all kinds of options before India.

What would be the regional implications of this conflict?

It is certainly not good for SAARC as the regional body has not moved ahead in the past four years because of tensions between India and Pakistan.  With the tensions flaring up again, the process of reactivating SAARC will be further delayed. Nepal has been pushing for the SAARC Summit, and other member countries have become increasingly impatient because it is an important regional organization, in fact the most important in South Asia. And regionalism cannot be made hostage to bilateral relations. That has happened with SAARC. With other organizations like BIMSTEC, it has not. 

Despite the tensions over Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh and Myanmar have continued to cooperate in BIMSTEC. I know India often faces criticism vis-à-vis SAARC. There are three or four instances when India tried to push regional cooperation through SAARC, including the SAARC motor vehicle agreement, a SAARC satellite and a transit corridor though India and Afghanistan. On all three issues, Pakistan consistently blocked the way.

That is Pakistan’s right, but the way Pakistan has bilateralized issues has affected the SAARC process. At some point, India said enough is enough, we cannot let regional cooperation be hostage to these issues and we will have to look for alternatives. Regional cooperation is not a monopoly of SAARC. There is BIMSTEC, BBIN, the India-Nepal framework on hydropower and transportation, and some triangular mechanisms. So recent developments have not been good but they don’t also spell the end of regional cooperation.

Beyond SAARC, how does the tension between India and Pakistan affect this region geo-strategically?

To cooperate, you need to be connected. SAARC has been unsuccessful for so many years because it is not connected properly. Earlier, India was defensive and a closed economy. And Nepal could not connect with China. Now, you have those options. You can also help bring China into South Asia. Now, there is a new world of connectivity. This is very different to the security-centered conflict between India and Pakistan. I do not see the possibility of war between India and Pakistan; and I do not see military escalation affecting the connectivity corridor between Nepal and China, or between Nepal and the Bay of Bengal, or between Bhutan and Bangladesh.

India and Pakistan want other countries in the region to take their side, which makes people nervous. In 1962 when India and China fought a war, Sri Lanka said it would be neutral and mediate the dispute. China agreed but India was very upset. India said to Sri Lanka that since it is an immediate neighbor, it couldn’t be neutral, and that it should not try to be a mediator. India said it was a bilateral issue. As a result, relations between India and Sri Lanka suffered. So there will obviously be pressure. In 2016 when India pulled out of the SAARC summit, it expected support from other countries. Several countries in the region supported India. Since then, many countries including Nepal have been impatient and saying that SAARC must be reactivated.

In case of a conflict, while there will be pressure from Delhi to take sides, no one is under any illusion that Nepal will give in. Sometimes, India also faces pressure from China and America to choose sides. It’s the same with Nepal. As an immediate neighbor, Nepal will have special consideration for India’s position, but it also has good relations with Pakistan, which it doesn’t want to spoil. Frankly, no one will really care. Smaller countries have learned to hedge their bets.

In your view will the national elections in India this year change its Nepal policy?

I hear in Kathmandu that the BJP, the Congress and various Indian communist parties have different policies on Nepal. Fundamentally, I do not think it matters much which party is in power in New Delhi. The broad lines of India’s Nepal policy are clear. Its main objectives like connectivity, interdependence, support for Nepal’s development will not change. You now have a strong and stable government in Nepal after 20 years of instability. I think New Delhi is clear that it has to engage with the government led by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. There is a good relationship between the two prime ministers, and between the two states and bureaucracies. So whoever is the prime minister in New Delhi, there would be continuation in Indian foreign policy. 

Do you think there has been a change in India’s Madhes policy after the blockade?

I do not have evidence to prove that the Indian state was complicit in the blockade. As a scholar, I can speak only on the basis of evidence and facts. What I can say is that the Indian government could have done more to help Nepal overcome the pain of the blockade.

Let’s assume India had no hand in the blockade. In that case, India could have supported Nepal. It could have airlifted essentials like food and fuel into Kathmandu. It did not. That hurt bilateral relations.

Let’s now assume that India had a role in the blockade, whatever the motive: support for the Madhesis, an inclusive constitution, etc. What instrument you use to pursue your interest is important. Do you use a blockade or diplomacy? Do you use pressure and what form of pressure? I think whatever happened, it left a bad aftertaste in bilateral relations. India learned that it has to respond to its neighbors’ demands and it cannot let neighboring countries develop anti-Indian feelings. So even if India had no role in the blockade, it could have done more to help Nepal during the humanitarian crisis.

How do you assess India’s current relationship with Madhesi parties?

The salience of the Madhes issue in bilateral relations has gone down. You see general statements about inclusiveness and diversity, but there are not prescriptive statements India used in 2015/2016 about what Nepal should be doing in terms of its constitutional and political arrangements. I think there is now a focus on delivering development assistance, implementing connectivity projects and diversifying outreach in Nepal beyond the usual groups of people who are friendly to India. No minority issue is permanently resolved. Every country has to continually work on diversity, bring in new people, redistribute. Even in post-war Sri Lanka, there is a continuous process of reassuring minority groups. Various minority groups in Nepal including the Madhesis want more rights. Generally speaking, India thinks nation-states need to be more inclusive.

Looking from New Delhi, how do you see the relationship between the communist government in Kathmandu and China?

China has always been around but its financial clout and emphasis on public diplomacy are relatively new, with a short history of just five to 10 years. All countries have to adjust to this new reality. I think India has gone through it. Now, India does not have a monopoly in this region. China is an immediate neighbor of Nepal. Often Beijing is portrayed as being far-away. But China is just across the border and is developing huge infrastructures on the border. Tibet is going to witness tremendous growth and infrastructure development. I think India is now focused on delivering because that is the only way it can pursue its interest. It does not have a special prerogative anymore. The best product is the cheapest, whatever Nepal gets it from. Nepal should pursue its national interest based on that. India’s clear focus now is on delivering more.

Is that because of pressure from China?

If you are a fan of connectivity in South Asia and believe Nepal and India should be more integrated and interdependent—in terms of infrastructure, roads, rails, inland waterways, airplane connectivity, data connectivity, educational exchanges, defense diplomacy—you have to ask why that didn’t happen in the past 70 years? Therefore ‘Thank you China!’ By coming into Nepal and developing that connectivity, China made India wake up to the importance of regional integration. India as the largest country in South Asia has a special responsibility in promoting connectivity. If Nepal wants connectivity with Bangladesh, it should have permission from India for the movement of trucks and data. It is in India’s interest to promote that, but it took China’s greater presence in South Asia for India to realize and speed up its investment in connectivity.

You have maintained that Nepal-India relations are still special, even though the idea of a special relationship is increasingly contested in Nepal.

On paper and in theory, every relationship is special and unique. Nepal-France relationship is special and unique. So is Nepal-Australia relationship. But I will speak to you realistically. As of today, geography, history and culture connect Nepal more to India than to China. Now, Nepal is saying it must change this and reconstitute linkages with China because it also has a long tradition of connectivity with China. Naturally, Nepal wants to diversify its options in order to reduce its dependence on India.  At the same time, there still are elements that make Nepal-India relationship more unique and special. Even today, Nepali citizens are allowed to join the Indian civil service and armed forces based on the 1950 treaty.  

Nepal could consider abrogating the treaty. But you have Nepali citizens serving as officers in the Indian air force. You cannot have Nepali citizens serving in the Chinese air force. In many ways, this is a vestige of the colonial era. The special treaty was signed on the behalf of British colonial players with the Kingdom of Nepal. 

The open border is yet another aspect of the special relationship between Nepal and India. Again, it is up to Nepal to decide whether it wants to do away with this.

How does India see the greater engagement of western powers in South Asian countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka?

The US opened its embassy in Kathmandu in 1959. It then started providing development aid. It is still a big provider of development assistance to Nepal. The long history of US-Nepal relationship is independent of US-India, US-China or China-India relationship. In fact, India was opposed to the US entering Nepal because it thought that would create tensions with the Chinese. India advised the US not to open an embassy in Kathmandu as that would encourage the Chinese to follow suit. There was cold war rivalry. But now the world has changed. Nepal is one of the dynamic economies in South Asia, and it has a young population. Up to the 1970s, Nepali students used to go to Calcutta or Delhi to study. Today they are also going to China, Singapore, Australia and Korea to work, study and teach. This is a different world that India has to adjust to. Now, India and China are working together in third countries. For example, India and China are jointly training diplomats in Afghanistan.

US interest has always been there in Nepal. The way the US looks at Nepal aligns more closely with the way India or Japan looks at Nepal than with how China looks at Nepal. That naturally creates coordination in policies. India, the US and Japan agree that Nepal needs open and free democratic institutions to develop sustainably.

Could you very briefly define the so-called Indo-Pacific Strategy?

The Indo-Pacific Strategy is a US document, one I doubt many people have read. It is a small security and strategic document, part of a larger approach called Indo-Pacific. Indo-Pacific is an alignment of worldviews and interests about how to manage security, growth, connectivity and development in larger Asia. You cannot separate these. People ask if it is all about security; yes it is also about security. This are similarities of views on the best ways to manage Asia, in particular as a response to the Chinese view. Again, ‘Thank you, China!’ I have to say because by developing the Belt and Road Initiative and thanks to its larger outreach across Asia and Euro Asia, it has also highlighted the need to develop alternatives.

You will be surprised. The biggest Indo-Pacific proponents often are not in the US, Japan or India. They are rather in countries like Sri Lanka and Malaysia that are now flooded with Chinese investment. They want India-Japan and other coordination mechanisms as alternatives. You do not want to depend on one country. There is an interest in balancing China. Many South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well as South East Asian countries want more of India. You have to deliver. The Indo-Pacific Strategy is not a security alliance, it is not about containing China, it is not about defense. It is about having alternatives.

Alternatives give you freedom and autonomy. If I depend on a single partner, whether it is India, China or the US, I am hostage to that partner. By having more partners, I gain greater bargaining power. That is why India still maintains a very good relationship with Russia, and the US is upset with it.  The current impulse in Nepal is to focus on China, its next-door neighbor and the second strongest power in this world. Similarly, China here is taken as a reliable partner that has delivered in the past decade and it is ready to do more. While there is this inclination in Nepal, there is a case to be made to diversify. You should always keep your options open.

While our Foreign Minister was in Washington, the US State Department issued a statement that put Nepal at the ‘center’ of the Indo-Pacific. How do we understand this?

It means that when the United States talks about the Indo-Pacific and India, it is talking not only about maritime countries. It is talking about countries which have an interest in a free and open Pacific. This means bilateral relations based on transparency, mutually agreed-upon rules and sovereignty. 

Q. A question you wish more people would ask of you?

A. ‘What is the reason for your happiness?’

Q. Your alternate career choice?

A. Air hostess.

Q. What is one thing you do to cheer yourself up?

A. Lately, spend more time with my son.

Q. One most misunder­stood thing about you?

A. That I am full of myself.

Q. You were star-struck when you met?

A. Sarun Tamrakar, my hus­band.

Q. The thing people would be surprised to know about you?

A. That I am family-oriented.

Q. If you could have coffee with one Nepali celebri­ty, who would it be?

A. Lemi, the make-up artist

Q. Words that keep you motivated?

A. ‘Keep doing what you can do without expecting anything in return’.

Q. Something you would tell your younger self?

A. I shouldn’t have left my parents to go overseas at such young age.

Q. Would you say you are a better wife or a better mother?

A. Better mother.

The constitutional deadline for promulgating laws loom ever closer, but the government is yet to table all the bills in the parliament. Neither is lawmaking transparent, nor do parties seems focused on the contents of these bills. There are already indications that several provisions are against the spirit of the constitution. And there are concerns about the role of the National Assembly (NA), the upper house of federal parliament: Is it more than a rubberstamp for the lower house? Biswas Baral and Kamal Dev Bhattarai talked to Radheshyam Adhikari, a senior advocate and an assembly member from the Nepali Congress, on a wide range of issues related to law-making and the assembly’s role therein.

How do you characterize the current law-making process?

The government has expressed its commitment to meet the statutory deadline—first week of March—for formulating or amending laws in line with the new constitution. But the way the federal parliament is functioning indicates that the commitment will not be fulfilled. The National Assembly meets just once a week, which means it does not have enough business.

Can you update us on the progress so far on formulating new laws and amending old ones?

There are some problems. The government has introduced dozens of laws under a single basket. For example, it has brought a proposal seeking to amend 57 laws simultaneously. Such a working style does not allow a broad cross-section study of laws and the monitoring of the provisions that could affect each other. We had a bitter experience while formulating laws concerning the implementation of the fundamental rights of citizens. We were compelled to endorse 11 laws forwarded by the House of Representatives (HoR) without examining even a single word therein. Five laws forwarded by the NA were endorsed by the HoR in a similar manner. Such a scenario shows there’s no point in having a bi-cameral house. Passing laws in this way will create problems. 

Why, unlike in the past, have lawmakers not been consulted on the law-making process?

There are two aspects to it. One, we have an in-built system that ensures checks and balances, but the system is weak. Two, we can consult various stakeholders when we have time, but now we are running out of time because of our tendency to table bills in the House at the eleventh hour seeking their early passage. There has been some consultation on some issues of public concern, such as the citizenship bill. However, we are going to formulate around 300 laws, each with several stakeholders. On some laws, there hasn’t even been a minimum level of consultation.  

It is ill intent or sheer negligence on the government’s part?

One reason is the looming constitutional deadline. Another is the incapacity of our state mechanisms. I refer not only to the performance of this government, but to our weak state mechanisms that have been in place for long. We have a dearth of human resources in state mechanisms. The manpower shortage is acute in the Ministry of Law, the Parliament Secretariat and the Nepal Law Commission, which are key bodies in the lawmaking process. We have also been unable to use the existing manpower. 

But it’s also true that laws have been formulated in a careless manner. For example, there was very little discussion in the preliminary stage among the concerned agencies, such as the cabinet’s bill committee and the relevant ministry. As I said, our in-built system is so flawed that it cannot handle these issues efficiently. Now, there are fears that only about 20 to 30 percent of the legislation will be made by the parliament and the rest of the lawmaking authority will gradually be transferred to the government. Lack of vigilance will further weaken the parliament.

Could you give us an example of the declining role of the parliament in the law-making process?

For example, when a bill with, say, 17-18 sections is tabled in the parliament, the bill will be formed in a way that allows the government the final say over 11-12 sections, which means granting more legislative powers to the government.

This means many legal provisions would be further elaborated by regulations and directives, which are issued by various government ministries and departments. By endorsing incomplete laws, the parliament is gradually transferring authority to the government or the bureaucracy. The parliament can monitor these processes, but it cannot perform all oversight tasks.

That is why we are pushing for having a substantive part of the bills endorsed by the parliament. However, very few are floating this idea, as the ruling party has a majority and we are not in a position to challenge it.

Why is the opposition not paying enough attention to the content of the bills?

It is partially true that the opposition has not paid sufficient attention to overall lawmaking.  This is because we are focused on other issues. Through our policies, we have to present ourselves in a different light than the government. But we are centered on personal issues and agenda. Our main task is law-making, and we should get involved in this process in a thorough manner. But this is not happening. We have told our party leadership to form departments or a shadow cabinet and entrust them with the responsibility to scrutinize the lawmaking process in both the chambers.

Could you talk a bit about what is happening with the Passport Bill?

The bill on passports contains some flawed provisions. After the political change in 1990, getting a passport became easy. People get a passport primarily to visit other countries. Issuing passports easily led to more foreign trips in the past three decades. Although this has some drawbacks, the benefits outweigh the costs. The bill tabled in the parliament has many ‘if and buts’ in several sections, which can curb access to a passport.

For example, the proposed bill says that people involved in money laundering would be denied passports. The government itself files cases related to money laundering. People’s passports cannot be seized on the basis of cases filed by the government. It is up to the court to control the movement of people facing money laundering charges, but the government cannot seize passports. If someone is convicted of money laundering, we would not object to such provisions. But we cannot deny passports on the basis of cases filed in the court. Such problematic provisions need to be amended. 

What about the bill on the management and regulation of advertisements?

There are a couples of reasons behind our opposition to the bill on the regulation of advertisements. Our first logic is that the provisions of criminal offence are not applicable to the issues related to publishing and broadcasting advertisements. It is very simple; it should be a civil offence. 

Our second concern is about the provision of freedom of speech and expression, which is a fundamental right. Also objectionable is a non-bailable provision with a five-year sentence. So the bill in its current form is hostile to freedom of expression and it intends to criminalize offenders. You can regulate, but not control, advertisements. And you certainly cannot make people infringing advertisement regulations criminals.  

There are confusions about the functions and duties of the National Assembly. Could you please help us understand it better?

We are going to squander an opportunity to exploit the assembly’s potential. We haven’t had a serious discussion on how to make good use of the NA. If we continue with the current process of endorsing the bills, there is no need for two chambers. Because it has mayors from the local level and those elected from provincial assemblies as members, the NA could have played a vital role in making the federal system more effective and result-oriented. It could be a mediator between the government and various federal structures.

The NA’s leadership should take up these issues. We have raised them in the parliament, but our voice is not strong enough to take a concrete shape. There is growing dissatisfaction that the provincial governments are being denied the powers granted by the constitution. This is where the assembly could play a vital role. It can question the government about this, and disseminate the response to the provincial and local levels. It is a political process.

Are there conflicts between constitutional provisions and the role that the assembly is playing?

There is a set of procedures for passing bills from parliament. The money bills directly go to the HoR, and it is its exclusive right. The feedback we provide on this bill could be accepted or rejected by the house. Irrespective of our position, the house can forward this bill to the President for authentication. Other bills could be registered in both the houses and there are certain procedures mentioned in the law. If we do not get an additional role from a legislative perspective, the NA loses its relevance.

The assembly can play an important role in the lawmaking process, as it can study the laws, find loopholes and ways to plug them. For example, within a year, the Ministry of Agriculture has introduced 20 directives that are being implemented as law. Of the 20, as many as 11 directives have not mentioned the law on which they are based. These are serious issues that require a strong leadership to address. We have three levels of government, all of which are making laws. But we do not have a place where the laws of all three levels can be deposited so that they can be later studied. The federal upper house could be such a place.

There are record-keeping tasks as well, but we still lack sufficient infrastructure to carry them out. Our parliament doesn’t have a record of the laws it has passed. We don’t have all the documents in one place. We can push the assembly to perform these tasks. Lawmaking is only a small part of the NA’s responsibilities. If efficiently run, it can play a huge role in assisting the ongoing process of state restructuring.  

You see unsatisfied with the current role of the National Assembly?

Yes, I am not satisfied with its performance so far. If the NA continues functioning this way, it is better to dissolve it. Because we are not in a position to interfere in the law-making process, there is currently a wasteful duplication of effort. If we need this institution, we have to prove its utility.

Bhaskar Koirala, the Director of Nepal Institute of International and Strategic Studies (NIIS), is an old China hand. He is a keen observer of the strategic competition among big powers in Nepal. Kamal Dev Bhattarai caught up with Koirala for his insights on Nepal’s foreign policy, the new rumpus over Venezuela and Nepal’s relations with China and the US.

How do you evaluate the Oli government’s foreign policy in the past one year?

The country is still in transition and even senior leaders are not sure which direction it is headed in. In this transitional phase, the leadership is weak, and there is a lack of clarity on the country’s foreign policy objectives. There are fundamental disagreements on what kind of foreign policy Nepal should pursue. So I do not know how you can claim success in the conduct of foreign policy. We can take the most recent example of Venezuela, and use it as a benchmark to determine the quality of foreign policy processes in Nepal. If you go back a bit and try to understand how this government has defined its relationship with China, India and the US, I see a lack of clarity.

Why do you think that is the case?

There is no creativity in the overall process. A lot of things could have been initiated in relationships with India, China and the US. But you do not see that happening. After one year, what is the result? Where is the government headed? How has the government defined its foreign policy? 

You referred to Venezuela. How has its handling by the ruling party and the government been?

Lately, the government seems embroiled in the Venezuela issue. Many were surprised by this; no one had expected happenings in that country to have reverberations in Nepal. It started with a press statement by a co-chairman of the ruling party. Some say it is an ideological issue and the communist party had to stand by it. But I think this is an example of negligence in the conduct of foreign policy. But let us not blow things up. There was similar negligence when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was supposed to mention ‘condolences’ instead of ‘congratulations’ while sending a message to Indonesia after it was struck by a devastating cyclone. Venezuela’s case was one of similar negligence, no more. Nepal does not have a substantive relationship with Venezuela.

Do you espy China’s hand behind Dahal’s statement on Venezuela?

I think that’s totally ridiculous. I do not think China would dictate to another country what kind of foreign policy statement it should release. I certainly do not believe, unlike what some media outlets have suggested, that China somehow coaxed Nepal into taking this position.

It seems that the government’s position has created some friction in our relations with the US.

It has created a serious problem in bilateral relations with the US. How long its impact will last, I do not know but it seems to be a big issue. In a recently held diplomatic briefing of the government, the US Ambassador to Nepal was missing. The US has said that the investment summit that Nepal is going to organize in March is premature. Remember, the statement on Venezuela was signed by a co-chairman of the ruling party and on the party’s letter pad, and it was backed by the Foreign Ministry later. That is not how foreign policy issues should have been handled. Even small negligence can lead to a serious crisis.

Talking about the Americans, how important are Nepal-US ties?

The Nepal-US relations have been very important over the past 70 years. Recently, Minister for Foreign Affairs Pradeep Gyawali visited the United States. At a recent program in Vietnam, I met Alice Wells, the US Assistant Deputy Secretary of State, who gave examples of how the Indo-Pacific region is becoming more and more important for them. She said the $500 million grant to Nepal under the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a part of their overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The MCC does two things: road maintenance and construction of transmission lines. Roads are already there and the Americans help repair them. Nepal has huge potential in hydropower, so the US is helping Nepal stand on its own feet. So, you can look at it in those terms as well. And you do not have to see it as the US trying to contain China from here. The US is a big power. As a relatively small country in this region between two larger states, Nepal should have its own identity. Nepal should stand on its own feet and should be independent. 

I find the concept of the US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP) interesting. Long before the earthquake, the US helped with the conservation of our temples through the AFCP. So, the US is trying to help Nepal to preserve its identity in this age of rapid globalization; maybe it thinks Nepal’s identity is being diluted. The US is helping us because it lost many aspects of its culture to modernization. They want to help us preserve our identity.

But there are views that China is concerned about Nepal cultivating closer ties with the US.

We are confining ourselves to a certain narrative. As someone who’s been interested in Chinese foreign policy for the last 15 years, I do not think China would be concerned if Nepal develops a closer relationship with the US and deepens its relationship with India, so long as these relations do not hurt its core interests. So long as its interests aren’t affected, China would be happy to see Nepal develop a multifaceted relationship with the United States. 

There was much talk about Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali’s visit to the US. How did you see it?

When the then Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Nepal 17 years ago, he did not specifically come here to meet our foreign minister and discuss bilateral issues or to talk about how Nepal had an important role in the US regional strategy. Powell had come here as a part of a world-wide tour after 9\11 to garner Nepal’s support on the war on terror. Gyawali’s recent visit is very important because such a visit took place after a gap of over 17 years. I do not know when the two countries’ foreign ministers had met before Powell’s visit.

What was the outcome of our foreign minister’s trip to the US?

Although Gyawali’s visit was a very important platform to cultivate relations with the United States, we were not able to capitalize on it. Maybe it was also the fault of the foreign ministry that didn’t know how to present the visit to the Nepali public, or to other international powers. It was not like Nepal had to sign on a dotted line that it was now subscribing to the Indo-Pacific Strategy. I do not see why Nepal could not take part in discussions on the concept of Indo-Pacific. There could be, for instance, discussions on how Nepal can contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.

We can move ahead in far more positive, constructive and creative ways rather than simply saying Nepal is neutral and implying that the Indo-Pacific Strategy is directed at China and Nepal cannot jeopardize the BRI.

The government lost an opportunity. The idea of Indo-Pacific is not contradictory to the Belt and Road Initiative. Even international media are presenting the two as mutually exclusive ideas. We can reconcile the two broad foreign policy concepts, one coming from China and another from the US.

How do you observe Nepal’s evolving relations with China?

It is headed in a positive direction. I frequently visit bordering areas such as Kerung and Hilsa. China is developing infrastructures along its border with Nepal. It shows how much importance China attaches to its relations with Nepal. We do not have the same level of infrastructure on the Nepali side. There is hardly any movement on our side. Bordering areas on our side do not have electricity. For example, police cum administrators are working without electricity in Hilsa, which is an important place. Hilsa is not connected with roads to the district headquarters. We can’t even get electricity from China, even though the locals want it desperately. There has not been any initiative to bring electricity from China to these areas. There is a lack of clarity. Pretty much the same could be said about our bilateral relations.

The BRI process in Nepal seems stuck. Then there is that talk of a debt trap.

Yes, obviously a country like Nepal, which is going through a transition and which is much weaker than China, India or the US, should be cautious. But this is just one narrative. We have to avoid the kind of entanglements seen in other countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Everyone is talking about a debt-trap. But one narrative cannot define Nepal’s relationship with China. There are other bilateral issues.  Around 7,000 Nepali students are studying in China. There are 65 weekly flights between Kathmandu and various Chinese cities. They are important for boosting our economic relationship. Tourism is another area that can enhance economic relations.

But there are some structural problems between the two countries. There have been discussions on railway connectivity and people are very excited. But there is no road connectivity. We have not talked to the Chinese about ensuring our agriculture products’ access in their market. Our government authorities have not sat down with their Chinese counterparts to discuss and settle this issue. This is a glaring weakness on the part of our government. There are many examples of this relationship moving forward but there are also counter-signs. Take the example of the ring road in Kathmandu. We should take it in a positive way because it is a significant piece of infrastructure. Rather than indulging conspiracy theories, we should be thankful to the Chinese government. We can plant trees and manage cycle lanes there on our own. Again, there are multiple narratives. We should try to understand those narratives.

How does Nepal manage the strategic competition between the US, India and China?

We talked about the railway from China, which is an extraordinary development. The Nepali leadership wants to show it to the public. See this is how our relations are progressing! But the Nepali leadership has not taken the initiative to take India into confidence. We have a 1,700 km-long open border with India. It is a historical fact, whether you like it or not. Our border with China, on the other hand, is closed. Trade relations between India and China are growing and there are frequent interactions between them. They also have serious disagreements on security matters. How you allay Indian concerns about this railway from China? Is it not the responsibility of our leadership?

We have to be sensitive while dealing with this delicate matter. In sum, we have to take India and China into confidence. That is the only way to move forward.