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In Nepal today, there is a growing feeling that things must change, and change fast. Many people are tired of corruption, political hiring and systems that do not work as they should. In such a moment, when strong and decisive actions are taken, it is natural to feel a sense of relief. Finally, something is moving. Finally, someone is acting. But at the same time, there is also unease. Not everyone is comfortable with the speed, the method or the consequences. This tension is not a weakness. It reflects the complexity of the situation we are in. There are generally two ways societies evolve.

One is gradual, where change happens slowly through learning, participation and institutional development. The other is more abrupt, where leaders try to break existing systems and introduce new rules quickly. Nepal at this moment seems to be experiencing more of the second. This is not surprising. When problems become deeply rooted, slow reform often feels insufficient. People lose patience. They begin to prefer action over discussion. Yet action without process brings its own questions. One example is the use of ordinances to pass decisions without full parliamentary debate. For some, this is necessary to avoid delays and resistance from within the system. For others, it raises concerns about legitimacy.

Debate is not just a procedural step. It is where different voices are heard, where policies are tested, and where unintended consequences can be identified early. When this space is reduced, even well intentioned policies can feel imposed rather than agreed upon. The issue of sukumbasi (informal) settlements shows how difficult this balance is. There are cases where people misuse public land, claiming to be landless when they are not. Addressing this is important. A system cannot function if rules are constantly bypassed. At the same time, there are families who genuinely have no alternative. They live on public land not by choice, but by necessity. When both groups are treated just the same, the line between justice and hardship becomes unclear.

Clearing settlements may solve a structural problem, but it creates a human one if people are left without support. Promises of rehabilitation are important, but they need to be timely, clear and trustworthy. Otherwise, people experience the policy not as reform, but as displacement. 

A similar pattern appears in everyday economic policies. New customs rules on small cross border purchases may be designed to bring discipline and reduce leakage. From a national perspective, this can make sense. But for people living near the border, or those with limited income, these small transactions are part of daily life. They are not exploiting the system. They are surviving within it. A policy that looks minor on paper can feel heavy in practice. This is where rapid change often struggles. It treats society as if it is uniform, but in reality, people experience policies very differently depending on their situation. 

What feels like progress to one group may feel like loss to another. At the same time, relying only on gradual change is not always realistic. In systems where problems are deeply embedded, slow reform can be absorbed, delayed or even quietly resisted. It can create the appearance of change without changing much at all. This is why moments of disruption emerge. They reflect accumulated frustration, not just political ambition. 

So Nepal stands between two pressures. The need to act, and the need to act carefully. In such a moment, the role of citizens also becomes complicated. There is a tendency to think that we must either fully support or strongly oppose. But reality is not so simple. Constant criticism can weaken the momentum needed for reform. It can turn every action into a controversy. At the same time, blind support can remove the checks that keep power accountable. Without questioning, even good intentions can lead to poor outcomes. The challenge is not to choose one side, but to hold both responsibilities at once: To support the need for change, while also asking how that change is being carried out. Another concern is how easily change becomes tied to individuals. When a leader or a small team becomes the symbol of reform, people begin to place their hopes in that person. This can be inspiring, but also risky. Systems should not depend on personalities. If change is not built into institutions, it may not last beyond the current leadership. What is achieved quickly can also disappear quickly. There is also a deeper layer to consider. Society is not only shaped by laws and policies. It is shaped by habits, relationships and shared understandings. These evolve slowly. 

Even the strongest policy cannot immediately change how people think or behave. If this cultural dimension is ignored, reforms may face resistance or fail to take root. Today, this complexity is amplified by the divide between online and offline spaces. Social media often presents issues in extreme terms. People are either for or against. There is little space for nuance. But on the ground, life continues in more complicated ways. People adapt, negotiate and find ways to cope, often outside the simplified narratives we see online.

Nepal today stands at an important turning point. Across the country, especially among younger generations, frustration is growing against corruption, policy paralysis, and an economic system that has left Nepal heavily dependent on imports, remittances, and external vulnerabilities. The rise of reform-oriented civic voices and new political narratives reflects a deeper aspiration: people want a Nepal that is economically confident, institutionally accountable, and capable of protecting citizens from recurring crises.

Yet Nepal’s economy remains dangerously exposed to external shocks. A conflict in the Middle East immediately affects transport costs in Kathmandu. Fuel disruptions abroad suddenly increase the prices of food, medicine, and daily essentials inside Nepal. Decisions made in New Delhi or Beijing can directly influence inflation, supply chains, and market stability across the country within days.

This is not merely an economic issue. It is a strategic vulnerability.

The recent tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran once again exposed how fragile import-dependent economies can become during geopolitical crises. Fuel prices surged across the region, transportation costs increased sharply, and inflation spread rapidly into smaller economies like Nepal. Businesses faced uncertainty, logistics became expensive, and households immediately felt the pressure. What made the situation more alarming was the widening fuel price disparity between Nepal and India. Diesel prices in Kathmandu rose dramatically higher than corresponding prices in Delhi, despite Nepal’s overwhelming dependence on imported petroleum routed through India. This gap is particularly concerning because diesel powers transportation, agriculture, construction, and industrial activity. When diesel prices rise sharply, the cost of almost everything rises with it.

Years ago, fuel price differences between Nepal and India were not this extreme. Today, however, Nepal often appears trapped between external dependency and internal inefficiency. This raises a serious question: why does Nepal still lack strong economic diplomacy capable of negotiating strategic economic safeguards during global instability? Economic diplomacy is often misunderstood in Nepal as simply an extension of foreign policy. In reality, it is one of the most powerful tools modern states use to protect national economic interests. Countries aggressively negotiate trade advantages, secure energy arrangements, attract industries, expand exports, and build strategic partnerships through coordinated economic diplomacy.

Nepal, despite being strategically located between two major economies, still behaves too passively in this domain. Diplomatic missions frequently remain focused on protocol and administrative functions while economic priorities receive limited attention. Meanwhile, neighboring countries are aggressively pursuing free trade agreements, export diversification, industrial relocation opportunities, and long-term energy security arrangements.

Nepal cannot afford to remain reactive while the global economy becomes increasingly competitive and geopolitically fragmented.

The country’s relationship with India and China should therefore be approached strategically. India remains Nepal’s largest trade partner, transit route, and energy supplier. China offers opportunities for infrastructure development, technology cooperation, and market diversification. Nepal’s objective should not be to choose between the two, but to engage both with maturity and strategic clarity. A stable Nepal benefits both neighbors. Excessive inflation, prolonged economic stress, or supply disruptions inside Nepal eventually create wider regional consequences. Nepal therefore has every right to use diplomatic channels more assertively to negotiate smoother supply coordination, emergency energy cooperation, transit facilitation, and price stabilization mechanisms during global disruptions.

However, diplomacy abroad cannot succeed if governance at home remains weak.

One of Nepal’s greatest problems is not the absence of policies. The country already possesses multiple foreign policy frameworks, trade strategies, and development plans. The real problem lies in execution failure. Institutions often lack coordination, accountability, urgency, and performance measurement. Many diplomatic missions do not have dedicated economic units focused solely on trade, investment, tourism, and technology partnerships.

This institutional inertia must change.

Nepal urgently needs professional economic diplomacy teams within major diplomatic missions. Diplomatic success should no longer be measured only through ceremonial engagements. It should also be evaluated through measurable outcomes such as foreign investment attracted, export markets expanded, tourism partnerships secured, and technology cooperation initiated. The country must also modernize its economic diplomacy agenda. Traditional diplomacy focused mainly on aid and political relations is insufficient today. Nepal should actively pursue technology transfer, climate financing, renewable energy cooperation, startup ecosystem development, and cross-border electricity trade. The future global economy will increasingly revolve around technology, sustainability, and strategic supply chains. Nepal must position itself accordingly.

At the same time, domestic governance reform remains the foundation of successful economic diplomacy. Foreign investors closely observe whether a country offers policy consistency, administrative efficiency, legal predictability, and infrastructure readiness. No amount of international promotion can compensate for domestic institutional disorder. Anti-corruption reform, regulatory stability, and administrative modernization are therefore essential parts of economic diplomacy itself. In this context, Nepal should also rethink how local governance contributes to economic development. An interesting lesson can be drawn from India’s district administration model. District Collectors and District Magistrates are often expected to actively facilitate economic activity, industrial growth, and revenue mobilization within their jurisdictions.

Nepal’s district administration remains far more limited in this regard. Chief District Officers primarily focus on law and orderresponsibilities while economic development functions remain fragmented across agencies. Nepal could benefit from redesigning district governance so that local administrations are partly accountable for revenue enhancement, business facilitation, tourism promotion, employment generation, and industrial coordination. Such reforms could gradually create healthy competition among districts to attract investment and improve economic performance.

Nepal must also prepare for a more competitive global environment as the country graduates from Least Developed Country status. Certain preferential protections and trade advantages will gradually diminish. Nepal will require stronger legal capacity, trade negotiation expertise, and international commercial diplomacy to compete effectively. Ultimately, Nepal’s economic future will depend not only on domestic politics but on whether the country develops the confidence and competence to defend its economic interests internationally. The world is entering an era where geopolitics increasingly shapes economics. Supply chains are becoming strategic. Energy security is becoming political. Inflation is becoming globalized.

Countries that fail to negotiate proactively will repeatedly suffer external shocks.

Nepal therefore faces a defining choice. It can continue operating with reactive policies and passive diplomacy, or it can build a new model centered around strategic economic diplomacy, institutional accountability, and national economic resilience. The aspirations emerging from Nepal’s younger generation are not unrealistic. Citizens are demanding a state that functions effectively, negotiates confidently, and protects the economic dignity of its people. In the years ahead, economic diplomacy may become the difference between a Nepal that remains permanently vulnerable and a Nepal that finally becomes economically sovereign.

The financial sectors and political circles in Nepal have taken the  on April 5 arrest of Sulav Agrawal, vice-chairperson of the Shanker Group, as a clear signal: business as usual has too much to lose. Agrawal was arrested as part of an investigation into a growing multi-billion rupee scheme allegedly involving the sale of political access in the insurance and steel industries, with financial oversight from the Department of Money Laundering Investigation (DMLI). This high-profile crackdown is not an isolated incident but an urgent response to a looming international crisis.

Nepal is struggling to exit the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘Gray List’, which flags jurisdictions with strategic weaknesses in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. With the country edging closer to the so-called Blacklist, the boundary between political influence and criminal accountability has never been more contested.

A designation like the Gray List may sound like a technicality, but for a developing economy like Nepal, it raises red flags for international banks and heightens scrutiny among foreign investors. While the FATF’s December 2024 progress report acknowledged Nepal’s technical compliance improvements—moving several recommendations to the Largely Compliant category—the country remains under monitoring.

The core problem is an effectiveness gap. Nepal has the legislation, such as the Asset (Money) Laundering Prevention Act, and the infrastructure, including the goAML software operated by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-Nepal) to track Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs). Yet these tools have historically failed to produce high-level prosecutions, fueling doubts among international observers about the state’s genuine commitment to reform.

Investigative reporting has further exposed the scale of money laundering in Nepal, with more than Rs 50bn reportedly held in anonymous Swiss bank accounts, wealth often traceable to domestic corruption funneled through offshore tax havens.

One telling pattern is the alleged round-tripping through the British Virgin Islands, which reportedly accounts for around 45 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nepal, a process whereby illicit proceeds are laundered abroad and returned as seemingly legitimate investment. This cycle not only distorts the national economy but also provides financial sustenance to high-level corruption, including the fake Bhutanese refugee scam now implicating senior political figures.

Public confidence has reached a new low as the government probes the unexplained wealth of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. The decision to halt the demolition of structures at his residence in order to preserve potential evidence underscores the seriousness of the investigation.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has questioned the executive’s handling of money laundering and organized crime charges against former Home Minister Rabi Lamichhane in the Gorkha Media cooperative scam. These cases span high-risk sectors—real estate, cooperatives, and political financing—long identified as the primary threats to Nepal's financial integrity. Without transparency in beneficial ownership, these industries will continue to serve as conduits for laundered money.

If Nepal fails to close these strategic gaps and slides onto the Blacklist, the economic consequences would be severe. Blacklisting would effectively cut Nepal off from the global financial system. Remittances, the lifeline of millions of Nepali families, would face mounting delays, punishing fees, and potential disruption. International loans and foreign aid would dry up, as global institutions avoid high-risk jurisdictions. Local banks would lose their correspondent banking relationships, making it nearly impossible to open Letters of Credit for critical imports such as fuel and medicine. The resulting inflation and economic isolation could set the country back by decades, turning a governance failure into a humanitarian crisis.

Recently, the Department of Money Laundering Investigation, led by the chief secretary, convened a high-level workshop to address coordination gaps between investigative and prosecutorial agencies. Such administrative steps are necessary, but the FATF demands more, specifically, effective convictions of major offenders. The recent scrutiny of the Shanker Group and the Deuba family suggests the state is finally beginning to hold itself accountable, but momentum must be sustained. Nepal needs to move beyond the phase of technical compliance—passing laws—and into the phase of effectiveness, where the rule of law applies equally to powerful businesspeople and politicians alike.

The road ahead is steep. Nepal’s challenge is not a lack of institutional knowledge but a lack of political will to disrupt the informal economy, which accounts for nearly 50 percent of the country’s financial transactions. The arrests we are witnessing today cannot be mere political theatre; they must be the foundation of a new, transparent financial architecture.

The world may not be watching closely, but the FATF clock is ticking. Without putting its house in order, Nepal’s Gray Zone will become a Blacklist reality, and the country’s economic future will remain permanently in shadow. The choice is now clear: protect the elite, or protect the national economy.

Nepal is a secular country. However, Nepal’s Constitution defines secularism as the ‘protection of religion and customs practiced from ancient times.’ Hinduism is typically described as the religion that has been practiced since antiquity. Likewise, Buddhism originated in Nepali soil. 

On March 27, conch shells were blown, 108 Batuks recited Rigvedic mantras and 16 Buddhist monks recited Ashtmangal during Balendra Shah’s swearing-in-ceremony as the 47th Prime Minister of Nepal. 

The religious cover of Balendra’s oath ceremony has drawn criticism from many who think the state has no religion. But, as Balendra’s persona has been discussed as a ‘calculative leader’, he must have also considered the global rise of cultural nationalism and its political implications.

According to the latest census of Nepal, more than 90 percent of the total population of Nepal follows Hinduism and Buddhism. For the past 10 years, religious issues have received a lot of attention in Nepali politics. From a global standpoint, cultural nationalism is becoming more and more influential. Discussions about Buddhism and Hinduism have become more prevalent after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took power in India. The Indian External Affairs Minister’s book, Why Bharat Matters, aims to encapsulate India’s foreign policy from a civilizational perspective rather than national one. It calls for a change from a western-centric optics to one rooted in India’s cultural heritage and identity. Simply put, the BJP regime aims to replace Indian discourse with ‘Bharat’. In a similar vein, President Donald Trump is taking part in a public Bible reading  in the United States.

In the Nepali context, the application of Hindu tradition in politics appears to be a common phenomenon. Given how strongly ingrained Hinduism is in Nepal, former prime ministers from all political parties and ideologies have also been making political gestures.  In every government agency, the influence of Hindu ceremonies is evident. However, despite Nepal’s transition to republicanism, no prominent leader of the traditional parties has shown their posturing to Buddhism in the political sphere like Balendra has heralded with. It appears that the PM has presented a clear picture of Nepal’s cultural bottom line. It is undeniable that all religions have a political and geopolitical component, even though the politics of religion is forbidden.

Once more, civilization-related factors support modern economic growth. Nepal has both enormous potential and difficulties in this regard. Through his oath-taking, Prime Minister Shah appears to be appealing for a broader perspective toward the preservation and promotion of Nepal’s civilization. Approximately 98 percent of all Buddhists worldwide reside in the Asia-Pacific region, making Buddhism one of the most powerful religions in Asia. India, Nepal’s southern neighbor, has 8.4m Buddhists, while China, its northern neighbor, has 40m. In a similar vein, data indicate that 2.39m individuals in Nepal are Buddhists.

In Nepal, especially Vajrayana and Newari Buddhism are predominant, while in China, the Han tradition of Mahayan Buddhism is dominant. Tibetan Buddhism (Vajryan) is also popular. More importantly, emperor Ashoka has a history of contributing all his ability and strength in the propagation of Buddhism in the latter half of his life. During the same period, Ashoka installed a pillar at Lumbini with the inscription ‘Hida Buddha Jate’ (The Buddha was born here), pointing out a key part of his journey to enlightenment. 

A new dynamic of Buddhism called Vajrayan flourished, where the advanced dharma tantra doctrine was practiced, thanks to influences from Nepal and beyond. The Vajrayan flourished in Nepal valley in the seventh and eighth centuries. These facts point at internal and external influences on the propagation of Buddhism in Nepal.

When the fourth ‘Summit of Laureates and Leaders for Children, Development, and Peace’ was scheduled to take place in Lumbini in 2024, an unexpected circumstance came to light. The Chief Minister of Lumbini Province, Dilli Bahadur Chaudhary (from the Nepali Congress), was forced to postpone the summit due to ‘special reasons’ after the formation of a coalition of the CPN-UML and Maoist Center in Kathmandu.  There were reports of pressure from the bordering countries in the north regarding the types of NGOs and programs that would be attending the conference. However, there was no detailed discussion and debate on the internal reasons behind the postponement.

On April 11, the Foreign Minister of Nepal, Sishir Khanal, addressing the ninth Indian Ocean Conference in Port Louis, Mauritius, said that nothing exists in isolation, citing the Buddhist concept of ‘Pratītyasamutpāda’ or the law of dependent origination. This lesson serves as a reminder that every phenomenon depends on other factors and circumstances.

Prime Minister Balen may have organized a swearing-in ceremony with the Shwasti sound and conch for a variety of reasons. And it seems sensible that, for a variety of geopolitical reasons, foreign powers have shown a special interest in Buddhist-related activities in Nepal.

Buddhists are primarily found in the northern Himalayan region, the Kathmandu Valley, a few districts in the eastern highlands, and the districts of Rupandehi and Kapilvastu in the province of Lumbini. Here, it would be worth incorporating Amishraj Mulmi’s standpoint from the book, ‘Shared Bonds, Strategic Interests’, edited by Ranjit Rae. In the chapter titled Himalayas: Borders and Transnational Heritage, Mulmi contends that Buddhism has become more globalized and linked to political identities as a result of Tibetan exiles. Governments in South Asia have therefore found it difficult to connect with Buddhism. He also claims, to some extent, China has convinced, lured, or coerced other nations to restrict their engagement with the Himalayan Buddhist heritage because of its ties to Tibetan exile politics while simultaneously promoting a version of Buddhism that is more in line with Chinese views, citing Sri Lanka’s refusal to host the Dalai Lama in order to avoid upsetting the People’s Republic of China.

The government that was established in Nepal following the GenZ revolt has drawn a lot of interest from across the world. Nepal’s friendly nations and neighbors have strengthened their engagement and sent their best wishes to the current government. May Nepal’s civilizational identity be furthered by this administration and possible advancements be extracted without dispute.