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Nepal may finally be entering a period of political stability. A majority government now offers something the country has lacked for years of continuity.

That continuity is critical for the water and sanitation sector. Despite its importance, the sector has often struggled to remain a sustained political and investment priority. We have made notable progress over the years, particularly in expanding access and achieving open defecation free status and have performed relatively well compared to others in the region. However, moving from basic access to safely managed and system level services will require a different level of institutional and financial commitment. Current spending suggests we are not there yet. Annual investments in water and sanitation are estimated at around $300m to $450m, equivalent to only two to three percent of the national budget and still insufficient to meet safely managed service targets.

At the same time, the broader financing landscape is also beginning to shift. Globally, water and sanitation financing still remains under $100bn annually, far behind sectors like energy and transport. And as traditional funding such as ODA and grants continue to shrink, the narrative around water and sanitation is also shifting. It is increasingly being positioned within climate and economic agendas. For countries like Nepal, this opens space to look beyond the usual WASH funding channels.

The question here is not whether financing will come. It is whether we are ready to use it well when it comes to us. From where I see it, this readiness challenge in the water and sanitation sector plays out across four stages.

Sectoral need

When financing becomes available, infrastructure often becomes the immediate focus, and rightly so. But repeated findings from our sector reviews and national sanitation planning documents show that the gaps are not only in infrastructure, but equally in the softer components that enable these systems to function. The challenge is that while we acknowledge this, we do not always define or plan for these needs with the same rigor. 

As a result, planning often remains incomplete. We know what infrastructure is needed, but are often less clear on what institutional, regulatory, operational and capacity strengthening must come alongside it. These gaps then surface during implementation, often becoming the very bottlenecks that delay or weaken delivery. Before asking how much financing is needed, we must first understand the true breadth of what the sector requires.

Required capacity

Our planning processes may be delivering projects today, but the more important question is whether it is building the internal capacity and institutional memory needed for Nepal to increasingly lead this work itself over time. Large-scale water and sanitation planning is relatively new in Nepal, and much of it continues to rely on external consulting support. This is not to say planning is weak, but opportunities for domestic institutions and firms to build practical experience remain limited.

If this is to change, the way projects and loans are structured must also change. Local firms and experts need to be made an integral part of planning and design teams, not brought in only for supporting roles. This is how practical knowledge is transferred, institutional memory is built and domestic capacity is gradually strengthened to lead such projects more independently over time.

Failed execution

Even when needs are clear and projects are well-planned, execution often remains the weakest link. In Nepal, this challenge can broadly be traced to four areas.

Structure: Our constitution mandates local governments as the service providers for water and sanitation. However, in practice, the way large scale investments are structured does not always reflect this. Most major projects are still routed through the national government, which leads the design and implementation and later hands the assets over to municipalities. What this often creates is a gap. Cities receive the infrastructure, but not always the understanding, ownership or readiness needed to operate it as intended. While consultation and participatory processes may happen along the way, these are rarely enough for already stretched municipalities to engage in a truly meaningful way.

Capacity: Municipalities are expected to take ownerships, but many still do not have dedicated teams or clearly assigned roles for managing water and sanitation systems. Existing staff are already stretched across multiple responsibilities, and bringing in additional capacity is not always straightforward. As a result, new systems often get absorbed into already burdened municipal structures, without the people or institutional strengthening needed to manage them properly.

Operations: Most often infrastructure is handed over without the necessary systems in place to operate it fully. This includes clear operating procedures, financing arrangements, accountability mechanisms and practical guidance on how these systems are to be managed over time. As a result, municipalities may receive infrastructure, but not always the full operational framework required to run it sustainably.

Community: The final piece is the community itself. Long-term service delivery does not depend only on infrastructure and institutions, but also on whether people understand, accept and adapt to the systems being introduced. Yet community engagement often remains limited to short-term awareness or consultation activities during the project period. For services that rely on behaviour change and sustained uptake, this is rarely enough.

Until these gaps are addressed together, even well-planned projects will continue to struggle in execution.

Monitoring and relearning

The fourth aspect is the sector learning from its own implementation. This is only possible when we have systems which capture information in a way that remains usable, reliable, and relevant over time. With digitalization now a growing government priority, the water and sanitation sector should also be thinking more strategically about the systems it builds. Municipalities are already working with some digital platforms, but what we want to address is their use in isolation. 

What is needed is a more integrated approach, systems that can build on what already exists, connect across functions, and provide usable information for decision making. At the same time, building platforms for monitoring alone is not enough. Equal emphasis must be placed on building the capacity to interpret and use this data for planning, prioritization and investment decisions. Otherwise, we risk collecting more data without improving how decisions are made.

So, where does this leave us? Nepal now has a rare opportunity to strengthen the foundations of its water and sanitation sector while much of it is still evolving. Rather than seeing current gaps as a weakness, we should treat them as a chance to reassess our institutions, capacities, priorities and readiness before larger scale investments begin to accelerate. The goal should not simply be to secure financing when it comes, but to be ready to define our own priorities, articulate our own needs and shape the direction of the sector ourselves. Because ultimately, the future of Nepal’s water and sanitation sector will depend not on how much financing comes in, but on how prepared we are to lead and deliver it well.

The author is currently working as Deputy Chief Operating Officer at Global Water & Sanitation Center at Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand

As Rastriya Swantantra Party (RSP) assumes the reins of power, social media is abuzz with anticipation of a digital revolution. From proposed data center building sprees to talks of making Nepal an IT outsourcing hub, these schemes are being touted as the kind of vision (a favorite word of the Nepali electorate) one can expect from youthful, dynamic leadership. Indeed, Prime Minister Balen Shah’s charismatic, and to some, enigmatic, image owes much to the way social media amplified him into a political phenomenon. Words like algorithm, AI, crypto, outsourcing and data centers have entered the national political lexicon and will likely remain there, barring a global catastrophe that forces a worldwide return to mythical pre-internet days.

Given the sweeping scale of this proposed digital revolution, we suggest the new government start at the most basic levels. The most consequential part of RSP’s digital agenda is not some glamorous AI project or cutting-edge tool, but the pledge to implement “modern and digital processes” in government offices. As it stands, for most ordinary Nepalese, visiting a government office is a humiliation ritual. If one’s patience and dignity are not eroded by the sclerotic bureaucracy and shady brokers, they will be by servers that are mysteriously and routinely “down.” 

Indeed, a recent case from July 2025 relating to National Identity Card (NID), where many online services were disrupted including online registration, card distribution, correction of personal details, and related welfare linked services, shows that these concerns are real. Thus, the foremost priority should be a public status tracking page that provides insights into service disruptions, uptime, and resolution times. With this data, taxpayers and auditing authorities can hold offices accountable and perhaps get to the bottom of why servers across Nepal’s government offices keep failing. We don’t have a crystal ball, but our prediction is that once status tracking is enforced, these outages will decline sharply.

The average voter may not grasp the intricacies of large-scale digital transformation, but if she can visit a government office or use an online service without feeling browbeaten, or better yet leave satisfied with the experience, RSP will have done far more to create a genuine sense of digital revolution. This kind of consistent, tangible improvement builds trust in the system and fosters citizen buy-in, both of which are essential to acclimatizing the citizenry to a future shaped by more ambitious, trailblazing digital innovations. Moreover, such satisfaction would also reinforce RSP’s signature commitment to good governance.

Another crucial step toward good governance is mandating every government office to publicly host standardized key performance indicators (KPIs) related to service efficiency on their websites. These dashboards must be updated in real time and include metrics such as average wait times, service completion rates, system uptime and data on ongoing projects. This would enable year-over-year comparisons as well as meaningful cross-comparisons across government bodies. It could also be used to incentivize high-performing departments and penalize persistent underperformers, creating a culture of performance and accountability.

Likewise, any serious drive toward digital governance should be accompanied by robust data protection regulation and actual enforcement. There is little value in moving services online only for citizens to be left wondering who is accessing their data, how long it is retained, with whom it is shared, and what recourse exists in the event of a breach.  The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) gained global influence because it went beyond treating data protection as mere technical legislation and instead addressed it as a right and an obligation. Nepal already has the Privacy Act, 2075 on its books. The critical next step is to ensure administrative seriousness that would render privacy protection visible, enforceable, and realistic in practice. Otherwise, digitization won't feel modern. It will feel invasive.

Our intention is not to dissuade the government from pursuing novel, cutting-edge technological advancements, but to suggest, in good faith, a few changes that would substantially improve governance and be felt by many. Discussions of the more ambitious programs outlined in RSP’s Citizen Contract merit deeper examination, which we intend to undertake in future articles.  Nepal’s digital revolution will depend primarily on strong digital public infrastructure and reliable cybersecurity capacity. Currently, Nepal’s digital infrastructure remains weak and underprepared, and its cybersecurity capacity is not yet strong enough to support a transformation on this scale. 

A 2024 government presentation, Country Report Presentation: Nepal’s Digital Policies, prepared by Indra Prasad Basyal, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, cites the International Telecommunication Union’s Global Cybersecurity Index and notes a score of 69.76 out of 100 for Nepal. That is the profile of a country still building cyber resilience, not one yet in a position to make grand claims about digital transformation. For now, we wish Prime Minister Balen Shah’s government the best.

US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Samir Paul Kapur, concluded a three-day visit to Nepal on April 22, marking the highest-level US visit since the new government took office. Ahead of Nepal’s March 5 election, Kapur had expressed confidence that the vote would be peaceful and said the US was prepared to work with the incoming government. Briefing the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in February, he stated: “With Nepal, we trust there will be a secure and peaceful electoral process, and we are prepared to work with whoever wins.”

In his testimony, Kapur placed Nepal within a broader US strategic outlook for South Asia, alongside developments in countries such as Bangladesh, where political transitions have recently drawn international attention. His subsequent visit to Dhaka in early March reflects continued US engagement across the region during periods of political transition.

A key underlying theme in his remarks was the strategic importance of Nepal’s geographic position between India and China. US lawmakers have increasingly emphasized that South Asia’s balance of power matters for global economic stability. Kapur explicitly noted that preventing dominance by any single power in the region remains a central US objective.

He warned that the emergence of a “hostile power dominating South Asia” could translate into broader coercive leverage over the global economy—underscoring how regional geopolitics is now directly tied to global economic security. Kapur also highlighted that smaller South Asian states—including Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka—are strategically significant but structurally vulnerable to external pressures, particularly through what he described as debt-driven influence mechanisms.

Against this backdrop, he outlined US priorities in the region: expanding trade and economic connectivity, strengthening defence and security cooperation, and supporting partners through diplomacy, investment, and institutional engagement.

The underlying message is clear: the US is increasingly framing South Asia not just as a development region, but as a strategic balance zone—where economic tools, connectivity, and institutional partnerships are deployed alongside traditional diplomacy.

This presents an opportunity for Nepal. The pattern of engagements matters, and this visit reflects a shift in how external actors—particularly the US—are approaching the country. Kapur’s visit appeared mission-driven rather than ceremonial, suggesting a targeted effort rather than symbolic diplomacy. His engagement with Rabi Lamichhane, chairperson of the Rastriya Swatantra Party, signals attention to Nepal’s evolving political landscape and the rise of non-traditional actors. It reflects an interest in governance narratives centered on anti-corruption, technocratic leadership, and service delivery.

Equally notable was the absence of meetings with top state leadership such as the president, prime minister, or army chief. This suggests a deliberate shift from conventional protocol—an exploratory approach that keeps distance from established power structures while focusing more on political economy than security.

The emphasis on engagements with foreign and finance ministries indicates that economic diplomacy is at the core of US priorities. This aligns with a broader approach that competes through capital, regulatory standards, and governance frameworks rather than solely through security partnerships. Key areas of focus include the investment climate, regulatory predictability, infrastructure, energy, and governance-linked economic systems.

Outreach to business leaders further signals that engagement is increasingly being built through markets, not just ministries. It reflects recognition of Nepal’s underutilized private sector and an interest in identifying credible local partners for international capital. Kapur also visited Patan Durbar Square and Boudhanath Stupa, highlighting Nepal’s Newari and Tibetan cultural heritage. He noted that US support for preserving such sites contributes to economic growth while safeguarding shared cultural values. His interaction with the Tibetan community in Kathmandu—and his call for attention to their concerns—signals continued US engagement on Tibet-related issues, a sensitive area given Nepal’s adherence to the One-China policy.

Unlike traditional diplomatic visits, this one appeared less ceremonial and more strategic—politically exploratory, economically focused, selective in protocol, and multi-channel in outreach. The visit can be interpreted as a calibration mission rather than a courtesy call. Its likely objectives include mapping Nepal’s evolving political landscape, re-anchoring US influence in the economic domain, diversifying engagement beyond state actors, and testing Nepal’s strategic flexibility amid intensifying regional competition.

At its core, the approach reflects economic statecraft as a substitute for overt political alignment—shaping the environment in which outcomes emerge rather than attempting to directly control them. The visit also unfolds against intensifying geopolitical competition in South Asia, where India has traditionally held significant influence. New Delhi appears to view increased US engagement with a mix of strategic alignment and cautious watchfulness.

On one hand, there is convergence with Washington on balancing China’s expanding regional role. On the other, India remains sensitive to any external presence that could dilute its influence in what it has long considered its immediate sphere. This reflects both opportunity and concern.

Indian analysts have also pointed to internal political developments in Nepal—particularly the consolidation of major communist parties—as a factor that could expand China’s leverage. This has prompted some within India’s strategic circles to call for closer coordination with the US, even as there is growing recognition that India’s traditional influence is evolving and requires a more deliberate, strategy-driven approach.

At the same time, China has signaled concern over the intensifying US presence. In the lead-up to the visit, Beijing’s representatives in Kathmandu cautioned against activities linked to Tibet and Taiwan, underscoring China’s priority that Nepal not become a platform for anti-China political or security agendas.

China continues to advance its economic footprint through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, framing development cooperation as the central pillar of its engagement. The broader picture is one of intensifying strategic signaling, with both Washington and Beijing testing the boundaries of influence.

For Kathmandu, the message is clear: the opportunity is significant. External actors are engaging despite political fluidity, not waiting for stability. Nepal is seen as strategically relevant even in transition. Future partnerships will depend less on ideology and more on governance quality, regulatory credibility, and economic openness.

The bottom line is that this was not a routine visit—it was a quiet strategic probe. The absence of top-level meetings is not a gap; it is the signal. The US appears to be looking beyond the current state structure—toward the next phase of Nepal’s political economy.

The post-Cold War world order of the 1990s set the tone with a thrust on transparency in political democratization. The international wave was so strong that developing countries like Nepal were swept along, readily embracing policies deeply engrained in the changed global landscape. International financial and socio-economic development institutions forcefully advocated for extensive transparency in every action and decision of governments, so that citizens could enjoy unencumbered access to information, thereby strengthening democratic values and paving the way for good governance.

Nepal, on one hand, suffered from becoming a mere market for foreign products, which narrowed its export base and severely undermined national economic growth, and on the other, in the name of transparency, state's confidential and secret matters were either leaked or slipped through the cracks. This situation, inevitably, exposed national security to serious vulnerabilities. These two pillars of democratic governance—transparency and secrecy—often pull in opposite directions, but both are indispensable for the effective functioning of government. While practicing them in  day-to-day activity of the government, maintaining a logical and practical balance between them had become increasingly essential, due to Nepal’s vulnerable position shaped by its geostrategic location.

There is no denying that transparency enhances the ability and capacity of citizens to rigorously scrutinize the actions and performances of the government, thereby promoting accountability and reinforcing institutional credibility. When transparency prevails, citizens remain well-informed and safeguard against the misuse of state power. In a democratic government, if decisions are taken in camera and the processes remain shrouded in opacity, the values and norms of democracy begin to decay, making pliable ground for the rise of autocracy or even monocracy.  With its paramount importance in democratic structure, transparency stands as a keystone of good governance, which contributes to fostering public trust in government. Transparency does not mean being naked, rather, it signifies being decent.

Security realm

Given its inherently sensitive domain, national security always perceives absolute transparency as a latent threat to the nation's survival.  Protecting critical and important information, which affects the sovereignty and  national unity of Nepal, is basically a matter of maintaining complete secrecy. Within this milieu of national security, there always stands a pressing challenge in striking a sensible balance between openness and confidentiality. There was a time when tensions frequently arose between information seekers and information providers.

Many times, information seekers were compelled to knock on the door of the National Information Commission. Only after issuing the formal directives by the Commission, the concerned officials provided the requested information or documents.  In a few cases, the Commission has also imposed a fine on those officials who did not comply with its directives. This situation brought two institutions—the Commission and the concerned ministry—in a state of tug- of-war.

Later, all the ministries classified certain official documents as confidential. In response to such decisions, information seekers raised questions about the intentions of the government. They alleged that the government's motive was to hide information—an affront to democratic values and constitutional rights.

In a democratic system, transparency empowers citizens to consistently scrutinize government actions, which helps reduce corruption. Transparency is not merely a tool for good governance, rather it is a democratic necessity.  In view of this, transparency in government operations, particularly in areas such as procurement, service delivery, decision-making for the welfare of citizens, is indispensable. In the pursuit of openness, the government’s decisions must not be compromised with national security.

At one side, there is a constitutional right to information, which unequivocally states that ‘every citizen shall have the right to demand or receive information on any matter of personal or public interest’.  On the other hand, its restrictive clause stipulates that ‘no person shall be compelled to disclose information that is required to be kept confidential by law’. There is a thin and delicate line between these two versions that should be distinguished through a patriotism-oriented interpretation. While disclosing the sensitive information, all concerned must give paramount consideration to the national interest and national security imperatives. National security policy is the umbrella policy encompassing all sectoral policies, such as industrial, economic, agriculture, health and education policies.

National security operates in different realms—basically with internal and external threats, intelligence operations, defense, internal security, sensitive national issues, and diplomatic negotiations. Premature or excessive disclosure can jeopardise national interests. Such an activity weakens the nation in particular. It must be taken into mind that in such a situation, secrecy can not be a choice but a necessity.

Some of the government’s responsible persons have developed a tendency of being vocal, believing that their respective ministries are superior to others and that their policy decisions need not comply with the national security policy. If such a mindset prevails, the entire government’s line ministries cannot work in unison in pursuit of national interests. No ministry can function in isolation, rather, a collective and coordinated effort must be reflected in their working styles—avoiding the repetition of past mistakes.

In order to cultivate a culture of responsible governance, officials must be trained to discern the 'fine line' between transparency and secrecy. Their ethical conduct, reinforced by professionalism, should guide them in identifying the delicate boundary. A mature working culture is a must to understand that these two are not adversaries but rather complementary gears serving different purposes.