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Nepal has many provisions in place to safeguard public health. All health facilities, and health-related educational and training institutions in Nepal need to follow strict regulations of several statutory bodies. Medical Education Commission serves as the central authority for regulating domestic health professional education institutions. Those seeking accreditation must first obtain a Letter of Intent, fulfill required infrastructural and academic standards, submit a self-evaluation report, and undergo periodic evaluation. Institutions are graded based on performance, with continued underperformance potentially resulting in de-accreditation.

Academic institutions need accreditations from concerned councils. Nepal Medical Council recognizes medical colleges and manages the registration and licensure of doctors, including dentists. Nepal Nursing Council accredits nursing education providers, conducts licensing exams and maintains the nursing registry. Nepal Ayurvedic Medical Council regulates traditional medicine programs. Nepal Pharmacy Council works in the field of pharmacy. Accreditation for allied health programs such as public health, physiotherapy, and medical laboratory sciences is handled by the Nepal Health Professional Council.

Students have to pass domestic entrance examinations before they can join such educational programs, whether they join domestic or foreign schools. The graduates are allowed to practice only after registration with respective councils, for which they have to pass the licensure tests. Implemented properly, these criteria ensure quality of registered health workers.

Whether the state, philanthropic institutions or the students themselves pay, producing health workers costs a huge amount of money, time and effort. In this age of global village, we cannot and should not bar such human resources from seeking a career abroad. But we should do everything to attract the workforce the country badly needs.

Look at the figures. From 2020 to 2023, the NMC issued Good Standing Certificates to 1,087 doctors in 2020, 1,502 in 2021, 2,189 in 2022, and 2,582 in 2023, totaling 7,360 certificates over the four-year period. Concurrently, between 2002 and early 2025, approximately 45,000 nurses received certificates to migrate abroad. Although about 45,000 doctors were registered with the council as of Jan 2024, fewer than 15,000 remained actively practicing in Nepal. This stark contrast underscores an accelerating brain drain, particularly acute in rural areas.

While better work environments and higher salaries are major factors, bureaucratic hurdles prevalent in our regulatory bodies and councils are not less responsible for accelerating brain drain, especially by failing to facilitate human resources educated abroad in getting registered in Nepal. These manifest in the forms of equivalence certificates and no objection certificates.

Issue of equivalence

Currently, all foreign graduates, including domestic products in some cases, need their educational degrees recognized by relevant Nepali institutions. Common practice is, instead of issuing recognition letters, these institutions issue equivalence certificates, frequently mentioning ‘in relevant field’, keeping open a space for future misunderstandings and conflicts.

Up to now, Tribhuvan University Curriculum Development Center (TUCDC) is trusted with this task for higher education degrees. The duty may look both as the state recognition and a lucrative income for TU, but CDC faces a myriad of challenges. Among HEIs ranging from high-end to low-end, there are innumerable differences in their performances, thanks to their available resources, institutional capabilities, philosophical outlook and autonomy in framing academic programs. Quality issues are not limited to poorly-performing, weak universities. A renowned university strong in other fields can have poor performance in health sciences.

Let us try to simplify the procedures. Universities and their academic programs do reflect sociopolitical values and technological stages of their countries and societies; their products may not exactly match our products. MIT graduates may excel in physics, Oxbridge products may outperform in history, but TU graduates are the best yardstick for Nepal. So, based on program and subject-specific parameters, the country needs to develop a high-ranking dynamic list of HEIs and programs whose products would be ‘recognized’ automatically, only those who wanted ‘equivalence’ would need to apply with the TU. For others, let us ask them to obtain ‘recognition’ or ‘equivalence’ letters for their degrees. ‘Recognition letters’ fulfil two purposes: prevent the use of fake degrees, and avoid unnecessary torture to graduates from foreign HEIs. As to educational criteria for employment, let the employers decide. Like other countries, we can fix minimum durations of study and entry criteria. We should also be specific on degrees earned with lateral entries, credit transfers and online learnings. As for faculty-wise duration, the country should make the total duration of vertical degrees postschool one of the parameters. 

Many a time, products of domestic institutions have objected to applying to TUCDC for equivalence, questioning why TU should evaluate degrees offered by other Nepali institutions. Against such a background, the University Grant Commission is trusted to shoulder the task from the beginning of the next fiscal year (July 17). Compared with TU, which alone hosts about 80 percent of all students against 20 percent shared by all remaining 27 HEIs, the UGC is an insignificant bureaucratic unit. The problems facing TUCDC will not go away just like that. Needed are policy reforms, not replacements of regulating hands.

Issue of NOCs

The No Objection Certificate (NOC) policy, originally meant to regulate foreign exchange, now unnecessarily obstructs students who do not require financial support from Nepal Rastra Bank. Many students fund their studies through scholarships or families abroad, yet face delays due to mandatory NOC processing, often missing admissions or visa deadlines. With over 110,000 NOC applications last year, the system is overloaded and outdated. Most countries do not require such clearances unless public funds are involved. We should make NOC optional for non-forex applicants, easing bureaucratic friction and empowering students to pursue global education without such obstacles.

Requiring foreign medical graduates to produce an NOC for degree equivalence or professional council registration is both illogical and unjust. Denying students equivalence or licensure for failure to produce a pre-departure NOC punishes them for a procedural formality that holds no relevance to their qualifications. Academic merit, not outdated paperwork, should guide professional recognition.

Nepal is in urgent need of such reforms to cope with alarming brain drain.

Tensions between governments and social media platforms are on the rise around the world. States are pushing for regulation to combat disinformation, curb hate speech, safeguard national security, protect minors and assert sovereignty over digital space. Tech companies, however, long accustomed to operating globally with minimal state oversight, are often reluctant to comply with country-specific rules.

Increasingly, governments are requiring local registration or licensing as a condition to operate.

While some platforms accept these demands, many resist, particularly in smaller and less influential countries that lack the leverage to enforce compliance. Nepal offers a telling example of this ongoing battle. Over the past few years, the government has attempted to regulate major platforms, though critics fear such moves could also restrict freedom of speech and expression.

On August 28, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology issued a seven-day deadline for all social media companies—domestic and international—to register locally or face progressive deactivation. While platforms like Viber, TikTok, Global View, We Talk and Nimbuzz have complied, most major players like X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, LinkedIn, Reddit, Snapchat and WeChat continue to operate without registration. Telegram, under pressure, has begun the process.

The requirement is not just about paperwork. Registered platforms must designate a local point of contact, a grievance officer and a compliance officer, effectively obliging them to establish a physical presence in Nepal. The policy reflects growing public concern over disinformation, hate speech and illegal content that many believe threaten social harmony.

However, enforcement of this policy is challenging. With millions of Nepalis relying on these platforms for communication, business and entertainment, abrupt bans could spark public outrage. The 2023 TikTok ban, lifted only after months of negotiation, demonstrated both the limits of state power and the possibilities of enforcement. TikTok’s eventual re-registration showed that, with sufficient pressure, even global giants can be brought to the table if they see enough value in the local market.

Nepal is not alone in this regulatory push. In 2024, Malaysia introduced licensing requirements for platforms with over eight million users. While some platforms complied, others like Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, and Google’s YouTube, are still negotiating. The European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) is often held up as a global benchmark. It rebalances the responsibilities between users, platforms and public authorities, and the protection of fundamental rights. Nepal could draw lessons from the DSA, particularly in ensuring that regulations are not solely punitive, but also protective of democratic values.

Another growing area of concern worldwide is the protection of minors. In 2025, Australia became the first country to impose a mandatory minimum age of 16 for most social media platforms through its Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Bill. Non-compliance to this legislation carries heavy fines. Nepal, which is seeing increasing reports of online harms affecting children, should consider similar protective legislation.

One of the thorniest issues in social media governance is content moderation. Although tech companies have deployed large moderation teams and AI-driven tools, governments see these efforts as inadequate, especially when it comes to locally sensitive content or criticism of state policies. But beneath this lies a deeper tension: while governments claim to be fighting disinformation, they may also use regulation to suppress dissent and limit freedom of expression. In countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, India and Indonesia, social media rules have often been doubled as tools of political censorship. The same risk exists in Nepal too. Regulation is necessary, but it must not be weaponized to silence critics or undermine the press. A strong legal framework should guarantee that posts from independent or mainstream media are protected, and that takedown requests are transparent and subject to oversight. In the neighboring countries, the Indian government has taken a slew of measures in order to regulate social media platforms.

Another pressing issue is privacy. Social media companies collect vast amounts of personal data, raising concerns about misuse, surveillance and inadequate safeguards for users. Addressing these challenges requires more than registration requirements alone. As Nepal finalizes its Social Media Bill, it should adopt a multi-stakeholder governance model, bringing together not only government agencies, but also platforms, civil society, journalists, academia and international partners.

Open dialogue with major platforms can help align expectations, clarify provisions and ensure mutual accountability. Beyond that, sector-specific laws, robust data protection frameworks and digital literacy campaigns are essential. Regional cooperation, particularly among global south countries facing similar challenges, could amplify Nepal’s voice and build a stronger front for fair regulation.

So far, Nepal’s approach has leaned too heavily on government control. For regulation to be effective and democratic, the country must shift from a control mindset to a governance mindset—one that balances accountability with protection of rights. The relationship between states and social media companies is at a critical juncture. For Nepal, this is an opportunity to craft a regulatory framework that tackles online harms without undermining digital freedoms. A thoughtful, inclusive and globally informed approach could allow Nepal to emerge as a leader in social media governance rather than just another regulatory battleground.

Ultimately, the challenge lies in striking a balance between free speech, content moderation and privacy. Constant dialogue between the government and platforms is essential, given that tech companies operate globally but also be held accountable locally. Another hurdle is the aggressive lobbying that media platforms extensively engage in against regulatory efforts—a trend already visible in Nepal.

Stronger rules inevitably affect the business interests of social media companies, and resistance is fierce. Global experience shows that states face significant pushback whenever they attempt to rein in tech giants. Nepal must navigate this pushback carefully, ensuring its regulatory ambitions protect citizens without stifling democratic values. In conclusion, regulation of social media is still an evolving concept  in many countries and there is no one-size-fits-all model; the only way is to closely follow the steps taken by other countries, and learn from each other. Nepal should also closely follow the attempts being made for global governance.

The global geopolitical stage has been rocked with multiple events, protracted theaters of conflict, and competing interests between different actors. At this time, the rapprochement and de-escalation between the two Asian giants, who have been otherwise seen as competitors and rivals, needs to be studied cautiously. The ties between two of the world’s largest economies went haywire after the clashes along the India-China border during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. It caused loss of lives to both sides, causing fundamental alteration in the ties between the two nations. 

After disengagement from the last friction point, namely the Patrolling Point 15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area in 2022, a hope of fragile calm in that region was expected. It needs to be noted that it is not the return of the pre-2020 status quo ante. But there has been an update since last October as both countries are actively pursuing to deescalate their border tensions and resuming some bilateral ties. There have been visits by the officials of both countries, including the Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and National Security Advisors. There is a resumption of flights after a gap of five years, re-opening of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage and lifting of import ban on fertilizers, rare earth metals, and tunnel machines are all part of this new deal. 

Whatever transpires in 2024-25 is a tentative, at most a fragile change. After the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi in August 2025, where he met Prime Minister Modi, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Doval, all agreed on the modalities of patrolling the borders, relaxation of Visa regimes, and possible opening of trade corridors. It is of some significance that this is the first meeting Prime Minister Modi will have had in seven years; his visit to meet Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin.

Nevertheless, all these measures do not indicate the resolution of the inherent conflicts. Border regulation systems are confidence-building measures and not solutions. India continues to raise objections to the CPEC, which passes through Kashmir, and the build-up of Chinese infrastructure along the LAC, among other factors, is bound to keep the mistrust tethered. 

In the Chinese view, the major strategic motivation of this rapprochement is the multifaceted and growing rivalry with the United States. China has expressed this through its foreign policy that is highly oriented toward its east coast, especially with the strained relationships with Taiwan and the South China Sea as well as the technology conflict with the United States. A constantly war-like border of hot troops with India, a country of increasing might, is an expensive and risky strategic distraction. The possibility of an accidental escalation might spell out a disastrous two-front scenario to Beijing, requiring it to divert its military and diplomatic resources. 

Such a Chinese strategic outlook over time has demonstrated as scholar Yun Sun has described, stabilizing relations on one front to free up resources and attention to a more urgent theater. This renewed thaw with India is a sensible de-risking policy, which will help Beijing in reducing the risk of war toward its western flank and redeploy its resources in the central arena of its standoff with the US and its allies. This is also a tactical thrust toward undermining the already existing Western rhetoric of a lone and threatening China, being surrounded by a complete coalition of democratic nations.

To India, the practical effect is a reprieve and a powerful endorsement of its diplomacy. On a pragmatic level, the military and economic burdens of the standoff have been enormous, and the de-escalation of direct tensions enables the government to concentrate on economic recovery and its long-term program of military modernisation. 

On a diplomatic level, the biggest achievement is the endorsement of its valued principle of strategic autonomy. This detente is not an isolated bilateral phenomenon but is directly tied to the changing geopolitical environment, specifically tensions with the United States. It must be noted that the defrosting is occurring against a background of what many consider to be the worst period in Indian relations with the US executive in decades. The imposition of high tariffs on Indian products by the Trump administration in the US has revealed the shortcomings of a relationship that was being marketed as a counterweight to China. 

In this regard, China has already expressed its discontent with the tariffs and underscored the importance of collaboration between the two Asian powerhouses against unilateral bullying. This has given a strategic leverage that Beijing has seized upon. Engaging with China, New Delhi plays to its partners in the Quad that the application is not an unconditional commitment against any one nation but a collaboration founded in mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific. This stance empowers India by demonstrating that it can juggle its complicated relationship with China in its own way, making it an independent and dominant power.

Among the strategic questions that the thaw poses and mostly depends upon is whether China would re-evaluate its Pakistan policy. Islamabad is vacillating once again between Beijing and Washington. On the one hand, it has inaugurated CPEC Phase 2, pursuing higher Chinese investment in infrastructure. 

On the other, it is renewing contacts with Washington, where Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has overtly solicited US investments and is executing diplomatic overtures to the Trump administration. Pakistan, however, would always be an essential ally to Beijing: a strategic partner, a corridor to the Arabian Sea and a warm client to export arms and finance. China is the major source of Pakistani imports of arms and rollover loans continue to be a major source of fiscal stability in Islamabad. It is due to this factor alone that there can be no likelihood of Beijing weakening its strategic commitment. 

Optics may, however, change. Such a cautious rapprochement with India does not imply that China will give up Pakistan. The most plausible is that of policy dualism, where China is to remain good friends with Islamabad and chooses to accept a limited cooperation dimension with New Delhi. This reflects its longstanding capacity to compartmentalize: advancing economic relations with India at the same time as keeping closer defence relations with Pakistan.

With a relative calm on its northern frontier, India will have time for maneuvering the bumpy roads of Trump’s foreign policy. The US’ strategic interest in India beyond Trump is a strong, independent India capable of anchoring regional stability. A stable border allows India to focus its resources and strategic attention on the broader Indo-Pacific, directly aligning with US goals. Crucially, it proves the US-India relationship is non-transactional and not solely defined by the current geopolitical rejig. Prime Minister Modi’s proposed visit to China and its outcomes are likely to define or redefine the limits and potential of this thaw.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Nepal’s rapid progress in digital finance is a well-documented success story. Mobile wallets and QR codes have fundamentally reshaped daily commerce, creating one of South Asia’s most dynamic payment infrastructure. This achievement has laid a vital foundation for a modern economy. Yet, this very success has created a significant imbalance. The nation's fintech ecosystem is heavily tilted toward payments, while the equally crucial domains of credit and investment remain underdeveloped.

While we have solved the problem of how to pay, the more pressing challenge of how to grow remains largely unaddressed by technology. This is more than a theoretical concern. It has tangible economic consequences. The country’s small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), the engine of job creation, face a credit gap estimated in the billions of dollars. Millions of households have savings in low-yield accounts that could be mobilized for productive investment. This imbalance represents a significant missed opportunity for fostering entrepreneurship, democratizing wealth, and accelerating economic growth.

The roots of this lopsided development are twofold: regulatory frameworks that haven’t kept pace with technology, and an institutional focus that has naturally prioritized payments. Key legislation like the Bank and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) was designed for a traditional banking era and lacks specific provisions for emerging models like digital-only lenders or peer-to-peer platforms. The Securities Act is similarly silent on innovations like crowdfunding or robo-advisory. This legal ambiguity leaves innovators in a grey area, unable to scale their solutions within a clear, regulated framework.

In addition to this, the institutional focus has logically centered on strengthening the payment systems, which has been essential. However, this has meant that the equally important areas of digital credit and investment have received less strategic impetus. The launch of the Regulatory Sandbox recently is a landmark step forward, but its initial focus on payments, while understandable, limits its potential. What was intended as a gateway for innovation risks becoming a walled garden if its scope is not expanded. To build a more resilient and dynamic digital economy, a balanced approach is essential. This requires a clear vision and decisive action on two fronts: modernizing policy and reimagining the tools for innovation.

First, the regulatory environment needs to evolve. A clear roadmap for amending key financial acts is necessary to create legal categories for new fintech players. This would provide them with a clear path from sandbox experimentation to full-scale, regulated operation, fostering responsible innovation while safeguarding the financial system. Alongside legislative updates, a more consolidated approach to fintech governance could be considered. A dedicated unit or department focused on the full spectrum of financial technology from payments to credit and investment could provide the specialized expertise and coherent policy direction needed to guide the market’s next phase.

Second, the Regulatory Sandbox should be empowered to become a true engine for full-spectrum innovation. Building on its initial success, its scope must be broadened. The next cohort of the sandbox could be transformative if it invited innovators to tackle the economy’s most significant gaps. Imagine a stream dedicated to MSME finance, testing PAN-based digital micro-loans that leverage alternative data to extend credit to viable businesses. Another could focus on retail investment, piloting robo-advisory services and micro-investment platforms to bring first-time savers into the capital markets. A third stream could enable regulated crowdfunding platforms, allowing the Nepali diaspora to invest directly in promising local startups.

Global experience shows this path is both practical and powerful. India has created specific licenses for P2P lenders, while Kenya’s M-Shwari pioneered mobile credit, demonstrating that innovation and regulation can and must evolve together. These examples provide proven models for safely incorporating new financial tools into the mainstream economy. The challenge now is to build upon the remarkable success of our payment infrastructure. Payments are the rails, but the real economic journey involves what runs on them: credit that fuels businesses, and investments that build wealth. By modernizing legal frameworks and expanding innovation initiatives, Nepal can correct its current imbalance. The goal is to create a financial system that is not only digitally efficient but also inclusive, dynamic, and capable of funding the nation's growth for decades to come. The time for this next digital leap is now.

The author is a director of Nepal Rastra Bank