WANG LI, HIMAL NEUPANE 

In the joint statement signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal, the two countries agreed to elevate their relationship to a ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’. A number of questions have been raised in Nepal about the real meaning of the Chinese strategic partnership approach and how it will affect bilateral ties.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli said in a newspaper interview that strategic partnership is not a military or a political alliance, and that its purpose is socio-economic development. Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali also remarked that ‘strategic partnership’ is just a new terminology for bilateral diplomacy.

Yet some political actors and scholars have argued that ‘strategic partnership’ can have far-reaching impact on Nepal and its foreign relations. So it is necessary to clarify things and be aware of the various dimensions of Chinese strategy and diplomacy. Since the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1955, Nepal-China relations have been characterized by equality, harmonious coexistence, everlasting friendship and overall cooperation. 

In line with this historical spirit of mutual respect and equality, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Nepal on October 12-13, during which the heads of the two states agreed to announce that they had elevated the ‘China-Nepal Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation’ to ‘Strategic Partnership of Cooperation’. It was reported that President Xi even said to his Nepali counterpart that Nepal would be transformed from a land-locked to a land-linked country because of the trans-Himalayan connectivity network. This is not only a promise from a large neighbor, but an expression of responsibility from the world’s rising power that aims to create an international community with a shared future.

However, in light of several concerns and even suspicions, it is necessary to review the concept of ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ in China’s foreign policy. First, neither ‘strategy’ nor ‘partnership’ is a new term; both have been widely used in international affairs for a long time. Robert Gilpin has defined ‘strategic cooperation’ as a shared attempt or response to find more efficient and less costly approaches to realize common interests. China initially used the phrase ‘strategic partnership’ in the 1990s, and has done so more frequently since 2003. 

Words and meanings

According to the Chinese official line, there are three major categories of strategic partnership: 1) The ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation’ currently covers Russia, Pakistan and many African states alongside Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; 2) The ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ embraces more than 30 countries across the world; 3) And the ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ includes South Korea, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Brunei. Nepal’s involvement in the last group was inevitable, for it is not only a South Asian state but also a close neighbor of China. As China aspires to be a modernized country by 2050, the ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ emphasizes Beijing’s overriding concerns with Nepal’s sustainable and balanced economic growth. President Xi has said that China’s development cannot take place in isolation from the rest of the world.

Now the inquiry is directed at the political dimensions of ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ in the Chinese discourse. Officially, it has three aspects: stressing cooperation over rivalry; promoting long-term cooperation rather than an expedient one; and building constructive relations. To these ends, both parties are required to work together in multiple fields, be they political, cultural or technological. China seeks dialogue with all partners, which is a key feature of classical diplomacy. 

As the goal is a win-win outcome, China and Nepal have agreed to take the BRI as an opportunity to deepen mutually-beneficial cooperation in all fields, including their attempt to advance the construction of a trans-Himalayan connectivity network. As a country nestled in the Himalayas, Nepal indeed needs to expand its infrastructures by integrating itself into the BRI so as to explore and harness its huge potential in hydropower. 

Financially, the two countries are committed to a multilateral trading regime and China will take measures to import more Nepali goods and to encourage Chinese banks to provide financial services in Nepal. Politically, the Chinese side has reiterated firm support to Nepal to uphold the country’s independence and respect its governance system. The Nepali side, in turn, has reasserted its long-standing commitment to a ‘one-China policy’, acknowledging that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are China’s internal ones.

Focus on NEWS

Strategically, China and Nepal need to maintain peace and stability in their border areas. In line with its ‘NEWS strategy’, China urgently needs to consolidate its entente with Russia in the ‘North’ and pacify its ‘East’ coast, while sustaining the BRI projects in the ‘West’ and the maritime silk route in the ‘South’. This is the core of the NEWS strategy initiated by the Chinese elite since President Xi assumed office in 2013. Considering Nepal’s strategic location and political stability, China was sure to promote bilateral ties to the level of ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’. And as a strategic partner, Nepal will get substantial help from its northern neighbor. 

For sure, as states are first and foremost committed to their own interests, a close relationship between China and Nepal will never be purely bilateral. There will always be local, regional and international concerns, suspicions and even hostility toward either China or Nepal or both. India is naturally the first to feel uncomfortable. This is why President Xi made a trip to India before visiting Nepal. China has reiterated that it would not use its economic or financial leverage to dictate the internal affairs of its partner countries. In addition, Chinese firms need to move in prudently and observe the local political norms before setting up their businesses.

As Xi has said on several occasions, China is the largest developing country and also one that is learning all the time. Mutual respect and equality are the preconditions for promoting China’s strategy and foster long-term cooperation. Xi’s state visit to Nepal is expected to unlock new strategic opportunities for bilateral relations, as well as promote ties with India and explore the prospects for trilateral cooperation. 

Nepal-China economic integration through the BRI is unstoppable, so it is sensible for India to take the opportunity to extend the proposed high-speed railway all the way down to the port in Kolkata in order to more closely tie the three countries in a complex web of economic interdependence. It might be just the right time to enhance trilateral understanding among Nepal and its two giant neighbors.

In brief, Nepal, though a much smaller state than China and India, could play a positive role as a bridge for building more trust-based relationships across this region. Geopolitical factors should never be an obstacle to elevating bilateral ties to ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’ between Nepal and China.

Wang is a Professor of International Relations and Diplomacy at Jilin University, China; Neupane is a China expert based in Kathmandu

Diplomatic License: The pursuit of strategic autonomy

When the Constituent Assembly members found themselves stuck during the writing of a new constitution, they often looked to the charter of the southern neighbor, the world’s largest democracy, for inspiration. It made sense too. Gandhian nonviolence and Indian struggles against the British had inspired Nepal’s own movement for democracy. Had India not become independent in 1947, Nepal would probably have had to wait for democracy for several more years, if not decades. As it was, even the 1951 agreement on democratic rule in Nepal was signed in New Delhi. It is thus no surprise that we, like India, have ended up with a federal parliamentary democratic system.

Post-1950, there has been a lot of convergence in the two neighbors’ foreign policy as well. As underdeveloped thirdworld countries that could not afford to pick sides in the Cold War, both Nepal and India became founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Both still have Panchsheel as a bedrock of their foreign policy. When India started opening up its economy in the early 1990s, Nepal did too. Of course, the interests of a civilizational state like India cannot in substance be compared with those of a far smaller power like Nepal. There are bound to be fundamental differences. Yet even accounting for this, there are some remarkable similarities.

Take, for instance, the new quest of both the countries for ‘strategic autonomy.’ In recent times this concept has been most commonly used in the context of the European Union; how the 27-country bloc needs to pursue its own interests as the US retreats from its role as a guarantor of peace in Europe. As Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, a German think tank, defines it: “…strategic autonomy is… the ability to set priorities and make decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through—in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone.”

Pushed and pulled in its relations with the US, China and Russia, each an essential partner of India, Narendra Modi has strictly adhered to the letter and spirit of this definition. Nepal just entered a ‘strategic partnership’ of its own with China, and the prime minister says he will pursue similar partnership with India. The US believes it is already a strategic partner of Nepal, which the communist government in Kathmandu is quick to deny. But even with the US, Nepal’s desire to pursue a foreign policy independent of India is clearly visible. For this, the Oli government will tilt a touch more toward China, but will also be ready to engage more with the western powers whose presence on Nepali soil India has traditionally loathed.

Whatever spin the Oli government gives to its foreign policy conduct, its desire, first and foremost, seems to be to yank Nepal out of India’s old, self-defined security umbrella. As a vote-bank strategy, too, it’s a no-brainer; hence the close defense and security cooperation with China and the US, the “third parties” in this game. But if India remains keen about maintaining its upper hand in its traditional backyard, Nepal’s interests will be easily tradable for bigger geopolitical or economic gains. Even Panchsheel, lest we forget, is an Indo-China construct.

The periodic plan of Prov­ince 1 aims to raise its per capita income to $1,620 within the next five years. According to the first periodic plan that the Pro­vincial Planning Commis­sion has made public, the targeted per capita income equals Rs 184,680. The prov­ince’s per capita income now is $1,062. Vice president of the Pro­vincial Planning Commission, Subodh Raj Pyakurel, says that the province also aims to raise its Human Development Index from 0.523 to 0.600 in the next five fiscals. “We have introduced the periodic plan with the main slogan ‘clean, happy and prosperous prov­ince’. All our targets are real­istic,” he adds.

The Gross Domestic Prod­uct (GDP) of the province is Rs 550.29 billion at present. Pyakurel says that the target is to increase it to Rs 803.05 bil­lion in the next five years. To this end, the province aims to increase the current economic growth rate of 8.7 percent to 10.4 percent. Currently, the contribution of the manufac­turing sector to province’s GDP is 20 percent, which the periodic plan aims to increase to 24 percent. As many as 200,000 jobs are expected to be created in the process.

Purna Loksom, a member of the Provincial Planning Commission, says other tar­gets for the next five years are to increase the literacy rate from 84 percent to 99 percent and the average life expectancy from 70 years to 73 years.

The provincial periodic plan is formulated on the basis of national plans, policies and programs; Province 1 has focused on reducing income inequality and boosting the literacy rate and economic growth.

Loksom adds that the main objective of the plan is to lay the foundation of advanced human resource develop­ment and an equitable soci­ety by improving the qual­ity of education, health and social security, and to pro­mote good governance of for­ests, environment, reservoirs and biodiversity by adapting to climatic shifts. He further says that despite the delay in passing the plan and mak­ing it public, its policies and programs have already been incorporated into the current fiscal’s budget.

Targets under the infrastructure sector include blacktopping 5,000 km of roads and ensuring everyone in the province has access to electricity. Currently, only 1,544 km of roads in Province 1 are blacktopped.

The province produces 121 megawatts of electricity, whereas demand stands at 240 megawatts. The Planning Commission says the prov­ince aims to generate 1,500 megawatts of electricity in the next five years and sell it elsewhere.

Chief Minister of Province 1, Sher Dhan Rai, says that only Gandaki Province has so far passed a periodic plan and Province 3 has only prepared a baseline report. He claims that although there has been some delay, Province 1 will be number one in terms of exe­cuting the plan. “The provin­cial government will work on the plan’s framework. And it will make sure it is effectively implemented and its targets attained,” says Rai

DIPLOMATIC LICENSE
Xi humbled but disappointed

Xi Jinping was reportedly humbled by the warm hospi­tality of his hosts. But he was also disappointed. The 14-point joint statement and the 20-point ‘List of agree­ments’ read more like a litany of missed opportunities than an expression of abiding faith between two close friends. Xi came with an open heart, even promising a ‘big surprise’ for Nepal. The surprise never materialized when Xi saw that there was zero preparation on Nepal’s part to finalize BRI projects, even after the announcement of his visit; it was as if the country had completely disregarded his central foreign policy agenda. The US and India will look upon with great satisfaction that what was being billed as a watershed moment in Nepal-China bilateral ties turned out to be a dud. Instead of the announce­ment of a new 1,000 MW project (the surprise?), there was a reiteration of two previously signed hydro deals. The much-vaunted cross-border railway is no closer to being realized. Nor is there anything substantial in the agreements about removing the scores of non-tariff barriers Nepali goods enter­ing China face. The only widely acknowledged achievement of the visit was the 50-km Kathmandu-Keyrung tunnel road.

The signing of an extradition treaty could have put a big spoke in the diplomatic wheel of the US, which has been strongly lobbying for the rights of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. It did not materialize, thanks to the last-minute exertions of the American ambassador Randy Berry. Yet the mutual legal assistance treaty that we now have could still be enough to spy on and extradite Tibetans from Nepal to China.

The rivalry between the IPS and the BRI is the new game in town. Many thought Xi’s reference to “crushed bodies and shattered bones” referred to Hong Kong and what China sees as the American meddling there. Instead, what he was hint­ing at was the recent American lobbying on behalf of Tibetan refugees in Nepal that jinxed a ‘full blown’ extradition treaty.

Xi’s visit was all about minimizing the US presence in Nepal. Given Nepal’s lukewarm response to the BRI, there was no other conceivable reason for him to come here right now. Symbolically, being able to host one of the most powerful persons on the planet was a huge achieve­ment for Nepal, no doubt. Sadly, there was no happy post-Mamallapuram surprise.

Indian analysts seem confident that Nepal can’t easily overcome the constraints of geography. Yet working out a viable role for India in the IPS, and its application in South Asia, is proving to be rather tricky. Indians have traditionally been loath to let westerners have a say in Nepal; yet they also realize that it will be hard to deal with an increasingly self-as­sured China without US help. In any case, we could see a more assertive Indian ambassador taking over the ever-jovial Manjeev Singh Puri who was sent to Nepal to smooth ruffled feathers post-blockade.

As the US-China rivalry in Nepal heats up, let me also haz­ard a guess at another likely development soon: the visit of American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (provided he is not roasted in the Trump impeachment inquiry).