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As the March 5 elections draw closer, debates and curiosity about the possible outcomes are intensifying. This election for the House of Representatives (HoR) is expected to be markedly different from previous ones due to several factors.

First, the elections are taking place against the backdrop of the Sept 8–9 GenZ movement, which toppled the powerful Nepali Congress-UML government. The main agenda of the movement was radical reform in key societal institutions, primarily targeting the state mechanism and political parties.

Second, for the first time in recent elections, youth engagement has been unusually high. Among around one million new voters, more than 80 percent are first-time voters, signaling a major shift in electoral dynamics.

Third, the anti-incumbency sentiment, which was relatively weak in the 2017 and 2022 elections, has now reached its peak, creating uncertainty for established parties.

Fourth, the emergence of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) adds another layer of unpredictability. From securing just 20 seats in the 2022 elections, the party—now allied with former Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Sah—has gained significant momentum, positioning itself as a serious contender.

Fifth, governance and reform have emerged as central electoral issues. In previous elections, these topics were not prime concerns. This time, however, they are expected to heavily influence voter decisions.

Sixth, the "new versus old" debate has intensified, with a strong narrative advocating that fresh leadership should be given the opportunity to implement a transformative agenda.

Seventh, geopolitics has become a prominent electoral issue, particularly highlighted by CPN-UML. Unlike other parties that focus on domestic issues, UML has emphasized external threats, suggesting that the September protests were backed by foreign forces aiming to destabilize Nepal. The party’s campaign materials raise concerns about the role of India and other foreign powers, warning that the victory of new political forces could make Nepal geopolitically vulnerable.

Given this new environment, predicting the election outcome is extremely difficult. There are multiple reasons for this uncertainty.

In the 2017 and 2022 elections, electoral alliances played a decisive role. In 2017, the pre-poll alliance between CPN-UML and the Maoist party led to their sweeping victory, while the Nepali Congress suffered a humiliating defeat. 

In 2022, the alliance between Nepali Congress and the Maoists was expected to favor NC, but UML managed to secure 30 percent of the proportional representation vote, slightly edging out NC at 29 percent. Meanwhile, RSP emerged as a “dark horse,” securing 20 seats, particularly attracting urban voters. This time, however, parties are contesting largely without alliances, fielding candidates across almost all 165 constituencies.

 The rise of RSP is forcing traditional parties to recalibrate their strategies. Speeches from top leaders indicate that major parties are targeting RSP and Balendra Sah, rather than criticizing each other—a clear sign of the pressure RSP is creating. While RSP is likely to make gains, its exact vote share remains uncertain, which could further weaken NC, UML, and Maoist positions.

Intra-party dynamics among the major parties also differ from previous elections. In the past, despite occasional dissatisfaction over candidate distribution, parties largely remained united. This time, the situation is more complex. 

In Nepali Congress, the election of Gagan Kumar Thapa as party president during the special general convention has energized the party, signaling alignment with GenZ aspirations. However, Sher Bahadur Deuba’s ongoing legal battles and the passive stance of his supporters may constrain the party’s overall performance. Old guards at both central and local levels are not fully backing the new candidates, creating a potential vertical split. In this context, it is unclear whether NC will hold its ground or continue to weaken.

Within UML, the intra-party rift is less visible but still impactful. Party Chairman KP Sharma Oli’s reputation after the GenZ protests, particularly regarding accountability for the deaths of 19 protesters, has hurt the party’s image. Senior leaders are also displeased with Oli’s ticket distribution, which barred dissenting voices from contesting. UML has a strong and active organizational network among major parties, but it remains uncertain whether the party can repair its image following the Gen Z protests.

For the Nepali Communist Party (NCP) led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, predicting outcomes is equally challenging. While Dahal is likely to win in Rukum East, the fate of other senior leaders is uncertain. Historically, Maoists have oscillated between dominance (2008) and marginalization (2013), often relying on alliances to bolster their performance. In 2017 and 2022, the party secured third position in alliance with UML and Congress respectively, positioning itself as a king-maker. There has not been an independent test of the party's strength since the 2013 elections because it formed alliances with other parties in the subsequent two elections, making it very difficult to predict the party's current standing.

Finally, RSP continues to pose unpredictability. Although there appears to be a wave in their favor, the party lacks the organizational strength of NC, UML, and Maoists at the grassroots level. District-level  leaders leaving the party further complicates predictions.  While Balendra Shah's entry into the RSP has generated momentum, the effect of Rabi Lamichhane's legal cases on voter behavior is still uncertain. While RSP is expected to gain significantly in proportional representation, its performance in first-past-the-post contests remains uncertain. 

Other political forces influencing all major parties include the Madhes-based parties, as well as the parties led by Harka Sampang and Kul Man Ghising, each of which plays a significant role in shaping voter sentiment. 

In conclusion, the March 5 election is shaping up to be highly unpredictable due to youth engagement, anti-incumbency sentiment, the rise of RSP, intra-party dynamics, and new electoral agendas. Analysts and voters alike are facing a complex and fluid political landscape, making any prediction a formidable challenge.

On March 5, Nepal is holding the election for the 275-member House of Representative (HoR) which will be the 10th democratic elections in Nepal’s history, including the referendum of 1980 and two elections of Constituent Assembly elections. The election is taking place against the backdrop of the Sept 8-9 Genz protests. Nepal’s electoral history from 1959 to 2022 reflects a gradual evolution from a nascent democracy with limited participation to a complex multiparty system, emphasizing inclusive representation. This is an overview of Nepal’s electoral exercise since 1959. 

1959 Parliamentary Elections

Nepal’s first parliamentary election was held in 1959, with polling conducted over 45 days—from Feb 18 to April 10—due to limited transportation and logistical constraints. A total of 4,246,468 voters were registered, and turnout stood at 42.19 percent.  Although participation was modest, the election was widely regarded as a historic democratic milestone. Nine political parties and 12 independent candidates contested the polls. The House of Representatives comprised 109 members, while the National Assembly had 36 members—half nominated by the King and half elected. The Nepali Congress secured victory with 74 seats. Other parties won as follows: Nepal Rastrabadi Gorkha Parisad (19), Samyukta Prajatantra Party (5), Nepal Communist Party (4), Nepal Praja Parisad (Acharya) (2), Nepal Praja Parisad (Mishra) (2), and independents (4). Dwarika Devi Thakurani became Nepal’s first female lawmaker. Several political heavyweights, including D.R. Regmi, Tanka Prasad Acharya, and K.I. Singh, were defeated. Nepali Congress leader B.P. Koirala became Nepal’s first democratically elected Prime Minister. However, in 1960, King Mahendra dismissed the government and imposed the party-less Panchayat system, halting parliamentary democracy for three decades.

1980 Referendum

The 1980 referendum marked a critical turning point. Voters were asked to choose between a reformed Panchayat system and a multiparty democracy. Out of 7,192,451 registered voters, turnout reached 66.93 percent. Invalid votes accounted for 7.64 percent, reflecting both the novelty of the process and voter confusion. The reformed Panchayat system secured 54.79 percent of the vote, while 45.21 percent supported multiparty democracy. Notably, 19 districts, including Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Morang, Sunsari, Kaski, Rupandehi, Dang, and Kanchanpur, voted in favor of multiparty democracy. The result revealed a country divided between continuity and change, foreshadowing the pro-democracy movement of 1990.

1990 Restoration of Democracy

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 2047 B.S. (1990 A.D.), restored multiparty democracy and established a bicameral legislature comprising the House of Representatives and the National Assembly. The National Assembly consisted of 60 members: 35 elected by the HoR through a single transferable vote system, 15 elected by an electoral college from the five development regions (three per region), and 10 appointed by the King. Members served six-year terms, with one-third retiring every two years. The House of Representatives consisted of 205 constituencies.

1991 Parliamentary Elections

The first election after the restoration of democracy was held on May 12, 1991. Of 11,191,777 registered voters, 65.15 percent cast their ballots. Invalid votes stood at 4.42 percent. Among 1,345 candidates, seven women and three independents were elected. The Nepali Congress won 110 seats, followed by CPN-UML with 69 seats, Samyukta Janamorcha with 9, and Nepal Sadbhawana Party with 6. The remaining seats went to smaller parties. Article 114 of the 1990 Constitution required parties to field at least five percent women candidates. Accordingly, 80 women contested the election, of whom seven were elected. A by-election in February 1994 increased the number of women lawmakers to eight. Daman Nath Dhungana was elected Speaker. Girija Prasad Koirala became Prime Minister, but internal party disputes led to the dissolution of Parliament in 1994.

1994 Mid-term Elections 

Mid-term elections were held on Nov 15, 1994. Registered voters increased to 12,327,329, and turnout reached 61.86 percent. The CPN-UML emerged as the largest party with 88 seats, followed by the Nepali Congress (83), Rastriya Prajatantra Party (20), Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party (4), Nepal Sadbhawana Party (3), and independents (7). Of 86 female candidates, six were elected, including Sailaja Acharya, Lila Shrestha, Mina Pandey, Bidya Devi Bhandari, Sahana Pradhan, and Kamala Devi Panta. Manmohan Adhikari of CPN-UML formed a minority government that lasted six months. This Parliament endorsed the Mahakali Treaty with India.

1999 Parliamentary Elections

Held on May 17, 1999, the election saw 2,238 candidates representing 39 political parties and independents. There were 13,518,839 registered voters, with turnout at 65.79 percent. Of 143 women candidates, 12 were elected. The Nepali Congress won 111 seats, CPN-UML 71, RPP 11, and the remaining seats went to smaller parties. Tara Nath Ranabhat was elected Speaker. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai initially became Prime Minister but was later replaced by Girija Prasad Koirala.

First Constituent Assembly Elections (2008) 

Following the Interim Constitution of 2007, Nepal held its historic Constituent Assembly (CA) election on April 10, 2008. The 601-member CA included 240 members elected through First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), 335 through Proportional Representation (PR), and 26 nominated members. Of 17,611,832 registered voters, turnout was 61.70 percent. Combining FPTP and PR results, the Maoists won 220 seats, Nepali Congress 110, CPN-UML 103, Madhesi Janadhikar Forum 52, and Tarai-Madhes Loktantrik Party 20. In total, 25 parties gained representation. Women held 197 seats (32.8 percent), marking a significant leap in inclusion. Pushpa Kamal Dahal became Prime Minister, though his government collapsed within nine months amid institutional conflict.

Second Constituent Assembly Elections (2013) 

The second CA election was held on Nov 19, 2013. Turnout reached 78.34 percent. Nepali Congress emerged as the largest party, followed by CPN-UML and the Maoists. Women secured 176 seats (nearly 29 percent) of the Assembly. Sushil Koirala became Prime Minister with CPN-UML support. The Assembly promulgated the Constitution of Nepal in 2015, establishing a federal democratic republic.

2017 Parliamentary Elections 

The first federal parliamentary elections under the 2015 Constitution were held in two phases in November and December 2017. Out of 15,427,938 registered voters, turnout was nearly 69 percent. Under FPTP, UML won 80 seats, Nepali Congress 23, Maoist Centre 36, and others 26. Under PR, UML secured 41 seats, Nepali Congress 40, and Maoist Centre 17. Women won 92 seats in the 275-member House. An electoral alliance between UML and Maoists later formed the Nepal Communist Party, with K.P. Sharma Oli as Prime Minister.

2022 Parliamentary Elections

The election was held on Nov 20, 2022. Registered voters totaled 17,988,570, with turnout at 61.4 percent. Nepali Congress emerged as the largest party with 89 seats, followed by CPN-UML (78), Maoist Centre (32), Rastriya Swatantra Party (21), and RPP (14). Women secured 91 seats in the 275-member House, reflecting continued though uneven progress in representation. Pushpa Kamal Dahal became Prime Minister in a coalition government, underscoring the era of fragmented mandates and coalition politics.

Road to 2026 Parliamentary Elections

Following the Gen Z movement, parliamentary elections are scheduled for March 5, 2026. There are 18,903,689 registered voters: 9,663,358 men, 9,240,131 women, and 200 registered under the LGBTIQ category. Under the PR system, 63 parties are participating under 58 symbols. Under FPTP, 65 of 107 registered parties are contesting. A total of 3,406 candidates are contesting under FPTP and 3,135 under PR, including 1,772 women and 1,363 men.

Conclusion

From the landmark 1959 election that brought B.P. Koirala led the inclusive, mixed electoral system of the federal republic era, Nepal’s parliamentary journey reflects resilience amid instability and transformation. The party-less system endorsed in 1980, the restoration of democracy in 1990, the turbulence of the 1990s, and the republican shift after 2008 collectively illustrate a gradual deepening of democratic participation and institutional reform. While governments have frequently changed and alliances have shifted, voter engagement has remained relatively robust. Representation, particularly of women and marginalized groups, has expanded through proportional mechanisms and constitutional mandates. As Nepal approaches the 2026 elections, its electoral history reveals both the persistent challenges of political consolidation and the enduring public commitment to democratic choice and pluralism.

Political parties contesting the March 5 elections for the House of Representatives (HoR) have unveiled their election manifestos. These documents are being closely scrutinized, as the polls are taking place against the backdrop of the Sept 8–9 protests. The GenZ-led demonstrations have shaken Nepali society, including the political establishment. This write-up offers a comparative analysis of the manifestos of five major parties—Nepali Congress (NC), CPN-UML (UML), Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), and the Nepali Communist Party (NCP)--focusing on their positions regarding the September protests, foreign policy, economic agenda, constitutional amendments, and governance reform.

 Positions on GenZ protest

 The Nepali Congress manifesto identifies two “worrying tendencies” that emerged after the Sept 8–9 protests. First, it criticizes attempts to dismiss the movement as a conspiracy or minor event, arguing that such denial seeks to restore the pre-Sept 7 status quo. Second, it warns against exploiting the youth rebellion for political gain, a remark widely interpreted as directed at RSP. NC positions itself against both tendencies, concluding that the rebellion represents a demand for good governance and accountability amid declining institutional credibility and corruption. It even equates the GenZ protests with major democratic movements since the 1950s.

 UML, which was in power during the protests, describes the Sept 8–9 events as a grave and organized attempt to undermine national sovereignty. The party raises concerns about infiltration, the nature of protesters’ demands, attacks on the private sector, and assaults on security agencies. It maintains that these questions cannot simply be dismissed as conspiracy theories.

 RSP states that it will implement the findings of a probe committee formed to investigate the protests. While it holds then-Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli accountable for the events, its manifesto does not elaborate extensively on its broader position regarding the protests. The Nepali Communist Party devotes limited space to the GenZ movement but indicates that constitutional changes will be made in response to youth demands. The Rastriya Prajatanta Party (RPP) argues that the incompetence and failure of major political parties, widespread corruption, and poor governance forced Gen Z youth to protest on Bhadra 23 and 24, resulting in irreparable loss of life and property. 

 Foreign policy

 Across the board, foreign policy sections are marked by cautious and abstract language. UML emphasizes sovereign equality, independence, and peaceful relations. It pledges stronger ties with neighboring countries, expanded labor agreements, foreign investment, and job creation. The manifesto reaffirms adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, non-alignment, peaceful coexistence, non-interference, and Panchsheel. UML reiterates its commitment to “friendship with all, enmity with none.”

 RSP advocates a “balanced and dynamic diplomacy,” aiming to transform Nepal from a “buffer state” into a “vibrant bridge” between India and China through strategic partnerships, connectivity, and development cooperation.

NC envisions Nepal as a sovereign, peaceful, and dignified nation guided by national interest and sovereign equality. It seeks to enhance Nepal’s global image, highlighting iconic heritage sites such as Mount Everest, Lumbini, Pashupatinath Temple, and Janaki Temple.

 The Nepali Communist Party(NCP) outlines a more detailed agenda: prioritizing balanced ties with neighbors, resolving border disputes (Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, Kalapani) through diplomatic dialogue and international law, strengthening participation in forums such as the UN, SAARC, and BIMSTEC, reviewing unequal treaties, and prioritizing economic diplomacy to boost investment and exports. In foreign policy, RPP has pledged to revive the concept of Nepal as a Zone of Peace, an idea introduced by former King Birendra in the 1970s. It has also stated that all unequal treaties and agreements will be annulled, in an apparent reference to India.

 Economic policy

 Nepali Congress reiterates its long-standing liberal economic orientation, recalling the liberalization and privatization policies of the early 1990s. It proposes establishing the private sector as the main engine of prosperity, with the government acting primarily as a regulator. At the same time, it emphasizes social justice by ensuring economic opportunities for marginalized communities.

 RSP similarly endorses a liberal economic model with a social justice component. It envisions the private sector leading in employment creation, service delivery, and investment, while the state serves as facilitator and regulator.

 UML sets ambitious targets: achieving over 7 percent annual growth and expanding the economy to Rs 100 trillion within five years. Although it does not explicitly frame its approach as liberal, it identifies the private sector as the principal driver of prosperity while supporting increased state investment in high-multiplier sectors.

 The Nepali Communist Party commits to a “socialist-oriented economy,” as envisioned in the 2015 Constitution. It calls for comprehensive structural reforms aimed at production growth, job creation, financial inclusion, and self-reliance, with balanced development among private, cooperative, and public sectors. On economic policy, the party emphasizes the central role of the private sector. It states that national progress is impossible without the private sector’s active participation and sustained growth.

According to the RPP, the private sector contributes approximately 82 percent of GDP, around 85 percent of employment, 77 percent of investment and capital formation, and over 90 percent of production and trade, while also playing a major role in revenue collection.

 Constitutional amendment

 All four parties acknowledge the need for constitutional amendments but remain vague on specifics. 

Nepali Congress argues that amendments are necessary to implement its reform agenda and proposes an Inter-Party Collaboration Framework to build consensus.

 RSP pledges to prepare, within three months of forming a government, a document outlining potential amendments. Its proposals include a directly elected executive, a fully proportional parliament, barring lawmakers from serving as ministers, non-party local governments, and restructuring parliament. UML supports amendments based on broad political consensus but offers limited detail and has softened its earlier calls for major changes.

 The Nepali Communist Party defends the 2015 Constitution as one of the best in the world, born of popular struggle. While rejecting any attempt to abolish it, the party supports review and amendment through constitutional procedures. It proposes revisiting the electoral system, governance structure, cabinet size, and provincial arrangements. On constitutional matters, the RPP has proposed restoring the monarchy as a guardian institution. It has called for reform of what it describes as the current expensive and unstable electoral system and has proposed a non-party-based local government system.

 Governance reform

 Nepali Congress and RSP present detailed reform agendas. NC proposes measures, including a high-level probe into the assets of public office holders since 1990; empowering the National Vigilance Center; conflict-of-interest legislation; merit-based appointments; a cooling-off period for officials; amendments to the Public Procurement Act; a governance lab and parliamentary knowledge unit; reducing ministries and departments; term limits for prime ministers and lawmakers; and state funding for political parties.

 RSP advances similar proposals, including dissolving trade unions in government offices, avoiding party sister wings, investigating past office holders’ assets, forming an independent civil service transfer board, ending political influence in judicial appointments, and transforming the National Planning Commission into a think tank.

 UML outlines broad principles of good governance, such as rule of law, efficiency, anti-corruption, impartiality, transparency, and accountability, but provides fewer concrete reform proposals. Its manifesto focuses more on defending its governance record since 1990.

 The Nepali Communist Party proposes forming an empowered, independent commission with a one-year mandate to investigate corruption and assets of past public officials. It also promises a high-level Lokpal body and merit-based appointments free from political influence. 

On governance reform, the RPP has stated that a high-level commission will be formed to investigate the assets of high-ranking officials since 1990, with legal provisions to confiscate illegally acquired property. The party has also pledged to introduce a law addressing conflicts of interest. 

Eighteen months after mass protests toppled the government of long-time prime minister Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has sworn in a new elected government led by Tarique Rahman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

At the same time,  Nepal is preparing for parliamentary elections on March 5 amid lingering questions about reform, stability, and the durability of its republican system. Together, the two countries present contrasting pathways in South Asia’s evolving democratic landscape.

Bangladesh’s new government emerged from an unusual democratic exercise: parliamentary elections were held alongside a referendum on constitutional reform. The referendum sought to institutionalize the demands of the 2024 youth-led protest movement, which called for greater accountability, stronger checks and balances, and the depoliticization of state institutions.

With this majority, the government is positioned to pursue constitutional amendments through a proposed constitutional council, potentially reshaping the balance of power among the executive, legislature, and judiciary. Reform priorities are expected to include strengthening electoral credibility, ensuring judicial independence, enhancing transparency, and safeguarding civil liberties. Yet the transition is not without risk. The Awami League was barred from contesting the election, a move that critics warn could fuel political resentment and street mobilization.

In contrast, Nepal heads into elections without having undertaken major reforms demanded by the Sept 8–9 protests, largely driven by GenZ activists. The protests reflected deep frustration with corruption, patronage networks, weak public services, and a perceived lack of accountability across political institutions.

Unlike Bangladesh’s reform-first electoral approach, Nepal  has opted to proceed directly to the polls. Skeptics argue that without pre-election structural changes, the vote may simply reproduce the existing power dynamics. Key public demands—restoring trust in institutions, reinforcing the rule of law, ensuring judicial and legislative independence, and building a merit-based bureaucracy—remain largely aspirational. The challenge for any incoming government will be translating campaign rhetoric into concrete institutional reform.

Nepal’s proportional representation system and fragmented party landscape make a single-party majority unlikely. A hung parliament and coalition government appear the most probable outcome. While coalition politics is familiar terrain in Kathmandu, past alliances have often been unstable, slowing policy implementation and weakening reform momentum. Failure to deliver tangible change could deepen youth disillusionment and embolden anti-establishment forces.

Adding to Nepal’s political complexity is the renewed activism of former monarch Gyanendra Shah. In a recent Democracy Day message, he criticized the electoral process and advocated for the restoration of the monarchy. Domestic reform efforts in both countries will unfold under the watchful eye of international stakeholders. Western governments are closely monitoring commitments to democratic governance, transparency, and anti-corruption. In Nepal, reform-oriented voices within the Nepali Congress and independent leaders such as Balendra Shah have attracted attention for emphasizing accountability and administrative reform.

For Nepal, relations with India remain crucial. The open border, deep economic ties, and longstanding sensitivities over boundary disputes and treaty arrangements make New Delhi a central actor in Kathmandu’s foreign policy calculus. India will be closely watching how the new government approaches unresolved bilateral issues. Simultaneously, engagement with China remains strategically significant. Chinese investment is central to Nepal’s infrastructure and development ambitions, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, expanded Chinese involvement is likely to be scrutinized by India and Western partners, placing Nepal in a familiar geopolitical balancing act.

Nepal’s major parties have highlighted distinct foreign policy visions in their election manifestos. CPN-UML focuses on sovereign equality, independence, and peaceful relations with all nations, pledging stronger ties with neighbors, labor agreements, foreign investment, and job creation. 

Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) advocates “balanced and dynamic diplomacy,” aiming to turn Nepal from a “buffer state” into a “vibrant bridge” through strategic partnerships with India and China, enhanced connectivity, and development cooperation. Nepali Congress (NC) envisions a sovereign, peaceful, and dignified Nepal, promoting equality, mutual respect, and economic partnerships, while raising Nepal’s global profile through iconic symbols.

 In its election manifesto, UML has said that it is committed to a foreign policy based on respect for sovereign equality, independence, and territorial integrity, and grounded in world peace, coexistence, and friendship with all.  The document says: “We maintain respectful relations with all nations. We respect the sovereignty and independence of all countries and expect similar treatment from others. We believe in sovereign equality. We reject any encroachment or interference against the independence, self-determination, and territorial integrity of any nation.”

It also emphasizes the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, non-alignment, peaceful coexistence, non-interference, mutual understanding, cooperation, and the Five Principles (Panchsheel). According to the manifesto, the party stands firmly against war and in favor of world peace.

The document further says: “We will participate in all efforts inspired by dialogue and goodwill and make thoughtful contributions. Enhancing the dignity and pride of Nepal and the Nepali people is our objective.”

The UML also pledges to continuously strive to further strengthen relations with our neighboring friendly countries, make them more cordial, and enhance mutual cooperation. It reaffirms commitment to the principle of “friendship with all, enmity with none”. “We do not wish harm to any of our neighbors and will not undertake any action that would harm them. We will cooperate with all friendly nations and with international and regional organizations.”

To effectively promote labor diplomacy, the party promises to conclude bilateral labor agreements with all destination countries, including provisions for social security.  The party manifesto also pledges to promote foreign direct investment in productive sectors and increase employment opportunities within Nepal. 

Meanwhile, RSP has emphasized balanced and dynamic diplomacy in its election manifesto.

The document says:  “Placing Nepal’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national interest above all, we will adopt a “balanced and dynamic diplomacy” to transform shifting global geopolitics and the rise of neighboring powers into opportunities for Nepal’s development.”

It also pledges to adapt to the strategic interests of neighboring countries and changes in the global balance of power to transform Nepal from a “buffer state” into a “vibrant bridge,” ensuring national interest through trilateral economic partnerships and enhanced connectivity.

The manifesto says that the party will renew the framework of development partnership with India, so that Nepal can benefit from their achievements in the areas such as digital public infrastructure, high-speed, high-quality physical infrastructure, formalization of economy, synergy between productive industries and the service sector, and overall enhancement of state capacity.

With China, RSP pledges to promote the mobilization of concessional financing for the construction of world-class infrastructure, implement state-directed targets and programs for economic and social development, and incorporate exemplary practices of inter-provincial competition as key pillars of partnership. 

In its election manifesto Nepali Congress (NC) says: “We envision Nepal  will be recognized by the international community as a sovereign, peaceful, and dignified nation.” According to the document Nepal’s foreign policy will be grounded in national interest and the principle of sovereign equality. The party states: “Our relationships with neighboring and friendly countries will be based on equality and mutual respect, and such relations will be advanced on the foundation of mutual trust and economic partnership.”

The NC manifesto also promises to make Nepal known to the world as a responsible and respected member, along with national heritages  like Mount Everest, Lumbini, Pashupatinath, and Janaki.

One year after Donald Trump assumed office for his second term as American President, his administration’s South Asia policy is beginning to take shape.

Over the past year, the Trump administration paid very little attention to the smaller countries of South Asia, as Trump was focused on preventing or stopping major wars occurring in different parts of the world. The Trump administration has recalled several ambassadors from South Asian countries, including Nepal, and has not yet appointed their replacements.

Meanwhile, the administration’s relationship with India witnessed a tumultuous phase due to tariff war. Now, the relationship between India and the United States is returning to normalcy following the settlement of trade disputes. 

This week, at least three senior American officials spoke about their approach to South Asia. S. Paul Kapur, Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at the U.S. State Department, appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to outline Washington’s South Asia policy.

According to Kapur’s statement, the principal agenda of the Trump administration is to expand trade relationships with South Asian countries, as it is doing elsewhere. In his second term, Trump has employed tariffs as a tool to pressure governments to make trade more favorable to the United States.

Kapur further added: “Just last week, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi reached agreement on a historic trade framework. And two days ago, the Trump Administration signed a trade deal with Bangladesh, providing American exporters with access to Bangladesh’s market of 175 million people.” But, U.S has a very minimal trade with Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka. 

Beyond trade, he outlined three broad approaches to strategic capacity-building that the Trump administration is deploying in South Asia: defense cooperation, targeted investment, and diplomacy.

Defense cooperation includes military sales and transfers, co-development of systems and platforms, and bilateral and multilateral exercises.  Targeted investment combines U.S. seed funding, American technology and expertise, and private industry participation.

Diplomacy involves institutionalized engagement between senior leaders, as well as ad hoc interactions to address emerging opportunities or challenges, along with strategic messaging to support U.S. initiatives.

Regarding the smaller countries of South Asia, the Trump administration’s first priority appears to be countering growing Chinese influence. Kapur said: “Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bhutan’s strategic locations afford them outsized importance, but also can make them targets for coercion.”

He added that defense cooperation with the United States helps these countries protect their borders and waterways against encroaching powers, while carefully targeted investment can provide high-quality, transparent, and non-coercive support for critical infrastructure such as ports, telecommunications networks, and energy facilities—helping them avoid the dangers of debt-trap diplomacy. This indicates that the U.S. intends to limit Chinese investment in those countries.

Similarly, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia Chairman Bill Huizenga said that strengthening ties with New Delhi through defense cooperation, trade, and technology partnerships advances shared interests.

He stated: “I look forward to increasing cooperation, co-production, and investment, especially under the new framework negotiated by the President. Bordering India, Nepal and Bangladesh are undergoing political transformations.”

He noted that Bangladesh will hold free elections tomorrow following its July 2024 revolution, which ousted an authoritarian government in September 2025.

 In Nepal, youth-led protests overthrew the government, and the country will hold democratic elections next month. According to him, both instances offer new chapters for engagement in South Asia, shaping U.S. relations with these new governments.

He further added that South and Central Asia is a dynamic region, where young and growing populations are more often drawn to Western cultures and values than to China’s authoritarian alternative.

“Strategic U.S.-led diplomacy will make a difference in building alliances and achieving our mutually beneficial goals throughout the region,” he said.

“Our strategy in South Asia must be comprehensive, anchored in strong partnerships, economic engagement, and a commitment to democratic values. Our engagement in the region must advance American interests, while also contributing to a more secure, prosperous, and free Indian Ocean,” he added.

Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), has said his visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. He visited Nepal ahead of the March 5 elections to the House of Representatives (HoR), which are taking place against the backdrop of the September 8–9 Gen Z protest.

The visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. U.S.-Nepal cooperation in these areas benefits Nepali and American citizens throughout the region and supports global peacekeeping efforts, says a press statement issued by INDOPACOM after the two-day visit. 

Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), has said his visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. He visited Nepal ahead of the March 5 elections to the House of Representatives (HoR), which are taking place against the backdrop of the September 8–9 Gen Z protest.

The visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. U.S.-Nepal cooperation in these areas benefits Nepali and American citizens throughout the region and supports global peacekeeping efforts, says a press statement issued by INDOPACOM after the two-day visit.

During his stay, Paparo met Foreign Minister Bala Nanda Sharma and Gen. Ashok Raj Sigdel, Chief of Army Staff of the Nepali Army, to discuss strengthening collaboration in disaster response and Nepal’s significant contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

At the Birendra Peace Operations Training Centre in Panchkhal, Paparo interacted with Nepali peacekeeping professionals and observed pre-deployment training activities. The center plays a vital role in preparing Nepali troops for UN peacekeeping missions and supports multinational peace operations, reinforcing Nepal’s standing as one of the world’s leading troop-contributing countries to UN missions.

An alumni event hosted by the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) and its director, Suzanne P. Vares-Lum, brought together Nepali graduates of APCSS programs. The gathering provided a platform for security professionals to exchange ideas and explore collaborative approaches to regional security challenges.

INDOPACOM and Nepal have maintained close cooperation in strengthening disaster response capabilities through joint exercises, technical assistance, and the provision of non-combat equipment such as helicopters, vehicles, and communication systems. U.S. training and logistical support have also enhanced Nepal’s capacity to conduct humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, the statement said.

Officials said the partnership aligns with Nepal’s goal of enhancing self-reliance while contributing to regional resilience and preparedness. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command reiterated its commitment to promoting stability across the region through security cooperation, peaceful development, and coordinated responses to emerging challenges, according to the statement.

Paparo’s visit highlighted Nepal’s strategic importance in South Asia and reaffirmed its leadership role in fostering regional stability and advancing global peacekeeping efforts.

During then Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali’s visit to the United States on December 18, 2018, then U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo highlighted Nepal’s central role in a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific and in global affairs.

 The 2019 U.S. Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report officially described Nepal as a valued partner. The report listed Nepal as a member of the State Partnership Program (SPP), which was later rejected by the Nepal government.

This week, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia Chairman Bill Huizenga has said that recent elections in Bangladesh and Nepal present new opportunities for U.S. engagement in South Asia.

In his opening remarks at a subcommittee hearing titled “South Asia: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region,” Huizenga described South and Central Asia as a dynamic region where young and growing populations are increasingly drawn to Western cultures and values rather than to what he called China’s “authoritarian alternative.”

Bordering India, both Nepal and Bangladesh are undergoing significant political transformations. Bangladesh held general elections on February 12, following the July 2024 revolution that led to the ouster of an authoritarian government in September 2025. Meanwhile, Nepal is set to hold democratic elections on March 5 after youth-led protests overthrew the previous government.

The election government led by Prime Minister Sushila Karki has come under growing criticism for its handling of Nepal’s relations with its immediate neighbors, particularly China. Since the formation of the government following the GenZ movement, Prime Minister Karki and senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have repeatedly reaffirmed Nepal’s commitment to the One-China policy. However, these assurances appear to have done little to fully reassure Beijing.

In recent months, China has dispatched a series of official and semi-official teams to Nepal to assess the evolving political situation and its possible implications for bilateral relations. Diplomatic sources in Kathmandu say these visits reflect Beijing’s concerns about political uncertainty following the Sept 8–9 GenZ movement and the direction of Nepal’s new leadership.

Beijing’s unease reportedly deepened after Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama sent a congratulatory message to Prime Minister Karki upon her assumption of office. The message came as a shock to Chinese officials, who subsequently conveyed strong concerns to the Nepali leadership through diplomatic channels. China views any public engagement—direct or indirect—with the Dalai Lama as a sensitive issue, given its longstanding position that he represents separatist activities.

More recently, the visit of Tibetan spiritual leader Jonang Gyletsab Rinpoche to Nepal and the reception accorded to him in Kathmandu has once again raised eyebrows, both in Beijing and within Nepal’s political circles. Although Nepali officials maintain that the visit was religious in nature, critics argue that the government failed to anticipate the diplomatic repercussions.

Vice-chairperson of the CPN-UML, Ram Bahadur Thapa, publicly accused the Karki-led interim government of providing space to what he described as “anti-China activities” on Nepali soil. “The Dalai Lama’s representative came to Nepal and was received with great honor at the airport,” Thapa said, alleging that the government is implicitly protecting elements opposed to China’s core interests.

Foreign policy analyst Rupak Sapkota also points to the shortcomings in the government’s diplomatic approach. According to him, the Karki administration’s “immature handling” of relations with neighboring countries has raised suspicions in Beijing regarding Nepal’s commitment to the One-China policy.

Sapkota is not alone in his assessment. Several observers of Nepal’s foreign and strategic affairs have expressed concern that relations between Kathmandu and Beijing have become strained since the GenZ movement. Beijing reportedly also harbored reservations about the composition of the new cabinet and the broader political team assembled by Prime Minister Karki.

Adding to the diplomatic unease, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu remained without an ambassador for over a month after Chen Song was recalled to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Beijing has now appointed Zhang Maoming, a familiar face in Nepal’s political and diplomatic circles, who is expected to arrive in Kathmandu in the second week of this month. Observers see his appointment as a signal that China intends to recalibrate its engagement with Nepal during a politically sensitive period.

In recent months, multiple Chinese delegations have visited Kathmandu to study the GenZ movement, assess preparations for upcoming elections, and gauge the likely nature of the next government. Notably, Beijing has maintained near silence on the GenZ movement in official statements, and Chinese state media have published far fewer reports and commentaries on Nepal than in the past—an absence that many analysts interpret as cautious watchfulness rather than indifference.