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On the sidelines of the 81st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Nepal’s Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal engaged extensively with the international community through side events and bilateral engagements. His engagement was focused mainly on two broad areas: to draw attention to the devastating impact of the Aug 26 Bhotekoshi-Trishuli flood, and to articulate the foreign-policy vision of the new government. At a program organized by the Asia Society, Khanal offered one of the clearest formulations yet of the foreign-policy thinking of the new government, which came to power with a two-thirds majority in the March 5 elections.

His remarks suggest an attempt to recast Nepal’s traditional balancing diplomacy around a distinctly economic objective. The emerging doctrine, according to Khanal, is three directions, one strategy. The three directions are India, China, and the wider international community. The common strategy is to engage all three simultaneously to expand trade, investment, connectivity, and economic opportunities while preserving what Khanal calls development autonomy. “Development autonomy is not about choosing sides: it is about increasing our value across three confident, unified directions,” Khanal said.

The formulation is significant because it seeks to move Nepal’s foreign policy away from the idea that engagement with India, China, and the wider world represents competing choices. Minister Khanal said that, like in the past, political ideology would not guide external relations. Instead, the government appears to view these relationships as complementary sources of markets, investment, infrastructure, technology, and diplomatic space. Khanal, in various engagements, made it clear that Nepal does not join any security and strategic alliances.

Nepal has long sought to maintain balanced relations with India and China while expanding ties with countries beyond its immediate neighborhood. What appears different in the new government's formulation is the attempt to organize these relationships around a single economic objective. For Kathmandu, multi-engagement is not simply a diplomatic principle. It is intended to become an economic strategy.

India offers geographical proximity, a huge consumer market, and an expanding electricity market. China offers connectivity, investment, access to the northern corridor, and technology. The United States, Europe, Japan, ASEAN, and the Gulf offer additional markets, capital, technology, and partnerships. The challenge for Nepal is to convert these relationships into economic leverage without becoming excessively dependent on any single external partner. That is the essence of the government's formulation of development autonomy: engage widely, diversify economic relationships, and preserve the freedom to make decisions based on Nepal's own development interests.

With India, the new government appears to be shifting the emphasis from managing longstanding disputes to expanding areas of practical economic cooperation, identifying new areas of opportunities. Energy is at the center of this approach, according to Khanal. Nepal wants to use its hydropower potential not only to generate electricity for domestic consumption, but also to become an important supplier of clean energy to India and, eventually, Bangladesh.

Khanal argued that Nepal could help power regional industrial decarbonization by exporting clean electricity to India and onward to Bangladesh. This would give the energy relationship a broader regional significance, positioning Nepal not simply as an electricity producer, but as part of an emerging South Asian energy market.

Geography strengthens the argument. Nepal shares an open border of more than 1,700 kilometers with five Indian states—Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, and Sikkim—giving it direct access to a large regional market. Khanal described the government's approach as “Thick Connectivity and Thin Borders.” The objective is to make the border increasingly important as a channel for commerce, energy, and investment while reducing the economic friction associated with physical borders.

The Southern region could, therefore, become an important component of this strategy. Khanal argued that global and Indian companies seeking resilient supply chains could locate manufacturing in Nepal’s border Special Economic Zones, combining access to relatively low-cost clean electricity with proximity to the Indian market and international market access. If India represents Nepal's southern economic gateway, China represents the northern connectivity opportunity.

In Western capitals, Nepal’s relationship with China is closely watched, particularly because of questions surrounding Chinese infrastructure financing and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Khanal sought to present the government’s approach as one based on connectivity, but not dependency. The objective, he said, is not simply to open roads to the north, but to transform Nepal from a landlocked economy into a land-linked economy.That vision involves a multidimensional Trans-Himalayan connectivity network encompassing roads, tunnels, dry ports, aviation, digital links, and cross-border rail.

Khanal also emphasized that Nepal has not implemented projects under the BRI, despite signing agreements with China. At the same time, he sought to reassure partners concerned about Chinese financing that project selection would be guided by transparent financing, rigorous feasibility studies, and value-for-money principles.

China is already Nepal’s second-largest trading partner, according to Khanal, while Chinese investors are among the largest sources of foreign investment in Nepal. The economic relationship, therefore, extends beyond infrastructure and connectivity. The most ambitious element of the new government's foreign-policy vision is perhaps its attempt to redefine Nepal's geopolitical geography.

For decades, Nepal has often been described in strategic terms as a buffer between India and China. The new formulation seeks to replace that image with that of an economic bridge. “We do not see our northern and southern corridors as competing directions,” Khanal said.

Instead, the government sees Nepal as being positioned between two of the world's largest markets, with a combined population of nearly three billion people. Its ambition is to turn that geography into a gateway for commerce and investment. This idea also appears in the election manifesto of the Rastriya Swatantra Party, which envisaged a more economically connected and strategically relevant Nepal. Khanal described Nepal as a civilizational bridge in the past, an economic bridge in the present, and a strategic bridge for the future.

The formulation captures the central logic of the new approach: Nepal should not view its location between India and China merely as a geopolitical constraint. It should attempt to convert that location into an economic asset. The third direction of the government's foreign policy extends beyond Nepal's immediate neighbourhood.

Khanal said Kathmandu intends to deepen partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan, ASEAN, and the Gulf. The purpose is not merely to expand Nepal's diplomatic footprint. It is also to diversify sources of investment, technology, markets, and economic opportunity. This diversification is particularly important if development autonomy is to be more than a diplomatic slogan. The US, Japan, the United Kingdom, and European countries have shown enthusiasm to engage with the new government. Khanal highlighted Nepal's potential as a digital hub, arguing that data and software face relatively little transit friction compared with physical goods. Nepal's hydropower resources and comparatively cool climate, he suggested, could support a digital economy, including through a Fintech and AI Sandbox.

The country’s large global diaspora is another component of this strategy. Khanal described Nepal’s roughly 5m-strong diaspora as a strategic asset that can help connect the country with markets and networks across the world. The government's formulation is ambitious. But the success of the strategy will depend less on its diplomatic articulation than on implementation. The first question is whether Nepal can build the infrastructure required to become an economic bridge between India and China. Roads, railways, tunnels, dry ports, electricity transmission lines, and digital infrastructure require substantial capital and long-term planning. The second is whether Nepal can attract productive investment rather than simply announce investment opportunities. Special Economic Zones, for example, will require reliable infrastructure, efficient customs, predictable regulations, and competitive business conditions.

One month after an ice-and-rock avalanche in the upper Lhende Khola watershed triggered a massive debris flow and flooding along the Bhotekoshi–Trishuli–Narayani river system, Nepal is moving from an immediate rescue response towards one of the country’s largest post-disaster recovery and reconstruction exercises. 

The avalanche occurred about 20 kilometers upstream of the Rasuwagadhi border point, sending debris and floodwaters downstream and causing extensive damage to infrastructure, homes, livelihoods and essential services.

The government has continued search and rescue operations while beginning preparations for short-, medium- and long-term recovery and reconstruction. It is also seeking financial support from India, China and other international partners to meet the enormous cost of rebuilding. A Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) has put the total economic impact of the disaster at $2.7bn, comprising $1.81bn in physical damage and $883.32m in economic losses.

But the bill for rebuilding is considerably higher. The assessment estimates that Nepal will require $4.77bn, or Rs 723.32bn, for recovery and reconstruction. Of this, $57.66m is required during the first six months, while $4.72bn is projected for recovery and reconstruction beyond the first six months.

The difference between the damage bill and the recovery requirement reflects the fact that reconstruction is not simply about replacing what was destroyed. The recovery program also incorporates disaster-risk reduction, stronger and more resilient infrastructure, debris management and measures intended to make affected communities less vulnerable to future disasters.

Infrastructure has emerged as the largest component of the recovery challenge. It accounts for 46.55 percent of the assessed disaster effects, while the productive sector accounts for 36.83 percent and the social sector 16.62 percent. The composition changes significantly when the focus shifts from damage and losses to reconstruction needs. Infrastructure accounts for 65.47 percent of total recovery needs, followed by social sectors at 14.32 percent, cross-cutting requirements at 13.19 percent and productive sectors at 7.02 percent.

The energy sector represents the largest single reconstruction requirement. Hydropower and electricity-grid infrastructure suffered $889.21m in physical damage, equivalent to 49.07 percent of total assessed physical damage. Economic losses in the energy sector are estimated at another $107.91m. Yet rebuilding the energy system will cost substantially more.

The assessment estimates $2.58bn in energy-sector recovery needs. Road reconstruction requires another $364.28m, while $119.9m is estimated for bridges. Further requirements have been identified for telecommunications, water supply and sanitation, irrigation and river-training infrastructure, and household renewable energy. The restoration of these networks will have consequences beyond repairing physical structures.

Roads and bridges determine access to affected settlements, markets and reconstruction sites, while electricity, telecommunications and water systems are essential to restoring normal economic and social activity.The social sector has also sustained substantial damage.

Private buildings account for $421.74m, or 94.15 percent of total social-sector damage. Recovery needs for private buildings alone are estimated at $632.61m. The remainder of the social-sector requirement covers public buildings and facilities, education, health and cultural heritage.

Although these sectors represent a smaller share of the overall financial requirement, the RDNA notes that their financial size should not be interpreted as an indication of their importance. Restoring schools, health facilities and other essential public services will be critical to the recovery of affected communities.

The disaster has also disrupted economic activity and livelihoods across the affected areas.

The productive sector recorded $200.05m in physical damage and $765.07m in economic losses. Economic activities and livelihoods alone account for 86.61 percent of all assessed economic losses.

The estimated recovery requirement for this subsector is $300.08m. Agriculture, fisheries, livestock and banking make up the remaining productive-sector requirements.

The assessment cautions that recovery needs should not be interpreted as compensation for accumulated economic losses. The two figures measure different things: economic losses capture the disruption to income and activity, while recovery needs to estimate the interventions required to restore and rebuild productive capacity. 

Perhaps the clearest indication that the government is looking beyond immediate reconstruction is the size of the cross-cutting recovery requirement. Cross-cutting recovery needs are estimated at $629.91m, of which $625.52m is allocated to disaster-risk reduction. The remainder covers debris management and inclusive recovery measures.

This means a significant portion of the reconstruction programme will be aimed not merely at restoring what existed before the flood, but at reducing the risk of similar disasters in the future.

Energy, private buildings and disaster-risk reduction alone account for $3.84bn—or 80.35 percent—of the total recovery requirement.

The concentration of resources in these three areas means that detailed engineering assessments, site investigations and activity-level costing will be particularly important as the government moves from the RDNA towards an implementable recovery programme. The immediate recovery requirement is comparatively small when measured against the overall reconstruction bill.

The RDNA estimates $57.66m for the first six months, only 1.21 percent of the total recovery requirement. The remaining $4.72bn is assigned to the period beyond six months. Of the early recovery requirement, 77.20 percent is allocated to infrastructure, with roads and bridges alone accounting for 54.26 percent. The emphasis reflects the urgent need to restore physical access to affected areas. But the adequacy of the allocation for other immediate needs will depend on the

A month after the disaster, the central challenge is therefore changing.

The immediate response centred on finding missing people, rescuing those stranded by the flood and dealing with debris and damaged infrastructure. The next phase will require the government to coordinate a reconstruction program worth more than Rs 723bn while maintaining essential services and livelihoods in affected areas.

The scale of the requirement also means that domestic resources alone are unlikely to be sufficient. The government's efforts to mobilize financial and technical assistance from neighboring countries and international development partners will be an important part of the next phase. 

But the RDNA also makes clear that securing money is only one part of the task. Detailed engineering, site assessments, prioritisation, financing arrangements and implementation plans will determine how quickly the estimated recovery programme can be translated into reconstruction on the ground.

One month after the Bhotekoshi disaster, Nepal is consequently facing a recovery challenge that extends far beyond repairing flood-damaged roads, bridges and houses. It is a question of rebuilding critical infrastructure, restoring livelihoods and essential services, and deciding how much of the reconstruction should be designed to withstand the next extreme event. 

The Rs 723.31bn recovery requirement provides the scale of the challenge. The next phase will determine how that figure is converted into projects, financing and, ultimately, recovery for the communities affected by the Bhotekoshi–Trishuli–Narayani disaster.

Kathmandu — The United States and China have agreed to build a "constructive relationship of strategic stability based on mutual respect, fairness, and reciprocity" following bilateral discussions between U.S. leadership and Chinese President Xi Jinping during his official visit to the United States. According to a press statement released by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two heads of state reached consensus on eight key deliverables and mutual understandings spanning diplomacy, trade, security, and emerging technologies:

• Multilateral engagement: Both nations pledged mutual support for hosting upcoming international forums, including the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting and the G20 Summit, with both heads of state indicating their intention to attend.
• Trade and tariffs: The leaders endorsed recent progress made by their respective trade teams, formalizing a $30 billion reciprocal tariff reduction arrangement, extending the outcomes of earlier consultations in Kuala Lumpur, and establishing a joint Board of Trade mechanism.
• Artificial intelligence safety: A bilateral China-U.S. AI Dialogue has been established to assess risks and opportunities associated with artificial intelligence, with the next formal session scheduled for November 2026. Both sides also agreed to set up a dedicated communication channel for AI-related incidents.
• Military and crisis prevention: Defense officials from both nations will finalize a memorandum of understanding on crisis communication and risk prevention. Additionally, joint operations will continue in searching for the remains of missing U.S. service members in China, referencing the shared history of the two nations as World War II allies.
• Counter-narcotics enforcement: Bilateral law enforcement collaboration recently resulted in joint operations targeting precursor chemicals and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS), leading to the arrest of dozens of suspects across both countries.
• International waterways & security: Both leaders agreed that Iran must uphold its commitment to refrain from developing nuclear weapons and reaffirmed that no state or institution may impose unauthorized tolls or restrictions on international shipping routes.

The agreements reflect an effort by both major powers to manage strategic competition while maintaining operational channels for economic and security cooperation.

On the sidelines of the 81st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Nepal’s Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal engaged extensively with the international community through side events and bilateral engagements.

His engagement was focused mainly on two broad areas: to draw attention to the devastating impact of the August 26 Bhotekoshi flood, and to articulate the foreign-policy vision of the new government.

At a programme organized by the Asia Society, Khanal offered one of the clearest formulations yet of the foreign-policy thinking of the new government, which came to power with a two-thirds majority in the March 5 elections.

His remarks suggest an attempt to recast Nepal’s traditional balancing diplomacy around a distinctly economic objective.

The emerging doctrine, according to Khanal, is three directions, one strategy. The three directions are India, China, and the wider international community. The common strategy is to engage all three simultaneously to expand trade, investment, connectivity, and economic opportunities while preserving what Khanal calls development autonomy. “Development autonomy is not about choosing sides: it is about increasing our value across three confident, unified directions,” Khanal said.

The formulation is significant because it seeks to move Nepal’s foreign policy away from the idea that engagement with India, China, and the wider world represents competing choices. Minister Khanal said that, like in the past, political ideology would not guide external relations.

Instead, the government appears to view these relationships as complementary sources of markets, investment, infrastructure, technology, and diplomatic space. Khanal, in various engagements, made it clear that Nepal does not join any security and strategic alliances.

Nepal has long sought to maintain balanced relations with India and China while expanding ties with countries beyond its immediate neighborhood. What appears different in the new government's formulation is the attempt to organize these relationships around a single economic objective.

For Kathmandu, multi-engagement is not simply a diplomatic principle. It is intended to become an economic strategy.

India offers geographical proximity, a huge consumer market, and an expanding electricity market. China offers connectivity, investment, access to the northern corridor, and technology. The United States, Europe, Japan, ASEAN, and the Gulf offer additional markets, capital, technology, and partnerships.

The challenge for Nepal is to convert these relationships into economic leverage without becoming excessively dependent on any single external partner.

That is the essence of the government's formulation of development autonomy: engage widely, diversify economic relationships, and preserve the freedom to make decisions based on Nepal's own development interests.

With India, the new government appears to be shifting the emphasis from managing longstanding disputes to expanding areas of practical economic cooperation, identifying new areas of opportunities.

Energy is at the center of this approach, according to Khanal. Nepal wants to use its hydropower potential not only to generate electricity for domestic consumption, but also to become an important supplier of clean energy to India and, eventually, Bangladesh.

Khanal argued that Nepal could help power regional industrial decarbonization by exporting clean electricity to India and onward to Bangladesh. This would give the energy relationship a broader regional significance, positioning Nepal not simply as an electricity producer, but as part of an emerging South Asian energy market.

Geography strengthens the argument. Nepal shares an open border of more than 1,700 kilometres with five Indian states—Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, and Sikkim—giving it direct access to a large regional market.

Khanal described the government's approach as “Thick Connectivity and Thin Borders.” The objective is to make the border increasingly important as a channel for commerce, energy, and investment while reducing the economic friction associated with physical borders.

The Southern region could, therefore, become an important component of this strategy. Khanal argued that global and Indian companies seeking resilient supply chains could locate manufacturing in Nepal's border Special Economic Zones, combining access to relatively low-cost clean electricity with proximity to the Indian market and international market access.

If India represents Nepal's southern economic gateway, China represents the northern connectivity opportunity.

In Western capitals, Nepal's relationship with China is closely watched, particularly because of questions surrounding Chinese infrastructure financing and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Khanal sought to present the government's approach as one based on connectivity, but not dependency. The objective, he said, is not simply to open roads to the north, but to transform Nepal from a landlocked economy into a land-linked economy.

That vision involves a multidimensional Trans-Himalayan connectivity network encompassing roads, tunnels, dry ports, aviation, digital links, and cross-border rail.

Khanal also emphasized that Nepal has not implemented projects under the BRI, despite signing agreements with China. At the same time, he sought to reassure partners concerned about Chinese financing that project selection would be guided by transparent financing, rigorous feasibility studies, and value-for-money principles.

China is already Nepal's second-largest trading partner, according to Khanal, while Chinese investors are among the largest sources of foreign investment in Nepal. The economic relationship, therefore, extends beyond infrastructure and connectivity.

The most ambitious element of the new government's foreign-policy vision is perhaps its attempt to redefine Nepal's geopolitical geography.

For decades, Nepal has often been described in strategic terms as a buffer between India and China. The new formulation seeks to replace that image with that of an economic bridge. “We do not see our northern and southern corridors as competing directions,” Khanal said.

Instead, the government sees Nepal as being positioned between two of the world's largest markets, with a combined population of nearly three billion people. Its ambition is to turn that geography into a gateway for commerce and investment.

This idea also appears in the election manifesto of the Rastriya Swatantra Party, which envisaged a more economically connected and strategically relevant Nepal. Khanal described Nepal as a civilizational bridge in the past, an economic bridge in the present, and a strategic bridge for the future.

The formulation captures the central logic of the new approach: Nepal should not view its location between India and China merely as a geopolitical constraint. It should attempt to convert that location into an economic asset.

The third direction of the government's foreign policy extends beyond Nepal's immediate neighbourhood.

Khanal said Kathmandu intends to deepen partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan, ASEAN, and the Gulf. The purpose is not merely to expand Nepal's diplomatic footprint. It is also to diversify sources of investment, technology, markets, and economic opportunity. This diversification is particularly important if development autonomy is to be more than a diplomatic slogan. The U.S., Japan, the United Kingdom, and European countries have shown enthusiasm to engage with the new government.

Khanal highlighted Nepal's potential as a digital hub, arguing that data and software face relatively little transit friction compared with physical goods. Nepal's hydropower resources and comparatively cool climate, he suggested, could support a digital economy, including through a Fintech and AI Sandbox.

The country's large global diaspora is another component of this strategy. Khanal described Nepal's roughly five-million-strong diaspora as a strategic asset that can help connect the country with markets and networks across the world.

The government's formulation is ambitious. But the success of the strategy will depend less on its diplomatic articulation than on implementation.

The first question is whether Nepal can build the infrastructure required to become an economic bridge between India and China. Roads, railways, tunnels, dry ports, electricity transmission lines, and digital infrastructure require substantial capital and long-term planning.

The second is whether Nepal can attract productive investment rather than simply announce investment opportunities. Special Economic Zones, for example, will require reliable infrastructure, efficient customs, predictable regulations, and competitive business conditions.

At the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Balendra Shah delivered a poignant address outlining the stark reality of the climate emergency facing Nepal and the broader region. Following devastating flash floods and landslides, PM Shah framed the crisis not as a localized issue, but as a crucial warning for humanity. Moving away from traditional diplomacy, his address outlined 10 core messages, calling on the international community to move from empty promises to immediate, concrete action.

First, PM Shah confronted global leaders over their continued failure to heed urgent climate warnings. He recalled the UN Secretary-General’s warning delivered near Mount Everest nearly three years prior, pointing out that while scientists and vulnerable communities understood the alarm, world leaders failed to translate those words into action at the necessary speed and scale. Pointing to the recent tragic loss of life and infrastructure across Nepal, he argued that political negligence has turned predictable environmental shifts into human catastrophes, demanding that the international community finally listen and respond. "A warming climate is destabilizing the fragile Himalayan ecology. Melting permafrost is fracturing mountain slopes beneath the glaciers and accelerating the risks of ice-rock avalanches, floods, landslides, and other cascading hazards," he noted. He further said, "When the next warning comes from the rooftop of the world: Let us be ready to hear it, and ready to act."

Second, the youngest prime minister to address UNGA emphasized that climate impacts are inherently transboundary and cannot be contained within national borders. Describing the severe hazards triggered by melting permafrost and unstable slopes—such as the recent Bhotekoshi-Trishuli floods—he noted that environmental disasters impact entire river basins across multiple countries, regardless of political boundaries. Because glaciers and floodwaters move freely across borders without visas, Shah reminded the Assembly that the fragile Hindu Kush Himalaya serves as a life-support system for nearly two billion people, making its stability a global imperative rather than a local concern.

Third, the prime minister articulated a clear concept of climate justice focused on responsibility rather than geopolitical confrontation. Noting that Nepal contributes less than 0.1 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, he highlighted the injustice of a nation paying a colossal price for a crisis it did not create. Without resorting to hostile blame, he appealed to the established principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, asserting that historically high-emitting nations must take greater action so that vulnerable populations can focus on building their futures rather than constantly rebuilding from past destruction. PM Shah said that climate justice is not merely about funding; it is about distributive justice—who bears the cost—and procedural justice—who has a voice. Ultimately, it is about whether mountain communities, small island states, landlocked and least-developed nations, and future generations count equally. In his message, Prime Minister Shah made it clear that Nepal is not simply asking for financial aid in the name of climate justice.

Fourth, the head of the government presented a practical proposal for regional cooperation by calling for the establishment of a Himalayan Climate Resilience Mechanism involving Nepal, India, and China. Recognizing the shared vulnerabilities of the region, he proposed using this framework to share satellite data, monitor dangerous glacial lakes, strengthen joint early-warning systems, and coordinate cross-border disaster relief. By encouraging these neighboring nations to collaborate, Shah sought to transform the Himalayas from a zone of fragmented information into a unified model for international environmental cooperation.

Fifth, PM Shah made a firm case for structural reform in climate finance, demanding grant-based assistance instead of debt-inducing loans. He argued that forcing a poor country to incur heavy debt to repair climate-driven destruction is fundamentally unjust and economically unsustainable. Criticizing existing mechanisms like the Loss and Damage Fund for being trapped in bureaucratic delays, Shah stressed that financial aid must be direct, prompt, and grant-funded, famously observing that when a house is on fire, one does not ask the family to fill out fifty forms before offering help. As many Global South nations sink deeper into a decade-long debt crisis, PM Shah’s declaration that Nepal prefers grants over loans sends a clear message: Nepal refuses to be trapped in unsustainable debt to fund its recovery and development.

Sixth, PM Shah expressed appreciation to neighboring and international partners for their support. He stated, “Our immediate neighbors, India and China, offered prompt and generous assistance. Other friendly nations, the United Nations system, humanitarian agencies, philanthropies, and people around the world stood with Nepal. To all of them, I express heartfelt thanks on behalf of the grateful people of Nepal.” Nepal now faces the massive task of recovery and reconstruction, he said.

Seventh, PM Shah highlighted that climate disasters threaten to erase years of development—a reality faced in every major crisis. For Nepal, this climate catastrophe is not merely a humanitarian event, but an urgent development emergency. It destroys critical infrastructure including roads, bridges, schools, homes, farms, and livelihoods. Furthermore, it devastates the clean energy infrastructure needed to power the nation's future, ultimately forcing a developing country to borrow money to repair damage it did not cause.

Eighth, PM Shah presented a bold climate mandate, warning that Nepal's recent catastrophic floods prove old environmental baselines are obsolete. Urging the international community to shift from ad-hoc disaster relief to genuine preparedness, he called for funding climate resilience, investing in innovation and insurance, building durable infrastructure, and establishing life-saving early warning systems. To achieve lasting climate justice, Shah insisted on phasing out fossil-fuel dependence while reforming a global order that leaves vulnerable nations powerless.

Ninth, PM Shah emphasized that Nepal cannot build resilience alone against a crisis exacerbated by failures in global governance, urging the General Assembly to commit to six core principles. He divided these into immediate post-disaster necessities—Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction—and long-term structural imperatives—Responsibility, Reparation, and Resilience. He concluded that while the first three address the aftermath of a crisis, the latter three are essential to prevent disaster from becoming a permanent condition for vulnerable nations.

Tenth, the prime minister highlighted Nepal's exceptional role in global ecological preservation, noting that the country contributes far beyond its ecological share despite being a least-developed nation. Shah pointed to Nepal's major achievements, including restoring forests to cover nearly half its territory, expanding hydropower to meet domestic clean energy needs while replacing fossil fuels abroad, and driving electric vehicle adoption at rates comparable to parts of Europe. Reaffirming Nepal's commitment to local climate adaptation, he pledged that the nation will continue doing more to withstand intensifying climate disasters.

In conclusion, PM Shah's address to the United Nations provided a clear roadmap for addressing climate vulnerability in the Global South. By connecting local destruction to global policy failures, he called for a shift toward relief, responsibility, and true resilience.

Nepal’s Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal has said that the Bhotekoshi flood tragedy has offered an unmistakable foreign-policy imperative for Nepal: treating climate change as an existential strategic priority.

"We, therefore, must focus on robust ecological cooperation: better early warning mechanisms, hydrological data-sharing, predictable grant-based climate finance, and practical collaboration with the neighbours and global community," Khanal said while addressing a program organized by the Asia Society.

In his speech, Minister Khanal provided a template of engagement with two immediate neighbors: India and China.

First, Southward: Turning proximity into production, he said.

Nepal shares an over 1,700-kilometer open border with five Indian states—Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, and Sikkim—home to over 400 million people, Khanal said. Contiguous to this vast market lies Nepal’s fertile Terai. "Guided by our policy of 'Thick Connectivity and Thin Borders,' we are moving towards structured, reciprocal interdependence," he said.

Nepal’s perennial rivers possess 43 gigawatts of economically viable hydropower, Khanal said.

“By scaling toward 28,000 megawatts by 2035, Nepal can power regional industrial decarbonization, exporting clean electricity to India and onward to Bangladesh.”

For global and Indian firms seeking resilient supply chains, locating manufacturing in Nepal’s border Special Economic Zones provides a structural edge: continuous, low-cost green power to decarbonize production networks, alongside favorable international market access, he said.

Second, Northward: Turning geography into connectivity and diversification, he said.

"With China, our approach is pragmatic, commercially grounded, and focused on long-term resilience. Our objective is not simply to open roads to the north; it is to transform Nepal from a landlocked economy into a land-linked economy," Khanal said.

"We are advancing a genuinely multidimensional Trans-Himalayan connectivity network—encompassing roads, tunnels, dry ports, aviation, digital links, and cross-border rail," Khanal said. “But connectivity must ultimately be measured not in kilometers of infrastructure, but in the movement of goods, services, investment, tourists, and opportunity.”

"Crucially, our northern partnership must be grounded in the shared science of the Himalayas—glacial monitoring, disaster early warning, hydrological information, climate adaptation, and resilient infrastructure," he said.

"We also seek deeper cooperation in digital connectivity, technology transfer, and innovation, ensuring the mountains do not become a barrier to the next generation of Nepali enterprise," Minister Khanal said. “Guided by transparent financing, rigorous feasibility, and value-for-money principles, Nepal will pursue every opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation while preserving our sovereign autonomy.”

Khanal further said, “We do not see our northern and southern corridors as competing directions. We see Nepal land-linked to two of the world’s largest markets, home to nearly three billion people. Our ambition is to turn this geography into a gateway for commerce and opportunity.”

Khanal said that after India and China, the third priority is Global reach: Turning engagement into advantage.

"Beyond the neighborhood, we plan to further deepen our partnership with the United States, Europe, Japan, ASEAN, and the Gulf," he said.

Prime Minister Balendra Shah has said that climate justice is not only about money. Addressing the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the PM said, “It is about distributive justice—who bears the costs. It is about procedural justice—who has a voice.”

He further added, “It is about whether the future of mountain communities, small island states, landlocked and least-developed countries, and generations yet unborn count equally.”

PM Shah stated, “I came to make sure that whatever else is said from this podium, one thing is said plainly: a country that is willing to pay should be able to buy, and a world that can deliver a weapon anywhere in seventy-two hours has no excuse for leaving a farmer without means for a decent livelihood. This is why we continue to believe in multilateralism.”

“This is why we need a United Nations in which the presence of small, poor countries is felt, and where we can work together towards just outcomes. Climate justice is, therefore, not only about money,” he said.

We need adequate grant-based support," Nepal PM tells the international community

Prime Minister Balendra Shah has sent a clear message to the world that Nepal needs adequate grant-based support.

Addressing the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, PM Shah said, “When a climate-driven disaster destroys the infrastructure of a poor country, the answer cannot simply be another mega loan or a patchwork of small grants.”

He further noted that the Loss and Damage Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and other relevant financing mechanisms remain grossly inadequate.

"Climate finance must not become a bureaucratic maze through which vulnerable countries spend years proving that they need help," he said. “When the house is burning, we do not ask the family to complete fifty forms. We act. That is what climate justice must mean.”