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In 1991, following the restoration of democracy in 1990, the Nepali Congress (NC) formed a single-party majority government with a five-year mandate. But largely owing to intra-party rifts, the government led by Girija Prasad Koirala collapsed just two years after its formation, starting a phase of chronic instability that still characterizes the country.

Frequent government changes, never-ending horse-trading for power, and corruption have since become key features of national politics. Again, in 1999, the Nepali Congress secured a majority in parliamentary elections and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai became the prime minister. But he was forced out in under a year, largely due to machinations of Koirala. This ultimately culminated in King Gyanendra’s takeover of executive powers in 2005.

In the first Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in 2008, the mother Maoist Party that had waged the decade-long insurgency emerged as the largest party, with near majority seats in the CA. But the subsequent government of Pushpa Kamal Dahal collapsed after only nine months in office. He had to resign over his sacking of the army chief Rookmangud Katawal, allegedly at the instigation of Baburam Bhattarai who wanted to cut Dahal down to size.

Intra-party rifts have been common in different political parties. And most Nepali prime ministers of the past three decades have paid for their failure to manage the relation between their party and the government. “Democracy demands a responsible, broadminded and consultative political leadership,” says political analyst Krishna Pokhrel. “Yet we have hardly had any leaders with these characters since the 1990 political change.” He attributes Nepal's political instability to the tendency of leaders to confine themselves to small coteries instead of trying to take the whole party into confidence.

Different but same

The formation of KP Sharma Oli's two-thirds majority government in 2018, it was hoped, would finally herald an era of stability. Yet in the two and a half years since, there have been constant talks about rifts in the ruling Nepal Communist Party and egregious lack of coordination between the party and the government it led. “The party gave a free-hand to PM Oli. But Oli failed to maintain a cordial relation with the party,” says Pokhrel. The kind of close consultation and coordination that is needed between the party and the government on policy-related issues was missing. 

Another political analyst Chandra Dev Bhatta also speaks of his disappointment with the two-thirds majority government. “The much talked about stability is once again falling apart due mainly to internal wrangling in the NCP,” he says. The current regime, like the earlier ones, is also heavily occupied by power politics, he avers, at the expense of people’s agendas.

Bhatta argues that ‘elite settlement’ of various democratic movements and convergence between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ classes to amass power, prestige, and money has also contributed to political instability in Nepal.

In the post-1990 phase, the number of political parties mushroomed. In several cases, fringe parties with only a handful of seats in the parliament were able to act as kingmakers. There were other loopholes in the parliamentary system as well. The earlier constitution gave the prime minister full authority to dissolve the House and call for fresh elections. That is why one after another prime minister opted for mid-term elections whenever they faced a crisis of confidence in their own party. In the new constitution adopted in 2015, many such loopholes were closed. Under new provisions, the prime minister cannot call for mid-term elections so long as there is a possibility of government formation from the House floor. Similarly, a no-confidence motion against the prime minister cannot be introduced before two years of government formation. The split of political parties has been made difficult too.

Enemies without

Then there are the external factors. Though India often says stability in Nepal is in its interest, it has often belied its stated commitment. In the past, India was instrumental in making and breaking governments by playing with the contradictions within Nepal. In analyst Pokhrel’s words, “India’s interference remains, and yet the primary drivers of instability are domestic. It was no different in the past.”

Bhatta has similar views on external factors. He cites two primary reasons for their outsized importance in Nepal: the country’s sensitive geographical location and its poor economic condition. “Our leaders have been co-opted by outside powers and today we see the majority of the political class is pro-India, pro-China, pro-West but not necessarily pro-Nepal,” he adds. The role of external meddling is so ingrained in Nepali minds that there is a tendency to see outside hands in just about every political development.

Shyam Shrestha, an analyst of left politics, meanwhile, blames the tendency in communist parties of portraying rival factions as enemies.  “If you see the politics of the last three decades, there has been a tendency of betrayal and non-cooperation in our communist parties. Similarly, leaders don’t seem committed to honoring their agreements. For instance, the first Oli government collapsed in 2016 because of his reluctance to implement the deal with Prachanda. Conditions now are pretty much the same.”

All three political analysts APEX talked to concurred that political stability would continue to remain elusive so long as Nepali political parties failed to strengthen internal democracy.

Carefully balancing the influence of its two giant neighbors has been Nepal’s guiding foreign policy principle since the reign of Prithvi Narayan Shah. This has never been easy. The British India government or the Qing emperors, each wanted the small landlocked state to serve only its interests. This expectation remains more or less intact. As India-China ties take a nosedive, Nepal could once again find itself in the unenviable position of being asked to choose between its two equally indispensable neighbors.

This is not idle speculation. There have been similar expectations in the past. Officially, “Nepal is confident that both the neighboring countries will resolve, in the spirit of good neighborliness, their mutual differences through peaceful means in favor of bilateral, regional and world peace and stability.”

But that is not how folks in New Delhi or Beijing see it. “Nepal has to take a clear position on whether to stay neutral or take a side,” says Nihar R Nayak, a Delhi-based expert on Nepal-India ties. He says that as per the 1950 treaty, India could inform Nepal about its tensions with China and may seek its support.

Lin Minwang, Professor at Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, and deputy director of the university’s Institute of South Asia Studies, says “India’s violation of the territorial sovereignty of China and Nepal has given China and Nepal a common strategic interest on this issue.” Therefore, China and Nepal should support each other in this process, whether this support is “direct or indirect, public or private.”

Nepali geopolitical analyst Tika Dhakal differs. “Nepal has historically taken a neutral, non-aligned position between the two neighbors. One aspect of Nepal’s unique positioning in the South Asian region is its role as a buffer between India and China,” he says. “Continuation of this policy is important to ensure perpetual peace in Nepal as well as in the region.” Nonetheless, Dhakal too does not rule out added pressure on Nepal to take sides.

Another issue dividing public opinion in Nepal is the MCC compact, the American grant program. The compact is in limbo after the latest parliamentary session that ended June 2 failed to endorse it. China is against Nepal’s endorsement of the compact, as it sees it as a part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy that aims to contain its rise. As India-China tensions worsen, India may pursue its interests in Nepal in concert with the US, further complicating things for Kathmandu.

The Oli government has only itself to blame for its current pro-China image, at least outside the country. There was no need for Nepal to hail China’s aggression in Hong Kong, or for the ruling party leaders to take part in a ‘training session’ with the CCP leaders—not when India and China were on the brink of war. History suggests Nepal cannot afford to so heavily rely on one of its neighbors, almost to the exclusion of the other. If unnatural proximity to India is dangerous, so is the NCP’s current love affair with China. Astute heads will be needed to pull Nepal out of the geostrategic quagmire it finds itself in.

Kathmandu: Nepal is watching mounting tensions between India and China in the Himalayas with great concern as it struggles to balance its relationship with its two giant neighbors. Reportedly, both India and China are amassing troops and weapons along the Galwan Valley in Ladakh—and preparing for the worst. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already given his armed forces a free hand to “take necessary steps to protect Indian territory.”

Nepal is also keenly watching growing tensions between China and the US. Over the past few years, Nepal had been witnessing heightened US-China rivalry, largely owing to developments around the American Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI).

In a June 20 statement on Ladakh, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged both sides to resolve the dispute through dialogue: “… In the context of recent developments in the Galwan valley area between our friendly neighbors India and China, Nepal is confident that both the neighboring countries will resolve, in the spirit of good neighborliness, their mutual differences through peaceful means in favor of bilateral, regional and world peace and stability.”

In an earlier India-China faceoff in 2017, this time in Doklam valley on the Bhutan-China border, Nepal had also maintained its neutrality and urged the two countries to resolve differences through dialogue. At the time, although India did not publicly say so, many Indian intellectuals had asked Nepal to support India on the basis of the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty. Similarly, during the 1962 India-China war, Nepal was able to maintain its strict neutrality by resisting competing pressures.

But if India-China tensions continue to grow, Nepal could once again be asked to take sides. “Nepal has to take a clear position on whether to stay neutral or take a side,” says Nihar R Nayak, a Delhi-based expert on Nepal-India ties. “On this issue the ruling Nepal Communist Party will be divided. So will the opposition parties.” He says that as per the 1950 treaty, India could inform Nepal about its tensions with China and may seek its support.

Nepali geopolitical analyst Tika Dhakal differs. “Nepal has historically taken a neutral, non-aligned position between the two neighbors. One aspect of Nepal’s unique positioning in the South Asian region is its role as a buffer between India and China,” he says. “Continuation of this policy is important to ensure perpetual peace in Nepal as well as in the region.” Nonetheless, Dhakal too does not rule out added pressure on Nepal to take sides.

As with India, so with China

Just like India, China is also likely to seek Nepal’s support if tensions rise. In an email interview, Lin Minwang, Professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, and deputy director of the university’s Institute of South Asia Studies, says “India’s violation of the territorial sovereignty of China and Nepal has given China and Nepal a common strategic interest on this issue.” Therefore, China and Nepal should support each other in this process, whether this support is “direct or indirect, public or private.”

If China and India go to war, the issue of Nepali nationals working in the Gurkha regiments of the Indian Army will again come to the fore. In that case, says Nayak, political parties and people from various walks of life could protest the deployment of Nepali nationals against China: The prospect of your fellow citizens coming back in body bags while fighting for another country is rather unsettling. 

The employment of Nepalis in the Indian Army “will affect Nepal’s interests if there is a conflict between China and India,” says Professor Lin. “China and Nepal should consider this issue that could adversely impact China-Nepal relations.”

Separately, experts say growing India-China tensions could push India closer to the United States and the European Union. In this scenario, India and the US may choose to work together to curtail growing Chinese influence in the region. Both India and the US oppose China’s BRI in Nepal. If India’s rivalry with China continues to grow, there is also a likelihood of an informal alliance among the four Quad members—India, Australia, America, and Japan—under the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

“The Quad has always been a part of the ‘Great Game’ imagination in the Pacific Ocean. On paper, such an alliance appears grand. But history informs us that attempts to isolate a particular country seldom yield peace. Isolating a powerful rising power like China can have even more dangerous consequences,” Dhakal says.

Domestic ructions

Amid such a fragile international climate, the future of the KP Sharma Oli government is in doubt after five of the nine NCP Secretariat members asked for his resignation, both as the head of the government as well as the party chairman. PM Oli is also in a pickle over the MCC compact, which he backs but is opposed by the majority Secretariat members. If Oli is removed at this juncture, the compact’s future will be in limbo.

Professor Lin says that China expects the NCP unity to remain intact, especially at a time “external forces are trying to influence unity within Nepal.”

For his part, Dhakal expects the new geopolitical competition in Nepal to be first evident in the form of growing competition between the BRI and the MCC, and the SAARC and the BIMSTEC, for instance. In the medium term, “this may reflect in the development aid that will come with more strings attached, and in sharp division among big powers even in our domestic issues.”

Additionally, escalating India-China border tensions could have a wider socio-economic impact on Nepal in the form of “blocked trade routes and scarcity of supplies.”

Third-generation Nepali Congress (NC) leaders often complain the party leadership disregards them on key issues.

First-generation leaders like BP Koirala, Ganeshman Singh, and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai founded the party back in 1950. Then, following the 1990 political changes, second-generation leaders like Sher Bahadur Deuba, Ram Chandra Poudel, and Bimalendra Nidhi came to the fore. Now, a new generation of leaders in the form of Gagan Thapa, Biswoprakash Sharma, and Pradeep Poudel are on the verge of taking up leadership positions.

These third-generation ‘youth’ leaders complain about their poor representation in policy-making, as the much older second-generation leaders continue to largely control the party. This has created a gulf between the country’s youth population and the Nepali Congress. 

Among the party’s eight office-bearers, no one belongs to the youth generation. The office-bearer body is the party’s powerful core, mandated to make quick decisions on vital national and party issues. 

Of late, there have been signs of change. Many youth leaders are coming out with strong voices on issues related to the party and national politics, and the party leadership is compelled to heed. Gagan Thapa’s impressive presence in the parliament is a case in point. People have started saying that Thapa is the sole threat to the government from the main opposition. Not only the parliament, Thapa’s influence in the party’s overall decision-making is also increasing. Besides Thapa, other youth leaders are emerging, too, but more as a result of their personal capacities rather than a system that promotes generational transfer of power.

Where’s the plan?

According to political analyst Shreekrishna Aniruddh Gautam, Congressi youth leaders have become more vocal and the party leadership has been forced to listen. But he reckons the youth leaders would help their own cause if they could come up with a clear vision on key national issues. “For example, what is the vision of NC youth leaders on Nepal-India relations in the changed context?” Gautam asks.  

He says the youth leaders need to have a clear ideological foundation for the party’s reformation. “Take the lack of ideological clarity in the party when it was forced to embrace federalism and republicanism,” he adds. Gautam himself was part of a Ganatrantrik Abhiyan (republican campaign), along with NC leaders Nara Hari Acharya, Gagan Thapa, Madhu Acharya, and political analyst Krishna Khanal. They filled the ideological vacuum and helped the party’s ideological shift from constitutional monarchy to republic. 

“The campaign also established many youth leaders in national politics. It shows that sustained youth campaign can bring meaningful changes in the party and the youths can find space within it,” Gautam says. 

Perhaps social media is making all the difference these days. Many youth leaders are active on social media, which allows them to gauge public opinion on national issues. They then press the party leadership to listen to the people. 

Recently, the party was obliged to go with public sentiment that favored changing the national map through the parliament. Some senior Congress leaders wanted to buy time, but youth leaders pressed them to immediately summon the Central Working Committee. There were some differences among the office-bearers, but they had to eventually yield to the youth pressure, and the CWC unanimously decided to vote in favor of endorsement of the new national map. 

Still, rues Pradeep Poudel, a noted youth leader, the party’s senior leaders listen to them only when the party is in opposition. “Perhaps the party leadership has started listening to us due to growing demand, both in and outside the party, that Congress needs to mend its ways,” he adds. “We are thus currently involved in party decision-making. But the real test of party leadership will come when Nepali Congress gets to power.” Despite some improvement, “the syndicate of old leaders continues to dominate decision-making,” Poudel concludes.  

Youth leaders have been vocal on the issue of corruption during the pandemic. They have proposed a nationwide campaign against corruption, but the party president is not interested. According to Dhan Raj Gurung, another prominent youth leader, the party submitted a memo to the government demanding a probe into the purchase of medical supplies, only after youth leaders pressed for it. “Corruption is one area where party leadership is listening to us. Still there are many pressing issues where they just ignore us,” Gurung says. 

Will happen, take time

The people, meanwhile, expect mainstream parties to actively fight corruption. Amid Covid-19 crisis, many apolitical young people came to the streets protesting the government’s poor handling of Covid-19 crisis. “We have to accept that the party’s involvement in such protests has weakened,” says Poudel. 

There are growing voices in the party that the leadership should be handed over to the next generation at the party’s general convention slated for April next year. Yet no third-generation leader is likely to be party president in the convention. The highest a young leader could go would be general secretary, the third in hierarchy after president and vice-president.  

There is a general consensus that there should be more and more third-generation leaders in party leadership if Congress is to effectively fight the consolidated communist juggernaut. But for the party to be actually led by a third-generation leader, perhaps the country will have to wait for some more time.

Tensions between India and China continue to simmer in Ladakh of Jammu & Kashmir. Chances of escalation are high as the Indian media report a massive build-up of Chinese forces in the Galwan Valley. Apparently, the Chinese have also rebuilt the camp, just inside India’s borders, which the Indian forces had earlier destroyed. China, meanwhile, maintains it is India that needlessly provoked the Chinese contingent in Galwan. Troublingly, both sides continue to increase their troop presence in the area. 

Among those deployed on India’s behalf will be the Nepali nationals serving in its six Gurkha regiments. There are currently around 40,000 of them. There has been a lengthy debate in Nepal on whether the country should continue to send its able-bodied men to fight—and sometimes die—on behalf of another country. The problem is compounded for Nepal whenever India faces off against China, Nepal’s only other neighbor. Can India use the citizens of Nepal—which has traditionally had close and largely problem-free ties with the northern neighbor—to fight the Chinese?

Nepali foreign ministry officials say there has never been a formal protest from China over the deployment of Gurkha soldiers, who have repeatedly engaged in combat against the Chinese on India’s behalf since the early 1960s. With India-China tensions mounting again, the Gurkha soldiers of the Indian Army on leave in Nepal are being summoned back to duty. In this light, the splinter Maoist group led by Netra Bikram Chand, in a June 20 statement, ‘reminded’ India to desist from using Nepali soldiers against China.  

Despite such concerns, Nepal is in no position to ask India not to use the Gurkhas against China. “We have to accept the reality that they are part of the Indian defense system. We can do nothing about it,” says political analyst Krishna Khanal. Though it is an emotional issue for Nepalis, he argues the Indian defense force can deploy them as they wish. 

Nepal has never brought up the issue of revisiting Gurkha recruitment with India. But it sent a note to Britain in February this year, seeking a review of the tripartite agreement signed in 1947 between Nepal, India, and Britain that split the Gurkha regiments between India and Britain. In an initial reaction, Britain refused to change the agreement.

Till date, Nepalis continue to be recruited into the Indian Army. Lured by attractive salary, pensions, and other social security benefits, they join the Indian Army and take an oath to protect India’s national interests. According to Ashok Mehta, an old Nepal hand in New Delhi, Nepali youths in the Indian Army get four times the salary and pensions they would get in Nepal Army. 

The Covid-19 crisis has battered the Nepali economy and rendered hundreds of thousands jobless. This is surely not the right time for Nepal to ask its nationals in the Indian Army to come back or to stop recruitment into the force. But Nepal may find itself in a tricky spot if China asks it to reconsider.

On June 18, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali took part in a high-level video conference on the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), chaired by Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Addressing the conference, Gyawali appreciated the role of the BRI in “high-quality development in the partner countries” and underscored the importance of the new initiative of “Health Silk Road under the BRI.”

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Health Silk Road hopes to facilitate trade in anti-epidemic medical supplies and cooperation in fighting infectious diseases, including sharing experiences and expertise. By organizing the conference, China wanted to convey a message that Covid-19 has not affected the BRI, but instead pushed the country toward new initiatives like the Health Silk Road.

Nepali politicians continue to express their full support for the BRI. Speaking at an interaction between the Nepal Communist Party and its Chinese counterpart, NCP co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal expressed his belief that “the BRI can bring in opportunities for common development... We can develop a community of shared destiny across the Himalayas by pursuing development path under the theme of trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network.”

But the BRI’s actual progress in Nepal has been sluggish. Though Nepal signed the BRI framework in 2017, it is yet to select specific projects under it and the Covid-19 crisis is likely to result in further delays. Before the corona outbreak, discussions were underway on specific projects and investment modalities. As talks had reached the level investment modality, discussing it over a video conference is not an option.

Chinese officials have said that the pandemic has affected over 20 percent BRI projects in Asia, Europe and beyond. According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, another 30-40 percent of the projects have been somewhat affected. “As the situation improves we have confidence that the projects will come back and the execution of them will speed up,” said Wang Xiaolong, director-general of the ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department at a June 18 news briefing in Beijing.

Not just ongoing projects, the Covid-19 is likely to badly impact countries like Nepal that are yet to select specific BRI projects. The pandemic could mar the BRI projects in Nepal, whatever they are, for two reasons. First, due to its fragile economic condition, Nepal may not be in a position to take loans from China to finance the projects.

In this context, Nepal can ask China to give grants instead of loans. Given the growing competition among big powers and fast-changing geopolitics, China might just agree, even though China normally gives little in grants under the BRI. “In our current state of economic fragility, we should request China to provide grants on BRI projects. There are high chances that it could agree,” says Dr. Rupak Sapkota, Deputy Executive Director, Institute for Foreign Affairs. According to him, China has given Nepal high priority during the pandemic and it will continue to do so in the future. “China is mindful that the economic condition of BRI recipient countries should remain vibrant and that the BRI should cause them no added pain,” he adds.

Second, China may itself not be in a position to give either loan or grants. But Sapkota differs. He says China’s economy has not suffered a lot from the pandemic, and it will as such continue to push the BRI projects in Nepal.

Initially, Nepal had selected 39 projects but following Chinese request it whittled the number down to nine. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, discussions were underway on project prioritization. “Had there been no corona, we could have had final agreements on some projects. We could still see some agreements in the days ahead,” says Sapkota.

China is also changing its approach to the financing of the BRI projects. In the initial days, it provided loans to several countries without considering their payback capacity, which created debt problems in some countries. Now, China is providing loans only after close examination of economic viability of such countries.

Dr. Upendra Gautam, general secretary of Nepal-China Study Centre, says the pandemic obviously affects China’s ongoing and future projects in Nepal under the BRI. Gautam, however, believes Nepal needs to come up with comprehensive plans clearly outlining its priority development projects.

“There could be resource constraints but if we come up with a clear vision and priority, I expect there to be no resource constraints on the BRI projects,” he says. Gautam says the start of the Health Silk Road is in keeping with the needs of the time and Nepal should tap into it to effectively deal with its corona crisis.

Whenever India-China or India-Pakistan border tensions flare up, one of the first concerns in Nepali minds is the fate of the frontline Gurkha soldiers. Accompanying this concern is a query about whether time has come for Nepal to rethink the recruitment of Nepali nationals into the Indian Army.

Same kinds of queries are now being raised as India and China face-off in Ladakh. If it comes to that, is it right for Nepali nationals to fight China, its immediate and vital neighbor, on behalf of a third country? Forget China. Is it even morally right to allow your citizens to serve as mercenaries?

With tensions against China mounting, the Gurkha soldiers of the Indian Army who are on leave in Nepal are now being summoned back to duty. In this light, the splinter Maoist group led by Netra Bikram Chand, in a June 20 statement, ‘reminded’ India to desist from using Nepali soldiers against China. 

Despite such concerns, Nepal is in no position to ask India not to use the Gurkhas against China, nor is it the current priority of any of Nepal’s major political parties. “We have to accept the reality that they are part of the Indian defense system. We can do nothing about it,” says political analyst Krishna Khanal. Though it is an emotional issue for Nepalis, he argues, the Indian defense force can deploy them as they wish.

Over the past 60 or 70 years, Nepal’s communist parties used this issue as a political instrument whenever they were out of power, Khanal adds. For instance, stopping recruitment into the Indian army was one of the 40 demands put forth by the mother Maoist party in 1996, right before they launched their insurgency.

During the insurgency, the Maoist party continued to raise this issue. But after joining peaceful politics in 2006, the party abandoned this agenda. Now Gurkha recruitment does not find a mention in the political documents of Nepal Communist Party, the ruling party formed after the merger of the mother Maoists and erstwhile CPN-UML. The Chand faction, plus some other fringe communist outfits, however, has continued to give voice to it.

“In the past, the CPN-UML, like other communist parties, also raised the issue of recruitment into Indian Army for political benefit. But it dropped the agenda when it came to power,” says Ashok Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army who closely follows Nepal.

History’s burden

There is a long history of recruitment of Nepali nationals into the Indian and British armies. The British started enlisting Nepalis in their colonial army from 1815 when it set up the Gurkha regiments. After India’s independence, six Gurkha regiments were retained in the Indian Army while the British Army got four. Now, there are seven Gurkha regiments in the Indian Army, with 40 battalions and a total of 40,000 soldiers.

Nepal has never brought up the issue of revisiting Gurkha recruitment with India. But Nepal did send a note to Britain in February this year, seeking a review of the tripartite agreement signed in 1947 between Nepal, India and Britain that split the Gurkha regiments between India and Britain. In an initial reaction, Britain refused to make any changes in the agreement. Before that, Prime Minister KP Oli had raised the issue during his bilateral talk with then British Prime Minister Theresa May in 2019.

In 2016, Nepal and India formed the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) to study the entire gamut of bilateral relations and to suggest modifications. The EPG prepared a report covering all bilateral issues but not Gurkha soldiers. “We did not discuss Gurkha recruitment as it was beyond our jurisdiction. But the two countries can always discuss this,” says Surya Nath Upadhyay, a member of the Nepal half of the EPG. He says it is a sensitive issue and needs to be dealt with finesse.

Till date, Nepalis continue to be recruited into the Indian Army. Lured by attractive salary, pensions, and other social security benefits, they join the Indian Army and take oath to protect India’s national interests. According to Mehta, Nepali youths in Indian Army get four times the salary and pensions they would get in Nepal Army.

As of now, there are 126,000 Indian Gurkha pensioners in Nepal, and there is an Indian Ex-servicemen Welfare Organization in Nepal working for retired army personnel.

“We are in no condition—politically, economically or socially—to stop the recruitment into Indian Army,” says political analyst Khanal. In economic mess created by Covid-19, that prospect appears unlikelier still.

Fighting for India

Gurkha units have a history of fighting India’s key wars including in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, all of them in Jammu & Kashmir and all against Pakistan. They also took part in the Indo-China war of 1962, and in later skirmishes between the two countries. There are many anecdotal evidences for this.

Writes ex-Indian Army Brigadier CS Thapa in Indian defense magazine Salute, “In 1962 the Chinese used loudspeakers daily against the company of Major Dhan Singh Thapa, PVC [Param Vir Chakra] asking the soldiers to withdraw as they were from Nepal.”

Then, in September-October 1967, the Nepali Gurkha soldiers were deployed against the Chinese at Nathu La pass between India and China. “A Gurkha unit,” according to Indian General V.K. Singh’s accounts, “gave the Chinese side a ‘bloody nose’… on that occasion, occupying a position after a brutal khukri assault.”

During the Doklam crisis in 2017, there were media reports that Gurkha soldiers were deployed at the forefront against China. But Mehta clarifies that Gurkha soldiers were deployed in Doklam only on second or third lines.

“If there are further tensions, China may raise this issue with Nepal stating that Nepali youths are fighting against China on India’s behalf. But so far as I know, China has lodged no such objection till date,” Mehta adds. Officials at Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expressed their ignorance of any formal Chinese objection to the use of Gurkha soldiers against them.

Despite growing domestic pressures on the two governments to settle outstanding border issues through diplomatic means, Nepal-India talks are unlikely anytime soon.

In Nepal, both ruling and opposition party leaders have been urging Prime Minister KP Oli to use his diplomatic skills to bring back Nepali territories through negotiations with India. Similarly, there is growing domestic pressure on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to talk with Nepal without delay. Ex-diplomats and opposition leaders in New Delhi are also criticizing Modi for ignoring Nepal’s talks offers. In a June 15 statement, senior Indian National Congress leader Karan Singh said: “Although the dispute in question is a long-standing one, it was, if I recall correctly, raised by Nepal in November last year. Surprisingly, we did not seem to take the matter seriously.”

According to the popular Indian portal aajtak.com, the Indian PM-led Cabinet Committee on Security, the highest body in India to decide on matters of national security, had recently concluded that it was meaningless to hold talks on Kalapani after Nepal’s constitution amendment. According to the same report, the meeting concluded that India would not accept the Nepal-India Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report, and that the ‘special ties’ with Nepal would be revised.  

“The chances of specific talks on the border are indeed slim,” says an ex-Indian ambassador to Nepal. “But there may yet be phone conversations between prime ministers or foreign ministers to give a message that bilateral ties are on track.”

As the two sides know resolution of the border dispute will take time, both Oli and Modi seem to be in a mood to ‘normalize’ bilateral relation via phone conversations. The goal is to ensure that the border issue will not have spillover effects in other areas of bilateral ties, according to a senior leader in the ruling Nepal Communist Party.

Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh had said on June 15 that it was still possible to settle border issues with Nepal, with which India shares ‘special ties,’ in a clear indication that India’s political leadership wants to keep talking to Kathmandu—if not on the border.

One story, two versions

India’s Ministry of External Affairs recently briefed its media that India had proposed foreign secretary-level talks just before the constitution amendment process started. “Our offer of talks as well as our response to their offer was positive. In fact, we offered foreign secretary-level phone call and also visits of the two foreign secretaries as recently as just before the tabling of the bill,” Indian government officials told the Indian media on June 15. Indian officials said the onus was on Kathmandu to create conducive atmosphere.

The Nepali side, however, says it has gotten no formal request for talks from India. According to sources in New Delhi, India had communicated through various informal channels that foreign secretary-level talks could be organized if Nepal postponed the constitution drafting process, but there was no official request for talks. The Nepali side understood this as no more than a ploy to stop constitutional amendment.

After the amendment, Nepal’s priority has been to initiate dialogue with India. Speaking to reporters after constitution amendment, PM Oli said talks with India would start soon.

“Dialogue is always our priority. We have been proposing foreign secretary-level talks since November last year but India has not responded,” says Rajan Bhattarai, PM Oli’s foreign affairs advisor.

After India came up with its new political map in November, Nepal twice sent diplomatic notes to India, offering foreign-secretary level talks. India did not respond positively. Foreign-Secretary level talks are the only mutually agreed mechanism to deal with border disputes.

India’s position on dialogue is inconsistent. India first said talks could be held once the Covid-19 crisis is over. It urged Nepali politicians to create a positive atmosphere. But in the latest statement issued on June 13, India’s Ministry of External Affairs said: “This artificial enlargement of claims is not based on historical fact or evidence and is not tenable. It is also violative of our current understanding to hold talks on outstanding boundary issues.”

Phony promises

During the April 10 phone conversation between PM Oli and PM Modi, the former had briefly broached the border issue, stating that the two countries needed to sit for dialogue without further ado. The next phone conversation between Oli and Modi was scheduled for May 18, the date Nepal’s cabinet endorsed the new political map including Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura. “The scheduled phone conversation was canceled by the Indian side at the eleventh hour,” says a source close to PM Oli.

Nepali Ambassador in New Delhi Nilambar Acharya has been in constant touch with officials of India’s Ministry of External Affairs. He is also in personal contact with some ministers of Modi cabinet but he too has been unable to persuade them for border talks.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali has categorically said that the cartographic change inscribed in the Nepali charter is permanent. In its future dialogue with India, Nepal is preparing to present evidences and historic facts that show Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura belong to Nepal. The country’s bottom-line is the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kalapani.

In the coming days, PM Oli will be under pressure to convince India to withdraw Indian forces from Kalapani. All political parties, including main opposition Nepali Congress, have put the onus of border talks on PM Oli.

After Ladakh

At the same time, the military standoff between India and China over their disputed border in Ladakh is escalating. India says 20 of its army personnel died in a hand-to-hand clash with PLA personnel on the night of June 15. This has further negated the possibility of Nepal-India dialogue to settle Kalapani.

“Nepal may now find it difficult to raise its case strongly, especially as a section in India had already been blaming Nepal for raising border issues at the behest of China,” says Pramod Jaiswal, Research Director of Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement, a Kathmandu-based think tank. “India could adopt a rigid stand while negotiating at the moment, as Kalapani is of strategic importance to it during the conflict with China.”

Jaiswal says Nepal would be wise to remain silent on border issues for a while. “It can raise them again when things calm down,” he advises.