Submit your Article

How has the issue of Kalapani affected Nepal-India relations?

It has had a huge impact. Available bilateral mechanisms are the only way to settle border disputes. There really is no other way. Bilateral talks are the only means. There cannot be third-party mediation, nor have other countries that kind of leverage. Despite some ups and downs, Nepal-India relations have always been cordial. Now, Kalapani is undoubtedly a major agenda. Nepal’s domestic forces raked up the issue to serve their interests instead of opting for an appropriate diplomatic solution. Nor is this a new issue. In my understanding, both our government and India are making little effort to resolve it. If it is an issue, India should also seek a solution at the earliest. Similarly, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not trying enough. There are several issues between the two countries and we have various instruments as well. Issues could be resolved if only there were regular meetings of existing mechanisms.

Aren’t border issues by their very nature hard to resolve?

There are some mechanisms exclusively dedicated to border issues. For example, there is a foreign-secretary level meeting but seldom has this been held. If this meeting cannot take place, we can give such rights to our ambassador in New Delhi. He can hold regular meetings with Indian officials unless it is settled. But Nepal seems to be seeking a solution that is not diplomatic. India prefers diplomatic channels. It is a responsibility of both the countries to create the right atmosphere for talks. The environment here gives the impression that we are preparing for war. Effigies have been burnt, and there are protests in front of the Indian Embassy. All political parties and even the government is involved. But what will we get from the street? Our only option is activating bilateral mechanisms. If some issues cannot be settled at the diplomatic level, we can take them to the top political level. Even for this, we first need to build confidence. Now there is no confidence.

You say this is not a new issue. But protests erupted only after India came up with a new political map.

We are saying that it is a new map but it is not. India comes up with a new map every time it restructures its internal boundaries. Now they have imposed central rule in Jammu and Kashmir and come out with a new political map. In 1995-97, this issue was prominently raised in Nepal. In subsequent years, it was not a priority of our political parties. Now it has resurfaced again.  Why was this issue not resolved in the past? It suggests a mishandling of our foreign policy.

In your view, how does India view recent developments in Nepal?

India has officially said that it is ready for talks on Kalpani. Two former Indian ambassadors to Nepal, Shyam Sharan and Ranjit Rae, say Nepal was never serious on this issue. Other intellectuals are saying the same. India has proposed diplomatic channels to resolve Kalapani. Nepal has not said that it cannot be resolved through such channels. If Nepal says so, it could be moved to political level. Two of our former foreign secretaries have said that Kalapani cannot be resolved at the diplomatic level. Yet former Indian ambassadors are saying that as India has resolved border disputes with Bangladesh, issues with Nepal can also be resolved. India believes the situation in Nepal should be normal for meaningful talks. Street protests and negotiation cannot go hand in hand.

There also seems to be a belief in some quarters of India that other external elements are involved in the anti-India protests in Nepal.

Since 1950 Nepali political parties have always used Nepal-India bilateral relations to serve their vested interests. They negotiated with India with the same intent. There is competition among political parties to become nationalists. Earlier, PM Oli used this border issue for political marketing, now Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba is resorting to the same tactic. Your nationalism is tested based on the negotiations you conduct when you are in power. How best did you serve national interest? The prime ministers of the two countries used to talk over the phone on day to day issues but now they have not spoken. At the least, Nepal government should have appealed to people not to protest in the street, assuring them that Kalapani would be resolved through diplomatic channels.

Are you suggesting that Oli government is using the nationalist card to cover up its domestic failures?

The federal government’s performance has been dismal in the nearly two years since its formation. The PM’s image is sinking and he knows it. He is not capable of defending himself in parliament. Corruption is rife. When the government feels a sense of crisis, nationalism resurfaces. This is not a first time. In 2015, after the promulgation of new constitution, our leaders talked with India about constitution amendment but they did not talk with Madhes-based parties.

Do you think there will come a time when India says enough is enough about the anti-India protests in Nepal?

I don’t think Indians take the ongoing protests seriously. I have not heard of serious discussions in India about them. The Indian establishment clearly understands our capacity. They are of the view that such protests frequently happen in Nepal. I see a diplomatic failure on our side. We decided to send Madhav Kumar Nepal as a special envoy to India. Actually, he cannot resolve the problems, and which level was he to engage? Such anti-Indian protests would impact other negotiations on trade and transit. We may face difficulties in those areas. For example, take the onion crisis. This is not the first time India has faced an onion crisis. In the past, India used to send certain amount of onions even while it faced a shortage but this time they completed stopped delivery.

You fault our foreign ministry. But it has already dispatched a letter to New Delhi asking for high-level talks. It is India that has not responded.

Nepal is yet to clearly mention that it wants a foreign secretary-level meeting. In the meeting of Joint Commission held in September, the two countries had agreed on a foreign secretary-level meeting on border issues in January 2020 in Dehradun. There are many informal channels between Nepal and India which need to be utilized before proposing a formal meeting. First, Nepal will have to say that it wants dialogue at the political level. On our part, preparation is lacking. We have not updated our maps for over 40 years. We are in a state of confusion.

What is your take on India’s refusal to accept the final report of the joint Nepal-India Eminent Persons Group (EPG)?

Let me say few things on the EPG. First, it was formed in 2016 when bilateral relations were at a low.  Second, see the background of the EPG members. They all were giving statements against India before the EPG was formed. How could they have been expected to normalize relations? Third, Madhes-based parties spoke against the EPG in the parliament, rejecting the final report. It means the report is contested within Nepal. We cannot say that reservation of Madhes-based parties is a domestic issue. India is closely watching the dissatisfaction inside the country.

More seriously, the Nepali side leaked important portions of the report. We also decided to submit the final report to the two prime ministers. This is a report prepared by experts and there is no need to submit it to the prime ministers. Similarly, there was wrong understanding about the report. Nepal government spokesperson publicly said that India should receive and implement the report. He missed the point that the report is not mandatory.

But is it not dishonest on India’s part to reject the EPG report formed through consensus between two countries?

You are correct. I am not satisfied with Indian position of not receiving this report. India should do so. Unfortunately, we also created a hostile environment here. Except Bhek Bahadur Thapa, other EPG members spoke about the report before it was submitted and they projected it as a cure-all for bilateral ills. The EPG report should not be projected as bible.

In a separate context, how does India view growing Chinese influence in Nepal?

It is natural for foreign powers to seek their space. Chinese influence in Nepal has increased in all areas including politics and government. In the past, such space was exclusively reserved for India and the US. There is no doubt that there is a huge Chinese influence in ruling parties. India is obviously concerned. But they have not taken any policy measures. China’s aggressive diplomacy in Kathmandu, particularly in domestic politics, is a major concern for India. If India becomes active in East Asian countries like Vietnam, Philippines, it is a matter of concerns for China as well. China’s influence in domestic politics particularly in unification of two communist parties and government formation are matters of grave concerns for India as well as for us in Nepal.

How do you see the growing competition between US, India and China play out in Nepal? 

Our political and diplomatic leadership do not have the capacity to manage the growing competition among three powers. We agree to everything with everyone. We may face a difficult situation if this continues.  We have to develop a capacity of managing growing interests. There is already a worrying conflict between the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the BRI.

Why could the two transitional bodies make no headway?

The intent itself was flawed. You cannot expect good results from a wrong approach, and this is what happened in the past four years. The law was formulated to serve the interest of leaders who were themselves human rights violators. The core purpose of the law was to provide blanket amnesty on war-time cases instead of justice to victims. The law granted the commission rights to make recommendations to the government irrespective of the position of conflict victims. The concerns of the victims were ignored. We knocked on the door of the Supreme Court against some of its provisions but the government hurriedly endorsed it and the commissions were subsequently formed. The people who have in-depth knowledge of and experiences with transitional justice were blocked and office-bearers were appointed along political lines. Later, the Supreme Court asked the government to amend the flawed provisions but the parties ignored the verdict. The commissions thus became platforms for parties to appoint their loyalists and show the international community the transitional justice system was functioning. There was the tendency of delaying the process and tiring the victims out.

How do you rate the performance of the two commissions in the past four years?

We were consulted only six months after the two commissions were formed. There were questions over whether the conflict victims were a priority for the commissions. We were saying the law itself was flawed but those who were appointed claimed it was fine. The terms of the office-bearers were repeatedly extended for no good reason and without any concrete work plan. The timeframe the commissions needed to complete their work was not properly defined. There were inter- and intra-commission fights. And they did not coordinate with national and international rights organizations. The government did not allocate enough resources.

In your view what were the legal hurdles to investigating war-era cases?

Obviously, the law was the key. The United Nations, the National Human Rights Commission, several NGOs and the international community have repeatedly been saying that the law should be amended in line with the 2015 Supreme Court verdict. But political parties and successive governments have chosen to ignore the ruling.

Now the government is again preparing to appoint new office-bearers to the two commissions. What is your take on this?

First, we have to analyze why the previous commissions could not work. There should be a comprehensive review without any prejudice. Whose mistake was it? The governments, the political parties, or the commissions? The Recommendation Committee had pledged to review all aspects of previous commissions but there has been no progress so far. The previous commissions were not able to settle even a single war-era case, which is a shame. More than that, the commissions cannot work if new laws are not formulated in line with the Supreme Court verdict and the victims’ suggestions. Without meaningful participation of the conflict victims, the TJ process can never reach a logical conclusion. The government and the commissions alone cannot drive the process. If you try to impose something from the political level, the results will be unproductive, as was evident in the past four years.

How should the transitional justice process proceed then?

First, the job of the Recommendation Commission should be put on hold. There should be meaningful consultations with all stakeholders, and we should have the right to fix the modality of those consultations. The government cannot dictate anything. The new act should accommodate the outcomes of such consultations. Similarly, the two transitional justice commissions should have a clear working calendar. The people who have in-depth knowledge of transitional justice should be given the responsibility, for which the government needs to prepare a roster of possible candidates.
 

Are you suggesting that as things are conflict victims have no hope of justice?

Obviously. Under the current circumstances, there is no room for hope. There are attempts to reappoint those who were removed earlier from the commissions. This will be a futile exercise.

A lot obviously depends on the political will of the major political parties. What is their stance on it?

They either want to scrap the whole process or settle it as per their wish. They do not intend to provide justice to the victims or to settle war-era cases. Politicians are saying all war-era issues should be forgotten in the ‘new Nepal’.

What is the position of the conflict victims on this?

First, all the appointments and processes should be credible and transparent, and convey a clear message to the victims that their genuine concerns will be addressed. The Recommendation Commission invited us for consultations twice, but did not heed even one of our suggestions. The consultations were just a show. The most important factor is to build trust. The people appointed based on political quotas cannot investigate the complaints filed against their political masters. Without a trustworthy process, we cannot expect a trustworthy result. There are around 63,000 complaints with the commission; we first have to identity the modality of settling them. There should be clarity on whether all complaints should be handled individually or whether some should be dealt with collectively.

Are you suggesting that you have no platform on which to voice your concerns?

We don’t have such a platform. The society does not listen to us. Politicians often want to avoid this issue. Even media coverage has decreased. There should be public hearings in different places where the victims can express their plight and concerns.

How do you evaluate the concerns of the international community toward transitional justice?

Their concerns have gradually dissipated, particularly after the formation of a strong government led by Nepali Communist Party Chairman KP Oli. Though they still issue statements in our support, their concerns are now marginal. The country now has a stable government, which is saying that transitional justice is a purely domestic issue and as such the international community should not speak about it.

What should the conflict victims do if war-era cases are not settled through national mechanisms? Any plans to take them to international platforms?

It is an issue of humanity and not confined to national boundaries.  For now, conflict victims want to settle all issues domestically. But if the government continues to ignore us, we will have no option but to seek justice elsewhere.

What is your vision for the IFA?

I decided to take this responsibility with a couple of objectives in mind. First, the IFA is the sole government think tank working on diplomacy, foreign policy and security issues. The tragedy is that in the 26 years since its establishment, it has gotten progressively weaker. I have some ideas about reforming it.

Second, we have some conventional issues that lack proper research. We need to provide support to the government through in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on international relations, strategic affairs and security issues. Even on Kalapani, there has not been much in-depth and evidence-based research on the Nepali side. Such research would have helped government agencies to come up with compelling arguments at the negotiating table. So we plan to develop this organization as a platform for researchers.

Third, we cannot compete with big countries on hard power and economy. We can protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity only through astute diplomacy. Now we are facing a host of new issues and challenges related to the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s ‘Neighborhood first’ policy. We have to groom the new generation for research on all these issues. This organization can play a vital role on this front as well.

You mentioned Kalapani. Does the IFA have specific plans related to it?

Kalapani is an old issue. Regarding disputed border areas, we have sufficient evidence. But we have not been able to organize all the pieces of evidence in a systematic way. First, we have to identity the encroached areas. We have heard the British Library has some relevant documents. We have to collect evidence from 1816 (at the time of the Sugauli Treaty) by coordinating with our diplomatic missions abroad. We are planning to organize a workshop with experts from various sectors. We will form an expert panel which can assemble various pieces of evidence. We can submit the workshop document as policy recommendation to the government and also use it for academic purposes.

PM Oli says the government is still busy collecting evidence on Kalapani. But the public sentiment is that it should be resolved immediately.

It is a crucial issue as the scale of encroachment in Kalapani is very high. Nepal is a small country and the relations between two of our big neighbors are not so cordial. In case of some geopolitical confrontation between them, there could be further encroachments, and we plan to identify such risk areas. Our first job is to identity encroached areas and the second is to flag high-risk areas. 

There is perpetual speculation about a resource crunch, both human and financial, at the IFA. What has been your assessment?
It has just been a week since I joined the office. What I feel is that this organization’s usefulness is increasing. So the government should be generous in providing human and financial resources.
 

On a separate note, how do you evaluate the Oli government’s foreign policy?

Over the past 70 years, our focus was more on addressing the genuine security interests of our two big neighbors, and maintaining a delicate balance between them.

With China’s rise in recent decades, new dynamics have been added to Nepal’s geopolitics. The US invited Nepal’s foreign minister after 17 years and said that Nepal can play a vital role in the Indo-Pacific region. 

The world order is shifting to the East and Nepal occupies a highly strategic space. The traditional two-way rivalry has been converted into a three-way rivalry. We can feel the magnitude of American involvement with its offer of the $500 million MCC grant. Handling this three-way rivalry won’t be easy.

As someone who closely studies Nepal-China ties, help us understand the new ‘strategic partnership’ between them.

The term ‘alliance’ was frequently used during the Cold War. After that, American President Bill Clinton started using the term ‘strategic’ during his tenure. Barack Obama used the term ‘engagement’ and his ‘Pivot to Asia’ was all about greater engagement with the continent. Now the Trump administration is reverting to an old terminology.

In essence, ‘strategic partnership’ is a new form of an ‘alliance’, a word that countries today prefer not to use. Strategic partnership entails giving due importance to a country. It suggests deep engagement between two countries. In that sense, strategic partnership is a vague terminology as it could entail military, economic and cultural cooperation. ‘Strategic’ does not mean only military partnership.

But there is suspicion that China wants to deepen military engagement with Nepal under the guise of a strategic partnership.

That is not true. Our engagement with China cannot be at both political and military levels. Now the key area of cooperation is economic. China is now facing many challenges, and its focus now is economic or development partnership. China could have identified Nepal as an important economic partner. 

The BRI, new agreements on trade and transit, and other Chinese aid are closely linked to economic partnership. Now there could be a question about the difference in the nature of the American IPS and Nepal’s strategic partnership with China. Given our location and economic limitations, we cannot afford military partnership with any country. Not only Nepal, other American allies in Asia have also clarified that they cannot join the IPS in a way that affects their economic collaboration with China.

You mean Nepal-China strategic partnership is strictly economic?

Yes. China has pledged to help us become a land-linked country, an example of economic collaboration. Bilateral military exercises with India, China and the US are important for us. But our military engagement should not be targeted against any particular country. We have a cautious approach to the IPS as it aims to contain China. Geopolitically, we are in a sensitive area, we share a border with China, and we shelter Tibetan refugees. That is why we have to have a ‘wait and see’ approach with regard to the IPS. We should not rush in matters that have strong military components.

But won’t shunning the IPS and embracing the BRI pose problems for Nepal?

All the initiatives of world powers have strategic implications. Economic diplomacy also has a strategic purpose. There is no free lunch. Nepal has already joined the BRI, which China says is an economic project, and that its key components are connectivity, economic collaboration and investment. But the IPS mentions strengthening all 26 countries in this region in terms of security, economic assistance and bilateral exchanges. As the IPS states military engagement and the US itself has defined it as a military project, we cannot compare it with the BRI. Yes, tomorrow we could discover that the BRI too has security components. But for now, we have to give China the ssbenefit of the doubt.

Could you shed some light on the much-discussed Nepal-China strategic partnership?

During Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit, the two countries agreed to elevate their ‘comprehensive economic partnership’ to ‘strategic partnership’. China is very clear about the strategic partnership with Nepal. First, it is not an alliance. In Chinese foreign policy, we never seek alliance with other countries; this is a fundamental of our policy that everyone should understand. Strategy in my understanding means China has put Nepal in its foreign policy priority. It is also about long-term relationship for broader economic cooperation.

There is skepticism in Nepal that such a partnership could be transformed into a security alliance?

As I said, the strategic partnership with Nepal does not have any security and defense implications and it is all about enhancing economic collaborations.

What are the other issues related to this strategic partnership?

By strategic partnership we want to emphasize that we have given importance to Nepal. Both sides should discuss the areas of focus like agriculture and infrastructure based on mutual consultations. There are several areas on which two countries can work together.

In the second informal summit between Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi in October, China pushed the ‘China-India Plus’ concept. What does it actually entail?

This means having consensus between China and India to jointly promote economic development in this region. This is not limiting, like the idea of trilateral cooperation, which is about three countries. There could be four-side or five-side cooperation. The Plus formula is multi-lateral cooperation and not limited to China, India, and Nepal.

Does it mean India and China would consult each other before big infrastructure projects in Nepal?

It is about benefiting from each other’s competitive advantage. India has its own comparative advantage. China is competent in infrastructure, and China also has plenty of financial resources. In big projects you have to combine all sides, combine all comparative advantages. In Afghanistan, this concept is already being implemented. India and China are together training young diplomats there. In the second informal summit in India, Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi have agreed to extend this cooperation in other regions such as Africa and South East Asia.

Will India-China Plus minimize possible conflict between India and China in Nepal?

Of course. This concept entails enhancing economic cooperation in this region. It is not only about big projects but all types of cooperation.

But does not the ‘Plus’ concept minimize Nepal’s role?
Again, China-India Plus is not only about trilateral co-operation. It could also be multilateral. When I was in Dhaka, some experts there said that Bangladeshis do not want to be clubbed under Plus. I fully understand such feelings. But we can also have China-Nepal Plus; or China, India, US Plus Nepal. There is no problem.

Is this Plus concept confined to economic and infrastructure issues or does it also touch security issues?
It is limited to economic cooperation. No security policy or defense policy here.

In Nepal, the railway with China is often a subject of intense debates. What are the prospects of Chinese railway coming to Nepal?

We have a bright future for connectivity projects. Now, I think railway still has many technical problems because of the high mountains. There are also chances of earthquake in the proposed area. We have to go through studies and choose best options. We should not hurry to build a railway line. We have to move ahead carefully as this connectivity is for long term; not for one day or one year.

Nepal has already signed up to China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) but there are continued concerns over debt trap.

The debt trap diplomacy terminology was actually coined by Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney, famous for his hostile view of China. He coined this term in 2017 just before the first Belt and Road Summit in Beijing. The debt trap is a misnomer. See Bhutan. Many Indian companies have invested in hydropower projects there and Bhutan is struggling to pay back the loan. But no one talks about any debt trap there. This is pure propaganda.

What about the modality of investment in the proposed railway with Nepal?

The multi-dimensional connectivity concept includes highways, railways and opening more border points. Nepal can use Chinese airports too. Investment modalities are still up for discussion.

Nepal is already in the BRI but India is yet to join it. How optimistic are you that India will come around?

It is clear that India will not join the BRI in the near future. India has given some reasons on why BRI is bad for it. India is ready for economic cooperation but it does not like the label of BRI and we are flexible on this as well. But rest assured there will continue to be great economic cooperation between the two countries.

How does China view the border dispute between Nepal and India?

The Spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clarified on this. China has not taken any position on it and we are hopeful that India and Nepal can settle it through peaceful negotiations. China also prefers to settle boundary disputes through peaceful means. We resolved our boundary dispute with Nepal in 1961 so there is no dispute between the two countries. India has also encroached on some Chinese territory in its new map.