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 Only after Nepal promised India it would limit its BRI involvement did India agree to Nepal’s participation in it. Thus how President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative will play out in Nepal is anyone’s guess. In an interview with APEX, Deep Kumar Upadhyay, the Nepali envoy in India in 2017 as Nepal’s BRI membership was being negotiated, says it was difficult to convince New Delhi that Nepal joining the initiative would not hurt its interests. Apparently, the deal was that Nepal would limit itself to ‘connectivity’ projects under the BRI. But I could not agree with Upadhyay’s other assertion in the same interview that India is not at all worried about the ‘Nepal-tilting-towards-China’ narrative. He seemed to imply that India understands that most such narratives emerge from people with little knowledge of how diplomacy works. In this thinking, the appointment of S Jaishankar, who has served as India’s ambassador to both the US and China, as the new Minister of External Affairs, is a sign of growing amity between India and China. Jaishankar knows Beijing so well he will allow no India-China tiff to balloon into a crisis.

A corollary to this argument is that with political-level engagements between India and China as good as ever, they will increasingly see eye to eye on their immediate neighbor­hood. Plus, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now so strong he can clear all bureaucratic obstacles and pursue a harmo­nious neighborhood policy. It was interesting to hear former ambassador Upadhyay say that during his twin tenures in New Delhi, he felt PM Modi personally oversaw India’s Nepal policy. If so, was the blockade Modi’s doing entirely? Or do we conclude that however powerful the prime minister, the bureaucrats lower down the hierarchy invariably prevail when it comes to India’s relations with smaller countries?

A Nepali team is currently in China for the finalization of the Detailed Project Report of the proposed Rasuwagadhi-Kath­mandu rail link. Nepal argues the DPR as well as the con­struction of the $2.5 billion project should be funded with Chinese grants. China insists on a loan agreement. It is also clear that India rather than Nepal is China’s target market. So unless New Delhi gives its go-ahead to the rail line, it makes no economic sense for China just to bring it to Nepal and extend it no farther.

Separately, whatever Xi and Modi decide between them, the Indian establishment will continue to have to rely on the same old MEA bureaucrats to craft India’s Nepal policy. Even if Modi wants to oversee Nepal policy himself, he does not have the time, with his hands full with a Trumpian US, an increasingly assertive China, and the old nemesis Pakistan. Or could it be that the Indians, their hands badly singed by the blockade, will from now on be happy to work behind the scenes while the US is given the lead role in Nepal, as one seasoned diplomat hinted to me? I for one don’t believe India will ever willingly give up, or even appear to do so, its near-absolute sway over Nepal.  

 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan founded the Shanghai Cooperation Orga­nization (SCO) in 2001. There were two more curious additions as full SCO members in 2017: India and Pakistan. Nepal for its part secured the status of a ‘dialogue partner’ during the 2015 summit in Ufa, Russia. At the time, there was much hoopla in Kathmandu’s strategic circles, as they struggled to understand Nepal’s role in this Eurasian eco­nomic and security body. When queried, officials of the then Sushil Koirala government were vague. Perhaps they too were clueless.

While I was digging into the source of Nepal’s interest in the SCO back in 2017, I had met Upendra Gautam of the China Study Center. He informed me that it was Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala who first showed an interest in the SCO soon after its formation in 2001. To quote Gautam from my article in Republica, “… the price of oil in Nepal had been steadily increasing. Koirala thought it would be wise for Nepal’s energy security to explore Central Asian oil markets”.

Which was mighty interesting. But even after Nepal secured the status of a dialogue partner in 2015, it could not make any headway in the regional grouping, maybe because it jumped on the SCO bandwagon without any homework. At the 2017 and 2018 SCO summits, Nepal was not even invited. Nor was there any effort from Nepal for a greater SCO role, or for participation in this year’s summit (June 12 and 13) in Bishkek, Kazakhstan.

Russia and China, the two main backers of the organiza­tion, are both uncomfortable with what they see as America’s unnecessary encroachment into their neighborhood. No doubt the two Eurasian behemoths have their differences. But as their relations with the US have soured, they have vastly increased their economic and military cooperation. With their long involvement in Nepal, it should not be a surprise if Russia and China start coordinating their Nepal policy—particularly if the Americans and the Indians, as part of the new Indo-Pacific Strategy join hands to limit their strategic space in Nepal.

Theoretically, the SCO gives India and Pakistan a rare platform to talk. This is important, including for a better prospect of the SAARC which Nepal currently chairs. Prac­tically, trying to bring India and Pakistan closer via the SCO is as good as flogging a dead horse. Separately, the KP Oli government might see the organization as a part of its ‘diver­sification’ policy. But Nepal first needs to be clear on where India, its most important foreign partner, stands on the SCO. Ever wary of China, India has been hesitant to push the SCO idea too far. Nor does it want to jeopardize its relation with the US. This dynamic will play out here in Nepal too.

Nepal has some tough strategic choices to make. Having declared its opposition to joining the Indo-Pacific Strategy, is it in Nepal’s interest to angle for a greater role in a competing security organization? On the other hand, if we are serious about connecting with Central Asia via China—as GPK envi­sioned, and as the country signing up to the BRI signaled—the Beijing-based organization could be a useful vehicle. Making this difficult choice requires greater clarity on Nepal’s diver­sification policy.

 Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s ‘untimely’ reminder of his written agreement with KP Oli, that each of them will get to lead the government for two-and-a-half years, was primarily directed at one person: Narendra Modi. Dahal made his case on May 29, accompanied by a ‘leak’ of the agreement, on the eve of PM Oli’s departure to New Delhi to take part in Modi’s second swearing-in as prime minister. But it was only a reminder. Last year, when Dahal was in New Delhi, he had already briefed the Indian government that there had been such an agreement and that he was the PM-in-waiting. Dahal has a checkered history of engaging in all kinds of dubious dealings abroad. On the pretext of medical check-ups for himself or one of his family members, he jets off to New Delhi or Singapore or Washington DC for hush-hush meetings with foreign spooks and bureaucrats. He does so with one intent: to find an external route back to power in his homeland.

The former Maoist supremo has been trying to impress on the Indians (and the Americans) that he is the only politician in Nepal who is acceptable to people from all political, ethnic and regional backgrounds (read: Madhesis) as the country looks to institutionalize the nascent federal republic. Oli, of late a suspect in New Delhi and Washington for his supposed pro-China proclivities, finds himself at a distinct disadvantage in this equation. Foreign powers know they cannot com­pletely trust Dahal. Yet they also increasingly believe Nepal’s pro-China tilt can be checked only if Oli is ousted as PM.

Dahal has now thrown down the gauntlet to Oli: either quit as the prime minister after a year or hand him party leader­ship. Even if Oli agrees—a big if—things won’t be straightfor­ward. Communist parties believe in centralized leadership for a reason. If Oli leads the government and Dahal the party for any length of time, the NCP will likely split sooner or later. Some reckon that is exactly what big powers active in Nepal want: A situation of ‘controlled instability’ in which they get to do as they please.

Interestingly, China is itself frustrated at what it sees as lackluster performance of the much-vaunted, two-third Oli government. Not only has PM Oli dragged his feet in clearing the obstacles for the BRI projects in Nepal. Nepal under Oli also wants all the goodies, including the trans-border railway line, pro bono, which is a no-no for Beijing as the Chinese economy begins to cool off. Perhaps the Chinese too are looking for someone more amenable than Oli? Considering the recent Modi-Xi bonhomie, it may also not be a surprise if China has agreed not to step on Indian sensitivities in Nepal, its traditional ‘backyard’. If Oli expects the northern neighbor to unconditionally prop him up, he may be in for a surprise. Faced with a protectionist US, China has far bigger fishes to fry in India.

 The globe-trotting Narendra Damodardas Modi was only half-jokingly referred to as the ‘foreign policy’ prime minister during his first term. In the five years, he visited 59 countries, from Argentina in South America to Turkmen­istan in Central Asia, from Rwanda in East Africa to Canada and the US in North America. During this time he came to Nepal four times. There were only two countries he visited more often: China and the US.

Modi has firmly entrenched India in the US-led Indo-Pa­cific Strategy even while he has tried to maintain a kind of modus vivendi with China after a tense standoff over the Doklam plateau in 2017. The BJP election manifesto spoke of enhancing India’s role in the Indo-Pacific; it was silent on the BRI. India has been noncommittal about the signature foreign policy initiative of Xi Jinping largely because CPEC, a key BRI project between China and Pakistan, passes through a disputed Kashmir territory.

But after the 2017 ‘informal’ Modi-Xi summit in Wuhan, China, the two countries have been able to collaborate, even as they “agreed to disagree” on several issues. Both realize that with the sole economic superpower turning inward, they need each other to ensure there are no bumps on their road to prosperity. India may be reluctant to sign on to the BRI, but it is keen to preserve the peaceful status quo with China. Therefore, India has proposed a second Wuhan-like informal Modi-Xi summit, this time in Varanasi, Modi’s elec­toral constituency.

Comfortable in his role as India’s torchbearer abroad, Modi no doubt feels even more confident of his ability to maintain the delicate US-China balance following his thumping victory in the recent Indian elections. It will be tough though. The Americans want India to play the pivotal role in the Indo-Pa­cific to check Chinese inroads into South and South East Asia. India also sees the centrality of the US role in its strategic competition against China. Yet it will be reluctant to further distance itself from China, irrespective of what the Americans want. China did Modi a huge favor by giving the UN Security Council the go-ahead to designate the Pakistan-based Masood Azar, someone implicated in various terror attacks in India, a terrorist. This was publicized as a huge diplomatic victory for the Pak-hardliner Modi, who as a result reaped huge electoral benefits. Modi will be obliged to return the favor to the Chinese.

But with the US determined to tighten the screws on China, will the Indians be able to resist the American pressure to ‘isolate’ the Middle Kingdom? And how will such pressure play out in South Asia, including in Nepal? Will the Indians, in true ‘Wuhan spirit’, give the Chinese, their biggest geopo­litical competitor, more or less a free hand in Kathmandu? Or will Modi agree to greater US involvement in Nepal, its traditional ‘backyard’ where India has always frowned on any western activism, to China’s visible discomfort? Or do China and the US now have such influence in Nepal individually that Indian concerns become secondary?

It will be difficult for Nepal if each of these three powers starts pursuing exclusive geopolitical interests here in Nepal. Or if two gang up against one.