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After years of tension and hostility, India and China are slowly moving toward rapprochement, signaling a potential shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. Their recent interactions, notably during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, are being closely observed not only across South Asian capitals but also in Western capitals, particularly Washington, DC.

On Aug 31, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the SCO summit. This marked one of the highest-level engagements between the two nations since their last meeting in Kazan in Oct 2024. The deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020 had severely strained bilateral ties.

During the meeting, both leaders acknowledged the progress made in stabilizing their relationship and expressed intent to build on this momentum. A particularly sensitive area—the long-standing border dispute—was a focal point. Modi noted that after the disengagement along certain friction points at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), an “atmosphere of peace and stability” had emerged. He further stated that special representatives from both countries had reached an agreement on enhanced border management.

Chinese President Xi emphasized that both sides should not let boundary issues define the overall relationship. He advocated for stronger bilateral cooperation and said, “It should be the right choice for China and India to be good-neighborly friends and partners that help each other succeed, and have the dragon and the elephant dance together.”

The ‘Dragon and Elephant’ metaphor has been previously invoked by Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who in March this year described it as the only correct strategic choice for both sides.

The Galwan Valley clash of June 2020 was the most serious military confrontation between India and China since the 1962 war, resulting in casualties on both sides. The incident led to a rapid deterioration in diplomatic, economic, and people-to-people ties. In the aftermath, direct flights between the two countries were suspended, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra was halted, and economic cooperation was curtailed.

However, signs of normalization have begun to appear. Both the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and direct air travel between New Delhi and Beijing are set to resume, signaling a renewed interest in rebuilding trust.

The rapprochement comes at a time when both countries are facing economic headwinds—partly due to external pressures such as the US trade war. US President Donald Trump’s administration has imposed steep tariffs on Chinese goods and extended similar measures to India, further complicating relations with both Asian powers.

As economic nationalism and protectionism rise in the West, India and China are increasingly turning to each other—not out of mutual affection but pragmatic necessity. Both countries are exploring expanded market access, supply chain integration, and greater cooperation in global governance.

At the SCO summit, Modi emphasized the importance of the bilateral relationship, stating, “Cooperation between our two countries is linked to the interests of 2.8bn people. This will also pave the way for the welfare of all humanity,” he said. Despite the warming tone, deep strategic divergences remain, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. India is a key member of the Quad alliance, along with the US, Japan, and Australia. The group aims to promote a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific, which Beijing perceives as an anti-China bloc.

India has also rejected China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on grounds of sovereignty and transparency—especially given that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI project. Moreover, India remains wary of China’s growing influence in South Asia, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives, where Beijing has invested heavily under its regional outreach strategy.

Despite these regional tensions, both countries continue to collaborate on global platforms. India and China are active participants in BRICS—a bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, and South Africa—which aims to offer an alternative to Western-dominated institutions. Discussions are ongoing about introducing a BRICS currency, although differences between India and China on implementation persist.

In their statements, both leaders recognized their roles as ancient civilizations, populous nations, and key voices of the Global South. They pledged to continue cooperation in multilateral frameworks on issues like climate change, sustainable development, and global economic governance.

India-China relations have seen cyclical highs and lows since they established diplomatic ties in 1950. Major milestones include Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark visit to China in 1988, and Chinese President Xi’s visit to India in 2014, followed by reciprocal visits and two informal summits in 2018 (Wuhan) and 2019 (Chennai). These engagements laid the groundwork for what was once seen as a promising new phase in bilateral ties.

However, the Galwan clash derailed much of that progress. Now, with global realignments and economic shifts, both countries appear to be reassessing their strategic calculus. The recent SCO declaration also criticized unilateral economic measures—widely interpreted as a rebuke of the West’s use of tariffs and sanctions. 

“Member States oppose unilateral coercive measures, including those of an economic nature, that contravene the UN Charter… negatively affecting the global economy, undermining fair competition, hindering international cooperation and the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals,” the declaration states.

The meeting between Modi and Xi in Tianjin symbolizes a cautious thaw between two regional heavyweights who have more to gain from cooperation than conflict. Yet, while economics may bring them closer in the short term, deep-seated geopolitical differences will continue to shape the trajectory of the India-China relationship. Whether the dragon and the elephant can truly dance or merely avoid stepping on each other’s toes remains one of Asia’s most critical strategic questions.

Tensions between governments and social media platforms are on the rise around the world. States are pushing for regulation to combat disinformation, curb hate speech, safeguard national security, protect minors and assert sovereignty over digital space. Tech companies, however, long accustomed to operating globally with minimal state oversight, are often reluctant to comply with country-specific rules.

Increasingly, governments are requiring local registration or licensing as a condition to operate.

While some platforms accept these demands, many resist, particularly in smaller and less influential countries that lack the leverage to enforce compliance. Nepal offers a telling example of this ongoing battle. Over the past few years, the government has attempted to regulate major platforms, though critics fear such moves could also restrict freedom of speech and expression.

On August 28, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology issued a seven-day deadline for all social media companies—domestic and international—to register locally or face progressive deactivation. While platforms like Viber, TikTok, Global View, We Talk and Nimbuzz have complied, most major players like X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, LinkedIn, Reddit, Snapchat and WeChat continue to operate without registration. Telegram, under pressure, has begun the process.

The requirement is not just about paperwork. Registered platforms must designate a local point of contact, a grievance officer and a compliance officer, effectively obliging them to establish a physical presence in Nepal. The policy reflects growing public concern over disinformation, hate speech and illegal content that many believe threaten social harmony.

However, enforcement of this policy is challenging. With millions of Nepalis relying on these platforms for communication, business and entertainment, abrupt bans could spark public outrage. The 2023 TikTok ban, lifted only after months of negotiation, demonstrated both the limits of state power and the possibilities of enforcement. TikTok’s eventual re-registration showed that, with sufficient pressure, even global giants can be brought to the table if they see enough value in the local market.

Nepal is not alone in this regulatory push. In 2024, Malaysia introduced licensing requirements for platforms with over eight million users. While some platforms complied, others like Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, and Google’s YouTube, are still negotiating. The European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) is often held up as a global benchmark. It rebalances the responsibilities between users, platforms and public authorities, and the protection of fundamental rights. Nepal could draw lessons from the DSA, particularly in ensuring that regulations are not solely punitive, but also protective of democratic values.

Another growing area of concern worldwide is the protection of minors. In 2025, Australia became the first country to impose a mandatory minimum age of 16 for most social media platforms through its Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Bill. Non-compliance to this legislation carries heavy fines. Nepal, which is seeing increasing reports of online harms affecting children, should consider similar protective legislation.

One of the thorniest issues in social media governance is content moderation. Although tech companies have deployed large moderation teams and AI-driven tools, governments see these efforts as inadequate, especially when it comes to locally sensitive content or criticism of state policies. But beneath this lies a deeper tension: while governments claim to be fighting disinformation, they may also use regulation to suppress dissent and limit freedom of expression. In countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, India and Indonesia, social media rules have often been doubled as tools of political censorship. The same risk exists in Nepal too. Regulation is necessary, but it must not be weaponized to silence critics or undermine the press. A strong legal framework should guarantee that posts from independent or mainstream media are protected, and that takedown requests are transparent and subject to oversight. In the neighboring countries, the Indian government has taken a slew of measures in order to regulate social media platforms.

Another pressing issue is privacy. Social media companies collect vast amounts of personal data, raising concerns about misuse, surveillance and inadequate safeguards for users. Addressing these challenges requires more than registration requirements alone. As Nepal finalizes its Social Media Bill, it should adopt a multi-stakeholder governance model, bringing together not only government agencies, but also platforms, civil society, journalists, academia and international partners.

Open dialogue with major platforms can help align expectations, clarify provisions and ensure mutual accountability. Beyond that, sector-specific laws, robust data protection frameworks and digital literacy campaigns are essential. Regional cooperation, particularly among global south countries facing similar challenges, could amplify Nepal’s voice and build a stronger front for fair regulation.

So far, Nepal’s approach has leaned too heavily on government control. For regulation to be effective and democratic, the country must shift from a control mindset to a governance mindset—one that balances accountability with protection of rights. The relationship between states and social media companies is at a critical juncture. For Nepal, this is an opportunity to craft a regulatory framework that tackles online harms without undermining digital freedoms. A thoughtful, inclusive and globally informed approach could allow Nepal to emerge as a leader in social media governance rather than just another regulatory battleground.

Ultimately, the challenge lies in striking a balance between free speech, content moderation and privacy. Constant dialogue between the government and platforms is essential, given that tech companies operate globally but also be held accountable locally. Another hurdle is the aggressive lobbying that media platforms extensively engage in against regulatory efforts—a trend already visible in Nepal.

Stronger rules inevitably affect the business interests of social media companies, and resistance is fierce. Global experience shows that states face significant pushback whenever they attempt to rein in tech giants. Nepal must navigate this pushback carefully, ensuring its regulatory ambitions protect citizens without stifling democratic values. In conclusion, regulation of social media is still an evolving concept  in many countries and there is no one-size-fits-all model; the only way is to closely follow the steps taken by other countries, and learn from each other. Nepal should also closely follow the attempts being made for global governance.

Nepal's Prime Minister, KP Sharma Oli, has raised a strong objection to the recent agreement between India and China to resume trade through the Lipu Lekh Pass, a disputed territory claimed by Nepal.

PM Oli who is in China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit 2025, as well as activities to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday, where he emphasized that the Lipu Lekh Pass is part of Nepalese territory.

A statement from Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined Oli's position: "Referring to the recent understanding reached between India and China on border trade through Lipu Lekh Pass, the Rt. Hon Prime Minister stated that the territory belongs to Nepal and that the Government of Nepal has lodged a strong objection."

This issue stems from the agreement signed on August 19 during the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India. Both countries agreed to resume trade from Lipu Lekh, a site that remains disputed between Nepal and India. Following the agreement, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately issued diplomatic notes to both nations, expressing its objections.

In 2020, Nepal published a new political map incorporating Kalapani, Lipu Lekh, and Limiyadhura as part of its territory.

It remains unclear how the Chinese side has responded to Prime Minister Oli's statement. Prior to his departure to China for the SCO summit, PM Oli had confirmed that he would raise the Lipu Lekh issue with both India and China. It is unclear yet whether Oli and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will meet on the sidelines of SCO meeting.

In the bilateral meeting, Nepal PM expressed the hope that projects listed under the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) would be advanced, adding that Nepal seeks Chinese support in the areas of fertilizer, petroleum exploration, human resource development, climate resilience and other areas.

Speaking highly of the China-Nepal good-neighborly friendship in the past seven decades, Xi said that the high-quality Belt and Road cooperation between the two countries is advancing steadily at present, according to China. China is willing to work with Nepal to carry forward the traditional friendship and facilitate the greater progress of the China-Nepal Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship for Development and Prosperity, Xi noted.

Joint efforts should be made to enhance connectivity programs covering port, highway, power grid, aviation, communications and other fields, and cooperation in sectors including industry, agriculture and animal husbandry, new energy, environmental protection, oil and gas, artificial intelligence, education, health, as well as law enforcement and security, should be advanced, he added.

According to Chinese official media, Oli said that Nepal supports the China-proposed Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, and expects China to play a greater role in international affairs.

On Aug 18, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala received Nepal’s instrument of acceptance of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies from Nepal’s WTO Ambassador Ram Prasad Subedi. Just three more acceptances are needed for the agreement to enter into force. 

DG Okonjo-Iweala said: “Only through collective action can we restore the health of our oceans—and curbing harmful fisheries subsidies is an important step to this end. I am deeply grateful to Nepal for its leadership as a landlocked least-developed country. With Nepal’s ratification, we are even closer to crossing the finish line in bringing the landmark Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies into force. Only three more acceptances to go!”

Ambassador Subedi said: “Nepal is very pleased to deposit its instrument of acceptance of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies today, reaffirming our commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system. As a landlocked country, we nonetheless share with other WTO members a responsibility to ensure the sustainable use of marine resources. We believe that healthy marine ecosystems are vital for food security, environmental sustainability and the livelihoods of millions of people around the world.”

Formal acceptances from two-thirds of WTO members are required for the agreement to enter into force—representing 111 members. At the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) held in Geneva in June 2022, ministers adopted the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies through consensus, setting new, binding, multilateral rules to curb harmful fisheries subsidies. The agreement prohibits subsidies for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, for fishing overfished stocks, and for fishing on the unregulated high seas.

Ministers also recognized the needs of developing economies and least-developed countries (LDCs) by establishing a fund to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to help governments that have formally accepted the agreement to implement the new obligations.

In early June, the Fish Fund launched a Call for Proposals inviting developing economies and LDCs that have ratified the agreement to submit requests for project grants aimed at helping them implement the Agreement. Applications are due by Oct 9. 

WTO members also agreed at MC12 to continue negotiating on remaining fisheries subsidies issues with the aim of finding consensus on additional provisions to further strengthen the disciplines on fisheries subsidies.

Five years after the deadly clashes in the Galwan Valley that severely strained ties, India and China now appear to be moving toward normalization of relations.

While the US President Donald Trump’s tariff war may have nudged the two Asian powers closer, the current thaw stems largely from sustained confidence-building measures and dialogue. For Kathmandu, cordial relations between India and China create a more favorable environment to engage constructively with both New Delhi and Beijing.

On both the Doklam and the Galwan clashes, Nepal consistently maintained that disputes should be resolved peacefully. Following the Galwan incident, Nepal stated: “In the context of recent developments in the Galwan Valley area between our friendly neighbors India and China, Nepal is confident that both the neighboring countries will resolve, in the spirit of good neighborliness, their mutual differences through peaceful means in favor of bilateral, regional and world peace and stability.”

Over the past year, multiple rounds of dialogue helped rebuild trust. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India on Aug 18–19, where discussions included the sensitive border question. Earlier, in July, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar traveled to Beijing.

India has long maintained that relations cannot return to normal unless border issues are addressed. In delegation-level talks, Jaishankar remarked: “Having seen a difficult period in our relationship, our two nations seek to move ahead. This requires a candid and constructive approach from both sides. Overall, it is our expectation that our discussions would contribute to building a stable, cooperative and forward-looking relationship between India and China, one that serves both our interests and addresses our concerns.”

On the global context, he added: “We seek a fair, balanced and multi-polar world order, including a multi-polar Asia. Reformed multilateralism is also the call of the day. In the current environment, there is clearly the imperative of maintaining and enhancing stability in the global economy as well.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, for his part, urged both sides to draw lessons from the past, cultivate a correct strategic outlook, and view each other as partners and opportunities rather than rivals or threats. He emphasized confidence-building, expanded cooperation and consolidating positive momentum. Pointing to the US, Wang warned that “unilateral bullying practices are on the rise, while free trade and the international order face severe challenges.”

This thaw in India-China ties comes at a time when New Delhi’s relations with Washington have soured after Trump imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian goods, citing India’s continued imports of Russian oil. Meanwhile, China and the US have been locked in a trade and technology war since 2018.

According to Kathmandu-based geopolitical analyst Chandra Dev Bhatta, shifting global geopolitics has compelled both India and China to temporarily set aside differences. “Both countries now recognize each other as competing powers, not necessarily the binary rivals often portrayed in Western media,” he said. “The backdrop to these developments is important for countries like Nepal. For instance, the Trump administration’s tariff measures against India for its Russian oil imports came despite the fact that most major countries were doing the same, something that actually helped stabilize the global oil market, benefiting even Nepal.”

Bhatta added that India and China have long learned from each other, and countries in between stand to benefit if ties continue to improve. Closer relations could generate alternative ideas for development and global governance.

Still, he cautioned that states prioritize their own interests, especially in times of heightened geopolitics. “We too must focus on our own interests and prepare to navigate accordingly,” he said. “There’s an old saying: whether elephants fight or make love, it’s the grass that suffers. It may be old, but it remains relevant when external factors increasingly shape regional relations.”

Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri has completed his two-day official visit to Nepal, during which he held extensive talks with top leaders of major parties, representatives of fringe parties, government officials, and the army chief.

While in Kathmandu, Misri met with Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, President Ramchandra Paudel and Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba. He also interacted with Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba, CPN (Maoist Center) Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal and other senior leaders. Bilateral talks were also held with his Nepali counterpart Amrit Kumar Rai, though both sides have kept the details undisclosed.

Misri’s trip comes ahead of Prime Minister Oli’s planned visit to India, marking the first such high-level exchange in four months. The timing follows a brief but deadly war between India and Pakistan, US President Donald Trump’s tariff measures against India and other shifting regional dynamics. For much of the past year, New Delhi had appeared hesitant to extend an invitation to Oli. However, PM Oli and Modi met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly last year and on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC meeting this year which means there has been constant communication between two sides.  

The upcoming visit suggests a thaw in what has been a turbulent relationship between Oli and New Delhi over the past decade. His trip is expected to focus on longstanding issues, particularly the implementation of earlier agreements. Among the priorities is the stalled Pancheshwor Multipurpose Project, where efforts are underway to resolve remaining disputes.

From 2015 to 2022, Nepal-India relations were shaped by five major factors: the 2015 blockade, the map row, the still-unimplemented Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report, China’s growing influence and debates over reviving SAARC. A decade later, only the “China factor” remains a prominent feature in bilateral diplomacy; the other issues have largely faded. In the same period, several temporary irritants, mostly border-related, hampered normalization of ties.

 Yet, another quiet trend was taking root: development projects began reaching completion on schedule, India’s overt support to Madhes-based parties waned and economic cooperation advanced despite political mistrust. In recent years, energy cooperation, connectivity projects and regular political and bureaucratic exchanges have helped sustain a more cordial partnership.

Meanwhile, Nepali leaders have softened their positions on the map row and the EPG report. Today, the three major forces—Nepali Congress, CPN (Maoist Center), and Madhes-based parties—have all set aside these contentious agendas. Only CPN-UML raises them, and even then, only half-heartedly. Oli remains consistent, however, in asserting that Lord Ram was born in Nepal, a claim that continues to irritate India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. On the boundary dispute, both governments appear to share an understanding to address the issue quietly through established bilateral mechanisms rather than public confrontation. As for SAARC, the prospect of revival has receded further since the India-Pakistan clashes in May this year. 

Still, despite the delay in Oli’s visit, Nepal-India engagement has intensified. Cabinet ministers from both sides have been exchanging visits, political delegations between Kathmandu and New Delhi have grown more frequent and meetings of long-dormant bilateral mechanisms have resumed, showing tangible progress. The “China factor” remains central, with India frequently raising concerns about Beijing’s influence in Nepal in the context of its own security interests.

Regional dynamics have also nudged the two countries closer. During the India–Pakistan war of May 7–9, Nepal issued two statements condemning terrorism, implicitly siding with India. Indian Ambassador Naveen Srivastava personally met Prime Minister Oli to convey New Delhi’s appreciation. Since coming to power in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has prioritized neighboring countries in India’s foreign policy. Though critics argue these efforts have fallen short, the Modi government continues to push forward with economic and development packages as the backbone of its neighborhood engagement.

Defense cooperation, once strained, is also seeing renewed momentum. During Misri’s visit, India handed over light strike vehicles, critical care medical equipment and military animals to the Nepali Army. The Indian readout described this as reflecting “the close relationship between the two armies and our robust defense cooperation.” 

Collaboration between the two armies has grown in recent months, even as India closely monitors Nepal’s growing ties with the US and Chinese militaries.

Institutional mechanisms have also restarted. After a six-year hiatus, the Nepal-India Boundary Working Group met in New Delhi on July 28–29 for its seventh session. While contentious issues remain unresolved, the two sides agreed on updated modalities for inspecting and maintaining boundary pillars, finalized a three-year work plan, and committed to using advanced technologies for boundary management.

Progress has also been noted in legal and development cooperation. Negotiations continue on a revised extradition treaty and a mutual legal assistance agreement in criminal matters. Small-scale development projects under the High Impact Community Development scheme are advancing steadily. Integrated Check Posts (ICPs), first agreed upon in 2005, have also moved forward. Three of the five ICPs were completed and operationalized in 2018, 2020, and 2024, with work underway on the remaining two.

“During the various engagements, both sides noted with satisfaction the concrete progress in recent years in diverse areas of bilateral cooperation, including physical connectivity, digital connectivity, defence and security and energy cooperation,” said the press release issued by Indian Embassy in Nepal. 

“Nepal is a priority partner of India under its Neighbourhood First policy. The Foreign Secretary’s visit continued the tradition of regular high-level exchanges between the two countries and helped in advancing our bilateral ties further.”

For a long time, Nepali media took its audience for granted. Little to no research was done on reader profiles, content preferences, audience engagement or even on circulation research and readability research which form the backbone of effective print media.

Similarly, there has been a complete lack of audience ratings research for radio and television. In the absence of such insights, audiences were expected to consume and believe whatever content was disseminated. The result of this one-sided dynamic has been disastrous as traditional media are now struggling to retain its audience. 

In the 20th century, audiences did not have many ways to consume the news. The relationship between media and audiences was largely one-way traffic, and audience engagement was limited to occasional letters to the editor or phone calls.

Radio, television and print were used to influence and control public opinion, often pushing through specific narratives. Audiences were viewed as passive recipients of information, and media houses operated under the assumptions of the “magic bullet theory” introduced by Harold Laswell in the 20th century. This theory assumed that media messages had a direct, powerful effect on a passive audience.

Although audiences may have had grievances, they either did not have a channel to register their feedback or media houses simply ignored their feedback. In contrast, the digital era introduced the “two-step flow theory” which seeks greater audience participation, engagement and feedback. Still, the remnants of the old bullet theory persist in the Nepali media landscape, albeit in subtler forms.

In Nepal, things began to change with the advent and subsequent expansion of the internet. By early 2000, online news platforms began to emerge. Unlike traditional outlets, these platforms introduced comment sections from the outset, giving readers space to express their opinion and to engage with content. 

The internet, and the broader digitization of Nepali society, transformed the country’s media sphere. While audiences in the past had limited access to news, they are now inundated with options. More importantly, they now have direct access to primary sources such as government press releases, official documents and reports. This allows them to compare what media houses report with the original information and identify discrepancies.

Meanwhile, the exponential rise of social media began reshaping how Nepali people consumed news. Traditional media lost its monopoly over the creation and dissemination of information. Ironically, media houses themselves rushed to social platforms to share their contents, often produced with significant investment, without a clear strategy for engagement or monetization. 

At the same time, internet access expanded even to remote areas for Nepal, becoming affordable even for low-income communities. Equipped with smartphones and internet access, audiences began spending more time on platforms like Facebook and X (formerly Twitter). Global studies show that between 2008 and 2018, these platforms led to a fundamental shift in new consumption. Today, however, TikTok has overtaken both as a primary source of information for many users.

When media houses began sharing their content on social media, it eliminated the need for audiences to turn to newspapers, radio and television for news. Despite this, Nepali media was doing relatively well in terms of revenue and audience before the COVID-19 pandemic. However, once nationwide lockdowns were enforced to curb the spread, the media landscape changed dramatically. For the first time in the history of Nepali media, many print publications halted operations for days. Radio and television also reduced news production significantly. A few online platforms, despite health risks, continued delivering news.

As people remained confined to their homes, they turned to smartphones and digital platforms for information. At the same time, government agencies, private businesses and NGOs relied heavily on social media to communicate with the public. This combination of traditional media’s limited presence and the active role of digital platforms meant that audiences were able to fulfill their information needs without newspapers or TV.  In fact, during the COVID era, a significant portion of the audience shifted to social media for news consumption, especially in Nepal. By the time the pandemic subsided, traditional media had lost a last share of its readership and advertising revenue.

Despite these seismic changes, mainstream media in Nepal largely failed to recognize, or respond, to the shifting dynamics of news production, dissemination and consumption. Meanwhile, other platforms like TikTok, Instagram and YouTube, and short-form video formats gained rapid popularity. 

For far too long, media houses in Nepal took their audiences for granted. They failed to evolve with changing news consumption behaviors and technological trends. Now, they are faced with a three-fold challenge: finding ways to retain the audience, researching reader preferences and developing sustainable revenue models. This has become a do-or-die situation for the media.

But no scientific research has been conducted in Nepal to understand changing media consumption patterns. Neither regional nor international research organizations have included Nepal in their studies. However, it is evident even without formal data that audiences are consuming news via TikTok and other platforms rather than by reading newspapers and watching television stations. 

The Reuters Institute’s Digital News Report, while not focused on Nepal, offers useful insights. The report points out that an accelerating shift toward consumption via social media and video platforms is further diminishing the influence of institutional journalism and fostering a fragmented media ecosystem dominated by podcasters, YouTubers and TikTokers.

The report also states that populist politicians around the world are bypassing traditional journalism, opting instead for friendly partisan outlets and influences. These personalities often gain privileged access, but rarely ask questions. Many of them are involved in spreading disinformation. In many ways, India’s experience mirrors that of Nepal’s, the report says.

According to the Reuters study, Indian audiences show a strong preference for accessing news via smartphones and social media platforms such as YouTube (55 percent), WhatsApp (46 percent), Instagram (37 percent) and Facebook (36 percent), especially among English-speaking users. This trend likely holds true for Nepal as well.

Another global trend that is increasingly evident in Nepal is news fatigue. With decades of political instability, the media has been dominated by repetitive coverage of political wrangling, corruption and the same political figures. On the international front, conflict-heavy news continues to dominate headlines. Audiences are growing tired of this monotony; they no longer want to read or hear the same narratives year after year.

While mainstream media has played an essential role in strengthening democracy, exposing corruption and holding power accountable, it has lagged behind in offering diverse, engaging content. This has contributed to audience fatigue and disinterest.

In conclusion, media houses must rethink their strategy. They need to increase their presence on platforms where audiences are active, especially video-centric platforms like YouTube and TikTok. As gatekeepers of institutional journalism, they still possess the credibility and capacity to serve public interest, but they must listen more to what their audience wants. 

This means developing responsive content strategies, adopting audience research methods and creating sustainable digital revenue models. More importantly, it is time to actively implement Audience Engagement Theory, which emphasizes two-way communication and greater interaction with the public. If mainstream media is to stay relevant, it must stop treating its audience as passive recipients and start seeing them as active participants in the media ecosystem.

The rapid expansion of digital technology is reshaping the media landscape in deep and profound ways. This shift has already compelled the media industry to transform—not only their newsrooms but entire media organizations. It also demands an overhaul of journalism education, if not a complete transformation.

In Nepal, journalism education has remained alarmingly disconnected from the media industry. It is heavily focused on theoretical aspects, paying little to attention to practical skills. There is already a huge gap between classrooms and newsrooms. Universities are often hesitant to engage with media houses, and media houses, in turn, are not particularly welcoming to journalism students.  

As both a media educator and journalist, I have closely observed the dynamics of both environments. The transformation of newsrooms is well underway, albeit often without clear direction. However, there has been little meaningful discussion about transforming journalism education. Any reform must involve a broad range of stakeholders, including the media fraternity. Given the radical changes in the media and digital landscape, it is high time universities offering journalism programs began revising their curricula. Otherwise, classrooms will turn redundant and irrelevant.

Already, multiple factors have put journalism on a downward trajectory. Gone are the days when classrooms were packed with enthusiastic students eager for a future in the media. Today, many colleges have closed media departments, and those still offering media programs are struggling to survive. When I began my career, classrooms were full of students and newsrooms bustling with journalists. Now, my dual profession, teaching journalism in the mornings and practicing it during the day, is at risk .. For the past decade and a half, these two roles have been my main sources of income. 

University curricula must be updated to reflect the realities of a media landscape shaped by information technology. Otherwise, they risk becoming irrelevant. On paper, Nepal’s mass communication and journalism curricula rank among the best in South Asia. From Bachelor’s to MPhil level, they cover a broad range of issues including new media, law, development, history, media studies, political communication, public relations, communications, culture and society, among others. Theoretically, these courses are up to date and relevant. Tribhuvan University’s journalism program, for example, is comprehensive and comparable to top universities of the world. Yet the real problem lies in human resources and practical training.

A lack of quality faculty is one of the most pressing issues. Without specialized teachers, students are receiving only a superficial, or sometimes even inaccurate, understanding of complex subjects. There is a shortage of teachers for core areas such as mass communication theories, intercultural communication, political communication and media research. This is not to say that current teachers are incapable; many are brilliant minds. However, they cannot dedicate time to teaching across multiple institutions. Generation Z students deserve deeper, more relevant media knowledge. While there are competent professionals outside academia, they rarely get opportunities to take classes because universities, which are highly politicized, often prioritize political affiliation over merit.

Another inherent problem is the lack of emphasis on practical training. There are fundamental errors in teaching methods.

Teachers still dominate classrooms with traditional notebooks; at best, some use digital tools like PowerPoint. Although the syllabus includes numerous practical assignments, their actual implementation is minimal. For example, students rarely receive mentorship to develop news stories on current issues, which is an essential skill for immediate employability. While practical assignments exist across courses, they are mostly left unexecuted or are treated as mere formalities.

Universities offer specializations such as radio, television and new media, yet many lack the infrastructure to produce news for these platforms. It was a serious oversight for universities to permit colleges to teach these courses without ensuring the availability of proper technology or requiring them to secure necessary facilities. While university teachers excel at theoretical aspects, they tend to be less engaged with practical training.

Meanwhile, student dissatisfaction with colleges and teachers is growing, though their voices are being suppressed. I have heard from many students that artificial intelligence (AI) tools provide deeper theoretical insights than their classes. Without interactive discussions and practical work, they see little reason to attend classes. They feel attendance, which is linked to final grades, is the only motivation keeping them in class. Such complaints deserve serious consideration, not outright dismissal. 

If colleges and universities lack resources to support practical training, they should collaborate with the media industry to provide students with hands-on experience. However, academia-industry collaboration is confined to signing Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with little real cooperation. Neither media houses nor universities engage each other. Despite this, some students independently secure internships and perform well in newsrooms. This is beneficial for media houses facing a shortage of human resources. However, there are issues on the students’ side too. Many university students of journalism show little interest in news reporting and writing. This is not to say Nepal’s media education solely produces journalists, it also opens career paths in advertising, public relation and media research, among others. My point is that the young generation’s enthusiasm for journalism itself is waning.

The purpose of this article is not merely to highlight the existing problems but to spark debate on revamping the media and journalism education in light of the rapidly changing media landscape. Over the past two decades, media courses have focused largely on print, radio and television, covering reporting, writing, editing and publishing. These core skills, but are no longer sufficient. 

The priority now should be on a comprehensive overhaul of journalism curricula to suit today’s media environment. Traditionally, journalism education has centered on news reporting, writing, editing and publishing. These skills are essential, but now must be supplemented. The current media landscape demands new journalistic skills which existing courses fail to address adequately.

The media industry now needs human resources in diverse roles such as social media officers, AI coordinators, video storytellers, revenue strategists, audience engagement specialists and more. Therefore, journalism programs, historically focused on producing reporters and editors, must expand to include these emerging fields created by digital technology. The future of journalism education demands greater innovation, creativity and student-driven learning models instead of the current theory-heavy syllabus. Additionally, AI is poised to revolutionize both newsrooms and classrooms. Given all these challenges, there is an urgent need to revisit and update the existing curriculum. At the same time, there should be debate and discussions on how best to teach journalism in this age of AI which has taken virtually every sector by storm.