APEX Series:
Nepal’s relations with ‘smaller’ powers

1     Pakistan and Bangladesh 

2    Bhutan (December 20)

3    Labor importing countries (January 03, 2020)

4    Africa (January 17)

5    The Americas (February 7)

The KP Oli government that swept to power with a two-third majority has made foreign policy diversification one of its main priorities. Its stated goal is to reduce the country’s overreliance on India. This, it reckons, is possible only with greater engagement with China, a superpower in the making and also Nepal’s only other immediate neighbor. But Nepal is also looking farther afield. The government seems as keen to engage the Americans as it does to host Russian President Vladimir Putin. The prime minister has also visited other smaller powers like Cambodia, Vietnam and Switzerland. 

In this multipolar world with multiple political and economic systems, diversification is the right strategy to pursue. Yet there also has to be a method to it. Just like we do with big powers, we should engage smaller powers strictly based on our national interest. Closer ties with Cambodia and Vietnam are desirable. But why aren’t we bolstering ties with neighbors like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan? We should also examine the spreading of our diplomatic wings: can we justify embassies in South Africa and Brazil, for instance?

Our new APEX Series “Nepal’s relations with ‘smaller’ powers” looks to explore our relations with countries other than India, China and the US, the big powers that are constantly on its radar. How should we pursue our relations with labor-importing countries? Or with Africa or the rest of the Americas? In this first article of the series, we discuss Nepal’s relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh, two countries physically close to Nepal but farther than many European and American states in terms of trade and connectivity. 

Can Nepal overcome India’s reservations over greater engagement with Pakistan? And why aren’t Nepal and Bangladesh, separated by just 27 km, trading more? Nepalis are constantly expanding their horizons, as is clear by their growing presence across all six inhabited continents. A record number of us are venturing abroad to work, to travel, and to settle down. It is only right that our government embraces the global ambitions of its citizens.
 

Pakistan: Difficult balancing with India

In his 2004 book Pakistan Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy, Bidanda M Chengappa, Associate Professor of International Relations at Christ University in Bangalore, writes, “Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Nepal has evolved over the five decades, with India as an important factor in their ties… both the countries attempted to cultivate cordial relations with each other only in order to dilute India’s influence in South Asia.”

As Chengappa elaborates, there have been several instances since the 1960s when India has been an important factor in Nepal-Pakistan ties, and Nepal has always maintained a neutral and cautious approach to Indo-Pak conflicts. The most recent example concerns India’s revocation of the special status of India-administered Kashmir. Nepal initially refrained from issuing any statement. Later, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali made a vague statement calling for resolution of the problem through dialogue. Nepal maintained a neutral position amid pressure from both India and Pakistan to side with them.

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between Nepal and Pakistan on 19 March 1960, bilateral relations have neither progressed substantially, nor have they faced major setbacks. It was King Madhendra who took the initiative to establish diplomatic ties with Pakistan as part of his broader policy of diversification. In June 1959, Mian Ziauddin, then Pakistani High Commissioner to India, visited Kathmandu and had long discussions with King Mahendra and PM BP Koirala about establishing diplomatic relations. These talks bore fruit a year later.

In the initial phase, the Pakistani High commission to New Delhi was also accredited to oversee Kathmandu. During the Panchayat era, there were some high-level visits between Nepal and Pakistan. King Mahendra paid a visit to Pakistan in 1961 to seek Pakistani support for the Panchayat system, which Islamabad extended. Subsequently, Pakistani President Ayub Khan made an official visit to Nepal in 1963 and spent almost two weeks here.

Pakistan’s approach has always been to support Nepal on issues over which Nepal has difference with India. For example, when King Mahendra imposed the Panchayat system, India expressed its reservations over it whereas Pakistan fully backed it. Similarly, while India objected to King Birendra’s proposal to recognize Nepal as a ‘Zone of Peace’, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto welcomed it. Bhutto had said, “We ourselves initiated certain proposals on the same lines and we welcome any proposal by a friendly country and a friendly sovereign like Birendra.”

Nepal, on its part, has always been cautious about its approach to Indo-Pak disputes. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Nepal faced a difficult situation. Pakistan complained that Nepali Gurkha soldiers were used against the Pakistan Army. “King Mahendra expressed his inability to intervene in the matter and the Nepalese foreign minister KN Bista even visited Pakistan in the post-conflict phase to personally explain the issue,” writes Chengappa. Similarly, Nepal has persistently maintained a neutral position on Kashmir.

However, there has been little progress on trade, investment and tourism between Nepal and Pakistan. After 1990, leaders of the two countries have met on the sidelines of various regional and global forums, but the frequency of high-level visits has gone down. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi visited Nepal on 5-6 March 2018 after almost 15 years; before that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had visited Nepal in 1994.

There is some cooperation between the two armies. In May 2018, Nepal Army Chief Rajendra Chhetri called on the prime minister and defense minister of Pakistan, and discussed possible cooperation between the armies. Similarly, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan Armed Forces General Zubair Mahmood Hayat visited Nepal in June.

The Pakistani government also provides scholarships for Nepali medical students.

Nepal exports black tea, woolen shawls, leather, hides and skins, optical lenses, herbal medicines, lentils and cardamom to Pakistan. Nepal’s imports from Pakistan include refined leather, machinery and parts, shoes and sandals, spices, poppy seeds and medicines. But overall trade is just $5 million. On average, around 3,000 Pakistani tourists visit Nepal every year.

In 1994, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, on her visit to Nepal, had pledged support for joint ventures in the industrial, agricultural, technical, and technological fields. “We aim to increase our trade, which at present represents only a small fraction of the trade of Nepal and Pakistan with third countries,” she had said. There has been little progress so far.

Bangladesh: Alien a stone’s throw away

When Bangladesh was created after its split with Pakistan in 1971, Nepal was the seventh country to recognize the new Bangla state by establishing diplomatic relations on 8 April 1972. Following this, Pakistan had severed diplomatic relations with Nepal, but reestablished it later.

Five months after Nepal recognized Bangladesh, then Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad came to Kathmandu, and his Nepali counterpart Gyanendra Bahadur Karki visited Dhaka the same year. In 1977, Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman came to Nepal, and King Birendra paid a state visit to Bangladesh in 1980. An example of close cooperation between the two countries in this period was the founding of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Dhaka in 1985. Nepal had strongly backed the formation of this regional grouping.

Soon after its creation, Bangladesh faced a huge food crisis and Nepal provided 15,000 tons of rice to it. In 1976, the two countries signed four memoranda of understanding (MoUs), covering trade, transit, civil aviation, and technical cooperation. They also agreed to collaborate on power generation and water resources. Although possible areas of cooperation were identified, little progress was made in subsequent years.

Nepal-Bangladesh relations have thus been characterized by high-level visits and discussions on potential areas of collaboration. Bilateral ties remain cordial but with little to show for it. Although Nepali and Bangladeshi leaders have met frequently on the margins of regional and multilateral summits, rarely have they made high-level visits to each other’s countries.

Bangladeshi President Abdul Hamid visited Nepal last month after a long gap, but there was no in-depth discussion on bilateral issues. Still, diplomats say, it could herald an era of more high-level visits, which could pave the way for greater engagement between the two countries.

A potential area of cooperation between Nepal and Bangladesh is hydropower. On 10 August 2018, they signed a much-awaited agreement for energy cooperation. Some Bangladeshi companies have shown interest in investing in Nepal’s hydropower. “Bangladesh is keen to buy electricity from Nepal in order to address its power shortage,” says former Nepali Ambassador to Bangladesh, Choplal Bhushal. “There has been some progress as well. We can either use the Indian power grid or construct a separate grid with India’s consent for the purpose.”

However, Sunil KC, Chief Executive of Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs in Kathmandu, has a different take. “Without signing a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protect Act (BIPPA), we cannot bring much investment from Bangladesh,” he says.

Bangladesh and Nepal are separated by 27 kilometers of Indian land. Following the opening of Kakarvitta-Phulbari-Banglabandha transit route in 1997, Bangladesh has permitted Nepal to use the port in Mongla. Bangladesh has also provided an additional rail-transit corridor to Nepal via Rohanpur-Singhabad, but this too has not been adequately utilized. “We can fully utilize those transit facilities, which are nearer to us than Chinese ports. And the Bangladeshi government is ready to offer us more facilities,” says Bhushal.

Various studies have also been conducted on the possibility of railway connectivity between the two countries.

There are some hindrances to the import of Nepali products in Bangladesh. While Nepal readily imports Bangladeshi goods such as industrial raw materials, chemicals, fabrics and textile, jute products and electronic items, Bangladesh is blocking most of our products. Still, Nepal exports some amount of yellow lentils, oil cakes, large cardamom, wheat, vegetable seeds, handicrafts and pashminas to Bangladesh. Total bilateral trade today stands at some $10 billion. Given Bangladesh’s huge population, there is undoubtedly much scope to export a lot more to Bangladesh.

Then there are thousands of Nepali students who are studying in Bangladesh, particularly medicine, and the number is rising. Tourism is another potential area of cooperation. Yet the number of Bangladeshi tourists in Nepal has been declining. In January-October period this year, a total of 19,279 Bangladeshi tourists visited Nepal, a 1.9 percent decline from the previous year. Over 29,000 Bangladeshi tourists had visited Nepal in 2017.

As Nepal is preoccupied with big powers like India, China, and the US, the country has made little or no effort to enhance ties with smaller South Asian countries. Lack of homework on exploring areas of cooperation between Nepal and Bangladesh, for example, is a huge missed opportunity.

Why could the two transitional bodies make no headway?

The intent itself was flawed. You cannot expect good results from a wrong approach, and this is what happened in the past four years. The law was formulated to serve the interest of leaders who were themselves human rights violators. The core purpose of the law was to provide blanket amnesty on war-time cases instead of justice to victims. The law granted the commission rights to make recommendations to the government irrespective of the position of conflict victims. The concerns of the victims were ignored. We knocked on the door of the Supreme Court against some of its provisions but the government hurriedly endorsed it and the commissions were subsequently formed. The people who have in-depth knowledge of and experiences with transitional justice were blocked and office-bearers were appointed along political lines. Later, the Supreme Court asked the government to amend the flawed provisions but the parties ignored the verdict. The commissions thus became platforms for parties to appoint their loyalists and show the international community the transitional justice system was functioning. There was the tendency of delaying the process and tiring the victims out.

How do you rate the performance of the two commissions in the past four years?

We were consulted only six months after the two commissions were formed. There were questions over whether the conflict victims were a priority for the commissions. We were saying the law itself was flawed but those who were appointed claimed it was fine. The terms of the office-bearers were repeatedly extended for no good reason and without any concrete work plan. The timeframe the commissions needed to complete their work was not properly defined. There were inter- and intra-commission fights. And they did not coordinate with national and international rights organizations. The government did not allocate enough resources.

In your view what were the legal hurdles to investigating war-era cases?

Obviously, the law was the key. The United Nations, the National Human Rights Commission, several NGOs and the international community have repeatedly been saying that the law should be amended in line with the 2015 Supreme Court verdict. But political parties and successive governments have chosen to ignore the ruling.

Now the government is again preparing to appoint new office-bearers to the two commissions. What is your take on this?

First, we have to analyze why the previous commissions could not work. There should be a comprehensive review without any prejudice. Whose mistake was it? The governments, the political parties, or the commissions? The Recommendation Committee had pledged to review all aspects of previous commissions but there has been no progress so far. The previous commissions were not able to settle even a single war-era case, which is a shame. More than that, the commissions cannot work if new laws are not formulated in line with the Supreme Court verdict and the victims’ suggestions. Without meaningful participation of the conflict victims, the TJ process can never reach a logical conclusion. The government and the commissions alone cannot drive the process. If you try to impose something from the political level, the results will be unproductive, as was evident in the past four years.

How should the transitional justice process proceed then?

First, the job of the Recommendation Commission should be put on hold. There should be meaningful consultations with all stakeholders, and we should have the right to fix the modality of those consultations. The government cannot dictate anything. The new act should accommodate the outcomes of such consultations. Similarly, the two transitional justice commissions should have a clear working calendar. The people who have in-depth knowledge of transitional justice should be given the responsibility, for which the government needs to prepare a roster of possible candidates.
 

Are you suggesting that as things are conflict victims have no hope of justice?

Obviously. Under the current circumstances, there is no room for hope. There are attempts to reappoint those who were removed earlier from the commissions. This will be a futile exercise.

A lot obviously depends on the political will of the major political parties. What is their stance on it?

They either want to scrap the whole process or settle it as per their wish. They do not intend to provide justice to the victims or to settle war-era cases. Politicians are saying all war-era issues should be forgotten in the ‘new Nepal’.

What is the position of the conflict victims on this?

First, all the appointments and processes should be credible and transparent, and convey a clear message to the victims that their genuine concerns will be addressed. The Recommendation Commission invited us for consultations twice, but did not heed even one of our suggestions. The consultations were just a show. The most important factor is to build trust. The people appointed based on political quotas cannot investigate the complaints filed against their political masters. Without a trustworthy process, we cannot expect a trustworthy result. There are around 63,000 complaints with the commission; we first have to identity the modality of settling them. There should be clarity on whether all complaints should be handled individually or whether some should be dealt with collectively.

Are you suggesting that you have no platform on which to voice your concerns?

We don’t have such a platform. The society does not listen to us. Politicians often want to avoid this issue. Even media coverage has decreased. There should be public hearings in different places where the victims can express their plight and concerns.

How do you evaluate the concerns of the international community toward transitional justice?

Their concerns have gradually dissipated, particularly after the formation of a strong government led by Nepali Communist Party Chairman KP Oli. Though they still issue statements in our support, their concerns are now marginal. The country now has a stable government, which is saying that transitional justice is a purely domestic issue and as such the international community should not speak about it.

What should the conflict victims do if war-era cases are not settled through national mechanisms? Any plans to take them to international platforms?

It is an issue of humanity and not confined to national boundaries.  For now, conflict victims want to settle all issues domestically. But if the government continues to ignore us, we will have no option but to seek justice elsewhere.

The Chinese train may or may not be coming to Nepal soon. China has only just agreed to a feasibility study of the Keyrung-Kathmandu railway. But is the train the best way to ensure better cross-border connectivity? What about improving the condition of our roads leading to China, at far less cost and time? The locals of Rasuwagadhi on the border with China don’t understand the federal government’s push for a train when improving the state of border roads could immediately work wonders to boost Nepal’s trade with China. 

They have a point. The Chinese have been keen on developing Rasuwagadhi into a major trading point between the two countries after the closure of the border point at Tatopani, over security concerns, following the 2015 earthquake. On the Chinese side of the border, high-tech immigration and custom facilities are ready. On the Nepali side, work has barely begun. Without a customs office, Nepali traders face many hassles. Says Choten Sherpa, a Rasuwagadhi resident, “Chinese officials and tourists come here frequently, and they always request us to press our government to speed up the upgrade of the roads.” 

But seldom do the visiting Chinese talk of a rail line, he says. The Chinese have let their Nepali counterparts know that building a rail line via Rasuwagadhi will be mighty difficult, and yet Nepal keeps insisting on it. The Chinese see no option but to go along with the Nepali request, perhaps hoping that Nepalis will see sense once the feasibility study is completed and the real costs become clear. 

Back in Rasuwagadhi, “the Chinese are asking us to hurry, but the Department of Roads is delaying the process citing budgetary constraints,” says Dawa Dorjee Tamang, Chairman of Ward 2 of the Gosaikunda rural municipality near the border. He says the work could be further delayed as the government needs to follow a public tender process.

The road versus rail debate continues to make news in Kathmandu. Meanwhile, the residents of Rasuwagadhi are confident that despite all the delays, it is only a matter of time before the roads to China are repaired and their lives, and the lives of their compatriots, become progressively easier.

Rasuwagadhi folks want roads now than railways later

The impatient Rasuagadhi locals, though dejected with the slow work of their government, have their fingers 
crossed. Most are optimistic that even though it may take some time, better roads to China are an inevitability

“Chinese officials and tourists come here frequently, and they always request us to press our government to speed up the upgrade of the roads between the two countries,” says Choten Sherpa, a resident of Rasuwagadhi, an area in Rasuwa district bordering China. “Seldom do they mention the railway.”

Interestingly, many locals have no clue about the possible routes of the much-hyped cross-border railway and the progress on it so far. They are instead worried about the roads. The Chinese side had officially opened the Gyirong Port on the Rasuwagadhi border in 2014 as an alternative to the Tatopani border point. Locals say there has since been little progress on Nepal’s part in improving road conditions.

“In the name of railways, we may continue to ignore these vital roads for another 20 years,” laments Dawa Dorjee Tamang, Chairman of Ward 2 of the Gosaikunda rural municipality near the border. “The government collects billions in revenue from this border point. Why not spend some of it in maintaining and repairing our roads?”

He also advises the federal government to focus more on roads rather than railways. The pre-feasibility study of the Keyrung-Kathmandu railway line has already identified the big hurdles on its way—hard rocks, snowfalls and greater chances of earthquakes. China has informed Nepal that a railway line may be possible, but only after considerable homework. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit in October, the two sides agreed to a feasibility study for a cross-border railway. The visit also emphasized road and tunnel connectivity.

“The Chinese side conveyed its readiness in initiating the repair of Syaphrubesi-Rasuwagadhi Highway,” states the joint statement issued after Xi's visit. “Realizing the importance of enhanced level of connectivity between the two countries, the two sides agreed to proactively cooperate on the feasibility study for the construction of tunnels along the road from Jilong/Keyrung to Kathmandu.”

Roads not easy too

Yet even the operation of roads year-round in this area presents formidable challenges because of the difficult terrain and snowfall. There are three main road linkages between Kathmandu and Rasuwadadhi.

The first one, between Kathmandu and Betrawati, are connected by three different roads: a) Kathmandu-Galchi-Betrawati, b) Kathmandu-Kakani-Betrawaiti, and c) Kathmandu-Tokha-Betrawati. Expansion of all three is underway. In parts of the Kathmandu-Galchi-Betrawati highway, a four-lane-road has already been built.

The second section comprises the route between Betrawati and Syabrubesi, an old, 41-km-long road via Dhunche (see the map alongside). A new road, which is 24 kilometers shorter than Betrawati-Dhunche-Sybrubesi, is under construction, connecting Betrawati with Sybrubesi via Mailung.

Although there is regular bus service between Betrawati, Dhunche and Syabrubesi, it is frequently obstructed—sometimes for two to three months—because of snowfall and landslides. The under-construction Mailung-Syabrubesi road is being built over hard rock, and it will take time to make it work. But this section via Mailung offers two benefits: it is shorter and sees less snowfall than the road via Dhunche.

The Betrawati-Dhunche-Syabrubesi road section is now under operation and buses and trucks plying between Kathmandu and Syabrubesi are routed this way. But the road is in a pathetic state and the government has paid scant attention to its maintenance, compelling people to make a risky journey.

The third section between Syabrubesi and Rasuwaghadi is also in a bad shape. The Chinese side has already agreed to financial assistance to upgrade this 16-km stretch. The agreement states that the section will be upgraded to two-lanes and blacktopped. Although the inauguration of the upgrade works took place in September, work is yet to start because of the delay in removing electric pylons and shifting human settlements on the Nepali side.

Betting on the hare

“The Chinese are asking us to hurry, but the Department of Roads is delaying the process citing budgetary constraints,” says ward chair Dawa Dorjee Tamang. He says the work could be further delayed as the government needs to follow a public tender process. “Even though the local sentiment is in favor of improving roads, five years since this border-point officially came into operation, there has not been much progress except for the opening of the Mailung-Syabrubesi track,” adds Tamang.

Not only roads, Nepal is yet to build other infrastructures needed to operate the border point. For instance, the foundation stone of the Integrated Customs Office was laid in 2014, but construction has not moved beyond the initial stage. The absence of such an office has made life difficult for Nepali traders and security officials, who face countless immigration-related hassles at the border. Proper lodging facilities for border forces and other staff deployed there are also lacking. China, on the other hand, has already built high-tech immigration and custom facilities on its side of the border.

The Chinese have been keen on turning Rasuwagadhi into a major trading point between the two countries after the closure of the border point at Tatopani following the 2015 earthquake.

But on Nepal’s part, despite frequent and loud talk about connectivity with the northern neighbor in the past few years, mainly after the Indian blockade of 2015-16, there has been no substantial progress.

In the absence of proper roads and other infrastructures, traders and locals alike face a plethora of problems. But the impatient Rasuagadhi locals, though dejected with the slow work of their own government, have their fingers crossed. Most of them are optimistic that even though it may take some time better roads to China are an inevitability.

On 26 December 2018, North and South Korea held ‘a groundbreaking ceremony’ to start a project to re-connect their railways and roads and to modernize North Korea’s old railway line. The two have also agreed to carry out a joint survey. 

These developments are considered meaningful in North-East Asia as South Korea plans to extend its railway line to China and Russia, which will potentially have huge geopolitical impact in the region.

The blueprint for the ‘New Economic Initiative’ prepared by South Korea’s Ministry of Unification was shared with a group of international journalists in the last week of October. 

It clearly mentions South Korea’s plan to connect with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through North Korea. “We are seeking a new engine for economic growth and North Korea is focusing all its efforts on its construction industry, so we have given top priority to railway connectivity,” said officials at South Korea’s Ministry of Unification. 

“The launch of the railway and road project also had symbolic meaning because it marked a starting point for [South Korean President] Moon’s proposal for the establishment of an East Asian rail network linking the Koreas with China, Russia and Mongolia,” wrote The Korea Times in its editorial published on 27 December 2018, a day after the ceremony. Since then, there have been several rounds of talks between the two Koreas about the railway line. 

Officials say the ambitious railway line will be costly, although exact figures are not available yet.  The Chinese province of Liaoning, which shares a border with North Korea, has already proposed a railway line connecting it with the North Korean capital Pyongyang and to extend it to Seoul under the BRI. 

“This railway line will be costly, but it will be worth it,” said an official at South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The railway lines of the two Koreas remain largely broken since the Korean War (1950-1953). China and North Korea have also signed an agreement to link Dandong, a city in Liaoning Province, with Pyongyang with a high-speed rail line. 

Experts say such developments will bring about significant changes in North-East Asia’s geopolitics. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has emphasized enhancing cooperation between the two Koreas since he assumed office in 2017. He has embraced a policy of greater engagement with North Korea amid lack of progress on denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang. 

Moon also came up with the ‘New Economic Initiative’, whose core and long-term objective is to connect with China’s BRI, Russia’s New Eastern Policy, and Mongolia’s Prairie Road Initiative. More than that, South Korea, which has a military alliance with the US, is willing to enhance cooperation with China in order to boost its economy, which is currently stagnant. Therefore, South Korea’s policy right now is to join the BRI by reconnecting its railway line with North Korea’s.

Chinese companies’ direct investment in South Korea surged 240 percent in 2018, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. China invested $2.74 billion in South Korea in 2018, up 238.9 percent from 2017 when China cut its investment by 60 percent. Chinese nationals also account for 31 percent of foreign visitors to South Korea, and South Korean officials say the railway line would help bring more tourists from China and increase other economic activities. 

The main obstacle to implementing the ‘New Economic Initiative’ is the slow progress on denuclearization. Said another South Korean official, “Denuclearization can lead to huge economic cooperation between the two Koreas.”

Could you shed some light on the much-discussed Nepal-China strategic partnership?

During Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit, the two countries agreed to elevate their ‘comprehensive economic partnership’ to ‘strategic partnership’. China is very clear about the strategic partnership with Nepal. First, it is not an alliance. In Chinese foreign policy, we never seek alliance with other countries; this is a fundamental of our policy that everyone should understand. Strategy in my understanding means China has put Nepal in its foreign policy priority. It is also about long-term relationship for broader economic cooperation.

There is skepticism in Nepal that such a partnership could be transformed into a security alliance?

As I said, the strategic partnership with Nepal does not have any security and defense implications and it is all about enhancing economic collaborations.

What are the other issues related to this strategic partnership?

By strategic partnership we want to emphasize that we have given importance to Nepal. Both sides should discuss the areas of focus like agriculture and infrastructure based on mutual consultations. There are several areas on which two countries can work together.

In the second informal summit between Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi in October, China pushed the ‘China-India Plus’ concept. What does it actually entail?

This means having consensus between China and India to jointly promote economic development in this region. This is not limiting, like the idea of trilateral cooperation, which is about three countries. There could be four-side or five-side cooperation. The Plus formula is multi-lateral cooperation and not limited to China, India, and Nepal.

Does it mean India and China would consult each other before big infrastructure projects in Nepal?

It is about benefiting from each other’s competitive advantage. India has its own comparative advantage. China is competent in infrastructure, and China also has plenty of financial resources. In big projects you have to combine all sides, combine all comparative advantages. In Afghanistan, this concept is already being implemented. India and China are together training young diplomats there. In the second informal summit in India, Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi have agreed to extend this cooperation in other regions such as Africa and South East Asia.

Will India-China Plus minimize possible conflict between India and China in Nepal?

Of course. This concept entails enhancing economic cooperation in this region. It is not only about big projects but all types of cooperation.

But does not the ‘Plus’ concept minimize Nepal’s role?
Again, China-India Plus is not only about trilateral co-operation. It could also be multilateral. When I was in Dhaka, some experts there said that Bangladeshis do not want to be clubbed under Plus. I fully understand such feelings. But we can also have China-Nepal Plus; or China, India, US Plus Nepal. There is no problem.

Is this Plus concept confined to economic and infrastructure issues or does it also touch security issues?
It is limited to economic cooperation. No security policy or defense policy here.

In Nepal, the railway with China is often a subject of intense debates. What are the prospects of Chinese railway coming to Nepal?

We have a bright future for connectivity projects. Now, I think railway still has many technical problems because of the high mountains. There are also chances of earthquake in the proposed area. We have to go through studies and choose best options. We should not hurry to build a railway line. We have to move ahead carefully as this connectivity is for long term; not for one day or one year.

Nepal has already signed up to China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) but there are continued concerns over debt trap.

The debt trap diplomacy terminology was actually coined by Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney, famous for his hostile view of China. He coined this term in 2017 just before the first Belt and Road Summit in Beijing. The debt trap is a misnomer. See Bhutan. Many Indian companies have invested in hydropower projects there and Bhutan is struggling to pay back the loan. But no one talks about any debt trap there. This is pure propaganda.

What about the modality of investment in the proposed railway with Nepal?

The multi-dimensional connectivity concept includes highways, railways and opening more border points. Nepal can use Chinese airports too. Investment modalities are still up for discussion.

Nepal is already in the BRI but India is yet to join it. How optimistic are you that India will come around?

It is clear that India will not join the BRI in the near future. India has given some reasons on why BRI is bad for it. India is ready for economic cooperation but it does not like the label of BRI and we are flexible on this as well. But rest assured there will continue to be great economic cooperation between the two countries.

How does China view the border dispute between Nepal and India?

The Spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clarified on this. China has not taken any position on it and we are hopeful that India and Nepal can settle it through peaceful negotiations. China also prefers to settle boundary disputes through peaceful means. We resolved our boundary dispute with Nepal in 1961 so there is no dispute between the two countries. India has also encroached on some Chinese territory in its new map.

Two Madhes-based parties, the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJP-N) and the Samajbadi Party Nepal, have prepared a blueprint for their long-delayed unification. And following the unification (if it happens) another round of Madhes movement may be in the cards.

The two parties have also reached a tentative agreement to adopt a twin leadership model, whereby there would be two presidents—one from each party. On the ideological front, there has been an agreement to embrace the principle of socialism with a focus on marginalized groups.

But despite these agreements something is still preventing the merger. Many party insiders say the only stumbling block now is Upendra Yadav's refusal to leave the government. “The unification will take place when Yadav quits,” says Keshav Jha, General Secretary of the RJP-N.

“Both the sides realize that without a united force of the Madhesi and other marginalized groups we cannot exert sufficient pressure on the government to amend the constitution,” he adds. But Yadav’s withdrawal from the government is one of the RJP-N’s preconditions to unification.

In a recent meeting of the Samajbadi Party, senior leader Baburam Bhattarai apprised party members of the progress so far in the unification process. “There have been discussions in the party. But we need not decide in haste,” says party general secretary Ram Sahaya Yadav, who is close to Upendra Yadav.

Although pressure seems to be building on Yadav to quit the government, he is not in a mood to do so immediately. “As another big Madhes movement is unlikely soon, Yadav has calculated that it would be beneficial to stay put,” says a Samajbadi Party leader requesting anonymity. Yadav has reportedly told party leaders that the party should exert pressure on amendment from the streets, the parliament, as well as the government.

Common cause

The two parties have also agreed to form a bigger alliance of identity-based political forces. According to leaders from the two parties, the next movement would be held under the banner of Rastriya Mukti Andolan. By accommodating Janajati and other forces that felt betrayed by the 2015 constitution, they plan to form a political force that provides an alternative to the ruling Nepal Communist Party as well as the main opposition Nepali Congress.

Amending the constitution remains a key political demand of the Madhes-based parties. The first amendment in January 2016 partially fulfilled their demands, but they have continued to push for another. But chances of another amendment in the near future appear bleak; the ruling NCP, which holds a two-third majority in the federal parliament, is not committed to it. That is why the Madhes-based parties wish to forge a united front and launch a street movement to exert pressure on the government.

There have been several rounds of talks between the government and the Madhes-based parties, but negotiations have broken down of late. Leaders of the Madhes-based parties say they supported the government with the belief that PM Oli would address their demands. “We haven’t had talks with the government on constitution amendment in recent months,” says Jha.

In public forums, Oli says the constitution can be amended ‘on the basis of necessity’ without further elaboration. NCP co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal is more receptive than Oli to the demand for an amendment. But a big section of the party, mostly comprised of the erstwhile CPN-UML leaders, is rigid. They seem confident that it is difficult to launch another Madhes movement as Madhesi leaders themselves govern Province 2.

The Madhes-based parties, meanwhile, are planning protests in the Tarai and in Kathmandu starting April 2020.

Many foreign policy experts in India are quoted as saying that there is no alternative to dialogue on Kalapani. Those who don’t want to be quoted tell a different story. As Kalapani is strategically important to India, they suggest, Nepal should not ‘politicize’ it. 

In other words, Indian troops are unlikely to leave Kalapani. Says a senior Indian Ministry of External Affairs official, “As Kalapani is a tri-junction, China can use it to monitor our activities across the border. So Kalapani is far more important to us than other disputed areas such as Susta.” New Delhi won’t relent also because it suspects China’s hand in the current anti-India protests in Nepal.

Meanwhile, Nepal says it has ample documentary evidence to prove its ownership of Kalapani. The Oli government is busy working out how best to proceed. Once it makes a decision, Nepal will seek a high-level engagement with India. Nepal will make its case for Kalapani; as will India. There is no other way out of this than through a healthy back and forth. It is also about time this old sore in Nepal-India ties is removed once and for all.

But, heck, it won’t be easy. Arrayed against India’s ‘national security’ will be Nepal’s ‘territorial integrity’. These are not issues that lend themselves to easy compromise. Even if the top leaderships of the two countries are willing, a backlash from other stakeholders back home would be all but certain. Even though the state is also led by the BJP, the government of Uttarakhand where Kalapani has been placed will protest. Back in Nepal, anything short of complete removal of the Indian troops will be seen as a betrayal, and the NCP-led government is in no mood to give the opposition an inch of the ‘nationalist niche’ it successfully carved in the 2017 elections.      

That does not mean Kalapani is unsolvable. As the bigger power and the instigator of the current dispute, the onus is on India to make the first concession, however painful. If it does, India could quickly win back the goodwill of Nepalis, India’s natural religious and cultural brethren. Such a gesture will also make it easier for Nepal to negotiate. Given PM Narendra Modi’s strong hold in India, there is little he cannot do with a bit of clever statesmanship.

The knotty Kalapani mess unlikely to be sorted soon

“Demarcation of two short segments of our boundary with Nepal—Kalapani and Susta—is yet to be completed. Of these, Kalapani is strategically important, since it determines the tri-junction between India, Nepal and China,” said V.P. Haran, a former Indian ambasador to Bhutan and Afghanistan, at a 2017 discussion organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs at the Central University of Tamil Nadu.

Haran’s views reflect those of the Indian establishment, which argues that Kalapani is crucial for India from a security point of view and ‘it should not be politicized’. This essentially means India is not ready to withdraw its troops from there.

There are plenty of historical documents that show Kalapani is Nepali territory. As Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali says, “We have sufficient evidence that Kalapani is ours. Voting had taken place in Kalapani in the 1959 parliamentary election. The area was included in the national census of 1961. And the Nepal government had collected revenue from the Kalapani area in the same period.”

Yet Kalapani has been a bone of contention between Nepal and India for around six decades due to the presence of the Indian security forces there since (at least) the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Successive Nepali governments—whether royal or democratic—have requested India to remove its security camps from Kalapani, to no avail. It remains a political agenda for Nepali leftist parties; it is also an election agenda for the politicians of the Indian state of Uttarakhand whose map now includes the territory.

Earlier this month, India published a new political map which showed Kalapani as Indian territory, sparking controversy and strong protests in Nepal. Although preparations are underway to hold Secretary-level meeting on the issue, officials from both the sides have told APEX that it can only be resolved at the highest political level—if at all. “Several times in the past, the two sides have realized that the issue should be addressed and dealt with politically, so negotiations at a bureaucratic level cannot yield results,” says a former Indian ambassador, who recently served in Nepal, on condition of anonymity.

He says that although Kalapani and Susta have been political tools in Nepal, no Nepali politician has taken it up seriously with the top Indian leadership in recent times. “There is this tradition of just mentioning this issue in joint statements,” he adds.

Gordian knot

But even such political-level talks are unlikely to easily succeed. In the view of another senior Indian Ministry of External Affairs official who deals with Nepal, “As Kalapani is a tri-junction, China can use it to monitor our activities across the border. So Kalapani is far more important to us than other disputed areas such as Susta.”

Even the ex-envoy acknowledges that “withdrawal of troops from there will have an adverse effect on our national security, so the issue should not be politicized and exaggerated.”

Nepali politicians and officials, however, dismiss such logic, and argue that India cannot occupy Kalapani for the simple reason that it belongs to Nepal.

The Indian security establishment started taking Kalapani even more seriously after the Doklam standoff in 2017, not least because of some troubling noise from China. In August 2017, when the Doklam crisis was at its peak, Wang Weni, Deputy Director General of the boundary and ocean affairs department of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs, had said, “India has many tri-junctions, what if we use the same excuse [that Indian troops used to enter Doklam, a territory claimed by both Bhutan and China] to enter the Kalapani region between China, India and Nepal…?” Soon after this statement, media reports in New Delhi indicated that India had increased its vigilance in areas around Kalapani.

‘Nepalese encroachment’

Following the protests in Nepal over the 2015 India-China bilateral statement on trading through the tri-junction of Lipulekh in Kalapani, the Indian side had informally floated a proposal before Nepali leaders to resolve the Kalapani issue with land swaps. India has adopted the same formula to settle border disputes with Bangladesh. Nepali leaders, however, rejected the proposal as Kalapani is purely Nepali and not disputed territory.

Kalapani is a political agenda in India as well. The ex-Nepal envoy believes Indian politicians are ready to resolve this issue but there is a public perception in India that Kalapani is Indian territory—even as Nepalis strongly believe India has encroached upon their land. “Given this scenario, finding a solution will be very difficult and time-consuming. It is a highly emotional and sensitive issue that top politicians of the two countries need to tackle prudently,” the former ambassador advises.

This sensitivity has often been reflected on the floor of the Indian parliament. On 26 July 2000, then member of Lok Sabha and current Chief Minister of the state of Uttar Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath, questioned Jaswant Singh, then Indian Minister of External Affairs, about reports of the efforts to resolve the Kalapani issue amicably. Singh replied, “There is a difference in perception between India and Nepal on the boundary alignment in the western sector of the India-Nepal border, where the Kalapani area is located.” Singh said the Indian government was aware that some people might exploit such differences in perception between two friendly neighbors.

On 7 December 2000, some members of India’s Rajya Sabha asked Ajit Kumar Panja, then Minister of State for External Affairs, again about media reports on talks between India, Nepal and China to settle the Kalapani dispute. In response, Panja doubted the veracity of such reports.

Then, on 6 December 2007, border issues were again discussed in the Indian parliament. Pranab Mukherjee, then Minister for External Affairs, pointed the finger at Nepal: “The shifting of course in Susta region of the Gandak River, the mid-stream of which formed the boundary as per Treaty of Sugauli of 1816, has resulted in claims/counterclaims by both sides in this segment. Government is constantly monitoring the situation with a view to prevent encroachments by the Nepalese side.”

Dragon dragged in

Some Indian officials and scholars claim that the issue of Kalapani has been complicated after Nepal tried to bring China into the matter. Says Nihar Nayak, a New Delhi-based expert in Nepal-India relations, “Officially, Nepal brought the issue before India after the signing of the Mahakali treaty in 1996.” India at the time assured Nepal that the issue would be resolved through a joint technical committee, which was formed in 2002. Six years later, the issue was once again discussed between then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his Nepali counterpart Upendra Yadav. “Reportedly, on both occasions, Nepal indirectly hinted that China should be included in the negotiations,” adds Nayak.

But foreign secretary Madhu Raman Acharya says he is unaware of Nepal ever seeking Chinese assistance to resolve the issue. “In fact, China says it is a bilateral issue that must be resolved between Nepal and India,” he told APEX. China has remained silent and Chinese media have largely ignored the recent Kalapani dispute.

“I don’t know why China should be dragged into the matter if the dispute is between Nepal and India,” says Bhaskar Koirala, Director of the Nepal Institute of International and Strategic Studies. “I believe the issue should be resolved by Nepali and Indian experts in a technically sound manner. There is no need to stage demonstrations in front of the Indian embassy. That is a wrong approach.” 

How did you see the recent US report?

The US comes up with such reports on an annual basis, and its reports are considered credible, given the huge American investment in security and intelligence. The US has been publishing various reports on Nepal for a long time. This time, they emphasized two issues. Their findings on the TIA is trustworthy and objective. But I do not completely agree with the US assessment of the activities of the Indian Mujahideen. But we cannot dismiss these findings casually.

The Indian Mujahideen was somewhat active here at one point, but the situation has improved. Our security forces have been able to curb their activities. 

You say the report cannot be dismissed. How then should we deal with the threats?

Our security forces should be aware and alert about the possible presence of terrorists in Nepal. First, there are flaws in the TIA’s security arrangements. Second, we have an open border with India. The report also states that the open border has been misused for human trafficking, trans-border crime, terrorist activities, drugs and arms trafficking. During the insurgency, more than 90 percent of the total arms had been smuggled into Nepal. The government and security agencies need to accept the US report as a source of information and carve out an appropriate policy to preempt possible terrorist acts. Similarly, coordination among security forces needs to be improved.

You said the concerns over the TIA were credible. How so?

I do not completely agree with the report but there are some security lapses at the TIA. We have had a plane hijacked from our airport and there are frequent reports of smuggling of gold and drugs from the TIA. 

Some claim the US brought out the report to justify bolstering its security presence in Nepal.

As a superpower that tries to impose its hegemony, the US has been active in Nepal too. Such tendencies are more prevalent in South Asia. American focus shifts constantly. In different years, it has focused on different countries such as Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Somehow, there are always some terrorist activities taking place in South Asia so regional and international threats constantly emerge from the region. If there are regional and global security threats emanating from Nepal, global powers will obviously play here.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal last month, Nepal and China agreed to elevate their bilateral relation to a strategic level. How do we read this agreement?

For the first time in Nepal’s diplomatic history, Nepal has signed an agreement of strategic partnership with a country, although the document says that such a partnership is only for economic purposes. There are mainly two types of partnership in bilateral relationship: comprehensive economic partnership and strategic partnership. While the former deals with social, economic and cultural issues, the later includes strategic, defense and security components. A comprehensive partnership is elevated to a strategic partnership if the countries feel the need to cooperate in strategic, defense and security areas. First, there is a diplomatic relationship between two countries. An upgrade of the diplomatic relationship results in a comprehensive economic partnership, and the elevation of a comprehensive partnership leads to a strategic partnership. If two countries collaborate further on defense-related issues, they opt for an alliance.

Does strategic partnership with China go against the principles of Nepal’s foreign policy?

Till date, Nepal is committed to non-alignment, Panchsheel and the UN charter. Until Xi’s visit, Nepal had not forged a strategic partnership with any country. A strategic partnership contradicts the norms and values of non-alignment and other fundamentals of Nepal’s foreign policy.  Nepal is sandwiched between two emerging powers. We are naturally closer to India than to China in terms of geography, culture, economy, transit, communications, etc.
 

But the government has clarified that the strategic partnership is purely economic in nature and Nepal will soon have similar agreements with India and other countries.

Yes. Right after Xi’s visit, Prime Minister KP Oli said Nepal would sign a strategic partnership with India as well. But how many countries can you have strategic partnerships with? What does strategic partnership mean? It seems that we are talking about strategic partnership without knowing its crux.

How would you relate the IPS and our strategic partnership with China?

The US has said it would have strategic partnerships with Nepal and Sri Lanka. But Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali has repeatedly said that Nepal will not join the IPS. On the one hand, Nepal is repeatedly expressing its dissatisfaction with the IPS. On the other, we are forging a strategic partnership with China.

What are the chances of a full-blown alliance with China?

First, the strategic partnership was forged without any preparations on the Nepali side. Second, the Chinese wanted to sign an extradition treaty in Xi’s presence. Third, if you read Xi’s article published in Nepali newspapers prior to his visit, you see that he had emphasized a defense partnership. Fourth, in 2017 China came up with a document much like the IPS titled ‘China’s Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation’ and it has recently come up with a white paper on the same. Both the documents mention defense cooperation with neighboring countries.

If you sign a strategic partnership, you have to be ready to discuss security and geopolitical issues. In the future, China may force us into an alliance citing common security threats. What will Nepal do if China proposes an alliance, with the argument that the two countries have common security threats? We agreed to a strategic partnership without any homework on its long-term implications. This is a major shift in Nepal’s foreign policy.
 

How do the US and India see our new strategic partnership with China?

After Nepal signed on to the BRI in 2017, there have been changes in the American and Indian approaches to Nepal. They have not officially commented on the Nepal-China strategic partnership. But ever since Nepal signed on to the BRI, there has been a series of visits by top US officials, who have all shown concerns over the BRI, a debt trap and Chinese investments in Nepal. There is a view in Delhi and Washington that the communist government in Nepal tilts toward China. It seems they are now preparing a counter-strategy.

The IPS aims to minimize Chinese influence in Nepal and both India and the US want to maintain their sway. Therefore, India and the US could adopt a more aggressive Nepal policy in the coming days. There are signs of an escalation in the rivalry between India, China and the US after the strategic partnership. In fact, Nepal has invited such escalation. I see the possibility of increasing strategic rivalry in Nepal. Such a tussle does not serve our national interest. In the past, we were too close to India, and now we have got too close to China.