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With nominations now complete for both the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR) categories, the prospects of holding the House of Representatives elections for March 5 have improved significantly. 

President Ramchandra Paudel and Prime Minister Sushila Karki have maintained a firm, non-negotiable stance in favor of the polls. Political parties across the spectrum have participated actively, showing organizational readiness and enthusiasm. Except for a fringe group under businessman Durga Prasai, no major force seems capable of disrupting the electoral process at this moment. Earlier, divisions within the Nepali Congress (NC) had raised doubts about whether the elections would take place on time. Those concerns have now largely subsided, clearing the way for the polls. 

The elections are widely seen as essential for restoring political normalcy by fully activating the constitution. Yet, security remains a concern. Morale within the Nepal Police is reportedly low, which could complicate campaigning and voting. The Nepali Army has already been deployed, signaling the state’s commitment to holding the elections as planned. The primary security concern comes from potential clashes between established and emerging parties. A minor clash in the Jhapa-5 constituency on nomination filing day serves as an early warning.

Why the vote matters

The March 5 elections are crucial for the country. First, the lower house election will formally transfer governing authority to a legitimate parliamentary body, restoring democratic credibility. The current unelected government will be replaced by one chosen by the people. Second, the polls will also address constitutional breaches and ambiguities that emerged after the Sept 8-9 unrest through a renewed popular mandate. Third, the elections will reduce the risk of a deepening constitutional crisis by re-establishing fully functional state institutions. 

Furthermore, the elections are expected to safeguard the current constitution and political system. Newer forces, like the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and leaders such as Balen Shah—whose earlier positions on the political system were ambiguous—have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to republicanism and secularism. This has eased fears of a rollback of the post-2008 political order. Major parties are also making visible efforts to bring fresh faces into Parliament. While limited, this reflects growing public dissatisfaction with entrenched elites. 

Failure to hold elections on schedule will seriously undermine the legitimacy of both the president and the prime minister, potentially plunging the country into renewed political conflict.

Will it bring stability and reform?

Despite these positive aspects, a critical question remains: will the elections bring political stability? The answer is far from reassuring. Current realities suggest that no single party is likely to win a clear majority. Major parties—including the NC, CPN-UML, the Nepali Communist Party, and the RSP—have fielded candidates in nearly all constituencies. Under the PR system, the balance of power among these parties is also expected to remain largely unchanged.

This points to a hung parliament. A stable majority government appears unlikely in the present context, making fragile coalitions almost inevitable. Coalition politics will dominate governance once again, limiting the government’s ability to pursue bold or long-term reforms. Sweeping changes, especially institutional and constitutional reforms, are unlikely to materialize. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds parliamentary majority—a threshold nearly impossible under current conditions. Historically, even powerful parties such as the NC and UML have shown little appetite for serious reform. 

Corruption and governance reforms will also be difficult to pursue. A hung parliament will likely become a battleground for party politics, with indecision and obstruction dominating parliamentary work.

Foreign policy post-vote

Political fragmentation will affect Nepal’s foreign policy. Instability creates space for foreign influence. Managing balanced and cordial relations with major powers will be more difficult, as old and new parties bring divergent, and at times contradicting, worldviews. Even when Parliament was dominated by three major parties, building a unified foreign policy had proved difficult. A more fragmented legislature will make consensus even harder. Differences on issues like the MCC of the US and BRI of China are already apparent.

Some traditional political parties have accused newer parties of being backed by foreign interests, particularly regarding the Sept 8-9 protest. Nepal’s engagement with major powers has slowed since the GenZ unrest. Meanwhile, major powers are waiting for a new government before adjusting their strategies. Managing the competing interests of major powers will be especially challenging for a coalition government. China seems to favor traditional, particularly communist, parties. New Delhi is open to working with any government. Western countries appear more supportive of newer parties. Conflicting agendas among these powers will place additional pressure on a coalition government. 

Conclusion

The March 5 elections are necessary and constitutionally indispensable. They offer a chance to restore democratic processes, correct past deviations, and prevent a constitutional crisis. However, while the elections may restore procedural normalcy, they are unlikely to bring political stability or transformative change. A fragmented mandate, coalition politics, and external pressures will continue shaping Nepal’s trajectory long after the vote. 

Elections, therefore, should be seen not as a solution, but as the start of another challenging phase in Nepal’s ongoing democratic transition.

With 36 days left to go for voting in the elections to the House of Representatives (HoR), the Election Commission has assigned the officers for monitoring the election code of conduct. 

EC Spokesperson Narayan Prsad Bhattarai informed that assistant chief district officer in each district has been assigned to monitor the enforcement of election code of conduct in a bid to ensure free and fair elections to HoR scheduled for March 5. 

The assistant chief district officer is given such responsibility except financial aspect. 

The officers from comptrollers' office are named as election monitors to look after the financial issues.

The election code of conduct is in force since January 18. 

Kathmandu’s water crisis is no longer a seasonal inconvenience. It is structural, chronic, and growing. Even after decades of investment in large supply projects, water remains unreliable, unequal, and expensive for many households. As the city expands and climate risks intensify, it is becoming increasingly clear that relying solely on centralized infrastructure will not secure Kathmandu’s water future. In this context, the hiti system—Kathmandu Valley’s traditional network of stone spouts—deserves renewed attention, not as a relic of the past, but as a relevant urban planning tool for the present.

For centuries, hitis supplied water through an integrated system of shallow aquifers, canals, ponds, and recharge areas. These systems were carefully aligned with local geology and topography and embedded within settlement patterns. Importantly, they were decentralized, resilient, and community-managed. Today, while many hitis have dried up or fallen into disuse, their underlying logic remains deeply relevant.

The decline of hitis did not happen overnight. As Kathmandu urbanized rapidly, land use changed faster than planning institutions could respond. Agricultural land was converted into housing, ponds were filled to create buildable plots, and natural drainage channels were covered or encroached upon. In many cases, development unknowingly severed the underground connections that sustained the hiti system.

At the same time, modern water supply systems were introduced with the assumption that they would replace traditional ones. Individual household taps became markers of progress, and shared water sources were gradually neglected. This shift was reinforced by weak enforcement of land-use regulations and fragmented institutional responsibility for water, heritage, and urban development. Ironically, even as the municipal system struggled to meet demand, the traditional system that could have provided supplementary resilience was allowed to deteriorate. The result is a city heavily dependent on groundwater extraction and private tankers, while sitting atop an underutilized network of traditional water infrastructure.

In present-day Kathmandu, hitis matter for three key reasons: water resilience, climate adaptation, and urban livability. First, the hiti system offers decentralized water security. It is not meant to replace the municipal supply, but it can significantly reduce pressure on it. During supply disruptions—whether caused by infrastructure failure, disaster, or seasonal scarcity—functional hitis can provide much-needed water. Second, hitis are climate-responsive systems. Kathmandu already experiences intense monsoon rainfall followed by long dry periods. Traditional ponds and recharge areas associated with hitis help absorb excess rainwater, reduce surface runoff, and replenish groundwater. Modern cities now invest heavily in similar ideas under labels such as “sponge cities” or nature-based solutions. Kathmandu already has its own version; it simply needs to be recognized and restored.

Third, hitis contribute to urban livability. They were never just water outlets. The system functioned as public space—places to gather, rest, and interact. In dense neighbourhoods with limited open space, revived hitis can once again serve social and cultural functions, strengthening community life.

Despite their relevance, hitis remain largely absent from contemporary urban planning frameworks. Plans, regulations, and infrastructure projects tend to focus on visible elements such as roads, buildings, and utilities, while ignoring invisible systems like groundwater flow and recharge paths. This disconnect has real consequences. Construction permits are issued without assessing impacts on aquifers or traditional water channels. Road projects cut through rajkulo alignments. Ponds that once served as recharge basins are paved or built over. By the time a hiti dries up, the damage has already been done elsewhere.

Urban planning in Kathmandu still treats water primarily as a service to be delivered, not as a holistic system embedded in the environment. This approach is increasingly unsustainable.

There are, however, encouraging examples within the Valley. In parts of Patan and Bhaktapur, community-led efforts have revived hitis by restoring ponds, clearing blocked channels, and protecting recharge zones. In some cases, water has returned after decades of inactivity. These initiatives highlight an important lesson: technical fixes alone are insufficient. Successful restoration required cooperation among local governments, technical experts, heritage practitioners, and, crucially, the community. Where local ownership was strong, maintenance followed. Where it was absent, interventions remained symbolic. These experiences suggest that hiti revival should not be treated as a standalone conservation effort, but as part of integrated neighbourhood planning.

Integrating hiti into present-day urban planning is not without challenges. Institutional fragmentation remains a major obstacle. Water supply agencies, municipalities, heritage authorities, and planning departments operate with limited coordination.

Another challenge is the lack of systematic documentation. Many hiti systems are poorly mapped, and their recharge areas remain unidentified. Without proper data, planners and developers cannot avoid damaging them, even when there is intent to do so. Public perception also poses a barrier. Hitis are often seen as outdated or ceremonial, rather than as functional assets. Changing this mindset requires demonstrating their practical value in addressing today’s urban problems.

If hitis are to play a meaningful role in Kathmandu’s urban future, planning practice must change in several ways. First, traditional water systems—including hitis, ponds, canals, and recharge zones—need to be properly documented and mapped. These should be integrated into GIS databases and development control systems. Second, urban policies and bylaws must recognize traditional water systems as critical infrastructure. Development guidelines should include provisions to protect recharge areas and underground channels, just as they protect road alignments or public land.

Third, hiti restoration should be linked to groundwater management and climate adaptation strategies. Viewing the system through the lens of water security, rather than heritage alone, opens access to broader planning and financing mechanisms. Fourth, community participation should be institutionalized. Local users are often the first to notice changes in water flow and quality. Empowering neighbourhood-level institutions to manage hiti can improve accountability and long-term sustainability.

Finally, planning education and professional practice in Nepal need to reconnect with indigenous knowledge systems. Modern tools and technologies are essential, but they should build upon local understanding of land and water, not override it.

Kathmandu’s water challenges are complex, and no single solution will resolve them. Large supply projects remain necessary, but they are not sufficient. The future lies in hybrid approaches that combine centralized infrastructure with decentralized, locally grounded systems.

Hiti represents such a possibility. They remind us that Kathmandu once planned its settlements with water at the center. Reintegrating that logic into contemporary urban planning is not about returning to the past—it is about learning from it. As the city continues to grow, the question planners and policymakers must ask is simple: will Kathmandu keep chasing water from afar, or will it finally learn to value and restore the systems beneath its own feet?

State-owned Nepal Telecom (NT) has cancelled its Rs 5bn procurement of a new billing system from Chinese technology giant Huawei, even though the bidding process had reached its final stage. The decision ends a tender that had been controversial from the beginning and raises fresh questions about governance, data security, and geopolitics in the country’s strategic telecom sector.

NT opened a tender for the system on March 18 last year. Although it shortlisted Huawei and WhaleCloud, the latter was disqualified at the technical proposal-stage. On Aug 31, NT formally invited Huawei’s representatives for the opening of the financial proposal scheduled for September 15. 

The process, however, never reached that point. The financial proposal opening was first postponed to Sept 24 following the GenZ protests of Sept 8 and 9 that toppled the KP Oli-led government. It was again postponed on Sept 4 until further notice. Days later, NT cancelled the entire procurement process, stating that a new tender would be called shortly.

Although then Minister for Communication and Information Technology Jagdish Kharel had given the go-ahead to the Nepal Telecom management, sources say the cancellation came after instructions from higher authorities. According to officials familiar with the process, geopolitics played a decisive role.

Huawei faces heavy restrictions in several countries, including the United States, over national security concerns. Western governments have repeatedly warned that Chinese telecom equipment could expose sensitive data to state influence. Although Nepal has not formally banned Huawei, the pressure of operating a state-owned telecom company in a polarized global technology environment is growing.

But geopolitics was not the only factor. The tender had been disputed since its announcement. Critics accused NT of structuring the bid to favor a single vendor and undermining fair competition. Questions were also raised about the violation of a directive order issued by the Supreme Court, which had clearly warned against awarding both the core network and billing system to the same supplier. 

The court, in its order dated 10 Sept 2024, had stated that the billing system procurement must ensure the protection of fundamental rights, including personal data. It said that the vendor supplying the billing system should not be in a position to access personal data through the core network. It also warned that using the same supplier for both systems could create a conflict of interest and pose information security risks. In simple terms, the ruling effectively meant that Nepal Telecom should maintain separate vendors for its core network and billing system.

In a telecom network, the core network is the central system which handles all voice calls, data routing, switching, roaming, and mobility management. It also generates call detail records (CDRs), which contain sensitive information about who called whom, when, and for how long. The billing system is responsible for converting network usage into money. It calculates charges, prepares invoices, deducts balances, and enables packages and offers. It can work in real time, such as through an online charging system, or in non-real time, through offline billing. Since both systems are critical and sensitive, many telecom operators globally use separate vendors for them. This separation reduces security risks, avoids monopoly control, and makes fault isolation easier when something goes wrong.

Nepal Telecom’s core network is built by Huawei. Its existing billing system, however, has been supplied by Asia Info since 2011. The original contract was for three years, but instead of launching a fresh tender, NT repeatedly extended Asia Info’s contract. Citing irregularities in the contract extension process, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a case at the Special Court against former managing director Sangeeta Pahadi Aryal and others. The case is still under consideration.

The attempt to replace Asia Info with Huawei would have brought both the core network and billing system under a single vendor. That triggered alarms among experts and regulators.

Ganesh Gautam, associate professor at Pulchowk Campus, had advised NT that although a single-vendor model might offer minor operational convenience, the risks far outweighed the benefits. He warned of data security vulnerabilities, reduced transparency, difficulty in fault diagnosis, and the danger of vendor lock-in.

“If one system is compromised, the same method can be used to breach the other,” he explained. “When systems are supplied by different vendors, the chance of identical security weaknesses is very low.”

Gautam also said that if one system goes down due to a technical flaw, the other may also fail if both are supplied by the same company. 

Global Telco Consult, an international advisory firm, had also advised NT that awarding both systems to the same vendor could create conflicts of interest.

Many leading operators have separate vendors for core and billing systems. Even Ncell, Nepal’s private telecom operator, initially used Huawei for both. In 2018, it brought ZTE on board as its billing system provider to reduce dependence on a single vendor.

The cancellation of the Huawei contract, therefore, appears less like a sudden decision and more like the inevitable outcome of legal, technical, and political pressure converging at one point.  The larger question now is whether Nepal Telecom can restart the process in a transparent and competitive manner.