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Claims of political equality are central to the normative theories of democracy as contemporary democracy has transformed from the ‘politics of ideas’ to the ‘politics of presence’. The Lincolnian aspirations of democracy as “by, for, and of the people” suffice no more, for the rulers are the same, the co-optation of whom the political institutions serve is narrow, and the encompassing diversity in social positioning renders it difficult for empirical democratic practices to mirror the norms on political equality. In such a scenario, the ideals of inclusive representative democracy are still fractured by the lack of gender parity in formal politics. 

All over the world, politics has been a masculine domain and Nepal is no exception. The tussles between muscular presence leave minuscule space for women representatives. The positioning of women in society to a great extent corresponds to the political sphere, so the alienated experiences of women in the societal sphere seep their way into politics. Although some women representatives are presented at the forefront of politics, it’s men who still hold the strings. The structural positioning of women has indeed created biased experiences of political institutions against them, but it would be a reductionist statement to blame only gender by isolating other forces it interacts with as the stirring force of inequality in Nepali politics. 

Intersectional forces 

The fundamental goal of representation of women in politics is that “women bring to politics a different set of values, experiences and expertise” thus, the emphasis on equal representation of women and initiatives for affirmative action are taken. It justifies representation extended to women based on their essential identity rather than their social position. The former argument reduces women into a homogeneous group, who withhold similar interests—whereas, in the case of Nepal, this essential identity intersects with various dimensions of caste and class. Other variables such as ethnicity, religion, region, academic background, differed abilities, and sexual minorities purport these differences to create complex social positioning, which forms sectional and distinct identities of and as a Nepali woman. A Janajati woman, a Brahmin woman, and a Badi woman—all three will narrate to you three distinct experiences each has despite a compulsion to take up the universal identity of Nepali women; their narratives of oppression certainly differ. 

The identity as a ‘woman’ does not exist in a single axis but it is interactive with other compounding variables that induce social stratification such as class, ethnicity, geographical location, etc. Such inter-sectional identities form “minorities within minorities”. Although gender acts as a common ground, there are other bases on which the subjugation of already marginalized demography is purported; thus, the provisions that aim to provide representation appear as one-dimensional and fail to encapsulate diverse categories existent within its presumptive category of “women.”

The space as a de-facto woman leader in Nepal is acquired by a Khas-Arya woman. She is likely to have undergone some of the same experiences as a Dalit or a Janajati woman, more women from the upper strata of society reap benefits from the provisions on gender equality and inclusivity than the marginalized women. The talks, the bold ambitions on countering gender parity lie neglectful to the spirit of equal representation in Nepal—which is to bring into discourse, tackle, and best represent their constituents and their problems. The mere fulfillment of a statistical requisite is hailed as a mark of gender equality or an attempt to it whereas equity becomes a lost cause in representation. 

The contemporary spirit of representative democracy consists of the fundamental expectation that those who are being represented are mirrored by their representatives in terms of experiences of their respective socio-political life. Thus, an essential account of intersectionality as an ontology and method of ensuring representation is a prerequisite in the contemporary political scenario of Nepal.

Representation for recognition 

The phenomenon of the convergence of politics with identity and recognition is something that has amassed mixed reactions. The mainstream Nepali nationalism is always resistant to the rise of ethnic and regional nationalism. Anything that challenges or merely lifts the smokescreen of a universal identity of a Nepali citizen shakes the very spine of our vain slogans on “Vividhata ma ekata.” 

This pattern of creating a universal and reductionist identity follows a similar trajectory in creating the identity of a Nepali woman. What is woeful of the absence of recognition is not the lack of affirmation of identities but the captivity of distinct identities as one. Even within the groups that lie as subordinate, the existing inequality is fostered and a hierarchy is established within the subjugated categories of people. Such layered inequality is formed by an ever-present patriarchal bias at its foundation. 

It is high-time recognition is viewed as a political goal. For a nation, which places diversity as a defining attribute, a rather paradoxical stance is held when it comes to acknowledging “ the politics of difference.” The very same diversity that crafts the vanity of being a Nepali is construed as a threat when it comes to its acknowledgment. Representation of diverse identities in mainstream politics gives autonomy over creating one’s identity, selecting a narrative for themselves, which they were devoid of in the course of historical schema.

Thus, recognition is an antecedent to the affirmation of identities. Equal representation for women representation in Nepal is no political epiphany but  newer and broader discourses as to its necessity are in dire need to be entertained.

Roughly two decades after the Gaur massacre, the government has promised justice for the victims. While the delay in justice delivery is regrettable, I take this pledge positively.

It should be noted that the United Nations Human Rights Commission had published a report on the massacre, urging legal action against the accused. Six months into the heinous crime, the National Human Rights Commission Nepal (NHRC) had also submitted its findings. But successive governments paid no heed to these reports.

In the wake of the victims’ protests, the government has taken an initial step toward justice dispensation. But it has not gone well with leaders of the Janata Samjbadi Party Nepal, a partner in the ruling coalition, which has started pressing the government to halt further steps.

Such acts can hinder the pursuit of justice. The government should probe this case by withstanding political pressure and deliver justice to the victims.

The author is a human rights activist 

Nepal’s three major political parties—Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center)—are currently focused on the task of bolstering their organizational strength. Revival of dormant party organizations and increasing party members have become their priority. To this end, they have come up with their own version of a grassroots campaign. Central-level leaders have been mobilized to various districts to interact with local cadres as well as voters.

These outreach drives of these three parties did not spur from the wisdom of their central leadership. They are rather a result of a clarion call from their ranks and files, who have witnessed their political bases erode almost overnight with the emergence of new political forces, particularly the Rastirya Swatantra Party.

The UML was the first party to reach out to the grassroots soon after the results of last year’s general election were out. According to media reports, the size of UML membership has decreased by nearly 50 percent in recent years, but the party leadership denies this. Leaders say that there was “an artificial increase” in the number of party members during the short-lived merger between the UML and the Maoist Center.

They claim that the UML’s core members remain intact.

The UML leadership has announced to increase the number of its members to one million by the next party convention.
According to Kashi Nath Adhikari, head of the party’s organizational department, along with the membership renewal, scores of new members have joined the UML. Since last year’s election, in which the party retained its third position, the UML is continuously focusing on building the party base, with central leaders reaching to the local level for cadre training and organization strengthening purposes.

Besides Adhikari’s words, the UML has not presented any metrics to accurately determine whether the party’s grassroots campaign was a success or a failure.

The Nepali Congress, which emerged as the largest party in last year’s elections, has also launched a nationwide campaign. In order to win the hearts and minds of people, the NC has adopted a two-pronged strategy of resolving the internal issues of the party and addressing the concerns of common people. The party leadership has instructed its central leaders to form a “service force” at each local level to address the problems faced by the people. By setting up these service forces, the NC hopes to attract youths to the party.

The NC leadership came up with such a plan amid complaints that the leaders and cadres at the local level have not been paying attention to the problems faced by common people. It was also largely prompted by the initiatives launched by the RSP to facilitate public access to various services including government-related works.

NC leader Nain Singh Mahar says the main challenge as well as priority of the party right now is to reconnect with the common people. He admits that the party for long has been focused on political issues, barely paying attention to the plights of ordinary people. 

The CPN (Maoist Center) has also announced a special grassroots campaign through its recently concluded central committee meeting to revive the party.

The Maoists support base and organizational strength pale in comparison to the NC and UML. So the party chairman and prime minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, has directed the party leaders to reach out to every household across the country to connect with the people. Dahal himself has announced that he would be traveling to every ward of all seven provinces to rally support for the party.

After completion of the campaign, the party plans to organize a policy convention probably in November to shape the party’s ideology. 

Despite being in power, the Maoist party is progressively becoming weaker since 2013. In order to strengthen the party, Dahal is even planning to unite with other fringe communist forces and Maoist splinter groups.
Political observers say campaigns launched by the three major parties to connect with the masses are a direct outcome of the RSP’s meteoric rise.

The RSP’s popularity is undeniable and the three major parties feel threatened. If this groundswell of support for the RSP continues to sustain until the next election season, the party could very well sweep the polls.
At the moment, the three major parties are in no position of contesting the election alone.

Agni Prasad Sapkota, Maoist Spokesperson: We will be launching a three-month campaign to revive the party organization which is a final test of our party. I am fully optimistic that we will pass this test because it is a matter of all party leaders and cadres. We will reach every ward across the country to re-energize our party structures. We will launch the program from September 10.

Madhu Acharya, NC leader:  I think our Central Working Committee did not take sufficient measures to reform party organization and shape ideology, policy and program. Instead of fixing the date of the policy convention, the party leadership decided to hold the Mahasamiti meeting, and we are making preparations accordingly. We will reach out to the people as per the decision of the party leadership.

Deepak Prakash Bhatta, UML leader: After the general elections, we diagnosed the organizational problems within the party. The UML party organization was in a mess after the unification with the Maoists in 2018. We have identified the problems now and are in the process of resolving them. We are also planning to hold the district- and provincial-level conventions. The party has also appointed the in-charge in each of the seven provinces for organizational rebuilding.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on August 1 cautioning and asking the Nepali youths not to join mercenaries of any country in violation of existing treaties and agreements. Nepali citizens have been a part of several foreign defense forces since the colonial era. Shifting geostrategic dynamics, global rivalry, rise in global migration and conscription through different methods and routes are a matter of concern. As per media reports, it is estimated that youths have been recruited in the Russian forces and other defense forces and may also be part of non-state actors or armed groups that contradict national priorities and policies. The shift in warfare besides other support also has implications for defense enrollment that comes with lucrative offers. The youth’s desire to join foreign forces emanates mainly from the Nepali state’s failure to provide ample jobs to its growing young population. But what happens to the national security and credibility of a relatively small country like Nepal when its youths choose to become part of a group or another by violating international norms and values in a deeply divided world?

This question calls for serious thinking on the government’s part.   

The presence of Nepali youths in foreign armed forces not only serves as an employment opportunity but also contributes to the economic well-being of Nepal through remittances. Additionally, these individuals gain exposure, training and experience that can benefit Nepal's own security forces and contribute to the nation's overall development.
However, it's worth noting that there have been discussions and debates about the repercussions of large-scale recruitment of Nepali youths in foreign armed forces with the state’s agreement. Some argue that it leads to brain drain, depriving the country of skilled human resources, while others highlight the economic benefits and the opportunity for youths to gain valuable training and career prospects.

The Department of Foreign Employment (DoFE) has allowed Nepali citizens to work in 110 countries, but our youths have been working in almost 172 countries. Still, our political elites do not appear ill at ease. Perhaps this does not qualify as an issue requiring serious attention.     

Rising labor out-migration is a grave issue, but more worrisome is the trend of the youths becoming part of foreign defense forces and law enforcement in the absence of necessary bilateral diplomatic arrangements.

Per statistics, around five lakh youths in Nepal seek job opportunities every year and more than 1700 Nepali citizens travel for work every day. The state encourages the youths to go abroad for jobs, laying bare its incompetence. 

As per the national census 2021, approximately 3.5m migrant workers (14 percent of the national population) are working abroad. Of them, 2.2m are aged 25-35 years and 18.72 percent of them are female. International migration, emerging as a means of livelihood for the poor, has also become a source of foreign currency ($8.2bn) revenue, which makes up 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Top five remittance sources are Saudi Arabia (20.6 percent), Malaysia (20.5 percent), India (19.3 percent), Qatar (13.4 percent) and the US (8.3 percent). 

In the last 10 months of the fiscal 2022/23, the DoFE issued work permits to 660,255 Nepali citizens, of which 600,000 have already left the country. 

What’s more, UNESCO data show an increasing number of Nepali students leaving the country to study abroad. The number of foreign-bound students more than doubled from 44,225 in 2017 to 95,268 in 2022. 

A good number of Indian citizens have found jobs in Nepal and so have the Nepalis in India, due to bilateral arrangements, the open border, cultural factors and contemporary reality. Per the World Bank’s Bilateral Remittance Matrix of 2017, while the Nepalis working in India send home around Rs 102bn every year (this includes Rs 72.57bn from 35,000 serving and 180,000 Gurkha veterans), the Indians working in Nepal send home almost triple the amount—Rs 302 bn. For India, Nepal is one of the top 10 sources of remittance. 

The Indian Embassy in Kathmandu estimates that 8m Nepali citizens are living and working in India and puts the number of Indian workers in Nepal at 600,000, whereas independent estimates suggest that 1 to 3m Nepalis are working in India. High mobility of workers across the border, cross-border marriages and a significant Indian population with family linkages in Nepal have made the picture unclear. There’s no denying the fact that migrations affect national stability and security.  

Youths in foreign forces 

The trends of warfare are evolving with technology and modern equipment, including nuclear, but human resources still play a crucial role.

Men aged 17 to 40 years from 140 nations can join the French Foreign Legion to safeguard French interests and secure French domains. Though the government of Nepal has no records nor settled accords, it is estimated that 300-350 Nepalis are serving as French Legionnaires on a singular premise. The US Army reportedly has more than 1000 Nepalis. 

The Tripartite treaty signed in 1947 concerns the rights of the Gurkhas recruited in military services of India and the United Kingdom. More than 4000 Gurkhas are serving the British Crown with a few hundred selected every year and 32,000 Nepali soldiers are serving in 40 Indian Gurkha battalions. Apart from providing jobs to individuals, these forces also help augment Nepal’s foreign currency reserves.

The path of fire

The ‘Agnipath Scheme’ meant to reduce India’s defense expenditure seems to have failed to impress the government of Nepal. The scheme has implications for job opportunities, the economy as well as the rights mentioned in the Tripartite Agreement, given that salary of the serving and pensions of the retired soldiers is an important source of Indian currency for Nepal’s economy, which relies overwhelmingly on imports from India. The scheme will permit only a quarter of the 46,000 soldiers between the age of 17-23 years to continue in service after four years and bid others adieu with a golden handshake of INR 1.7m.

Absence of diplomatic steps prior to the scheme’s announcement has created problems that India and Nepal would have been better off without. Three points should be noted in this context: The new entry scheme was not part of the tripartite agreement; it adds to the unemployment data after four years and that the trained returnees would be vulnerable to non-state actors. 

There are many more Nepalis serving in Singapore, Brunei, UAE and other destinations. 

The Gurkha Contingent or the Singapore Police Force, with roughly 2000 Gurkha personnel, has a role in maintaining law and order. Formed on the basis of a deal between Singapore and the British Government on 9 April 1949, which entrusts the British government with the recruitment, the contingent was mobilized to quell communal riots between the Chinese and Malays of Singapore. After the 9/11 attacks, these soldiers have also been providing security to the President and Prime Minister and guarding vital installations. 

The sultanate of Brunei is another nation that accommodates more than 500 Gurkha in the Brunei Reserve Unit or the Royal Brunei Gurkha Reserve Unit, a special elite guard force previously led by the British Commanders to protect the Royal family, the citizens and major oil installations. Known as the “Praetorian Guard”, it works as a special forces unit directly under the command of the Sultan as well as alongside the Special Forces Regiment and Special Combat Squadron of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces. 

This article is Part I of the two-part series 

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand