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There have been numerous generalizations, and with them, many misunderstandings regarding the crucial factors that underpin elitism in Nepal.

Undoubtedly, caste and land, and language, considering also the extent to which they have always been inextricably interlinked with each other, have continuously been predominant factors. Throughout the history of Nepal, these have been consistently key elements acting as springboards for individuals and groups with homogenous features to cement their prerogatives and privileges within the society.

Yet, a certain degree of privilege and the status coming with it do not automatically make someone part of the ruling elite. And, certainly, there has been a paucity of studies that try to go beyond such analysis of established societal dynamics and attempt to understand different dimensions of power creation that can lead to the exercise of real decision-making at the highest echelons of power.

Therefore, there is an opportunity to analyze how elites are created and shaped in Nepal from different perspectives. In this line, a novel line of inquiry is emerging. It focuses on the nexus between the influences exerted by foreign powers in Nepal and the hidden dynamics and consequences triggered by them over those who have been ruling the country.

This new approach tries to answer the following question: could be possible that foreign powers that, since the early days of Nepal’s formation till now, have been holding a very relevant role in shaping national politics, have a unique sway and impact over the underlying and hidden processes of elite formation, defined as those members of the society truly exercising power?

Nepal is a nation where foreign policy has always been passively exercised in reaction to the desires and moves of bigger and more powerful nations. To some extent, the conduct of foreign affairs by the different elites in power has not been, either by design or by default, aimed at independently exerting the country’s sovereign interests.

Rather, Nepal’s foreign policy has been more focused on responding to the interests that foreign powers have always held over it. It has been shaped to maximize a return not based on its own priorities and strategic interests but rather from how and what bigger international players, such as India, China, the USA, and, during the Rana oligarchy, the British Resident, approached Nepal and wanted from it.

At the same time, the elites in power did also benefit immensely from steering the country’s foreign policy in a balancing act that would not antagonize foreign powers but would be masterfully crafted and leveraged for their own self-interests. Therefore, wouldn’t it be interesting to reflect on how foreign policy conducted by others has determined and continues to influence elite formation in the country?

This is the ambitious task that Gaurav Bhattarai, an Assistant Professor at Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, set to decipher with his latest book, “Nepal’s Power Elites: Rajahs, Ranas and Republic,” due to be published in the first week of August.

The book is a bold attempt at understanding the elevation to power through the prism of foreign policy. “Elitism cannot be fully grasped without recognizing the profound influences of distant hands”, Bhattarai explained to me in our conversation.
Throughout a series of online interviews and exchange of emails, Bhattarai shared with me that normally the focus is on pinpointing the oversized influence that foreign powers have always held in shaping national politics.

But, according to him, we have been missing something important to better understand the elite’s formation and their related power dynamics in Nepal.

“In the grand narrative of the evolution of the Nepali statecraft, the role of British residency, Indian independence leaders, and a plethora of regional and international factors emerge as more than scanty background details—it is the very plot that drives the story of elite power structure”.

“In line with this insight, I argue that any understanding of elite status in Nepal is incomplete without an acknowledgment of these external forces”, Bhattarai wrote me in the e-mail. Elite is a loose concept, open to different interpretations.
The theories formulated in the nineteenth century by Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels in Europe, or C Wright Mills in the US, and Sanjaya Baru in India elucidating the key elements and factors of elite making cannot simply be re-contextualized and adapted to Nepal according to Bhattarai.

To understand how the different elites across the different phases of Nepal’s model history, each with its unique features, formed and assumed power in the country, we need to go beyond the socio-religious aspects of the nation that have inevitably been conductors and enablers of access to power.

Foreign policy can turn out to be a very relevant area that deserves to be studied in order to decipher the formation of elites in Nepal. This undertaking should not only be analyzed from the ways foreign powers exercised it to influence and, in many instances, indirectly control power. Certainly, this aspect cannot be underestimated. “External forces have not only enabled but at times also constrained the power and influence of Nepali elites throughout history”, I was told in our conversation.
So in “Nepal’s Power Elites: Rajahs, Ranas and Republic”, Bhattarai analyzed to full extent “how foreign influences have shaped, bolstered or even undermined the authority of the ruling class”.

There is also another side of the coin, and this is really an important point that Bhattarai makes. According to him, the different elites holding decision-making authority in the country have themselves exploited the perceived influence of foreign nations in the country for their own interest.

In essence, the Shahs, then the Ranas, and then again the Shahs during the Panchayat and even the political class of the post-2008 Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, have all consistently taken advantage of their access to foreign powers.
Each of them had different dynamics and unique features, and each asserted its powers in a unique context. And yet, the study conducted by Bhattarai is centered on the fact that all of them had one common denominator: the support received by foreign powers, without whom their own survival in power could have been jeopardized.

The members of the elites in power throughout different phases of Nepal’s modern history, have always shared something in common. They all misappropriated and misused, their prerogatives in dealing with foreign powers exercising their own influence over the country, to legitimize, cement and consolidate their own status and grip on the decision-making.
“Elites have leveraged their ‘monopoly’ or their exclusive access to foreign policy to justify their power”. “By engaging with missionaries, colonial powers, residents, envoys, ambassadors, and international organizations in different eras, they positioned themselves as the architects of Nepal’s modern history,” Bhattarai said.

What we think of national interest, which is often proclaimed with high rhetoric by politicians even these days, is actually the interest of elites whose members strive to preserve by leveraging their decision-making in the realm of foreign policies through their access to foreign actors.

Power has been exercised by elites not in the interest of the people but to further strengthen the elite itself, and Bhattarai’s scholarly research is an effort at understanding “how elites have ably used foreign policy to consolidate their authority”.
“In this book, I seek to advance beyond the existing debates in International Relations by exploring how the priorities, preferences, and behaviors of individual decision-makers impact foreign policy decisions. By examining these individuals’ actions, we may gain insights into the structural constraints they face and the norms that shape their positions,” explained Bhattarai. To better comprehend these patterns and dynamics, the publication tries to answer an important question:
“How do we measure their agency within the web of constraints they are bound by, and in what ways do we distinguish between genuine influence and the illusion of power within the broader political machinery?”.

“This question challenges the very concept of elite status and prompts us to reconsider how we understand leadership, authority, and influence in the realm of foreign policy decision-making”.

In essence, Bhattarai tries to explain how the domain of foreign and its interactions with national elites in different phases of Nepal’s modern history have shaped not only the country’s own political trajectories along the years but also enabled the rulers of the time to exert their power over the nation.
Normally, we explain and justify foreign policies through the angle of national politics. After all, foreign affairs are at the service of nations’ interests and priorities. The case of Nepal is different. Foreign powers did abuse and continue to abuse their own influence over the nation’s destiny.

But as Bhattarai helps us to realize, it is not only a one-way street. His inquiry tries to prove this point by presenting examples from numerous historical episodes and also from his observation of elite-driven foreign policy discourses in contemporary Nepal, be it in the media, seminars, or university.

The book is about the idea and practice of foreign and the way Nepali elites have been using and exploiting the domain of foreign and how, in the name of foreign policy behaviour and foreign policy priorities, they have been fulfilling their own vested interests.

The book also brings to the fore the presence and role of henchmen and interlocutors of all three—Rajhas, Ranas, and Republican leaders of Nepal—in different periods of time, to show how the idea of the foreign has been romanticized and weaponized as rhetoric.

Among them, what tops the list is the discourse of national interest, which, according to Bhattarai, as discussed in his upcoming book, is actually an “elite interest”. The elites in power throughout the history of Nepal till now excelled at preserving their own status and ably used the same foreign powers targeting and influencing them, for their own advantage. And let’s be honest, they have been extremely good and they are still good in this game. 

Former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s nine-day visit to China has been interpreted differently by various sections of the society. Much of the commentary and analysis was based on reports in the Nepali media often lacking objectivity or verification. This tendency, with a few exceptions, remains a characteristic of Nepal’s media landscape.
Before delving into her high-level visit to Beijing and Gansu province accompanied by leaders of the CPN-UML and a Minister of the Government of Nepal, it is worth recalling who Bidya Devi Bhandari is. She served two terms as the president of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, becoming both the country’s first female president and a founding president of the republican era. During her tenure, she faithfully upheld the Constitution and acted as a guardian of national interest, always prioritizing sovereignty and integrity without compromise.

In Nepal’s political history, Bhandari has made lasting contributions that are widely recognized. She championed the women’s movement, significantly advancing women’s participation in policymaking, especially in politics. Before becoming the head of state, she was the vice-president of the CPN-UML—the party’s second-highest position. Although she entered the presidential office carrying her party’s legacy, she fulfilled the responsibilities of her high office with dignity and neutrality.

Now, let us return to the core issue: the nature of her visit to China. She visited the northern neighbor in the capacity of a former head of state, not as a CPN-UML leader. Contrary to reports in Kathmandu, she was not invited by the International Department of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC), but rather by an organization named the Chinese Association for International Understanding. However, it is true that the IDCPC facilitated the visit. During her stay in Beijing, she addressed a gathering of political parties from China’s neighboring countries as a guest speaker. She understandably presented herself as both a former head of state and a former vice-president of the CPN-UML, which is appropriate and does not harm anyone. After all, political leaders carry their legacies.

In Gansu, she delivered a statement on China’s Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), announced by President Xi Jinping in 2023, at a high-level political party meeting. China is a civilizational state with a recorded history of more than five thousand years. The revival of such a legacy is a proud moment for any nation. During her visit, Bhandari met with Chinese Vice-president Han Zheng in Gansu and held a meeting with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the IDCPC, in Beijing. In both meetings, she presented herself as a leader of Nepal’s communist movement and a former president. She also met Ji Bingxuan, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress and president of the Chinese Association for International Understanding. Their exchanges focused on goodwill and matters of mutual interest.

While she was participating in programs in Beijing, a wave of speculations and conspiracy theories flooded the media in Kathmandu. Much of the reporting misrepresented the nature of her engagements, fueling unnecessary political tensions. Upon the delegation’s return, Minister Damodar Bhandari held a press briefing to clarify the purpose and outcomes of the visit. He explained that the visit focused on strengthening bilateral ties and covered various issues, including trade, culture, civilizational linkages and people-to-people relations. Understandably, discussions also included party-to-party relations between the CPN-UML and the CPC.

These were the key diplomatic engagements of former President Bhandari during her visit to China. Everyone has the right to interpret the underlying messages, but interpretations must be based on facts and coherence with the agendas of the visit.

Let’s fairly evaluate the visit.

First, no Chinese leader said that Nepal’s communist parties must unite before the 2027 elections, as some Nepali media outlets inaccurately reported. Chinese officials are careful not to interfere in domestic political matters. They consistently emphasize political stability as a prerequisite for development and prosperity. When engaging with Nepali leaders, they often share their own historical experiences of national humiliation and urge Nepali counterparts to maintain stability and pursue development with patience and vision.

Second, Chinese leaders generally welcome guests with honor and respect—more so for someone like Madam Bhandari, who is both a former head of state and a figure with a strong communist legacy. The respect she received should be interpreted as respect for the people of Nepal and its leadership. There is no evidence to support the claim that China is projecting her as the next president of the CPN-UML or facilitating her return to active politics.

Third, some reports suggested that Minister Liu said Madam Bhandari was the only leader capable of uniting Nepal’s communist parties. This was another misrepresentation. While Minister Liu did praise Bhandari, he did not suggest that she was uniquely trusted by China to reunite the leftist forces. This claim is part of a deliberate effort to circulate misleading narratives.

Fourth, Madam Bhandari is not only a former president but also the spouse of Madan Bhandari, the architect of People’s Multiparty Democracy (PMD)—the guiding principle of the CPN-UML. Chinese leaders hold great respect for the late Madan Bhandari and are closely familiar with the PMD framework. Their respect for Madam Bhandari is naturally linked to her late husband’s ideology, which sought to creatively reorient Nepal’s communist movement.

Fifth, the issue of who will be the next president of the CPN-UML is entirely an internal matter of the party. It is neither dictated by Beijing nor influenced externally. KP Sharma Oli is the current president of the party and the Prime Minister of Nepal. He leads both roles with strength and stability. Oli has never faced a leadership challenge within the party. He is seen as the leader who protected and revived the party during difficult times. If and when he decides to step down, he will identify a suitable successor. Should Madam Bhandari re-enter active politics, it will only be with Oli’s endorsement.

Therefore, let us refrain from circulating fabricated plots. Let us respect our neighbors and avoid unnecessarily dragging them into our internal affairs. Let us show our leaders some respect and avoid fueling divisions.

The Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (OPMCM) has expressed serious concern over the deployment of staff beyond the approved quota at the Immigration Office at the Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA). The issue has come under scrutiny following a complaint filed with the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), alleging that the Ministry of Home Affairs has appointed more personnel than the sanctioned positions in several departments, including immigration.

According to an OPMCM source, the practice of leaving some positions vacant while overstaffing others has disrupted service delivery. The complaint to the CIAA calls for a thorough investigation and strict action against those responsible. The Prime Minister’s Office has warned that those involved could face departmental action, be issued warnings or even punished under anti-corruption laws.

In a letter to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the OPMCM cited provisions under various laws, including Section 18(A) of the Civil Service Act 2049, which governs deputation of civil servants. Sub-section 3 of the same clause mandates that if a civil servant is deputed against the stated legal provisions, the officer responsible for the posting must repay the salary and allowances from their own pocket and face departmental action. Furthermore, Section 15 of the Governance (Management and Operation) Act 2065 requires timely decision-making, and Section 17(B) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2059 stipulates penalties for causing harm through indecision or negligence.

The Prime Minister’s Office also reminded the Home Ministry that deploying staff without adherence to the decisions of secretary-level meetings constitutes a breach of existing laws. It has issued an ultimatum to provide a full list of personnel working beyond the approved staff quota.

Additionally, the PMO has directed the Home Ministry to align staffing strictly with the sanctioned positions within seven days. “I urge you to immediately provide the list of institutions operating with excess staff and the names of such personnel, and to ensure staff deployment is strictly in accordance with the approved quota within seven days, with updates submitted to this office,” the letter goes.

The PMO has further warned that it will initiate legal proceedings under the Governance Act if the directive is not followed.

The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) has filed a corruption case against former Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal and 91 others in connection with the Patanjali land scandal. The move has ignited a debate over whether the CIAA has the constitutional authority to investigate cabinet decisions, with legal experts and political analysts sharply divided.

Nepal’s party, the CPN (Unified Socialist), along with several opposition groups, has denounced the case as politically motivated. Many suspect that Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli may have influenced CIAA Chief Prem Kumar Rai to target Nepal, one of Oli’s most vocal critics, under the pretense of a corruption probe. The rift between the two leaders has been widening since the party’s split in 2021

Public reaction has been swift and skeptical. From social media to teashop gossip, many see this as an attempt to weaken the Unified Socialist and lure away its lawmakers. If successful, such a maneuver could boost the CPN-UML’s numbers in the House of Representatives, potentially pushing the Nepali Congress into second place.

But the greater concern is the deepening erosion of public trust in state institutions.  This growing distrust poses a more serious threat to Nepal’s democratic order than the revival of monarchist sentiment.

Like many state institutions, the CIAA is losing legitimacy due to a flawed appointment process, selective investigations, and a deferential attitude toward the political elite—all of which compromise its constitutional autonomy. At the heart of the problem lies the method of appointing the CIAA’s leadership.

Chiefs and commissioners are often chosen based on political allegiance or their willingness to offer bribes for the position. Such practices fatally compromise the agency’s independence.

As a result, the CIAA is frequently accused of targeting “small fish” while ignoring large-scale corruption involving high-profile figures. Its track record in major cases is dismal, with many prosecutions falling apart due to poorly prepared charges at the Special Court.

Had the CIAA built a reputation for fair and rigorous investigations, the current case against Nepal might not have provoked such intense skepticism.

This isn’t just about one institution. Across the board, Nepal’s key democratic institutions are rapidly losing public confidence. The recent delay in appointing the Governor of Nepal Rastra Bank is a case in point, which was marked by indecision and political bargaining at the highest level.

Meanwhile, the judiciary’s credibility continues to decline. One controversial verdict after another has led many to question the impartiality of the courts. Just two weeks ago, the Janakpur high court acquitted former Nepali Congress lawmaker Mohammad Aftab Alam in connection with the 2008 Rautahat blast and subsequent killing of those injured. 

Despite strong testimony from legal experts, witnesses, and journalists implicating Alam, the court found him not guilty. Such rulings fuel public despair and reinforce the perception that justice in Nepal is hostage to politics and impunity. 

The executive branch fares no better. Public trust in the government is at an all-time low, driven by repeated accusations of corruption, opacity, and indifference to citizens’ concerns. One glaring example is the unwillingness of the Prime Minister and ministers to disclose their property details more than a year after the current NC–UML coalition took power.

If Nepal’s political parties are serious about defending the current system against royalist and other anti-democratic forces, they must begin by restoring faith in public institutions. That starts with overhauling the deeply flawed appointment process. Too often, constitutional bodies are staffed not by competent, independent professionals but by political loyalists and former bureaucrats with party affiliations.

These appointees remain beholden to the leaders who installed them, rendering institutions ineffective and subservient. Far from being autonomous, many constitutional bodies now operate as extensions of the executive. The judiciary is no exception.

Over the past two decades, political interference in the justice system has become so normalized that ordinary citizens can identify the political leanings of Supreme Court justices based on their past affiliations. This perceived bias has severely undermined the legitimacy of court rulings.

Both the judiciary and legislature operate in the shadow of partisan influence. Other institutions, including the Nepal Police, Nepal Army, and various regulatory agencies, are also viewed as corrupt and politicized

Because political parties remain at the center of power, the impetus for reform must come from them. Yet history shows a troubling pattern: when prominent political figures are implicated in corruption, their parties work to weaken or discredit oversight bodies. This has been the case since the early 1990s, when the CPN-UML resisted unfavorable court rulings, followed by the Nepali Congress in the 2000s.

After 2006, the Maoists and Madhes-based parties attacked the credibility of state institutions, and now, newer parties like the Rastriya Swatantra Party publicly challenge investigations and court decisions. This persistent trend has done lasting damage to the credibility of Nepal’s democratic institutions.

Political parties often proclaim their commitment to democracy, but that commitment must be judged by actions—not words. True dedication to democratic values requires strengthening institutional integrity, not undermining it for short-term political gain. On this front, Nepal’s political leadership has repeatedly failed.

Public faith in the current political class is near collapse. To address this deepening crisis, Nepal urgently needs principled, accountable leadership at all levels—federal, provincial, and local. These leaders must ensure that public institutions function independently, deliver on their mandates, and operate without political interference.

Today, state institutions are widely seen as corrupt, politicized, inefficient, and disconnected from the public. If political parties genuinely wish to safeguard the political system, they must embrace a long-term, systemic reform agenda rooted in the spirit of the 2015 Constitution.

Although the Constitution enshrines the separation of powers, genuine institutional reform has yet to follow. Nepal does not need a constitutional amendment, but it does need a comprehensive review aimed at strengthening the architecture of democracy. Only then can the country’s political system hope to survive and thrive.