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Nepal has over the past few years seen growing penetration of the US and China in its military. India has always been the primary outside military force in Nepal, as well as a major defense supplier. Now there are new actors in the fray, raising concerns that Nepal could find itself entangled in the military components of the American Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and the Chinese BRI. Kamal Dev Bhattarai talked to Deepak Prakash Bhatta, a security expert and lawmaker of the ruling Nepal Communist Party.  

There is much talk of the IPS in Nepal these days. Some argue that as it is a military strategy, Nepal should not subscribe to it.

When we talk about our relationship with the wider world or with a specific country like America, we first need to first be aware of our current political and economic situations as well as of our priorities. The current government leadership does not have a clear working modality on this. First, we need to formulate a national development policy and on that basis our security, foreign and other policies can be developed. Only after the formulation of this development policy will we be able to evaluate our relations with India, China, the US, and frame our national interests. Then we can start a discourse on the role of China’s BRI, the US’ IPS and India’s ‘Make in India’ in Nepal’s development process.

Again, our government does not have a clear policy on how to derive maximum benefit from the IPS, largely because we do not have a national development policy. The US has listed us among its IPS partners but alliances are their necessity. Our necessity is not a military alliance. I see this as a continuation of America’s pivot or rebalancing policy and it falls under the grand strategy of maintaining the status of ‘America First’. We should not be troubled by such a strategy. We should rather collaborate with the US even while we continue to work within vibrant regional frameworks. We should learn to strike a balance.

Is the US trying to drag Nepal into a costly military strategy?

From the American perspective, trying to get Nepal into its military orbit is normal. But accepting some military support should also not be seen as an acceptance of a military alliance. At the same time, we are conducting joint military exercises with India, China and other countries on specific issues such as engineering, information technology, and terrorism. But despite having a stable government, we have not made our position clear. We go to whoever invites us, and if there is criticism, we have a tendency of saying that we went there unknowingly.

America’s military influence and interest seems to have increased in Nepal of late. What could be the reason?

With the goal of retaining its global superiority in the current multi-polar world, the US is working to create new alliances and bases. After the conclusion of our peace process, we have seen more US activities here. Through the IPS, and by projecting India as its champion in the region, America wants to promote democracy and its principles and it expects India will remain its strategic partner in the region. But it is not easy to make an alliance with India, unlike with, say, Pakistan. India also looks after its own economic and strategic interests.

Sometimes, we analyze things by projecting ourselves as an important player. The reality is that we are indeed in an important place but we are yet to develop any kind of national capacity. It may also be a compulsion of big powers to show that Nepal is in their area of influence. This is not a propaganda issue. We should not be in a hurry at the policy level.

Nepal’s old defense partners were India and the US. How do you see China’s new role as a military partner of Nepal?

China has an aggressive presence not only in Nepal. But the crux of matter is how we move ahead. As our threats multiple, our military and strategic alliance with China will further increases.

Does the BRI have greater security and strategic than economic components?

Some western countries are asking us to question the BRI, citing the issues of debt-trap and sovereignty. They have come up with policy papers on the BRI and its implications. On the other hand, China has invested heavily in science and technology. When a powerful country comes up with such a grand strategy, the military component figures prominently. Therefore, the BRI has a military component and there is a desire to engage militarily. The military component has also been mobilized through private security companies.    

There is a competition between the BRI and the IPS. Under the BRI, new infrastructures are being built. China has the Shanghai Economic Cooperation (SCO) which deals with broader regional and international issues. Under the BRI, China is inviting more and more countries for discussion. As a backup structure, China has the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. Top positions of this bank are occupied by citizens of other countries. For some time, we should be open to development projects under both the BRI and the IPS.  We can benefit from other big economies too. We should go beyond India, China and the US.

So we should cooperate with the IPS and the BRI despite their clear military and strategic components?

They obviously have military and strategic components. But we cannot have a policy of going one step forward and two back. There is a tendency of us stepping back based on the reaction of one country to our engagement with another country. With such a flawed approach, we will get nowhere. We cannot remain aloof in this inter-dependent world.

How should Nepal should collaborate with Chinese militarily?

There should be sectoral collaboration with Chinese military in areas such as medicine, engineering, intelligence, terrorism, and disaster management. We need collaboration in all these sectors because if we face a disaster tomorrow, India and China will be first countries to help us. We should look for compatibility. We should be in a position of responding to them when they come to assist us. Similarly, we may face new security threats and challenges, further boosting military collaboration with China.

In this context, how should Nepal reform its security bodies?

We should first discuss the right size of our army. If development is a key priority for the next 10 years, how many army battalions do we need for such development? There is no clarity on how we are going to mobilize our security forces. During army integration, there was the talk of creating a separate directorate for development-related activities. I don’t know what happened to it.  

Is it right to say our defense collaboration with India is stuck while such collaboration with China is increasing?

First, we are going to establish a National Defense University. We are working to produce knowledge. We already have a war-college. The Armed Police Force has a Masters’ course at its commanding staff college. In Nepal Police, the academy is extremely capable. So we have a good understanding of our security discourse. 

In the past, there was dependency on India in the area of study; now we are diversifying. As far as the perception that Nepal is tilting towards China is concerned, the situation is different. I just returned from China. The Chinese say they are ready to do many things here if only Nepal can come up with concrete plans. Indian media often says Nepal is tilting towards China, which is not true.

What could be repercussions of major powers continuing to increase their penetration in Nepal Army?

In terms of our economy and our investment in the security sector, we are not in a position of exerting ourselves militarily. The threats and challenges of cyber world are increasing. We alone cannot fight these challenges. So we need collaboration. In the digital world, we need to cooperate with all three big powers we are talking about. Their presence will be more pertinent in coming days because they are coming up with technology-driven policies and strategies.

How do you read the new national security policy?

This is the second edition of the national security policy. The first edition had come during the transition from the interim constitution to the new constitution and subsequent implementation of federalism. We have already adopted a federal structure and province-level discussions about possible security challenges of the provinces would have been fruitful. For example, Province 2 is connected only with India while Province 6 is connected only with China. But the whole of our country is connected with both India and China. Similarly, the least developed Sudurpaschim province is connected with both India and China. National security discussion should thus be made more vibrant. There should be discussions in the national security council on Nepal’s relations with emerging and big powers, as well as issue-specific discussions. I think there has been a hurry while finalizing the document.

The policy has identified blockade as a major threat to national security. What is your take?

The two latest national crises we faced were the earthquake and the blockade. If we want to decrease our dependence on the country that imposed the blockade, our focus should be on the finalization of the national development policy. The draft laws on the new national security council are not in line with the constitution. All these show we are working in haste. We are suffering from the hangover of short-lived governments that could do no long-term planning.

Case 1: On July 2, the parliament’s International Relations and Human Rights Committee instructed the government to cancel the holding of the International Indian Film Academy Awards (IIFAA) in Kathmandu. The government, however, expressed displeasure at the committee’s decision; it thought the decision was taken without sufficient
homework.

Case 2: A few weeks ago, the parliament’s State Affairs and Good Governance committee instructed the Public Service Commission (PSC) to halt the process to recruit 9,000 civil servants. The government said there was no need to stop the process. The Supreme Court (SC) agreed and allowed the PSC to go ahead with the recruitment. The parliamentary committee expressed displeasure, stating that the SC encroached on the parliament’s jurisdiction.
There are several other instances where the parliamentary committees’ decisions have courted controversy and criticism. Of late, there are fears that the committees’ significance has eroded—something that calls for serious reflection on the part of the parliament, the government and the political parties.

Are the parliamentary committees making mature decisions? Are their instructions being implemented by the government? How can we make these committees more effective and less controversial? These are frequently asked questions in political circles. The parliament itself needs to answer these questions honestly if it is to maintain its dignity, trustworthiness
and significance.

In parliamentary practice, parliamentary committees are regarded as mini-parliaments that hold their sessions in the absence of a full House. Observers therefore argue that any decision taken by these committees should be free from controversy and pressure, and that the government should carry out their instructions. The basic principle of having parliamentary committees is to divide lawmakers into small groups so as to enable serious work to be done in a more effective manner.
The goal is to assist the parliament in its functioning and make government agencies accountable to the parliament. The committees are mandated to monitor and investigate government policies and programs and issue directives accordingly. They make decisions on the basis of majority.

Committees under HoR
- Finance Committee
- International Relations and Human Rights Committee
- Industry-Commerce-Labor and Consumer Welfare Committee
- Law, Justice and Human Rights Committee
- Agriculture, Cooperatives and National Resource Committee
- Women and Social Committee
- State Affairs and Good Governance Committee
- Development and Technology Committee
- Education and Health Committee
- Public Accounts Committee

Committees under NA
- Sustainable Development and Good Governance Committee
- Bill Management Committee
- Transfer of Management and Government Committee
- National Concern and Coordination Committee

 Joint Committees
- Parliamentary Hearing Committee
- Committee to monitor and evaluate the State Directives, Policy and
Responsibility

Where’s the research?
The problem, however, lies in the functioning of the parliamentary committees as they make important decisions without adequate research. Parliamentary committees are facing accusations that they depend heavily on secondary sources such as newspapers and information gathered by lawmakers while making decisions, most of which, as a result, end up being flawed. In several cases, the committees have taken decisions in haste without considering their implications. As lawmakers cannot be experts on all national and international issues, they need the support of professionals and experienced government officials.
“This is happening because the parliamentary committees do not consult experts. And their decisions are politically motivated,” says Mukunda Acharya, a former secretary at the parliament secretariat. Another reason behind the problem is the absence of senior government officials in these committees. Either an undersecretary or a section officer serves as the secretary of these committees.

“If senior staff are appointed, they can guide the lawmakers on vital issues, which reduces the chances of drawing controversy,” says Acharya. The committees are dominated by lawmakers who see politics in every issue rather than study it in a rigorous manner. Instead of undertaking serious research, the committees desire easy publicity and therefore pick up any random issue, hold meetings, and invite the media.

As such, the government has a handy pretext to ignore the committees’ instructions, resulting in a contempt of parliament. There is no official record of what proportion of instructions get implemented. A senior official at the parliamentary secretariat says the majority of instructions provided by the committees are gathering dust.

There are 10 thematic committees under the House of Representatives (HoR) and four under the National Assembly (NA). There are two joint committees. Each committee has a specific job as stipulated by the law, but there are many overlaps, and disputes over jurisdiction often arise.

“There is a sort of competition among the committees to show that they are doing something. So they sometimes take up issues that fall under another committee’s jurisdiction,” says Acharya.

Multiple maladies
There are several instances where a particular minister or a government official is invited by multiple parliamentary committees to hold discussions on the same issue, sometimes at the same time. Ministers and high-level government officials complain that there is no need to speak several times on the same issue. Failure to attend, however, will invite criticism of dishonoring the parliament.

There is a long list of work that the parliamentary committees are supposed to do. But they have so far failed to conduct their business effectively. The Speaker of the House is responsible for overseeing the functioning of all parliamentary committees, but he is not doing a good job. If a committee’s decision is controversial, the Speaker should call a meeting of the committee chairs and try to resolve the dispute.

Last year, a sub-committee under the Public Affairs Committee concluded that Minister for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation Rabindra Adhikari was complicit in corruption of Rs 4.3556 billion during the procurement of two wide-body aircraft. Later, the sub-committee’s conclusion was considered unjustified. Subsequently, the main committee formed a separate probe panel and the government also constituted a separate committee. Neither has made its report public.

Ruling party leaders publicly disparage the parliamentary committees. Earlier in the month, when the International Relations and Human Rights Committee directed the government to cancel the IIFAA event, both Prime Minister KP Oli and Minister for Communication and Information Technology Gokul Prasad Banskota publicly criticized the committee. A few days back, the Development and Technology Committee invited Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport Raghubir Mahaseth for a discussion on public transport, but the minister declined the invite.

Though it is normal parliamentary practice to invite stakeholders, Mahaseth refused to speak in the parliament and blamed the committee of violating parliamentary norms. He claimed that the parliamentary committee took a decision in a casual manner without digging into the details of the matter.

Observers say the tendency of the executive encroaching on parliamentary affairs has grown under this government. Some lawmakers from the ruling parties believe they can take any decision because they have a two-thirds majority. “Unlike in the past, ministers are openly speaking against the decisions made by the parliamentary committees, which is a serious breach of parliamentary supremacy,” laments a senior parliament official.

Domestic and international trips that lawmakers affiliated with the parliamentary committees make have also drawn considerable flak. When a team of lawmakers from the Public Accounts Committee visited a European country to inspect the Nepali embassies there, it attracted criticism on the grounds that the committee did not have the mandate to monitor the embassies, as the Auditor General does that job on an annual basis. Even the government has expressed its dissatisfaction over such visits.

The Indians are in a fix. They are reluctant to let any western power increase its footprint in Nepal, their traditional ‘backyard’. Yet India also increasingly thinks it alone may not be able to check China’s growing inroads into its immediate neighborhood. This is the reason it has agreed to cooperate with the US under the Indo-Pacific Strategy, meant specifically to contain China’s rise in Asia. But then, what do we make of the much-touted personal chemistry between Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping post-2017 Wuhan Summit, which has helped reduce the friction between the two Asian giants?

Whatever the state of Sino-India ties, it is hard to see them cooperate while dealing with other countries in the region, particularly those in South Asia. Indian bureaucrats and strategic thinkers are still obsessed with the idea of China ‘gobbling up’ South Asia; Modi will thus find it difficult to be seen as accommodating China in South Asia. Moreover, New Delhi seems to think the US, a faraway and not-always-reliable power, will be much easier to manage in South Asia than will be China, the next-door geopolitical adversary. Thus, even though India won’t completely cede ground to the US in South Asia, we can expect the anti-China cooperation between them to intensify.

This will be the case particularly after President Xi comes to Nepal, perhaps in as little as three months. The Chinese are unhappy with what they see as the turtle’s pace of Nepali politicians and bureaucrats who are hindering progress in China-funded projects in Nepal. Nor have they taken kindly to the criticism of the Ring Road expansion in Kathmandu—such a beautiful road they built! Why are Nepalis so thankless?
But then the time has also come for China to stamp its authority, to show the Americans and the Indians that their best of plans in Nepal can unravel if China is ready to loosen its purse-strings again. It is not a coincidence that our foreign minister these days repeatedly tweets about the ‘hoax of a Chinese debt trap’. As if to needle the Americans, the Oli government also frequently brushes aside concerns about illegal North Korean businesses in Nepal. The Americans would like no less than the shut-down of the North Korean Embassy in Kathmandu.

Will the Chinese railway come trundling into Kathmandu soon after Xi’s visit? Unlikely. With Indian markets as its final target, China sees no utility in extending the railway into Nepal without first getting India’s nod to take it all the way to UP and Bihar. A purely grants-based railway for Nepal is thus a no-no. Yet many big-ticket bilateral projects may yet be announced during Xi’s Kathmandu trip, projects that yield both economic and geostrategic benefits to China.

A visit of the Chinese president and all the projects he brings along will undoubtedly alarm the Indians and the Americans. There are bound to be retaliatory gestures. Nepal is likely to discover the perils of dual membership of the seemingly mutually exclusive BRI and Indo-Pacific clubs. Hope Nepali government officials and political leaders know what they are getting into.

 Only after Nepal promised India it would limit its BRI involvement did India agree to Nepal’s participation in it. Thus how President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative will play out in Nepal is anyone’s guess. In an interview with APEX, Deep Kumar Upadhyay, the Nepali envoy in India in 2017 as Nepal’s BRI membership was being negotiated, says it was difficult to convince New Delhi that Nepal joining the initiative would not hurt its interests. Apparently, the deal was that Nepal would limit itself to ‘connectivity’ projects under the BRI. But I could not agree with Upadhyay’s other assertion in the same interview that India is not at all worried about the ‘Nepal-tilting-towards-China’ narrative. He seemed to imply that India understands that most such narratives emerge from people with little knowledge of how diplomacy works. In this thinking, the appointment of S Jaishankar, who has served as India’s ambassador to both the US and China, as the new Minister of External Affairs, is a sign of growing amity between India and China. Jaishankar knows Beijing so well he will allow no India-China tiff to balloon into a crisis.

A corollary to this argument is that with political-level engagements between India and China as good as ever, they will increasingly see eye to eye on their immediate neighbor­hood. Plus, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now so strong he can clear all bureaucratic obstacles and pursue a harmo­nious neighborhood policy. It was interesting to hear former ambassador Upadhyay say that during his twin tenures in New Delhi, he felt PM Modi personally oversaw India’s Nepal policy. If so, was the blockade Modi’s doing entirely? Or do we conclude that however powerful the prime minister, the bureaucrats lower down the hierarchy invariably prevail when it comes to India’s relations with smaller countries?

A Nepali team is currently in China for the finalization of the Detailed Project Report of the proposed Rasuwagadhi-Kath­mandu rail link. Nepal argues the DPR as well as the con­struction of the $2.5 billion project should be funded with Chinese grants. China insists on a loan agreement. It is also clear that India rather than Nepal is China’s target market. So unless New Delhi gives its go-ahead to the rail line, it makes no economic sense for China just to bring it to Nepal and extend it no farther.

Separately, whatever Xi and Modi decide between them, the Indian establishment will continue to have to rely on the same old MEA bureaucrats to craft India’s Nepal policy. Even if Modi wants to oversee Nepal policy himself, he does not have the time, with his hands full with a Trumpian US, an increasingly assertive China, and the old nemesis Pakistan. Or could it be that the Indians, their hands badly singed by the blockade, will from now on be happy to work behind the scenes while the US is given the lead role in Nepal, as one seasoned diplomat hinted to me? I for one don’t believe India will ever willingly give up, or even appear to do so, its near-absolute sway over Nepal.