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Acting US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia David J Ranz’s Nepal visit was part of recent American efforts to ‘explain’ to Nepalis the much-hyped Indo-Pacific Strategy. To this end, senior American officials have been regularly visiting Kathmandu. The process of Nepali scholars and journalists being ferried to the US for the same purpose has also begun. Separately, while Ranz was in Nepal, Shambhu Kattel reported in Annapurna Post of the third joint ‘anti-terrorism’ military drills between Nepal and China, planned for August-September.

These two seemingly unrelated events have many common threads. The Americans, who see Nepal playing a ‘central role’ in the Indo-Pacific, want to minimize Nepal’s participa­tion in the BRI. They are loath to see China’s growing activism in what they have traditionally viewed as the perfect outpost from which to monitor the communist China’s rise. Nepal’s joint anti-terrorism military drills with China trouble them. The Indians too have never gotten over how Nepal, a keen participant in Chinese military exercises, ditched the India-led BIMSTEC military anti-terrorism drills in Pune last year.

The Indians and the Americans have many differences over how they view South Asia. But they also know that only by working together can they check China’s expanding presence here—the joint military drills with Nepal the perfect manifes­tation of this presence. Both India and the US have repeatedly objected to Nepal’s military exercises with China. Under pressure, the then Army Chief Rajendra Chhetri had even assured the Americans that he would not allow the exercises to go ahead—only to be overridden by his political masters.

But why is the focus of Nepal-China military drills the loaded concept of ‘anti-terrorism’? Those in the know say the Chinese pushed for anti-terror drills for two reasons: one, it would send a clear message to the Indians and Americans that China has a lot of clout in Nepal; and two, China wanted to draw the world’s attention to Uighur ‘extremism’ in Xin­jiang and its ‘success’ in controlling it: If the Americans can have terrorist correction facilities why can’t the Chinese have similar re-education camps of their own?

A recent editorial in the Chinese Communist Party mouth­piece Global Times was instructive: “New Zealand and Sri Lanka have recently suffered religious massacres. Xinjiang, in turn, has been shielded from the flow of international terrorism and extremism. The international opinion will gradually turn in favor of Xinjiang governance.” The larger goal is to convince the international community that the Uighur extremism in Xinjiang, if left uncontrolled, could lead to another New Zealand or Sri Lanka.

The implicit message of Ranz when he talked to Home Min­ister Ram Bahadur Thapa about Nepal needing to crack down on terrorism—including by installing the American PIECES border control database system at the TIA—is that western help is essential for Nepal to keep the ‘scheming Chinese’ in check. Rest assured: In the face of this heightened American concern in Nepal, the Chinese are not sitting quietly either

 One is a de jure communist one-party state. The other is a communist dictatorship in all but name. Yet both the countries have of late enjoyed remarkable economic success. Vietnam’s economy grew by an average of 6.3 per­cent between 2005 and 2018. The rise of Cambodia has been even more stellar, with its GDP growing at an astonishing 7.59 percent in average between 1994 and 2017. During his visit to these two countries, Prime Minister KP Oli, we are told, hopes to discover the secret sauce of their economic miracle and apply it to Nepal. But the lead-up has been marred by growing criticism of the ‘irrelevant’ visits to these distant countries from which Nepal has little to gain. Besides, the criticism goes, the prime minister of the new federal democratic republic paying an official visit to two undemocratic and illiberal countries will send all kinds of wrong signals to the international community. These criti­cisms miss the point.

Nepal, a full-fledged democracy, is no Vietnam. The ‘Social­ist Republic’ with a GDP of $224 billion is home to nearly 100m people, compared with Nepal’s GDP of around $25 billion and 30m people. Nor is Nepal as closely connected to the west as Vietnam. Oli may get some pointers on com­munist rule from Vietnam (where he is also addressing an international conference). But his true destination is Cambo­dia. It has half the population of Nepal, but a near identical GDP-size and comparable per capita income. Cambodia is also a democracy, of a kind, with a hard-left government at the helm. What PM Oli and his NCP comrades want to know is: How does a communist party tweak state machinery to hold power for 40 consecutive years while also maintaining a veneer of democracy?

In fact, PM Oli seems fascinated by his Cambodian counter­part, Hun Sen, who has been in power for 34 years in a row. Oli held an extensive one-on-one with Hun Sen while he was in New York for the UNGA in September 2018. Two months later, the two again held extensive consultations on the side­lines of the Asia Pacific Summit in Kathmandu. So keen was PM Oli to confer with Hun Sen that he stayed for three days in Soaltee Hotel, which was hosting the Cambodian prime minister in Kathmandu.

While he is in Cambodia, besides trying to learn a few tricks of the trade in centralization of power from Hun Sen, Oli will also discuss another common fascination: China. How does Cambodia maintain “best ever” relations with China while its neighbors remain highly suspicious of the Middle Kingdom? With such close ties to Beijing, isn’t it increasingly harder for Phnom Penh to deal with western powers? Can a ruler in this region be so openly pro-China and still retain power for so long?

After mounting criticism of its ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, the Chinese leadership seemed keen to emphasize ‘debt sustainability’ for all BRI participant countries, at the just-concluded second BRI Forum in Beijing. It also commit­ted to more transparency in BRI projects. This is music to the ears of the advocates of greater connectivity with China, which is essential if Nepal is to shed its ‘India-locked’ status. Yet in this corruption-ridden and foreign-dependent country there is also a strong case for transparency and sustainability of any kind of external debt, from China or any other country or institution.

Most notably, neither India nor the US took part in the BRI Forum, in any capacity. (Attending the forum were 37 heads of state and representatives from nearly 100 countries.) In the lead-up to the second forum, concerns over a debt trap filled Indian and US media outlets, if sometimes with a grudging acceptance of BRI’s benefits. The Americans maintain Nepal should resist Chinese financing unless it’s clearly in Nepal’s interest. This worries China. For the Chinese, the Ameri­can involvement in Nepal is strategic and aimed at undercutting China’s rise. This is why the ‘US-spon­sored Free Tibet activism’ in Nepal is again a growing concern for Beijing.

The ‘US-sponsored Free Tibet activism’ in Nepal is again a growing concern for Beijing

Any support Nepal gets via the BRI may be contingent on Nepal’s ability (or lack thereof ) to deal with this core security issue for China. Yet the Chinese gave President Bhandari’s visit the highest impor­tance, notwithstanding that it had to host so many high-level dignitaries all at once. Bhandari’s coverage in the Chinese media was lavish. Particularly notable was how Nepal was portrayed as an integral part of the BRI. During the trip the all-important protocols to the transit and transport treaty were signed too. A full-fledged feasibility study of the Key­rung-Kathmandu rail should soon start. It would be a surprise if these developments didn’t worry New Delhi. Many believe a new, more muscular Indian policy, one aimed at limiting China’s growing clout in Nepal, is in the cards.

When President Xi comes to Kathmandu, most likely around October, Indian and western concerns will reach new heights. The Oli government’s central foreign policy plank of ‘diversification’ away from India, to avoid another blockade ‘at all cost’, is the right one. Yet with India, China and the US all tugging in different directions, it will also be devilishly difficult to pull off.

After mounting criticism of its ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, the Chinese leadership seemed keen to emphasize ‘debt sustainability’ for all BRI participant countries, at the just-concluded second BRI Forum in Beijing. It also commit­ted to more transparency in BRI projects. This is music to the ears of the advocates of greater connectivity with China, which is essential if Nepal is to shed its ‘India-locked’ status. Yet in this corruption-ridden and foreign-dependent country there is also a strong case for transparency and sustainability of any kind of external debt, from China or any other country or institution.

Most notably, neither India nor the US took part in the BRI Forum, in any capacity. (Attending the forum were 37 heads of state and representatives from nearly 100 countries.) In the lead-up to the second forum, concerns over a debt trap filled Indian and US media outlets, if sometimes with a grudging acceptance of BRI’s benefits. The Americans maintain Nepal should resist Chinese financing unless it’s clearly in Nepal’s interest. This worries China. For the Chinese, the Ameri­can involvement in Nepal is strategic and aimed at undercutting China’s rise. This is why the ‘US-spon­sored Free Tibet activism’ in Nepal is again a growing concern for Beijing.

Any support Nepal gets via the BRI may be contingent on Nepal’s ability (or lack thereof ) to deal with this core security issue for China. Yet the Chinese gave President Bhandari’s visit the highest impor­tance, notwithstanding that it had to host so many high-level dignitaries all at once. Bhandari’s coverage in the Chinese media was lavish. Particularly notable was how Nepal was portrayed as an integral part of the BRI. During the trip the all-important protocols to the transit and transport treaty were signed too. A full-fledged feasibility study of the Key­rung-Kathmandu rail should soon start. It would be a surprise if these developments didn’t worry New Delhi. Many believe a new, more muscular Indian policy, one aimed at limiting China’s growing clout in Nepal, is in the cards.

When President Xi comes to Kathmandu, most likely around October, Indian and western concerns will reach new heights. The Oli government’s central foreign policy plank of ‘diversification’ away from India, to avoid another blockade ‘at all cost’, is the right one. Yet with India, China and the US all tugging in different directions, it will also be devilishly difficult to pull off.