Oli on the mark

Perhaps the only person who is definitely happy with the federal government’s 11-point agreement with CK Raut’s secessionist party is Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Forget the main opposition Nepali Congress, Oli didn’t even consult senior leaders in his own party before he signed the agreement. There has thus been vociferous opposition of the ‘hush-hush’ and ‘ambiguous’ agreement, even from within the ruling Nepal Communist Party. Congress has repeatedly asked PM Oli to come clean on it, as have the two main Madhesi parties.

 

Even Raut seems to be in a dilemma whether to talk up the agreement. In a way, Raut wants to have his cake and eat it too. Had he not realized the futility of the quest for an independent Madhes through extra-constitutional means, he would not have signed it. But having done so, he also does not want to lose his core support base comprising Madhesi youths mesmerized by his larger-than-life per­sona and the radical solutions to Madhesi marginalization he offered over the years. As it is, these youths won’t be amused by the agreement with Oli, who was until recently projected as Mad­hes’s ‘Enemy number 1’.

To get Raut to agree to such vague terminology is a political victory for Oli

But nor does Raut want to violate the agree­ment with the govern­ment by saying some­thing incendiary. He rather seems intent on biding his time: to gauge the public pulse, weigh India’s response and explore political options. Either way, he is fighting an uphill battle. With the field of mainstream Mad­hesi politics already crowded, open politics will not be easy for Raut, whether or not he sticks to his referendum agenda on the final status of Madhes.

 

Many political analysts have been critical of PM Oli for what they suspect is his tacit agreement for a referendum in Madhes, which, they say, is reflected in the ambiguous second point of the 11-point accord that seems to leave open the prospect of a referendum. But then, just to get Raut to agree to such vague terminology, with no clear promises, is a political victory for Oli. It has stolen the thunder of the firebrand revolutionary that was CK Raut, and turned him into just another opportunistic politician in the Madhesi eyes.

 

Some Madhesi intellectuals are against the government’s agreement with Raut, which they see as kicking the Madhesi radicalism can down the road. But if Oli’s goal was to diffuse the threat of secession, however big or small, or at least to reduce its appeal as a viable option among the Madhesi youth, he has succeeded.

 

Why the ban on CPN is justified

For once Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli was on the money. Referring to Netra Bikram Chand ‘Biplob’-led Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), he asked, how can an outfit that sets off bombs in public places, shakes down businesses, and spreads terror be called a political party? With violence at the heart of its modus operandi, the group has behaved more like a terrorist organization than a political party. The government was thus perfectly justified in banning it. Or was it?

 

As the CPN never registered with the Election Commission, some argue, it cannot be banned under existing laws. In order to do so, the parliament will have to pass new laws. But that is playing with technicalities. The absence of law should not deter the government from its primary duty: protecting its citizens at all times, and making them feel safe and secure. It could not look on helplessly even as its citizens were being killed and openly extorted.

 

 The kind of communist utopia Biplob and his party have in mind is just not happening

 

Unlike the CPN, the outfit of CK Raut that was pressing for a separate Madhes, with violence if necessary, had not ter­rorized common people. After it gave up its seces­sionist agenda and agreed to abide by the consti­tution, the government had no problem talking to Raut, and helping him make a transition to the political mainstream. By contrast, while Biplob says he is not averse to talking with the government, he has continued with his violent activities, even after the government released his spokesperson as a goodwill gesture. In fact, his party of late has reportedly been busy raising a militia.

 

Biplob and his ilk do not seem to realize that even though they may still enjoy support in some enclaves of western Nepal, their incipient rebellion is unlikely to get broader approval. After the bloody Maoist insurgency that claimed 17,000 lives, Nepalis have no appetite for more vio­lence. Not just that. The two police forces and the army, bat­tle-hardened during the insurgency, are far better equipped to tackle an insurrection than they were in 1996, the year the civil war started.

 

The kind of communist utopia Biplob and his party have in mind is just not happening. The sooner they realize the futility of their quest and give up violence, the better it is for everyone, including themselves. If not, they deserve to be treated firmly.

Foreign policy via president

 Earlier in the week, a video of motorists in Kathmandu protesting and violating the ‘no vehicle’ restriction imposed to allow President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s motorcade to pass went viral. Being made to wait out in a cold night for 40 minutes, with no sign of Her Excellency, would have tested the patience of the most jaded commuter. A day later, newspapers carried the story of President Bhan­dari’s upcoming trip to New York where she will take part in the 63rd session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women and be a part of the ‘High-Level Roundtable: How Women Leaders Change the World’.

 

A ceremonial head of state, Bhandari has a knack of get­ting into controversy in her country. She apparently wants the most lavish of motorcades, a more opulent President’s Office—even if the adjacent police academy has to be razed for the purpose—a spanking new chopper to crisscross the country, and she likes the high and mighty bowing and scraping before her. In comparison, her foreign trips have drawn a more balanced response. Widely criticized for ‘inviting herself’ to Qatar, Bhandari was also lauded for her measured speech highlighting Nepal’s pre­carious climatic position at the UN climate meet in Poland.

 

 So long as the bird is killed, what does it matter who throws the stone?

 

On April 24, she will fly to Beijing to attend the second BRI conference. Foreign Ministry sources say the visit will be meaningful as Bhandari will discuss important BRI projects with her Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping; and the long-stuck BRI projects in Nepal could finally get some momentum. Moreover, she will formally invite President Xi to Nepal. The communist government, in this light, seems intent on using the good offices of the president to secure its diplomatic goals. This is more astute than may appear on the surface.

 

As Nepal is pulled even deeper into the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and with Prime Minister KP Oli seen in New Delhi as an old China sympathizer, the communist government is looking to get closer to China via the president: So long as the bird is killed, what does it matter who throws the stone? Bhandari, who seems in total comfort in the patriarchal world she inhabits back home, may struggle to assert herself as a ‘woman leader who can change the world’. But while she is in the Big Apple, the communist government will be happy if she can carry out a less demanding responsibility: Can she do some legwork to expand Nepal’s diplomatic relations beyond the existing 163 countries and add a feather to the Oli government’s diplomatic cap, for instance?

Moving on from debt-trap diplomacy

The Americans seldom fail to remind the world of the perils of falling into China’s ‘debt trap’, as embodied in President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia Joe Felter did the same during his brief stay in Nepal earlier this week. As reported in The Kathmandu Post, and speaking like a spokesperson for the Nepal government, Felter said: “We welcome a constructive relation with China, we welcome the investment by China, but as long as that investment is designed to serve the interest of Nepal and not just China.”

The Chinese were not amused. A day later, Chinese Ambas­sador to Nepal, Hou Yanqi, told the Global Times, “The sup­port and assistance China has offered have no political strings attached and [China] does not interfere in [Nepal’s] domestic affairs.” It is “very ridiculous” for someone to try to interfere in friendly relations between China and Nepal, she added.

 

Those fearful of ‘autocratic’ China’s influence have long invoked the dangers of getting close to the dragon

 

Those fearful of the rise of ‘autocratic’ China’s influence in Nepal have long invoked the dangers of getting too close to the fire-breathing dragon. “Look at what happened in Hambantota!” is their most common refrain. But as Ameet Dhakal recently reported in Setopati, there is an alternative narrative to Hambantota. Accord­ing to the prominent Sri Lankan economist Nis­han de Mel he quotes, the Lankans also offered the US and India a chance to operate the port. Both declined. This correspondent has himself heard more than one Sri Lankan intellectual say there should be a more nuanced reading of the monolithic ‘BRI is evil’ narrative.

 

It is also interesting that the US is reminding Nepal of the dangers of the BRI when the Chinese are themselves skeptical of the big infrastructure projects Nepal wants them to build under the initiative. For instance, they have in recent times told Nepali officials that a costly cross-border rail may not be in Nepal’s economic interest. “Even if China builds the rail line, who will ensure its upkeep in Nepal? Does Nepal have enough railway engineers, for instance?” one Kathman­du-based Chinese official recently asked this correspondent. Instead, “why not focus on more economically feasible and bilaterally beneficial projects?”

 

Far from looking to trap Nepal in debt it cannot repay, the Chinese approach in Nepal has been more business-minded in recent times, which is perhaps how it should be. And who says good business decisions don’t make geostrategic sense?