Submit your Article

A crucial contradiction seems to be developing in Nepal’s relations with China. On the one hand, our political leaders never tire of highlighting all the ways in which Nepal can benefit from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the other, Nepal has failed to present any concrete BRI proposal that the Chinese can seriously consider. The Chinese team under Foreign Minister Wang Yi that was recently in Kathmandu was flummoxed when its Nepali negotiating counterparts could present not a single solid proposal on prospective BRI projects.

The much-ballyhooed rail link between the two countries also came up for discussions. The Chinese side asked if Nepal had any plans on the Nepal-leg of the rail line from Rasuagadhi to Kathmandu. Instead of a firm reply, the Nepali side posed a curious counter-question: Why doesn’t China conduct the DPR for the same with its own money? But how, the Chinese responded, will Nepal feel ownership of the project in which it has no investment? This time no answer was forthcoming.

High-level Nepali and Chinese officials have been meeting often of late, and each time it is the same story. Basically, Nepal wants China to do everything: come up with project plans, prepare the DPRs, and complete the proposed projects on its own. Something else happens routinely as well. For instance, the political leadership in Nepal expresses its full commitment to some BRI project. Enthused, the Chinese start preparing. Then, they meet the Nepali bureaucrats across the table.

The Nepali bureaucrats come up with a hundred reasons why the proposed project won’t fly. “Are your bureaucrats actually working for Nepal?” asks a senior Chinese official closely involved in recent Nepal-China negotiations. The common perception is that the entire Nepali bureaucracy has become pro-Chinese after the Indian blockade of 2015-16. The endless stream of pleasure trips of our bureaucrats to the Middle Kingdom only reinforces this perception. But there is clearly more to the story than meets the eye.

On the part of the Chinese, one other thing is amply clear. They are bothered by the heightened American activism in South Asia and want its partner countries in the region to keep a safe distance from the sole superpower. Chinese advice to senior communist leaders to extricate Nepal from the Indo-Pacific Strategy naturally follows. In fact, Xi is coming primarily to strengthen China’s hand in Nepal vis-à-vis the US. But is it certain that Xi will come? Not if the Chinese are not assured on a possible PR debacle.

For instance, a pro-Tibet protestor showing the Snow Lion to President Xi during his Kathmandu trip and the image being broadcast around the world. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi thus spent most of his time in Kathmandu seeking assurance that such embarrassment to the Paramount Leader will be avoided at all cost. Given China’s troubled history with its own Muslims, it fears a possible backlash from the Nepali Muslim community as well. Even the small, seemingly innocuous protest outside the Chinese Embassy during Wang’s trip was seen as a red flag in Beijing. Thus no amount of preparation is enough.

If Xi is determined to come and the Nepali political leadership committed to host him, the trip will most likely go ahead. If Xi comes, expect one Narendra Damodardas Modi to come rushing hot on his heels.

Tens of thousands of Nepali speakers in India’s north-eastern state of Assam feel let down by the upgraded National Register of Citizens (NRC) of India that was published on August 31. (Assam is the first Indian state to upgrade its NRC compo­nent.) As many as 80,000 Nepali speakers have been excluded from this NRC list and they are worried about being stateless. But Ganga Poudel, vice-pres­ident of the Gorkha Develop­ment Council, says all hope is not lost. Anyone excluded from the final list has 120 days to appeal against the decision through a foreigner’s tribunal. Poudel says he would do all he can to help those whose names did not appear on the list.

A total of around 31.1 million people in the state had applied to have their names listed, but about 1.9 million people were excluded. Most of them are people who migrated to Assam from Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Poudel says those people whose citizen­ship is questionable or whose surnames differ from those of their parents or children have been left out.

As many as 2.5 million Nepali-speaking people live in Assam. About 25 percent of them were missing from an earlier draft list. “We were confident that these names would appear on the final list, but that did not happen,” says Poudel. He adds that some may be rendered stateless if they are not able to submit certain documents to prove residency.

Indian media have men­tioned that if the victims do not get justice in international courts, they can knock on the doors of the Indian High Court and Supreme Court. Many independent bodies claim that although this option is available, as many as 25,000 Nepali-speakers would still not make it to the list. Those whose names did not appear on the list could be arrested and detained. But Assam’s Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal says that just because their names are not on the list does not mean they will be taken into custody.

Assam shares borders with Bhutan and Bangladesh and is considered a sensitive state. The Indian government claims that there is illegal trafficking of humans and animals into the state. It says the list was updated in order to check ille­gal immigrants from Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Secu­rity in Assam has been beefed up since the publication of the list.

There are Nepalis in every district of Assam. The major­ity of residents in Surajpur district are Nepalis, and there is a big group of people from western Nepal in Kamrup metropolis.

The All Assam Gorkha Stu­dent Union has asked for a thorough investigation as it believes the list is flawed. Pres­ident Prem Tamang has been protesting the process of cre­ating this list from the start, claiming that it discriminates against Nepali speakers.

According to the 2011 population census, there are about 31.1 million people in the 33 districts of Assam.

State visits are the highest level of diplomatic engage­ment between two sovereign countries. They signal the two are in good terms, value one another, and want to further bilateral ties. By visiting Nepal four times in the five years of his first term as the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi conveyed the great value he placed on Nepal-India ties. (Of course, he wouldn’t have come if these trips also didn’t boost his pro-Hindu credentials and his image of a globally recognized statesman back home.) Modi had come to Nepal within two months of becoming prime minister in May 2014. In his second inning, he hasn’t been here for three months. Even in this short time, Modi has already visited nine countries, including making state visits to other neighborhood countries like the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. This suggests something is amiss in Nepal-India relations, which is also why India has refused to accept the joint EPG report. Perhaps it was Nepal’s reluctance to make an official statement in recognition of India’s recent decision on Jammu & Kashmir—unlike the Maldives and Bhutan. Per­haps the Indians are unhappy with the growing proximity of the Nepali political class with the Chinese. Or perhaps Modi sees no personal benefit in visiting Nepal after his second electoral victory.

By contrast, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will be in Kathmandu on September 8 to pave the way for the long-awaited Nepal visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Again, a state visit is also a lot of signaling. So, if Xi comes, will it be an unmistakable sign of exemplary Nepal-China ties? Not nec­essarily. It will be more a case of the Chinese wanting to give a clear message to other powers that it is still a potent force in Nepal. The message is aimed less at the Indians (whom the Chinese still see as their ‘juniors’) than at the Americans (whose success the Chinese want to emulate in every field). The unfolding of the military-centric Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in Nepal is a big bother up north.

Xi, with his penchant for grandeur, could announce some big projects in Nepal, including in PM Oli’s home district of Jhapa. And Xi will be warmly received. Whatever the per­sonal calculations of individual NCP leaders, as a political party, they are unanimous about the urgency of enhanc­ing relations with China. This is why a priority of the new National Security Policy is to ‘prevent another blockade’ at any cost. This, in the reckoning of the ruling communist party grandees, will be possible only through more balance between India and China.

Xi’s Kathmandu trip could also hasten Modi’s, in what will be his first since his reelection. India and China are not openly confrontational these days. Yet they have also come to view each other as natural adversaries in South Asia jostling for influence in the region, particularly after India’s embrace of the IPS. The Indian political leadership will not let its tra­ditional sway in the region wane easily. Now that the Nepali foreign minister has spoken in favor of India’s stand on J&K, Modi will have an added incentive to visit Nepal. But after the fanfare that will surround Xi’s visit, Nepal will be under pressure to match it when Modi comes to town.

 Kathmandu was not densely populated in those days. Singha Durbar was surrounded by fields where one could hear jack­als howl at night. It was not easy to go to and come back from Singha Durbar in the middle of the night. There were no taxis and lawmakers had no private vehicles. Except for a few elites, almost everybody com­muted on foot. “Once all the members of the House of Representatives assembled on the midnight of 30 June 1959, the Secretary read out the following letter received from the Chief Sec­retary of the King. To begin House proceedings, we have nominated Giri Prasad Budathoki as the exec­utive chairperson,” states a parlia­mentary record.

King Mahendra had felt a sense of alarm after the Congress won a two-third majority in the country’s first parliamentary election. From the very beginning, he was into expand­ing the circle of people critical of the Congress. The first example of that was the nomination of the party’s loudest critics to the upper house of parliament. On the nomination list was Dil Bahadur Shrestha, who had lost in the election. Others like Surya Bahadur Thapa, Nagendra Prasad Rijal, Mukti Nath Sharma, Chandra Man Thakali, Pashupati Ghosh, and Tsering Tenzin Lama, all of whom had been defeated in the polls, ended up becoming members of the upper house. Well-known Con­gress denouncers like Bharat Mani Sharma, Bal Chandra Sharma and Laxman Jung Bahadur Singh were among those chosen by the king. Differences between Mahendra and BP had arisen ever since the time of the upper house nomination.

King Mahendra adopted a policy of promoting whoever reviled BP the most. Bishwa Bandhu Thapa, the then Congress whip had once told me, “King Mahendra wanted to belittle BP at any cost. But instead of doing that himself, he used oth­ers. The palace has a habit of find­ing people to malign those it does not approve of, while managing to maintain a veneer of respectability for itself.”

Mahendra was afraid of being a ruler in name only as long as BP was prime minister. His primary interest was to rule the country directly. To that end, Mahendra was keen on using his loyalists to discredit the prime minister and the parliamen­tary system.

When BP was appointed prime minister, the palace started conspiring against the Congress from within the party itself. It brought into its fold Dr Tulsi Giri and Bishwa Bandhu Thapa, who were close to BP. It started invit­ing lawmakers for lunch and rous­ing them to go against the govern­ment. King Mahendra was eager to use anyone he could find—from hermits to spies—in order make the government a failure.

On 30 January 1960, he went on a tour of western Nepal, where he said in a speech: “I also want to tell you that I have certain duties, such as protecting the sovereignty, nationality and other interests of the country. Never ever will I quit doing whatever it takes to clear any hurdle in safeguarding such inter­ests—for which I want every Nepali’s support.”

A series of such speeches had prompted speculation that Mahen­dra would dissolve the government. The number of people unwilling to pay taxes and registering complaints with the palace against the govern­ment was on the rise.

Prime Minister Koirala had also suspected a conspiracy against him. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Subarna Shumsher, who was on a visit to Calcutta, had told BP that the king was planning a coup, but because the date of the British queen’s visit to Nepal had already been set, he probably would not mount it before that. Before leaving for Calcutta, Subarna Shumsher had told BP that he would discuss the king’s plan with him in detail once he returns to Kathmandu. The British queen was scheduled to visit Nepal on 26 February 1961. The Congress had guessed that a coup against a democratic government would not take place on the eve of the visit of a country’s queen where the parliamentary system was born. The prediction turned out to be stupendously wrong O

Next week’s ‘Vault of history’ column will discuss the immediate aftermath of the royal coup