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Though geographically the largest of 77 districts in Nepal, Dolpa is one of its most remote and inaccessible due to its mountainous and hilly terrain. According to the Dolpa District Administration Office, only 0.31 percent of the total area is arable land, and just nine percent of that cultivated land has irrigation facilities. During winter, the entire landscape is blanketed in snow, making agriculture unproductive. The district can only produce enough grain to last for about five months, forcing residents to depend on rice brought in from other districts.

While Dolpa lags behind other districts in every human development index, it is ahead in one aspect: its abundant and valuable medicinal herbs. The Dolpa Division Forest Office reports that the highly-prized yarsagumba, which sells for millions of rupees per kilogram, is found in greater quantities in Dolpa than in any other district in Nepal.

Bishnu Bahadur Rokaya from Lahara village of Thuli Bheri Municipality-3, earned up to Rs 3.2m from a single kilogram of yarsagumba last year. While the value of yarsagumba has been increasing annually, its production and collection have been declining.

Chhiring Lama, a local collector, says until a few years ago, a person could collect an average of 200 yarsas. Now, it’s difficult to find even 40 or 50. The usual collection season is May and June, but climate change has made the weather unpredictable. 

“Sometimes it snows so much it buries people; and other times the snow melts before people can even get there. When the season starts, collectors who arrive early pick the young sprouts, which is also a problem,” says Lama.

According to the  Karnali Province Forest Directorate, the quantity of yarsagumba found in the meadows of Karnali’s Humla, Jumla, Kalikot, Mugu, Dolpa, and Western Rukum districts has decreased, along with the revenue collected from it.

In the fiscal year 2022/23, the directorate collected Rs 12.74m in revenue from 411 kg of exported yarsagumba. The following fiscal year, this amount plummeted to Rs 5.94m with just 191 kg yarsagumba exported.

Data from previous years also show a gradual decrease: 306 kg in 2017/18, 301 kg in 2018/19, and just 291 kg in 2019/20 were exported from the five yarsagumba-producing districts of Karnali.

This decline was flagged by the Nepal Rastra Bank almost a decade ago. A 2015 survey on the impact of yarsagumba on the Nepali economy raised concerns about improper waste management at collection sites. The survey concluded that activities like indiscriminate logging, setting fires, and scattered waste from pack animals in yarsagumba habitats were having an adverse effect on the environment. 

The presence of thousands of collectors who camp for weeks or even months negatively impacts the forest and national park environment. The survey also found that deforestation for temporary shelters and firewood, along with the clearing of ‘sunbuki’ grass (the main food source for the yarsagumba-producing larva), was contributing to the problem.

Disappearing indigenous crops

Climate change isn’t just threatening the valuable biological commodity like yarsagumba; It’s also causing the gradual disappearance of traditional indigenous crops cultivated in Upper Karnali. The production of nutritious, natural, and organic indigenous crops like chino, kaguno, millet, buckwheat, barley, latte, Marshe rice, local beans, and wheat has been steadily declining.

Krishna Jaisi, a farmer from Rodikot, Sarkegad Rural Municipality-7, Humla, vividly remembers when he would sell a few quintals of Marshe rice from his 3-bigha field in Surkhet. The nutrient-rich Marshe rice would last his family for a year, and selling the surplus helped support his household.

Today, Karnali’s agriculture, which traditionally relies on rainfall, is being devastated by drought, intermittent rainfall, and excessive rain. In addition, the increased growth of weeds and pests due to seasonal changes has become another major problem. The Agricultural Research Center in Dashrathpur, Surkhet, reports that indigenous crops are at risk due to changing weather patterns and an increase in various diseases and pests.

The directorate is currently testing over 200 different climate-resilient food crop varieties suitable for the soil in various Karnali districts. According to the center’s director, Devanidhi Tiwari, they are testing 37 new varieties of paddy, millet, maize, wheat, mustard, buckwheat, peanuts, and soybeans.

Bharat Budhathapa, a farmer from Jumla, says that since farming depends on traditional methods and rainfall, there’s no telling when excessive rain will destroy the crops or when a lack of rain will kill the seeds. He had started an apple farm with 4,000 saplings across 17,000 square meters, but on May 8 and 9, a two-day hailstorm destroyed his crops, causing an estimated loss of Rs 1.5m.

“As a commercial farmer, there’s no certainty for any crop, not just traditional rice,” he says. “Sometimes there’s no rain when you need it, and other times it pours day and night, making things miserable.”

No solutions, no plans

While climate change continues to destroy Karnali’s indigenous crops, the Karnali Provincial Government has created a special logo called ‘Mulyawan’ (Valuable) to brand and promote their value and significance. The province has officially listed chino, kaguno, barley, latte (marshe), buckwheat, Jumli Marshe, millet, and local beans as indigenous crops.

However, the province has no concrete plans, strategies, or budget to protect the native seeds in a climate-adaptive way. The first meeting of the Karnali Provincial Government’s Council of Ministers on 18 Feb 2017 decided to lay the foundation for organic agriculture and conserve indigenous crops, aiming to make Karnali an ‘Organic Province’. Based on this decision, the provincial government introduced the Organic Agriculture Act, 2018.

Despite this, the province has not created any specific climate-adaptive programs to make all its produce organic. According to Tara Baral, a ministry information officer, projects for the protection and promotion of organic and indigenous agriculture and livestock are conducted annually, but there are no plans or budgets specifically addressing climate change. However, he claims that the issue and problem of climate change are automatically addressed when focusing on organic and indigenous crop conservation.

Impact of climate change

According to the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, Nepal's high Himalayan and high hill regions are experiencing changes not only in temperature but also in rainfall patterns. A 2017 report from the department indicates that rainfall in the high Himalayan region is decreasing at a rate of 1.46 millimeters per year. The high hill region is experiencing an even greater decline, with a drop of 3.17 millimeters per year. Department spokesperson Bibhuti Pokharel states that rainfall in the Himalayan districts is fluctuating.

Rasuwa district, for example, is seeing a decrease in the number of rainy days, dropping by 0.9 to 1.18 days per year. This suggests a decline of about 12 rainy days in a decade. Similarly, rain-shadow districts like Manang and Mustang are also experiencing fewer rainy days, with declines of 0.1 and 0.2 days per year, respectively. In contrast, rainy days are increasing in Mugu and Humla, with a rise of 0.9 and 1.0 days per year, respectively.

Continuous dry spells are also fluctuating in these districts. They are increasing in Rasuwa, Manang, and Mustang by 1.6, 0.3, and 0.3 days per year, respectively. However, according to meteorologist Sudarshan Humagain from the department’s Climate Analysis Branch, continuous dry days are decreasing by one day per year in Humla.

Rising temperatures and disaster risks

The Department of Hydrology and Meteorology reports that temperatures are rising in the Himalayan region. Maximum temperatures in the high Himalayas are increasing by 0.086 degrees Celsius per year. Temperatures in the high hills are also rising at the same rate. Department spokesperson Pokharel says with temperatures rising, small glacial lakes are beginning to burst. There is a risk of more explosions if the trend continues.

In the high Himalayan region, the winter temperature increase rate is 0.101 degrees Celsius. Meteorologists warn if this rate continues, the temperature will rise by 1 degree Celsius in a decade during winter. The temperature rise rate in the high hills during winter is 0.070 degrees Celsius. Rising temperatures in both the high Himalayan and high hill regions will ultimately affect all parts of the country.

Meanwhile, melting glaciers are also disrupting the climate cycle. With Nepal’s economy tied to the Himalayas, the negative effects of climate change are causing hills to become barren. The increased melting of snow due to rising temperatures is forming new glacial lakes, and the risk of them bursting is increasing.

According to Basant Raj Adhikari, director at the Disaster Studies Center at the Institute of Engineering, the frequency of glacial lake bursts is increasing. “While large glacial lakes like the Tsho Rolpa are being monitored due to the risk of explosion, smaller ones are being neglected,” he says.

Adhikari explains that glacial lakes can be monitored using satellite imagery and additional equipment to give early warnings to at-risk communities. 

Hindu Kush Himalayas: An abnormal climate

According to the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), temperatures in all eight countries of the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region are expected to be above normal in 2025, with an increase of 0.5 to 2 degrees Celsius above the long-term average. Global and national weather forecasts had also predicted that much of South Asia would experience above-normal rainfall during the 2025 summer monsoon, with more rain expected in the Tibetan Plateau of China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan, while Afghanistan and Myanmar were expected to receive less.

ICIMOD estimates that this summer monsoon, temperatures across the entire HKH region could be up to 2 degrees Celsius above average. Floods have been the primary cause of death and economic damage in the region, with nearly three-quarters (72.5 percent) of floods between 1980 and 2024 occurring during the summer monsoon.

Meanwhile, the snow-covered area in the HKH has dropped to its lowest level in 23 years, at 23.6 percent below normal, creating a further water security crisis across South Asia. These impacts pose a serious threat to rivers, hydropower projects, agriculture, and the safety of Himalayan communities.

India is also experiencing an abnormal climate within the HKH region. This year’s monsoon alone was expected to have temperatures up to 2 degrees Celsius above average. Rainfall has also been irregular. India has experienced its highest monsoon rainfall since 2013, with a 21 percent increase above normal. Some northern Indian states saw more than a 1,200 percent increase in rainfall over a short period. According to ICIMOD, this has led to flash floods, cloudbursts with more than 100 millimeters of rain per hour, and landslides, which have killed hundreds of people and damaged critical infrastructure.

Nepal’s need for cooperation with HKH countries

ICIMOD’s April forecast report on snow in the HKH region predicts a lower-than-normal snow cover in 2025 for the third consecutive year. The HKH region is a biodiverse and culturally rich mountainous area spanning eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan.

This region is facing various crises from climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution, as well as rapid socio-economic changes. These are having a severe impact on ecosystems, natural resources, livelihoods, and human lives.

Geologist Adhikari states that the HKH region has seen significant changes from previous years to the present. He points to the recent floods in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and India’s Dhareli, along with negative impacts in Bhutan and Myanmar. With a large population and agriculture as the main profession in the HKH region, the increased rate of snowmelt is raising concerns about a lack of naturally available water.

Recalling the flood in Kerung, Rasuwa, he emphasizes the need for international cooperation in studying and researching cross-border disasters. “The upstream countries must share information with the downstream countries during a disaster,” he says.

The Department of Hydrology and Meteorology states that while there is some coordination related to weather systems, there is very little research in this region. Spokesperson Pokharel says, “The HKH nations need to unite for study and research.”

Dolly Alderton’s books, I think, come badly packaged. The publisher should really rethink the cover design. They are confusing and all over the place. Your eyes hover over the covers without taking much in. I wouldn’t have bought her books had I not read a few of her interviews—one on Elle magazine and another in British GQ—where she talks candidly about why she writes the kinds of stories that she does. I loved reading her interviews because she talks passionately about writing and life.

I read ‘Good Material’ a while back and enjoyed it. About a guy going through a breakup and trying to come to terms with it, Good Material was an interesting take on relationships and how different people view them differently. It was a little slow at times but Alderton’s writing was refreshing and honest and I really enjoyed the book. I had heard her debut novel ‘Ghosts’ was much better than Good Material and though I had seen the book at a few bookstores in town, I had been put off by its silly cover. I know I’m harping about the cover and they say you shouldn’t judge a book by its cover but with colorful patches and loud proclamations, it’s quite off-putting.

Alderton is a columnist for The Sunday Times and the author of the hugely popular memoir ‘Everything I Know About Love’ which won a National Book Awards (United Kingdom) in 2018. Many of my friends rave about the memoir but I haven’t found the book. I was actually looking for it when I came across Ghosts again and decided to give it a chance (despite the unappealing cover).

Ghosts is a bittersweet and sarcastic book about navigating single life in your 30s. Nina is in her 30s and all her friends are married and having babies. She, on the other hand, has recently broken up with her long time boyfriend. And he is getting engaged to this other girl he has only recently met. Then, she meets someone and they click. Everything looks perfect until he ghosts her, leaving her wondering just what went wrong. Aside from the romantic drama, Nina is also dealing with a difficult career, dwindling friendships, and worse, her beloved dad is slowly losing his memory while her mother seems to be having a mid-life crisis of sorts.

If you feel that’s a bit too much to be happening all at once, if you actually think about it life can sometimes unravel like that. It’s never a linear path, with one singular problem at a time. That is why Ghosts feels so relatable. Nina is not without flaws and you might even identify with one of her friends, depending on what’s going on in your life. The writing is smooth and flows with ease—you feel like a friend is talking to you, taking you through her life.

The book makes you smile, simmer in anger, and upsets you. But as it takes you through a rollercoaster of emotions, you feel better about life in general and more capable of handling whatever comes your way. It left me with an empowering ‘life’s like that’ attitude. I have to admit that it was hard to read at times because of the content but it’s definitely one of the best books I’ve read in a long time.

Fiction 

Ghosts

Dolly Alderton

Published: 2020

Publisher: Penguin Random House UK

Pages: 337, Paperback 

The global geopolitical stage has been rocked with multiple events, protracted theaters of conflict, and competing interests between different actors. At this time, the rapprochement and de-escalation between the two Asian giants, who have been otherwise seen as competitors and rivals, needs to be studied cautiously. The ties between two of the world’s largest economies went haywire after the clashes along the India-China border during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. It caused loss of lives to both sides, causing fundamental alteration in the ties between the two nations. 

After disengagement from the last friction point, namely the Patrolling Point 15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area in 2022, a hope of fragile calm in that region was expected. It needs to be noted that it is not the return of the pre-2020 status quo ante. But there has been an update since last October as both countries are actively pursuing to deescalate their border tensions and resuming some bilateral ties. There have been visits by the officials of both countries, including the Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and National Security Advisors. There is a resumption of flights after a gap of five years, re-opening of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage and lifting of import ban on fertilizers, rare earth metals, and tunnel machines are all part of this new deal. 

Whatever transpires in 2024-25 is a tentative, at most a fragile change. After the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi in August 2025, where he met Prime Minister Modi, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Doval, all agreed on the modalities of patrolling the borders, relaxation of Visa regimes, and possible opening of trade corridors. It is of some significance that this is the first meeting Prime Minister Modi will have had in seven years; his visit to meet Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin.

Nevertheless, all these measures do not indicate the resolution of the inherent conflicts. Border regulation systems are confidence-building measures and not solutions. India continues to raise objections to the CPEC, which passes through Kashmir, and the build-up of Chinese infrastructure along the LAC, among other factors, is bound to keep the mistrust tethered. 

In the Chinese view, the major strategic motivation of this rapprochement is the multifaceted and growing rivalry with the United States. China has expressed this through its foreign policy that is highly oriented toward its east coast, especially with the strained relationships with Taiwan and the South China Sea as well as the technology conflict with the United States. A constantly war-like border of hot troops with India, a country of increasing might, is an expensive and risky strategic distraction. The possibility of an accidental escalation might spell out a disastrous two-front scenario to Beijing, requiring it to divert its military and diplomatic resources. 

Such a Chinese strategic outlook over time has demonstrated as scholar Yun Sun has described, stabilizing relations on one front to free up resources and attention to a more urgent theater. This renewed thaw with India is a sensible de-risking policy, which will help Beijing in reducing the risk of war toward its western flank and redeploy its resources in the central arena of its standoff with the US and its allies. This is also a tactical thrust toward undermining the already existing Western rhetoric of a lone and threatening China, being surrounded by a complete coalition of democratic nations.

To India, the practical effect is a reprieve and a powerful endorsement of its diplomacy. On a pragmatic level, the military and economic burdens of the standoff have been enormous, and the de-escalation of direct tensions enables the government to concentrate on economic recovery and its long-term program of military modernisation. 

On a diplomatic level, the biggest achievement is the endorsement of its valued principle of strategic autonomy. This detente is not an isolated bilateral phenomenon but is directly tied to the changing geopolitical environment, specifically tensions with the United States. It must be noted that the defrosting is occurring against a background of what many consider to be the worst period in Indian relations with the US executive in decades. The imposition of high tariffs on Indian products by the Trump administration in the US has revealed the shortcomings of a relationship that was being marketed as a counterweight to China. 

In this regard, China has already expressed its discontent with the tariffs and underscored the importance of collaboration between the two Asian powerhouses against unilateral bullying. This has given a strategic leverage that Beijing has seized upon. Engaging with China, New Delhi plays to its partners in the Quad that the application is not an unconditional commitment against any one nation but a collaboration founded in mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific. This stance empowers India by demonstrating that it can juggle its complicated relationship with China in its own way, making it an independent and dominant power.

Among the strategic questions that the thaw poses and mostly depends upon is whether China would re-evaluate its Pakistan policy. Islamabad is vacillating once again between Beijing and Washington. On the one hand, it has inaugurated CPEC Phase 2, pursuing higher Chinese investment in infrastructure. 

On the other, it is renewing contacts with Washington, where Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has overtly solicited US investments and is executing diplomatic overtures to the Trump administration. Pakistan, however, would always be an essential ally to Beijing: a strategic partner, a corridor to the Arabian Sea and a warm client to export arms and finance. China is the major source of Pakistani imports of arms and rollover loans continue to be a major source of fiscal stability in Islamabad. It is due to this factor alone that there can be no likelihood of Beijing weakening its strategic commitment. 

Optics may, however, change. Such a cautious rapprochement with India does not imply that China will give up Pakistan. The most plausible is that of policy dualism, where China is to remain good friends with Islamabad and chooses to accept a limited cooperation dimension with New Delhi. This reflects its longstanding capacity to compartmentalize: advancing economic relations with India at the same time as keeping closer defence relations with Pakistan.

With a relative calm on its northern frontier, India will have time for maneuvering the bumpy roads of Trump’s foreign policy. The US’ strategic interest in India beyond Trump is a strong, independent India capable of anchoring regional stability. A stable border allows India to focus its resources and strategic attention on the broader Indo-Pacific, directly aligning with US goals. Crucially, it proves the US-India relationship is non-transactional and not solely defined by the current geopolitical rejig. Prime Minister Modi’s proposed visit to China and its outcomes are likely to define or redefine the limits and potential of this thaw.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Nepal's Prime Minister, KP Sharma Oli, has raised a strong objection to the recent agreement between India and China to resume trade through the Lipu Lekh Pass, a disputed territory claimed by Nepal.

PM Oli who is in China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit 2025, as well as activities to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday, where he emphasized that the Lipu Lekh Pass is part of Nepalese territory.

A statement from Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined Oli's position: "Referring to the recent understanding reached between India and China on border trade through Lipu Lekh Pass, the Rt. Hon Prime Minister stated that the territory belongs to Nepal and that the Government of Nepal has lodged a strong objection."

This issue stems from the agreement signed on August 19 during the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India. Both countries agreed to resume trade from Lipu Lekh, a site that remains disputed between Nepal and India. Following the agreement, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately issued diplomatic notes to both nations, expressing its objections.

In 2020, Nepal published a new political map incorporating Kalapani, Lipu Lekh, and Limiyadhura as part of its territory.

It remains unclear how the Chinese side has responded to Prime Minister Oli's statement. Prior to his departure to China for the SCO summit, PM Oli had confirmed that he would raise the Lipu Lekh issue with both India and China. It is unclear yet whether Oli and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will meet on the sidelines of SCO meeting.

In the bilateral meeting, Nepal PM expressed the hope that projects listed under the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) would be advanced, adding that Nepal seeks Chinese support in the areas of fertilizer, petroleum exploration, human resource development, climate resilience and other areas.

Speaking highly of the China-Nepal good-neighborly friendship in the past seven decades, Xi said that the high-quality Belt and Road cooperation between the two countries is advancing steadily at present, according to China. China is willing to work with Nepal to carry forward the traditional friendship and facilitate the greater progress of the China-Nepal Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship for Development and Prosperity, Xi noted.

Joint efforts should be made to enhance connectivity programs covering port, highway, power grid, aviation, communications and other fields, and cooperation in sectors including industry, agriculture and animal husbandry, new energy, environmental protection, oil and gas, artificial intelligence, education, health, as well as law enforcement and security, should be advanced, he added.

According to Chinese official media, Oli said that Nepal supports the China-proposed Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, and expects China to play a greater role in international affairs.