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Nepal has been passing through a volatile political phase following the violent protests of Sept 9, during which key state installations—including the Parliament building, Singha Durbar, and the President’s Office—were set on fire. The unrest created a serious political and constitutional vacuum, raising concerns about state stability and security. In the aftermath, the role of the Nepali Army (NA) came under intense public scrutiny.

Many members of the public and political leaders questioned why the NA failed to protect vital government institutions such as Singhadurbar. The Army, however, defended its actions, arguing that its top priority was to prevent human casualties rather than protect physical infrastructure. According to senior NA officials, opening fire on protesters on September 9 could have triggered even more severe violence the following day. They maintain that if more lives had been lost, the situation might have spiraled beyond control of NA. This debate is likely to continue in the days ahead.

Despite the criticism, the Army’s conduct during and after the protests has been widely regarded as measured and responsible. Most notably, in the political vacuum that emerged after the unrest, the NA did not attempt to assume power. Instead, it facilitated the restoration of civilian rule. Following initial engagement with protest groups to help restore normalcy, the Army worked closely with President Ramchandra Paudel and major political parties to expedite the formation of a new government.

Between Sept 9 and 12, the NA coordinated with the President and senior leaders from major parties to accelerate the government formation process. The Army reportedly urged political actors to quickly establish a new administration, given the sensitive and volatile environment. By doing so, it sent a clear message that it had no political ambitions and remained committed to its professional and apolitical role.

A military takeover—even a temporary one until elections could be held—might have further complicated the crisis and jeopardized Nepal’s 2015 Constitution. Senior leaders such as Madhav Kumar Nepal and Pushpa Kamal Dahal publicly acknowledged the Army’s constructive role in restoring stability. The US Embassy in Nepal also praised President Paudel and Chief of the Army Staff Ashok Raj Sigdel for ensuring a smooth transition back to civilian governance.

Following the formation of the Karki-led government and the announcement of elections, the Army continued to emphasize that elections were the only viable path out of the crisis. On this issue, the NA, President Paudel, and Prime Minister Sushila Karki appeared aligned. The Army maintained that any postponement of elections could trigger another round of political instability and constitutional uncertainty. This firm position helped bring political parties together in support of the electoral process.

In preparation for the March 5 elections, the Nepal Army played a proactive role in strengthening security arrangements. Although constitutional questions sometimes arise regarding the mobilization of the Army for election security, the NA fully cooperated with the government. Given concerns about declining morale within the Nepal Police, there had been doubts about whether adequate security could be ensured. In response, the Army expedited logistical and operational preparations within a limited timeframe.

To date, no major incidents of election-related violence have been reported. The Army has continued patrol operations to maintain a secure environment. Just weeks ago, top political leaders had expressed concerns about their ability to campaign safely. However, most candidates are now actively engaged in electioneering without significant security complaints, aside from a few minor incidents.

The NA has provided security for elections since the restoration of democracy. For the March 5 polls, it deployed over 80,000 personnel. Traditionally, the Army is stationed in the outer security ring of polling centers, while police and local security forces manage the inner perimeter. However, in coordination with local authorities, the NA can assume responsibility for inner-circle security when threat levels are high.

Compared to previous elections, the Army’s role in this process has been more extensive and intensive, largely due to the extraordinary political circumstances. These elections are not taking place under normal conditions; they are viewed as a crucial step toward restoring constitutional order and political stability. By committing itself to ensuring free, fair, and timely elections, the Nepal Army has positioned the electoral process as central to resolving the ongoing crisis and putting the constitution back on track.

As the March 5 elections draw closer, debates and curiosity about the possible outcomes are intensifying. This election for the House of Representatives (HoR) is expected to be markedly different from previous ones due to several factors.

First, the elections are taking place against the backdrop of the Sept 8–9 GenZ movement, which toppled the powerful Nepali Congress-UML government. The main agenda of the movement was radical reform in key societal institutions, primarily targeting the state mechanism and political parties.

Second, for the first time in recent elections, youth engagement has been unusually high. Among around one million new voters, more than 80 percent are first-time voters, signaling a major shift in electoral dynamics.

Third, the anti-incumbency sentiment, which was relatively weak in the 2017 and 2022 elections, has now reached its peak, creating uncertainty for established parties.

Fourth, the emergence of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) adds another layer of unpredictability. From securing just 20 seats in the 2022 elections, the party—now allied with former Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Sah—has gained significant momentum, positioning itself as a serious contender.

Fifth, governance and reform have emerged as central electoral issues. In previous elections, these topics were not prime concerns. This time, however, they are expected to heavily influence voter decisions.

Sixth, the "new versus old" debate has intensified, with a strong narrative advocating that fresh leadership should be given the opportunity to implement a transformative agenda.

Seventh, geopolitics has become a prominent electoral issue, particularly highlighted by CPN-UML. Unlike other parties that focus on domestic issues, UML has emphasized external threats, suggesting that the September protests were backed by foreign forces aiming to destabilize Nepal. The party’s campaign materials raise concerns about the role of India and other foreign powers, warning that the victory of new political forces could make Nepal geopolitically vulnerable.

Given this new environment, predicting the election outcome is extremely difficult. There are multiple reasons for this uncertainty.

In the 2017 and 2022 elections, electoral alliances played a decisive role. In 2017, the pre-poll alliance between CPN-UML and the Maoist party led to their sweeping victory, while the Nepali Congress suffered a humiliating defeat. 

In 2022, the alliance between Nepali Congress and the Maoists was expected to favor NC, but UML managed to secure 30 percent of the proportional representation vote, slightly edging out NC at 29 percent. Meanwhile, RSP emerged as a “dark horse,” securing 20 seats, particularly attracting urban voters. This time, however, parties are contesting largely without alliances, fielding candidates across almost all 165 constituencies.

 The rise of RSP is forcing traditional parties to recalibrate their strategies. Speeches from top leaders indicate that major parties are targeting RSP and Balendra Sah, rather than criticizing each other—a clear sign of the pressure RSP is creating. While RSP is likely to make gains, its exact vote share remains uncertain, which could further weaken NC, UML, and Maoist positions.

Intra-party dynamics among the major parties also differ from previous elections. In the past, despite occasional dissatisfaction over candidate distribution, parties largely remained united. This time, the situation is more complex. 

In Nepali Congress, the election of Gagan Kumar Thapa as party president during the special general convention has energized the party, signaling alignment with GenZ aspirations. However, Sher Bahadur Deuba’s ongoing legal battles and the passive stance of his supporters may constrain the party’s overall performance. Old guards at both central and local levels are not fully backing the new candidates, creating a potential vertical split. In this context, it is unclear whether NC will hold its ground or continue to weaken.

Within UML, the intra-party rift is less visible but still impactful. Party Chairman KP Sharma Oli’s reputation after the GenZ protests, particularly regarding accountability for the deaths of 19 protesters, has hurt the party’s image. Senior leaders are also displeased with Oli’s ticket distribution, which barred dissenting voices from contesting. UML has a strong and active organizational network among major parties, but it remains uncertain whether the party can repair its image following the Gen Z protests.

For the Nepali Communist Party (NCP) led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, predicting outcomes is equally challenging. While Dahal is likely to win in Rukum East, the fate of other senior leaders is uncertain. Historically, Maoists have oscillated between dominance (2008) and marginalization (2013), often relying on alliances to bolster their performance. In 2017 and 2022, the party secured third position in alliance with UML and Congress respectively, positioning itself as a king-maker. There has not been an independent test of the party's strength since the 2013 elections because it formed alliances with other parties in the subsequent two elections, making it very difficult to predict the party's current standing.

Finally, RSP continues to pose unpredictability. Although there appears to be a wave in their favor, the party lacks the organizational strength of NC, UML, and Maoists at the grassroots level. District-level  leaders leaving the party further complicates predictions.  While Balendra Shah's entry into the RSP has generated momentum, the effect of Rabi Lamichhane's legal cases on voter behavior is still uncertain. While RSP is expected to gain significantly in proportional representation, its performance in first-past-the-post contests remains uncertain. 

Other political forces influencing all major parties include the Madhes-based parties, as well as the parties led by Harka Sampang and Kul Man Ghising, each of which plays a significant role in shaping voter sentiment. 

In conclusion, the March 5 election is shaping up to be highly unpredictable due to youth engagement, anti-incumbency sentiment, the rise of RSP, intra-party dynamics, and new electoral agendas. Analysts and voters alike are facing a complex and fluid political landscape, making any prediction a formidable challenge.

Eight days are left to go for voting in the House of Representatives (HoR) elections scheduled on March 5. 

The Election Commission has reminded everyone not to bar any political party or candidate from election campaigning. If they are barred from election publicity, those involved in it would face a fine of Rs 200, 000.

None is allowed to bar the political party or candidate from campaigning, and the citizens from voting, the EC said, adding that if anyone is found involved in such an act, it would be actionable as per federal law. In case of barring candidates from publicity, those behind it would be fined Rs 200, 000 or three years' jail term, or both of these. 

The EC has been conducting a monitoring of the election publicity of political parties and candidates via various mediums. It also received complaints that some political parties and candidates were barred by other parties from making publicity. Various media had reported such violations, to which the EC was concerned seriously.

The election code of conduct is already in place where the candidates, political parties, and their sister organizations are made aware of the activities they can carry out during the elections. The election programs, rallies, gathering and meetings must not be disrupted as per the code of conduct. 

Deprivation of voting rights is punishable, the EC reiterated. 

With less than two weeks remaining before the House of Representatives election scheduled for March 5, Election Commission Nepal has unveiled a sweeping 64-point directive aimed at tightening campaign discipline, curbing financial irregularities, and preventing the resurgence of election-related malpractices.

The detailed code comes amid growing concerns over rising campaign expenditures, the expanding influence of social media, and recurring allegations of voter inducement and misuse of state resources in past elections. By introducing stricter enforcement mechanisms and clearer prohibitions, the Commission appears determined to project institutional authority and reinforce electoral credibility.

Nepal’s previous electoral cycles have often been marred by accusations of vote buying, use of public vehicles and state machinery for partisan purposes, and inflammatory rhetoric targeting marginalized communities. While the country has largely avoided large-scale electoral violence in recent years, sporadic incidents of intimidation, financial inducement, and character attacks have persisted.

The new directive signals the Commission’s effort to close regulatory gaps — particularly in campaign financing and digital campaigning — while reinforcing the spirit of the Election Code of Conduct, 2082 and prevailing federal election laws.

Campaign activities—including rallies, assemblies, door-to-door outreach, and media promotions—are permitted only between Falgun 4 and Falgun 18 (February 16-March 2, 2026). A mandatory 48-hour silence period before polling will prohibit all forms of campaign activity, including social media posts and online messaging.

The emphasis on digital silence reflects a recognition of the increasing role of online platforms in shaping voter perceptions. By extending restrictions to social media sharing and reposting, the Commission is attempting to prevent last-minute misinformation or targeted messaging.

A central feature of the directive is its stringent financial oversight. Candidates must route all election-related expenses through banks or financial institutions. Contributions exceeding NPR 25,000 must be deposited into a separate bank account, and detailed expenditure reports must be submitted within 35 days of the election results.

The Commission has also prohibited financial assistance from government bodies, NGOs, educational institutions, and public entities in violation of federal law. These measures are widely interpreted as an effort to curb opaque funding channels and reduce the influence of money in politics.

Election analysts note that effective enforcement will be key. While reporting requirements have existed in previous elections, critics argue that monitoring mechanisms have historically lacked teeth. The Commission’s public warning of strict action suggests a more assertive approach this time.

In a notable shift, the directive severely restricts visual campaign materials. Only a single-color leaflet of limited size is permitted. Posters, banners, digital displays, flex boards, wall paintings, and even digital advertising boards are banned. Sound systems may only be used during approved assemblies between 7:00 am and 7:00 pm.

The prohibition of plastic and non-biodegradable materials marks an environmental dimension to the code, aligning electoral conduct with broader sustainability concerns. Parties are required to collect and manage campaign materials responsibly after events.

Additionally, the use of children in campaign activities has been explicitly barred, reinforcing child protection standards.

The directive introduces strict vehicle regulations. Candidates may use only up to two light vehicles in their constituency, subject to prior approval from the Election Officer. Vehicles cannot be used to transport voters, and motorized rallies are prohibited.

These measures target a common election-time practice of mobilizing voters through organized transport, which critics argue can distort voter autonomy and create unequal advantages for wealthier candidates.

To protect ballot integrity, the Commission has reiterated prohibitions against tampering with ballot papers and boxes, producing fake ballots, unauthorized entry into polling or counting centers, and carrying weapons near polling stations.

Access to polling and counting venues will be strictly limited to authorized personnel, voters, and approved representatives. Disturbances within 300 meters of polling centers are banned.

The directive explicitly bars campaigning that promotes hatred based on religion, caste, ethnicity, language, gender, or region. It also prohibits rhetoric undermining Nepal’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, or federal democratic republican system.

This provision reflects heightened sensitivity to divisive narratives in a politically fragmented landscape. By including protections for senior citizens, women, sexual and gender minorities, and persons with disabilities, the Commission signals an intent to safeguard inclusive democratic participation.

The Commission has encouraged citizens and political actors to report violations to Election Officers, Chief Election Officers, local administration, or directly to the Commission. This participatory monitoring model aims to expand oversight beyond institutional mechanisms. 

The breadth of the 64-point directive underscores the Commission’s attempt to assert regulatory control in a competitive and often polarized political environment. However, the true test will lie in enforcement.

In its concluding appeal, the Commission has urged all parties and candidates to fully comply with the directive and contribute to an election that is free, fair, transparent, credible, and fear-free.

As political parties prepare to intensify their outreach within the limited campaign window, observers say adherence to the code will determine not only the credibility of the March 5 vote but also public trust in Nepal’s evolving democratic institutions.