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It has finally been confirmed that Nepali student Bipin Joshi died while being held captive by the Hamas group in Gaza.

Hamas on Monday released the names of four dead hostages including Joshi.

Confirming the names of four dead hostages, the terror group has announced to hand over the bodies today itself.

According to the group, the bodies of the hostages to be handed over today include Nepali national Bipin Joshi and Israeli citizens Gully Illouz, Yossi Sharabi and Daniel Perez.

Earlier this morning, Israeli authorities had informed the Nepali officials that Joshi was not alive.

Officials at the Prime Minister's Office, Israel and the military had officially informed the Nepali Embassy in Israel that Joshi is not alive.

Hamas abducted Joshi from Alumim Kibbutz on October 10, 2023.

For almost a year, Joshi’s family had heard nothing about him, until the Israeli military released a video in November 2023, confirming that he was alive in captivity. A video showing him alive was released a few days ago when the new ceasefire was announced.

Hamas handed over 20 living hostages to Israel through the Red Cross today.

A total 1,139 people, including 10 Nepali students had died in the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.

Born on October 26,  2000 in Kanchanpur, Joshi had travelled to Israel as part of the “Learn and Earn” agricultural training program under a bilateral initiative between the two countries. Just three weeks after his arrival, he found himself at the heart of one of the most violent attacks in Israel’s history.

On the morning of Oct 7, 2023, Hamas militants launched a surprise assault on southern Israel, including Kibbutz Alumim, where Joshi was staying with 48 other Nepali students. When attackers threw a grenade into the bunker where Joshi and his friends were hiding, he reportedly deflected it—saving lives but exposing himself in the process. He was captured and later seen alive in Gaza.

Following his abduction, a flurry of diplomatic efforts was made by Nepal, Israel, and international partners to secure Joshi’s release.

On November 11, 2023, the Nepal government dispatched a DNA collection team to Joshi’s home to check samples against unclaimed bodies. No matches were found. Then on November 20, 2023, The Israel Defense Force released CCTV footage from October 7, where Joshi was identified by his family and friends as he was dragged by militants.

Months passed without any confirmed updates. Israeli intelligence tracked Joshi’s phone to Gaza, and despite being included in international hostage talks, his name never appeared on release lists.

Many initiatives were taken to bring him back to Nepal. On November 24, 2023, then Minister for Foreign Affairs Narayan Prakash Saud urged Qatar’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Soltan bin Saad Al-Muraikhi, to take initiatives for Joshi’s release from Hamas’ captivity.

On April 23, 2024, President Ram Chandra Paudel requested the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, to help secure Joshi’s release. On May 19, 2024, Joshi’s family met then Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal to seek support for his release. On May 31, 2024, Israeli Ambassador to Nepal, Hanan Goder, demanded the unconditional release of all 125 people, including Joshi.

On October 8, 2024, the BBC reported that Israeli intelligence confirmed Joshi’s phone was located in Gaza. On January 8, 2025, then Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba appealed to Israeli Ambassador to Nepal Shmulik Arie Bass at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take immediate action to secure Joshi’s release.

On January 17, the Ministry of Home Affairs in Kathmandu welcomed the ‘Agreement for the Release of Hostages and Ceasefire in Gaza’ expressing hope for Joshi’s safe return.

A few days ago, Joshi’s family posted a 33-second video—believed to be filmed in a Gaza hospital—where Joshi, visibly under duress, identified himself in English: “My name is Bipin Joshi. I am from Nepal. I am 23 years old.”

“We decided to release it to show that he is in Gaza and alive, and maybe it can create pressure on the negotiating teams to understand our feelings, our pain,” said Joshi’s sister Pushpa. “It’s been two years, it’s too much pain for us and the hostages and the other hostages’ families.”

Despite the silence, Joshi’s family remained hopeful. His sister Pushpa became a voice in the campaign to bring her brother home. “It’s been two years. It’s too much pain for us,” she said during a protest in Israel’s Hostages Square. “How can anyone endure more than 680 days in a dark, unbearable room?”

Joshi’s mother, Padma, made a tearful plea upon arriving in Israel earlier this year: “Please, rescue my son… bring him home now.” Their journey took them from their home to the heart of Israeli politics, where they met President Isaac Herzog, Speaker Amir Ohana, and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar—all of whom expressed their commitment to Joshi’s case.

Since the IDF tweeted: “It’s official, there are no more living Israeli hostages in Hamas captivity,” the state of Joshi is still unknown as they haven’t mentioned about other nationalists’ hostages. The Israeli military confirms that the last 20 living hostages held by Hamas in Gaza are now back in Israel after more than two years in captivity.

Pushpa’s continued appeals have gathered support among Nepali youths, civil society, and more. His image has appeared on banners, placards, and even an Israeli flag made of hostage portraits displayed during mass rallies. Before his capture, Joshi sent a message to his cousin saying, “If something happens to me, you have to take care of my family. Be strong and always see the future.”

Nepal’s interim government is operating amid a deep national crisis. Public trust in the state is weak. Institutions are working at cross purposes. Citizens, especially the youth, are demanding change on the streets, while political factions and external actors closely watch for any weakness to push their own agendas. The government’s mandate is limited but crucial: conduct national elections within six months, of which one month has already passed. This cannot be achieved through short-term political arrangements or by simply reacting to every crisis. The state must fix its weak institutional foundations. Fortunately, the Constitution offers a clear instrument for this task: the National Security Council (NSC). This is one of the government’s most strategic, but most underused, institutions.

Nepal’s instability is not happening in isolation. Youth groups are demanding structural change, while political parties that lost power after the dissolution of the lower chamber of the bicameral parliament (the House of Representatives) see this as a chance to make a comeback. At the same time, supporters of a return to the erstwhile royalist order are becoming more vocal, presenting themselves as an alternative political force. External actors are also watching the situation closely. 

A weak and distracted Nepal suits the strategic interests of some regional and global powers. The longer state institutions remain uncoordinated, the more space internal and external actors will find to influence national affairs. The current situation, latent inter-agency rivalries, uncoordinated responses, and widespread public anger reflect a deep crisis of coordination and command. If this gap remains, it could become very difficult to control later.

The NSC, established under Article 266 of the Constitution, was created precisely for such a situation. It is meant to serve as the strategic brain of national security, bringing together the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defense, Home, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. However, successive governments have allowed the NSC to remain a ceremonial body, meeting rarely and acting even less. This interim government can change that. Reactivating the NSC requires no new law or constitutional amendment, only political will. The NSC offers a neutral platform to depoliticize security discussions, the authority to bring all security agencies under a common plan, and a legally sound way for an interim government to address security challenges.

Reviving the NSC should not mean only holding closed meetings. It should become a real center for coordination, planning and communication. The government can give it three immediate tasks. First, the NSC should issue a clear public directive explaining which agency does what during a crisis. This simple step will reduce confusion and close the gaps that opportunistic actors currently exploit. Second, intelligence and security agencies must be required to share information and work on the basis of a common threat assessment as fragmented works allow destabilizing elements to take advantage of blind spots. Third, the NSC should hold regular briefings to inform citizens about the security situation and present a common narrative. This is not about revealing sensitive information; it is about preventing rumours, misinformation and disinformation from filling the gap. While the NSC membership is constitutionally fixed, its processes can be more inclusive. It should consult representatives from the private sector, civil society, scholars, technology experts and youth groups as these stakeholders bring perspectives from the ground that government officials often miss.

Given limited time and high risks, the government’s approach must be focused and realistic. In the first phase, the government should activate the NSC by holding a serious, substantive meeting and publicly declaring it as the central coordinating body. This will signal both to the public and to external observers that there is a clear hand on the wheel. It should also launch an independent inquiry by forming a time-bound, judge-led commission to investigate recent protest violence. Showing accountability will strengthen public confidence and deny critics their strongest arguments. Alongside this, the government should establish a crisis communication desk to serve as a single, trusted source for verified information. When rumors spread about “foreign hands” or hidden agendas, citizens should know exactly where to get the truth.

In the second phase, the NSC’s policy directives must be translated into operational orders across all security agencies. In sensitive districts, local security committees made up of officials, police and community leaders should be set up to identify grievances early and prevent external exploitation.

The interim government’s success will not be measured only by whether the streets become quieter for a short period. Its real success will be judged by whether it leaves behind a more coherent, trusted and functional state than it inherited — one that is less vulnerable to internal manipulation and external pressure. The NSC can and should be the central instrument to achieve this. By reactivating the NSC and using it strategically, the government can provide clarity, restore coordination, and close the gaps that currently invite instability.

The author is a self-practicing social analyst. Through her independent study of Nepali society, she provides a unique perspective on societal norms

In addition to highlighting the long-simmering generational resentment in the nation, the GenZ protests in Sept 2025 brought about one of the worst economic shocks in Nepal’s recent history. What started as youth-led protests against political stagnation, unemployment, and corruption swiftly descended into violence, resulting in dozens of fatalities, thousands of injuries, and an enormous financial loss. The actual question now is whether Nepal can withstand these shocks without spiralling into more severe cycles of instability. The protests’ financial toll is already apparent: direct damages totalling billions of rupees, a decline in investor confidence, a contraction in essential industries, and an increase in unemployment. These losses, if ignored, will worsen the very circumstances that pushed young Nepalis onto the streets, raising the possibility of future unrest.

The most apparent and agonizing toll is the human one. Over two thousand people were injured during the protests, and at least seventy-four people were killed nationwide, including protesters and security personnel. Public trust in the state’s ability to maintain law and order was broken and prison breakouts contributed to the growing sense of lawlessness. The less obvious but no less terrible tale of economic devastation, however, is hidden behind these headlines. According to estimates from economists, the collateral damage caused by the protests is approximately Rs 3trn, which is nearly half of the nation’s GDP and equal to the government’s budget for almost one and a half fiscal years. The foundation of Nepal’s economy, the tourism industry, has been especially severely affected. According to tourism officials, the industry lost approximately Rs 25bn during and immediately following the protests, as thousands of cancellations destroyed what was supposed to be a prosperous season. With reported losses exceeding Rs 25bn and damage exceeding Rs 8bn at the Hilton in Kathmandu alone, the hotel industry has been disproportionately affected. These numbers are more than just statistics; they reflect the closure of businesses, unpaid workers, and a decline in Nepal’s reputation as a safe and secure travel destination abroad. When order is restored, the effects won’t go away; damage to a tourism industry's reputation may persist for years, discouraging subsequent tourism and investment in associated infrastructure.

The entire private sector has also suffered greatly. An estimated 15,000 jobs were directly impacted, and businesses reported losses of about Rs 80bn. These new job losses run the risk of escalating the cycle of economic despair in a nation already beset by pervasive underemployment and a significant reliance on foreign migration for employment. In addition to undermining household incomes, unemployment increases outbound migration and strengthens Nepal's reliance on remittances from abroad. Due to business closures or reductions during the unrest, nearly 10,000 Nepalis reportedly lost their jobs within a short period. This weakens the very demographic advantage Nepal should use for development, exacerbating an already precarious situation where the young, skilled labour force sees greater prospects abroad than at home.

The losses extended beyond small businesses and the tourism sector. Due to increased consumer demand, the automobile industry, which has been one of the most dynamic in recent years, sustained damages totalling about Rs 15bn. Along with interrupted imports and supply chains, the destruction of showrooms and warehouses runs the risk of slowing down a market that was previously growing. Consumer confidence and purchasing power might take some time to recover, even with the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, particularly as inflationary pressures increase and household incomes remain stagnant. This illustrates how instability undermines long-term growth prospects: years of gradual progress in industries that reflect the burgeoning middle-class economy can be reversed by a single wave of violence.

The cumulative effect of these losses has negatively impacted the macroeconomic outlook for Nepal. The economy was expected to grow by 3.5 to 4 percent this fiscal year, but growth forecasts have since been drastically reduced; some economists now predict growth of less than one percent. Others note that if reconstruction is postponed or funded carelessly, Nepal might experience complete contraction. According to one estimate, the protests caused losses of $22.5bn, or nearly half of Nepal’s GDP. As a result, the GenZ protests would rank among the most severe economic shocks to South Asia during a period of peace in recent memory, in addition to being a disruptive episode. This magnitude of loss runs the risk of igniting a fiscal and monetary crisis for a nation still recuperating from the pandemic and having trouble managing its debt.

The state is already feeling the financial strain. The government has been forced to reallocate funds for increased security spending, emergency relief, and compensation for the families of the victims. The fiscal deficit has widened as a result of the collapse of tourism and commerce revenues. Nepal may have to borrow more money as a result of declining revenues and growing debt. However, borrowing now runs the risk of trapping the nation in a debt cycle, particularly if grants and concessional loans from outside partners are not forthcoming. The burden will only get worse if borrowing costs increase, especially if credit rating agencies reduce Nepal’s risk profile in reaction to political and economic unrest. A declining rupee and growing import prices could cause inflationary pressures that further reduce real incomes and exacerbate public annoyance.

A new generation of Nepalis has taken to the streets to vent their frustration because they are better educated, more globally connected, and more conscious of the shortcomings of the government. Disillusionment will increase if their complaints are only addressed through repression and short-term fixes rather than structural changes. That might undermine democratic stability by opening the door for frequent demonstrations or more extreme forms of mobilisation. Nepal runs the risk of becoming caught in a vicious cycle where protests erode the economy further, which in turn leads to more protests. Economic despair and political alienation are a volatile combination.

Consequently, Nepal cannot meet the challenge on its own. Being a landlocked nation sandwiched between two powerful countries, Nepal’s instability will unavoidably impact its neighbours, and it needs outside assistance to recover. India, Nepal’s closest neighbour and biggest trading partner, has a special obligation to provide concessional credit lines for reconstruction and investment in industries that create jobs. Targeted assistance in border areas, primarily through cross-border trade hubs and renewable energy projects, may be able to absorb some of the young people without jobs and lessen the pressures of migration. In order to guarantee the transparent use of reconstruction funds, India can simultaneously offer technical expertise in auditing and public finance.

Beijing must put community-sensitive projects that meet local needs ahead of purely strategic objectives if it hopes to be regarded as a reliable development partner. Coordination with Nepali stakeholders, grants rather than high-interest loans, and transparent funding will be essential. The time demands that multilateral organisations like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank reevaluate their priorities, allocating funds not only to infrastructure but also to rural development, youth employment, and governance reforms. Through direct investments in healthcare and education, development bonds backed by remittances, or emergency compensation funds for impacted families, Western donors and Nepal’s diaspora communities can also make a significant contribution.

Nepal’s recent history has taught us that crises rarely come to an end with a single incident. The monarchy was overthrown by the People's Movement of 2006, but federalism and ethnic grievances remained unresolved. Although it alienated important groups, the 2015 Constitution established a new order. The GenZ protests follow this pattern: if youth grievances are not addressed, today’s instability will only serve as the catalyst for tomorrow’s upheaval. Now, structural reform is required in addition to reconstruction. The bare minimum of stability requires the transparent rebuilding of damaged infrastructure, a youth-focused national employment mission, institutional reforms to fight corruption, and sincere communication with younger generations and civil society.

If these economic wounds are allowed to worsen, there is a risk that they will exacerbate disenchantment, accelerate migration, erode the fiscal system, and create the conditions for further upheavals. Nepal and its neighbours, who would unavoidably be affected, cannot afford such a course. It is now the duty of Nepali leaders and outside partners to take note of the possibility to not only restore what has been destroyed but also to establish the framework for a more resilient, inclusive, and stable order. The GenZ protests might be seen as a sign of long-term decline rather than a turning point towards reform in the absence of such a concerted and systemic response.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, was arrested by the Central Investigation Bureau (CIB) of Nepal Police on Sunday. This marks the first high profile arrest from the new government. The arrest is linked to the 9-kilogram gold smuggling case dating back to Dec 2022, when a Chinese national, Li Hansong, arrived in Kathmandu from Fly Dubai flight FZ-0587 carrying two suitcases. Inside those suitcases were 73 vape packs containing a total of 730 vape pieces, which were later found to have concealed gold worth Rs 85.5m.

According to CIB’s investigation, the gold was smuggled and sold in collusion with customs officer Rewant Khadka and others. Mahara is accused of exerting pressure on customs officials to release the gold. His son, Rahul Mahara, had earlier been arrested and sent to jail in connection with the same case.

The suspicious suitcases had been seized by the Tribhuvan International Airport Customs Office after the discovery of the vapes. Li Hansong had left Kathmandu shortly after retrieving his passport, while the seized vapes remained in customs custody.

Following suspicions that the gold concealed in the vapes had been secretly replaced, the Customs Office formally requested the CIB to investigate in April 2023. After two months of investigation, CIB concluded that 9 kilograms of gold had been smuggled, filing a case against six people including customs officer Khadka.

A supplementary charge sheet was later filed, naming Belgian national of Chinese origin Dawa Chhiring, his driver Lokendra Paudel, Rahul Mahara, and Nima Gurung as accomplices. Krishna Bahadur Mahara’s arrest marks the third prosecution related to the case.

CIB had recently taken Mahara’s statement as part of its ongoing investigation. Call records reportedly showed continuous communication between Mahara, his son Rahul, and Chinese nationals Li Hansong.

Although Mahara had earlier been questioned, the case had not progressed due to alleged political protection.

Once known as an honest leader during the conflict era, Mahara’s political career has been marred by controversies since joining peaceful politics. He has previously faced allegations in multiple cases,  including the misuse of Rs 400m in funds meant for Maoist combatant management, irregularities in frequency distribution during his tenure as Minister for Information and Communications, and an infamous 2010 audio scandal in which he was allegedly heard seeking Rs 500m from a Chinese national to buy lawmakers’ support. None of those cases, however, led to prosecution.

Elected from Dang-2 in the 2017 general election, Mahara became Speaker but was forced to resign in 2019 after charges of sexual misconduct against a female employee at the Federal Parliament Secretariat. Though he was arrested and jailed, he was later acquitted by the District Court and the verdict was upheld by the Patan High Court.

Since then, Mahara has remained largely inactive in politics, limiting himself to party affairs. He was elected Vice-chairperson of the CPN (Maoist Centre) at its last General Convention and was also serving as the party’s spokesperson.