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I’ve eaten at many tables. From Michelin-starred restaurants to roadside stalls, I’ve tried dishes across continents. But nothing compares to a Newari ‘suku bhwey’, also called a ‘lapte bhwey’. It’s more than just a meal. It’s a ritual. A performance. A cultural celebration passed down through generations. It’s time the world knows about it.

Why shouldn’t our lapte bhwey stand beside a British Sunday roast, an American Thanksgiving, a European Christmas dinner, or a grand Eid meal? Let me take you into this experience—bite by bite.

The lapte plate: A living canvas

It all begins with the lapte—a plate made by stitching sal leaves together. It smells of forests and memories. It reminds us that food is sacred. That’s why each item is placed with care and order, never just dumped.

Before the meal starts, we take off our shoes. We greet our hosts. We sit cross-legged on a long straw mat called the sukul. Elders sit first. That’s the rule. The meal begins only when they take the first bite. There’s laughter, teasing, and chatter. Even if your legs go numb, the feast keeps you grounded.

A meal with rhythm

A suku bhwey is not random. It flows like music. It begins with baji—flattened rice. Simple, but essential. Everything else builds around it. Then come spicy pickles, green garlic, and tangy vegetable dishes like alu tama (potato and bamboo shoot curry). You may also get geda gudi—a mix of chickpeas and dry peas.

Each flavor is bold and earthy. Nothing is bland. Dishes are spicy, sour, or fermented. Every bite awakens a memory.

Then comes the highlight: the meat curry. It may be buffalo or goat, cooked thick and rich. People wait for this moment. The bowl is always wiped clean.

On a lapte bhwey, every part of the animal is honored. We serve bhuttan—fried stomach and intestine. Hakuchoila—grilled and spiced meat—is smoky and strong. Goat head parts like senla mu, swanpuka, and mainh are served with care. This isn’t seen as odd, but respected.

Who gets what matters. Elders get first pick. There is a silent order. Respect flows with each serving.

Aila: Fire in a cup

With the food comes aila, the homemade spirit. It’s distilled from rice or barley. Served in small metal cups, it burns going down but warms the soul. Aila is sacred—a drink for the gods, the ancestors, and the living.

There is also thwon, a cloudy rice beer. Lighter than aila, it cools your tongue and balances the heat of the food.

The sweet ending

At the end comes lapsi paun—a sweet-sour drink made from hog plum. Then, curd, often juju dhau from Bhaktapur. It’s creamy and smooth, like dessert.

Before we eat the curd, we do a small ritual. A dab of curd goes on the forehead—right side for men, left for women. It’s a blessing. A way to say, ‘You were here.’

After that, we’re served sisapusa—fruit and vegetable slices like radish, carrot, and sugarcane. These are nibbled as we talk and laugh.

The order matters

This meal is not a buffet. Dishes don’t come all at once. They arrive in waves, like verses in a poem. First the rice, then the pickles, then meat, then more rice, then curd. Each return to the plate has meaning. You don’t leave halfway. You sit through it all—an hour or more. Your knees may hurt, but your heart is full.

Why this feast belongs on the world stage

Think of global food traditions. These are more than meals. They are about family, memory, and identity. Why not the lapte bhwey? It has everything; history, structure, symbolism, and flavor. It’s sustainable—no plastic, no excess. The serving style has its own rhythm. The ingredients tell stories. It deserves to be on the global food map. In documentaries. In food festivals. In Michelin’s world of fine dining.

From Kathmandu to the world

But it must start with us. We should stop calling it old-fashioned. It takes real skill to host a lapte bhwey. You need training to serve in the right order. You need pride to keep traditions alive when buffets seem easier.

Let’s photograph these feasts. Write about them. Document the recipes. Invite foreign chefs to join us. Let them sit cross-legged, eat with their hands, sip aila, and understand our rhythm.

We could set up pop-up Newari kitchens in New York, London, or Tokyo. Not fusion food—but the real thing. Served on leaves, eaten by hand, seated on floor mats.

Let’s turn the lapte bhwey into Nepal’s answer to Japan’s kaiseki, Ethiopia’s doro wat, or Italy’s Sunday lunches. Because its heritage served on a leaf.

Buffet or bhwey?

Buffets are quick. Convenient. But they don’t tell a story. A suku bhwey tells a thousand. About family. About caste and ritual. About the seasons, the harvest, and the cycle of life. Every dish is part of a bigger picture. Every glass of aila is a poem. Every dot of curd on the forehead is a seal of belonging. And one day, if we share it with pride, maybe someone in Berlin or Paris will be sitting on a straw mat, eating our food, feeling our story.

The author is a London-based R&D chef

Thibaut Bruttin is a Franco-Swiss civil society activist, Director-General of Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and President of the Forum on Information and Democracy (FID). He joined RSF in 2014 and contributed to the development of key initiatives such as the Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI), the evacuations of Afghan journalists, the press freedom centers in Ukraine, the escape of Marina Ovsyannikova from Russia, and the Svoboda satellite package targeting Russian audiences. He began his career in the international development team at the Louvre Museum and later worked for Echo Studio, a production and distribution company focused on impact-driven cinema. A film historian as well, Thibaut Bruttin has published several works, the most recent of which is Michel Audiard–Jean Herman/Vautrin (Actes Sud–Institut Lumière, 2023). Kamal Dev Bhattarai of ApEx talked to him about the global and regional scenarios of press freedom and journalist safety.

What are the key threats that global journalists in common are facing today?

In 2025, the global state of press freedom is now classified as a “difficult situation” for the first time in the history of RSF's World Press Freedom Index. Although physical attacks against journalists are the most visible violations of press freedom and some 50 journalists were killed in 2024, RSF has underlined that economic pressure is also a major, more insidious problem. The economic indicator on the RSF World Press Freedom Index now stands at an unprecedented, critical low as its decline continues in 2025.

As a global organization, what are RSF's priorities?

RSF defends and promotes a free, independent and pluralistic press via publications, advocacy and direct support.

What is your overall impression of the status of press freedom in South Asia?

In the Asia-Pacific region, press freedom and access to reliable news sources are severely compromised by the predominance of regimes—often authoritarian—that strictly control information, often through economic means. In many countries, the government has a tight grip on media ownership, allowing them to interfere in outlets’ editorial choices. It is highly telling that twenty of the region’s 32 countries and territories saw their economic indicators drop in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index.

You recently visited Nepal and discussed the media fraternity here. How do you rate the status of press freedom in Nepal?

RSF published its World Press Freedom Index in early May and Nepal is ranked 90th, down 16 places. Worst: Nepal is 80th regarding the economy of the media 120th in terms of safety of the journalists. Today, the state of press freedom in Nepal is increasingly fragile. Therefore, Nepal must uphold its constitutional promise of a free press.

Despite a relatively calm and peaceful political situation, Nepali journalists still face physical threats. What are your suggestions to local stakeholders here to address this issue?

Journalists in Nepal still face physical violence. Two media professionals have lost their lives recently: freelance journalist Suresh Bhul, from Dhangadhi, and Avenues TV cameraperson Suresh Rajak. I have met the widow of Suresh Rajak, killed during the pro-monarch demonstration and she expressed, just as Rajak’s colleagues did, the lack of progress and transparency in the investigation.  This case highlights several issues when dealing with the safety of journalists. First, what happened in this arsoned building? Second, was the response of the police and emergency services appropriate? And third, is there a true will to shed light on this incident? Reaffirming that attacks on journalists are unacceptable in a democracy is not enough. Impunity for crimes committed against journalists puts the entire profession at risk.

Could you shed light on the areas RSF is working in Nepal?

RSF is also advocating for public policies to support the media economy. The weakened economy of the news industry has two consequences, highly evidenced in Nepal: the outlets can be tempted to lower the quality of their content and favor sensationalist, polarizing or clickbait pieces; the journalists must diversify their resources and can engage in communications or politics. We urge media owners to fully implement the minimum wage regulation and to pay in due time their employees. Furthermore, we invite the parliament to amend the Social Media Bill so as to exempt from its scope news media, identified according to national licenses or international standards such as the Journalism Trust Initiative; and to adopt transparent, fair mechanisms for the allocation of public advertising and subsidies, to support independent media without discrimination. 

Nestled between India and China, Nepal possesses a unique and complex trade history, along with significant market opportunities. However, the country faces multiple constraints—including geographical challenges, weak infrastructure, procedural bottlenecks, and an often unstable political-economic environment. Moreover, the government’s approach to trade negotiations tends to be reactive, shaped by perceived contexts rather than long-term strategy. In this light, it is essential to institutionalise effective standard operating procedures (SOPs) for trade negotiations. Such SOPs would ensure consistency, enhance transparency, and provide strategic direction across bilateral, subregional, and regional trade engagements.

The need for an SOP

Nepal’s trade diplomacy currently relies heavily on ad hoc arrangements and the personal experience of individual bureaucrats. This knowledge-driven, personality-based approach often leads to inconsistencies, a lack of institutional memory, and missed opportunities on bilateral, regional, and multilateral platforms.

A national SOP would promote coherence across government departments and ensure continuity during political transitions. It would also empower negotiation teams with procedural clarity and sectoral insights while presenting Nepal as a prepared and credible counterpart in international forums.

Core SOP features for trade negotiations

Institutional mechanisms

Since the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies (MoICS) leads trade negotiations, it should initiate the formation of a formal negotiation coordination committee. This body should include representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, private sector associations, academia, legal experts, and provincial authorities. Together, they would set national priorities, vet negotiation positions, and guide strategies.

SOP cycle

Pre-negotiation phase: Conduct data-driven impact assessments, define national priorities, consult relevant stakeholders, and prepare position papers.

Negotiation phase: Select delegation members, assign roles, and maintain real-time internal coordination.

Post-negotiation phase: Identify legal provisions, outline ratification processes, create implementation roadmaps, and establish monitoring indicators.

Sectoral working group

A specialised group should bring together representatives from transit service providers, agriculture, digital trade, transport logistics, and quality assurance sectors to provide technical expertise. Key issues should include Nepal’s transit rights and infrastructure cooperation. The SOP must prioritise multimodal transport corridors, efficient cross-border logistics, and enhanced trade facilitation through modernised customs systems and logistics hubs.

Trade facilitation

Efforts should focus on easing the movement of people, goods, services, capital, and data—while remaining mindful of risks associated with automation and digitalisation. Nepal must align with the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and leverage regional initiatives such as BBIN, BIMSTEC, SAARC, SASEC, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

To support this, a negotiation readiness toolkit is needed. This should include templates, records of past negotiations, sectoral briefings, simulation exercises, and case studies. Trade facilitation measures must align with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and be benchmarked accordingly.

Establishing bodies such as a National Trade Negotiation Council (NTNC), a National Trade Consulting Forum, or a Trade Intelligence and Analysis Unit is crucial for institutional continuity and informed decision-making.

Infrastructure development—including rail, road, and inland waterway connectivity—must be a priority. Logistical alignment, mutual recognition of standards and certifications, and the promotion of low-carbon, climate-smart trade chains should drive Nepal’s trade agenda.

Legal and risk mitigation

Trade agreements must include robust provisions for dispute resolution, force majeure, and other legal safeguards. It is vital to protect the interests of small producers, uphold environmental standards, and ensure policy space for future reforms.

Inclusion and capacity building

An inclusive trade negotiation process must involve wide consultations with the private sector, civil society, and marginalised communities. The SOP should ensure that all relevant stakeholders are engaged meaningfully.

Capacity building is essential. Members of the negotiation team must receive training in legal interpretation, economic analysis, negotiation tactics, and language skills. Ongoing collaboration with think tanks and trade institutions will enhance capacity and knowledge.

Meeting key performance indicators (KOIs) and conducting annual performance reviews by independent experts will help ensure the negotiation team’s effectiveness and accountability.

Conclusion

Institutionalising SOPs for trade negotiations through a phased, strategic approach is crucial for Nepal. This process should be backed by technical and financial support, and ensure coherence between national development plans and regional trade commitments. Effective monitoring and evaluation must be embedded to achieve desired trade outcomes and social impact.

Nepal should not view its position between two dominant economic powers as a limitation, but a strategic opportunity. By transitioning from a reactive player to a proactive influencer in regional and global trade, Nepal can better serve its national interests. Now is the time to establish a negotiation process that is strategic, inclusive, and driven by national priorities—one that enables Nepal to negotiate with confidence, not just consent.

The appointment of Mohammad Yunus as Chief Advisor of Bangladesh, after the acrimonious removal of Sheikh Hasina, signifies an unparalleled shift in the nation’s political course. Globally recognized as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and innovator of microfinance via Grameen Bank, Yunus ascended to the highest executive role amid a period of national upheaval. His leadership has emerged when Bangladesh faces a confluence of challenges—severe economic downturn, waning investor confidence, geopolitical strife in South and Southeast Asia and a domestic landscape characterised by civil upheaval and institutional exhaustion. 

The unelected top official of Bangladesh has been in the news since the ouster of his predecessor, Sheikh Hasina. When the students of Bangladesh, after the uprising, chose Yunus as a top executive, they must have had a few things in their minds: his international stature, his closeness to the Western governments, his reputation as a global economist and finally, for some, his secular credentials. These qualities of Yunus are not providing dividends for the current political climate of Bangladesh. The most recent example of this tension has been the visible opposition from Bangladesh’s Army to the Yunus-proposed ‘humanitarian corridor’.  

Other than that, in a recent speech in Beijing, Yunus stated that India’s northeastern territories are ‘landlocked’ and suggested that Bangladesh could serve as their natural conduit to the Indian Ocean. Although ostensibly a harmless appeal for regional connection and collaboration, the speech directly aligned with Beijing’s geopolitical characterization of India’s vulnerabilities. Chinese state media promptly disseminated Yunus’s statements, portraying Bangladesh as a neutral yet empathetic regional participant. The political characterization of India’s Northeast is very sensitive. India regards this region as strategically vital, mainly because of the constricted Siliguri corridor, often called the ‘Chicken’s Neck’—and symbolically significant for its domestic cohesion. The speech was interpreted in New Delhi as an implicit endorsement of China's enduring attempts to undermine Indian sovereignty in Arunachal Pradesh and to globalize the geopolitical character of the Northeast.

India's response was prompt and multifaceted. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a pointed retort, affirmed that the Northeast is “central to India’s growth narrative, not peripheral or isolated,” clearly countering Yunus’ assertion, with geographic and diplomatic connotations. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar intensified the matter by publicly alleging that Yunus was “cherry-picking narratives” and emphasized to Dhaka the profound economic, cultural and historical dimensions of Indo-Bangladeshi relations.

Central to India’s response is the Siliguri corridor—a 22-kilometer-wide land passage linking the remainder of India with its northeastern states. The ‘Chicken’s Neck’ is commonly referred to as one of the nation’s most significant strategic vulnerabilities. Yunus’ comments directly contributed to India’s enduring apprehension of encirclement. The episode revitalized New Delhi’s security dialogue, with Indian defense strategists cautioning about a ‘chicken with two necks’, wherein Bangladesh and China may exert pressure on India’s most vulnerable spot together.

It was another blow to an already fragile relationship between India and Bangladesh, considering Bangladesh’s ex-PM Sheikh Hasina is currently residing in India, fearing persecution in Bangladesh. The current Bangladesh government has demanded her return from India. On its part, the government of India has been wary of the current regime as it has “failed to stop the persecution of minorities after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina”. 

While the current regime in Bangladesh has signalled strong ties with China, they are yet to see any material impact. Other than that, Pakistan has also made overtures toward Bangladesh, which the current regime has welcomed, but the strategic and economic viability of this relationship is in question. The political climate in the West has also changed drastically since the arrival of Donald Trump as US president. His transactional relationship is haunting the US’ oldest and most steadfast allies. In his first term, Trump was particularly interested in the Indo-Pacific to counter China. Bangladesh finalized its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2023 during Hasina’s tenure, which more or less aligned with the US’ vision. However, the US is currently dealing with two evolving crises in Gaza and Ukraine, and the Indo-Pacific has again taken a back seat. The other economic powers are trying to cut deals with the US because of Trump’s trade war threat.

Yunus must embrace a more equitable and realistic strategy that harmonizes with Bangladesh’s domestic circumstances and the shifting geopolitical environment to traverse the intricate political and diplomatic landscape ahead. Although advantageous, his global credentials and reformer persona must now be enhanced by a more profound engagement with regional nuances and state institutions. In the light of the recent tensions with India, it would be wise for Yunus to implement confidence-building measures that strengthen Bangladesh’s dedication to regional peace and cooperative benefits, especially on connectivity, trade and border security. This does not inherently necessitate a withdrawal from alliances with other nations, such as China; nevertheless, it demands meticulous recalibration to prevent the appearance of strategic alignment with any one entity. 

Simultaneously, Yunus must tackle national issues regarding governance and institutional credibility. Establishing communication lines with political players, especially moderate opposition factions and civil society, may alleviate tensions and facilitate a more inclusive political process. Enhancing civilian-military interactions will be crucial for ensuring policy continuity and internal consistency. His initiatives, including the humanitarian corridor, must be conveyed transparently and deliberated within national institutions to prevent misunderstandings or suspicions of unilateralism.

Bangladesh’s future will likely hinge on its capacity to sustain strategic flexibility while strengthening internal cohesion. As global power dynamics change and regional alliances develop, Yunus’ leadership will be evaluated on his ability to establish Bangladesh as a constructive regional participant, engaging with all significant actors without excessive dependence on any, and grounding its diplomacy in national consensus and institutional robustness.

The author is pursuing his doctoral research from the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi