Digital accessibility in Nepal’s healthcare websites
Despite having established several legal frameworks promoting digital accessibility, Nepal lacks implementation resulting in significant gaps across healthcare websites. This writeup examines the current state of web accessibility in Nepal government’s health-related websites based on WAVE API analysis of the eight homepages, namely https://www.mohp.gov.np, https://www.dohs.gov.np, https://www.fwd.gov.np, https://www.digitalhealth.mohp.gov.np, https://www.nhpc.gov.np, https://www.iom.edu.np, https://www.bpkhis.edu and https://www.dda.gov.np
Nepal doesn’t lack the legal instruments for digital accessibility, however, there seems to be a gap in their implementation. The Right to Information Act of 2007 ensures that every person has the right to access and regulate information. Nepal signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 3 Jan 2008, which also requires infrastructure so that information and communication is accessible to all. Health is similarly among the eight priority sectors for digital transformation in the Digital Nepal Framework. The National ICT Policy (2015) and the National Broadband Policy (2016) add weight to the drive for digital growth, but challenges in implementation persist.
The analysis of eight healthcare-related government websites reveal concerning patterns across multiple domains. This analysis was done using a Python program and WebAIM’s accessibility WAVE API.
The eight homepages averaged 30.43 Errors, 23.00 Contrast Issues and 28.00 Alerts per site. These numbers indicate significant accessibility barriers for users with disabilities.
WebAIM defines errors as accessibility issues that are almost always barriers for users with disabilities and require immediate attention. Contrast issues occur when there is insufficient color contrast between text (or images of text) and its background, making content difficult or even impossible to read for users with low vision or color blindness. Alerts refer to potential accessibility issues that may not be definitive problems but still require review or further manual evaluation.
The eight homepages we analyzed had 62 empty links that don’t tell users where they will go when clicked. There are 51 images missing alternative text, which means people who can’t see the images won’t know what they contain. The site also has 46 linked images that are missing alternative text, making it impossible for screen reader users to understand where clicking these images would take them. Additionally, there are 19 buttons that have no text or labels, leaving users with disabilities confused about what these buttons do. Finally, the websites’ homepages contain 17 empty headings that don’t describe the content of their sections, making navigation difficult for people using assistive technology.
We believe several factors contribute to the current state of web accessibility in Nepal’s healthcare sector. One major factor is resource limitations, as widespread poverty and inadequate telecommunications infrastructure in rural areas restrict access to digital services. Another significant issue is the awareness gap—there is a general lack of understanding about the transformative potential of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), including websites, for improving the lives of persons with disabilities. Finally, policy implementation challenges persist; although legal frameworks exist, there is a lack of a suitable policy environment specifically designed to promote ICT accessibility.
Poor digital accessibility, especially in health-related websites, has severe consequences in Nepal, where difficult terrain, limited infrastructure, and frequent natural disasters like floods and earthquakes already hinder access to care. In rural areas, where physical services are scarce, digital platforms become essential. Yet, inaccessible websites exclude persons with disabilities, causing dangerous delays in receiving critical updates on safety protocols and medical aid. Government platforms must be accessible to ensure rapid, inclusive information delivery during crises, as inaccessibility in such moments can cost lives. In Nepal, an estimated two percent of the population with disabilities, including roughly 94,000 visually impaired and 79,000 hearing-impaired individuals, face significant barriers accessing healthcare information due to non-compliant website design on key health portals such as the Department of Health Services. We see basic keyboard navigation failures and violation of semantic markup standards which results in exclusion of people from vital emergency directives and service updates.
Based on the analysis, several strategies aligned with international standards could significantly improve digital accessibility in Nepal’s healthcare websites. First, accessibility policy implementation is essential—specific digital accessibility guidelines for government healthcare websites should be enforced based on the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG). Second, training and awareness efforts must be strengthened by investing in capacity building for web developers and content creators, equipping them with the necessary skills and knowledge on accessibility principles and techniques. Third, regular auditing should be incorporated into the website development and maintenance cycle to ensure that accessibility is not overlooked over time.
Additionally, applying the 80-20 rule by prioritizing critical fixes—such as addressing empty links, missing alternative text, and contrast issues—can lead to significant improvements with relatively minimal effort. Lastly, the government can leverage the Rural Telecom Development Fund to finance accessibility initiatives and promote the development of assistive technologies in local languages. These strategies, if properly implemented, can help create a more inclusive digital healthcare environment for all, including persons with disabilities.
Poor web accessibility in Nepal’s healthcare websites creates a significant digital barrier that exacerbates existing challenges in healthcare access. These accessibility barriers—primarily empty links, missing alternative text and poor contrast—effectively exclude persons with disabilities from accessing critical health information in a country where 79.42 percent of the population lives in rural areas, facing financial, geographical and infrastructural challenges to healthcare access. The digital divide is particularly concerning as Nepal increasingly relies on digital health initiatives to overcome its rugged terrain, proclivity to natural disasters and limited physical infrastructure. While some sites like Digital Health show progress, others contain numerous barriers that prevent equal access for persons with disabilities. Addressing these issues will require coordinated efforts across technical, policy and awareness dimensions. As Nepal continues its digital transformation in healthcare, ensuring accessibility should be integrated into development processes from the beginning rather than added as an afterthought.
Decoding Bhandari’s China visit
Former President Bidya Devi Bhandari returned home on Monday after completing a 10-day China visit, during which she held talks with senior leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and government officials.
Her visit came amid her recent, unannounced but increasingly active involvement in party politics, drawing significant attention from both political and strategic circles. In the weeks leading up to the trip, Bhandari toured various provinces, engaging with local leaders and cadres, and has become more vocal about her ambition to lead the CPN-UML. She has ignored public concerns that former heads of state should stay away from active politics to preserve the dignity of the presidency. Bhandari was accompanied by Raghubir Mahaseth, head of the UML’s international department, Minister Damodar Bhandari and other senior leaders, who have distanced themselves from Prime Minister and party chairperson KP Sharma Oli. In Beijing, she was accorded a moderate level of respect.
Although Chinese President Xi Jinping did not meet her, Bhandari held talks with Chinese Vice-President Ji Bingxuan and Liu Jianchao, Minister of the CPC’s International Department and a prominent Chinese leader known for his close engagement with Nepali political figures.
Bhandari’s main event in Beijing was her participation in a conference of political parties from China’s neighboring countries, themed “Building a Community with a Shared Future with Neighboring Countries: Political Parties in Action,” held on May 25–26.
The reception Bhandari received as a senior UML figure must be viewed in the light of her past role and potential political future. As President from 2015 to 2022, she played a crucial part in enhancing Nepal’s engagement with China. She frequently encouraged successive governments to advance the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During her tenure, she attended the second BRI summit in 2019 and helped finalize the protocol on the Transit and Transport Agreement signed in 2016.
In 2017, Bhandari launched Chinese President Xi Jinping’s book, “The Governance of China,” at a special ceremony held in Shital Niwas. She also endorsed China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) by attending a high-level video conference, despite opposition from Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The year 2019 saw Xi’s historic visit to Nepal, during which several strategic agreements were signed, significantly deepening bilateral cooperation. These developments have shaped the Chinese perception of Bhandari as a dependable figure in Nepal's political landscape.
For Beijing, the return of a China-friendly leader like Bhandari to active politics could be welcome news. Members of her delegation have publicly claimed that China encouraged her to initiate efforts to unify Nepal’s communist parties—a long-held preference of the Chinese leadership. However, such claims should be taken with caution, as Chinese officials rarely make such direct statements.
Within the UML, some leaders believe that if Bhandari becomes party chair, the long-elusive unification with the CPN (Maoist Centre) could be revived—something hindered by personal rivalries between Oli and Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal. While Bhandari is certain to return to UML politics, it remains unclear whether she will take a confrontational path against Oli or whether Oli will voluntarily step aside. Oli has recently stated that his health permits him to remain politically active for the next 15–20 years, suggesting he is unlikely to support a unification narrative that credits Bhandari over himself.
Bhandari’s visit is unlikely to have any immediate or direct impact on UML’s internal dynamics, despite some sidelined party leaders hoping it will accelerate her rise to the helm. Her supporters are trying to portray the visit as an indication that China backs her leadership, suggesting she is capable of uniting Nepal’s fragmented communist forces. However, there are ample reasons to remain cautious. Open Chinese support for Bhandari could antagonize both Oli and the Nepali Congress (NC). A senior UML leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, noted that China prioritizes political stability in Nepal and may support left unity only if it contributes to that goal—but without backing one leader at the expense of alienating others.
Nevertheless, the perception of Bhandari’s close ties with Beijing may cause ripples within the UML. Ironically, this perception could even bring Oli and New Delhi closer. China, meanwhile, appears to have realized that its earlier emphasis on communist unification risked alienating other key actors in Nepal, including the NC. Given the current state of relations, observers say China is unlikely to openly push for left unity at the cost of broader political balance.
In Beijing, Liu Jianchao met Bhandari and, according to the Chinese readout, acknowledged her longstanding contributions to China-Nepal relations. “Inter-party exchanges play an important role in China–Nepal relations,” the readout stated. The CPC expressed its willingness to strengthen engagement with all Nepali political parties and deepen exchanges in governance and administration through the “political party +” channel. Bhandari, for her part, emphasized Nepal’s commitment to finding a development path suited to its own conditions and expressed interest in learning from China’s experience in party-building and governance.
During her address at the CPC dialogue, Bhandari praised the CPC’s governance model, stating: “The historical experience and contemporary practice of the CPC are of great reference to Nepal’s economic and social transformation and also provide important reference for developing countries around the world to explore the path of modernization.” She further stated that China’s vision of building a “community with a shared future” offers a powerful example for regional cooperation and solidarity. By amplifying China’s development model in her speeches, Bhandari is aligning herself closely with Beijing’s strategic messaging.
Challenges beyond representation: Women in parliament of Nepal
In Nepal, the journey of women in politics can symbolically be presented as a tug-of-war between progress and resistance. The deeply entrenched patriarchal norms limit the roles of women in political and public life. The Constitution of Nepal promulgated in 1990 brought about a glimmer of hope as Article 114 of the constitution mandated political parties to file five percent women candidates to contest in elections . But this did not guarantee that women would actually make it to parliament. As a result, between 1990-1999 elections, the percentage of women in parliament could not exceed six percent.
Nepal witnessed a surge in the number of female candidates in 2008 elections due to the provision in the 2007 Interim-Constitution ensuring a minimum of 33.33 percent reservations for women in parliament. This demographic representation celebrated an outcome of years of fight for equality, propelled by the decade long civil war 1995-2006. While it brought an increase in the demographic representation of female candidates, did it actually signify effective participation and empowerment, or did it simply mask the underlying systemic barriers that hinder the rise of women’s political power and decision-making?
Today, with the House of Representatives having a base requirement of 92 women (33.45 percent) out of the 275 total parliamentarians, we see how beneath Nepal’s democratic framework lies a troubling gap between promise and practice. The 33.33 percent representation quota for women was meant to be a minimum threshold, a starting point for inclusion. Unfortunately, many political parties treat it as a ceiling, not a base. This representation becomes even scarcer as we ascend the hierarchy ladder. In 2025, out of 22 ministries of the federal government of Nepal only one female is appointed a minister.
The quota system designed with the aim of democratizing opportunities were treated by the political parties as checkboxes they needed to tick. Political parties were responsible for exploiting the country’s constitutional provisions to empower women for their vested interests. By manipulating the loopholes parties are allowing the avoidance of the crucial measures mentioned in the regulations. The issue doesn’t end here women are placed in unelectable constituencies, sidelined from key decision making processes and reduced to symbolic placeholders. This challenge does not end once they enter the parliament. The complex interplay of socio-economic and institutional factors shape these women’s experiences and overall effectiveness in their work in politics.
Women continue to pass through various stages of scrutiny and criticism because patriarchal societal norms question their legitimacy as leaders. These factors not only discourage the women in the field but also the potential women candidates who wish to enter the political arena. Unaddressed challenges have consequences that extend outwards. On the grounds of tokenistic representation, without significance in participation, women may be continually excluded from significant policy formulation and lobbying processes—an antithesis to democratic governance. It also impairs the responsiveness of policies to address the needs of the diverse population. Additionally, gender imbalance representation in hierarchy further solidifies structural inequality and thus inhibits progress toward social justice and equality.
Overcoming these barriers requires systematic reforms and beyond-the-surface solutions. There is a need to wipe out the root sources of social-cultural, economic, and institutional conditions that make gender inequality by implementing such reforms and changing societal mindsets in a way that they eradicate such norms and values that perceive women as more subordinate than men. Only in that way can the future of this nation be remolded with the voices of women shaping its political destiny.
Nepal needs more than women in seats, it needs women in power.
New budget puts future of RoR projects in limbo
The new fiscal budget presented on Thursday has effectively halted the progress of around 17,117 MW of run-of-river (RoR) hydropower projects in Nepal by introducing a major policy shift in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) model.
Until now, RoR projects operated under a ‘Take or Pay’ PPA model, where the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) had to pay private developers regardless of whether it used the electricity or not. The latest budget, however, proposes a shift to a ‘Take and Pay’ model, meaning the NEA will only pay for the electricity it actually purchases.
Ganesh Karki, President of the Independent Power Producers’ Association of Nepal (IPPAN), warned that this policy change could render investments already made by private developers in RoR projects unviable. He said banks are unlikely to finance projects under the new PPA model, pushing many developments to the brink of cancellation.
According to IPPAN, 17,117 MW worth of RoR projects currently hold licenses from the Department of Electricity Development, with approximately Rs 66bn already invested. These projects are in various stages of development, awaiting PPAs and financial closure. Once fully implemented, total investment could reach Rs 3.4trn. The breakdown includes 2,078 MW of projects already under construction, 6,436 MW awaiting construction permits, 5,079 MW with survey licenses, and 3,521 MW awaiting survey permits.
This shift has frustrated private developers who had expected the budget to align with the government’s recently unveiled Energy Development Roadmap, which aims to generate 28,500 MW of electricity—15,000 MW for export to India and 13,500 MW for domestic consumption.
IPPAN claims the new provision makes it nearly impossible for the private sector to move forward, despite other budget promises like streamlining forest clearance, transmission line construction, and support for reservoir-based projects. Karki argued that unless developers can build the projects, these other incentives become meaningless.
“The government’s move has placed private developers in a position where their investment could drop to zero,” Karki said. “The state should not have issued licenses in the first place if it planned to later change the agreement terms. The Department of Electricity Development continues to issue licenses, but developers are now left in limbo.”
NEA sources said the switch to ‘Take and Pay’ is necessary for the financial sustainability of the authority. The previous model, where payments had to be made even without actual power usage, posed significant financial risks—especially during the monsoon when RoR production exceeds domestic demand and guaranteed exports to India remain uncertain.
IPPAN has strongly opposed the shift and announced plans to launch protests if the decision is not reversed. In a statement released Friday, IPPAN described the new policy as hostile to private investment and a setback for Nepal’s power sector. The group also criticized the government for failing to support the ongoing development of RoR projects, which they claim still constitute a majority of the private sector’s hydropower activity.
IPPAN called for an immediate revision of the policy and demanded a return to the ‘Take or Pay’ model. Failure to do so, they said, would prompt a “strong and decisive” protest campaign.
Currently, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity is about 3,600 MW, with over 80 percent contributed by the private sector. Of the 17,117 MW of RoR projects awaiting PPAs, the NEA or the government is developing only 190 MW.
IPPAN argues that the new provision contradicts the Energy Development Roadmap and the goals set out in the 16th Five-Year Plan of the National Planning Commission. The association also claims the decision violates existing policies and legislation, including the Electricity Act 1992, the Hydropower Policy 2001, and the National Water Resources Policy.
The organization fears that this policy change will derail over Rs 1.5trn already invested by the private sector, and jeopardize an additional Rs 3trn planned for future investment, pushing the entire sector into uncertainty.



